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ABSTRACT 
 
In this dissertation a comparative study is made of the constitutional accommodation of 
the distribution of financial resources and constitutional obligations to the various spheres 
of government in Germany and South Africa.  Both countries have decentralised or multi-
level systems of government and can be classified, in terms of current studies on 
federalism, as integrated or cooperative federal systems.  An overview of the historical 
developments, the political contexts, the fundamental principles and the constitutional 
frameworks for government in Germany and South Africa is provided as a basis for the 
in-depth analysis regarding the financial intergovernmental relations in these countries.  
This study has shown that economic theory is important in the design of decentralised 
systems of government and that political and socio-economic considerations, for 
example, the need for rebuilding Germany after World War II and the need to eliminate 
severe poverty in South Africa after 1994, often play a dominant role in the design and 
implementation of decentralised constitutional systems.  The economic theory applicable 
to decentralised systems of government suggests a balanced approach to the distribution 
of financial resources and constitutional obligations with a view to obtaining the most 
efficient and equitable solution.  In both countries the particular constitutional allocation 
of obligations and financial resources created a fiscal gap that required some form of 
revenue sharing or financial equalisation.  The German financial equalisation system has 
been developed over fifty years and is quite complex.  It attempts to balance the 
constitutional aim of reasonable equalisation of the financial disparity of the Länder with 
the financial autonomy of the Länder as required by the Basic Law.  The huge financial 
and economic demands from the eastern Länder after unification in 1990 placed an 
additional burden on the available funds and on the financial equalisation system.  
Germany currently faces reform of its financial equalisation system and possibly also 
bigger constitutional reform.  The South African constitutional system is only a decade 
old and the financial equalisation system that is less complex than the German system, is 
functioning reasonably well but needs time to develop to its full potential. The system 
may however require some adjustment in order to enhance accountability, efficiency and 
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equity.  A lack of sufficient skills and administrative capacity at municipal government 
level and in some provinces hampers service delivery and good governance and places 
additional pressure on the financial equalisation system.  The Bundesverfassungsgericht 
and the Constitutional Court play important roles in Germany and South Africa in 
upholding the principle of constitutional supremacy, and make a valuable contribution to 
the better understanding of the constitutional systems and the further development 
thereof.  This study has shown that clear principles in constitutional texts, for example, 
such as those contained in the Basic Law, guide the development of applicable financial 
legislation and add value to the provisions on financial equalisation and how they are 
implemented.  These principles in the Basic Law are justiciable and give the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht an important tool to adjudicate the financial equalisation 
legislation.  The study of the constitutional accommodation of the distribution of financial 
resources and constitutional obligations in Germany and South Africa is not an abstract 
academic exercise and should be seen in the particular political and socio-economic 
contexts within which the respective constitutions function.  The need to give effect to the 
realisation of socio-economic rights, for example, the right of access to health services, 
places additional demands on the financial equalisation system.  The South African 
society experienced a major transformation from the apartheid system to a democratic 
constitutional order that in itself has had a significant influence on financial 
intergovernmental relations.  This dissertation focuses on a distinct part of constitutional 
law that can be described as financial constitutional law.  This comparative analysis of 
the two countries has provided some lessons for the further development of South 
Africa’s young democracy, in particular the financial intergovernmental relations system. 
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OPSOMMING 
 
In hierdie proefskrif is ‘n vergelykende studie gemaak van die grondwetlike 
akkommodering van die verdeling van finansiële hulpbronne en konstitusionele 
verpligtinge tussen die onderskeie regeringsfere in Duitsland en Suid-Afrika .  Beide 
lande het gedesentraliseerde of multi-vlak regeringstelsels en kan, ingevolge huidige 
studies oor federalisme, geklassifiseer word as geïntegreerde of koöperatiewe federale 
stelsels.  ‘n Oorsig van die historiese ontwikkelinge, politieke kontekste, fundamentele 
beginsels en grondwetlike raamwerke vir regering in Duitsland en Suid-Afrika is verskaf 
as basis vir die in diepte ontleding van die finansiële interowerheidsverhoudinge in elke 
land.  Hierdie studie toon aan dat ekonomiese teorie belangrik is in die ontwerp van 
gedesentraliseerde regeringstelsels, endat politieke en sosio-ekonomiese oorwegings, 
soos die behoefte aan die heropbou van Duitsland na die Tweede Wêreldoorlog en die 
behoefte na 1994 om grootskaalse armoede in Suid-Afrika uit te skakel, dikwels ‘n 
oorheersende rol speel in die ontwerp sowel as die implementering van 
gedesentraliseerde grondwetlike stelsels.  Die ekonomiese teorie van toepassing op 
gedesentraliseerde regeringstelsels suggereer ‘n gebalanseerde benadering tot die 
verdeling van finansiële hulpbronne en grondwetlike verpligtinge ten einde die mees 
doeltreffende en billike oplossing te kry.  In beide lande het die besondere grondwetlike 
verdeling van verpligtinge en finansiële hulpbronne ‘n fiskale gaping geskep, wat een of 
ander vorm van inkomsteverdeling of finansiële egalisasie verg.  Die Duitse finansiële 
egalisasiestelsel is oor vyftig jaar ontwikkel en is redelik ingewikkeld.  Dit poog om ‘n 
balans te vind tussen die grondwetlike doelwit van redelike egalisasie van die finansiële 
ongelykhede tussen die Länder  en die finansiële outonomie van die Länder, soos vereis 
deur die Duitse Grondwet.  Die reuse finansiële en ekonomiese eise van die oostelike 
Länder na vereniging in 1990 het ‘n verdere las op die beskikbare fondse sowel as die 
finansiële egalisasiestelsel geplaas.  Hervorming van die finansiële egalisasiestelsel in 
Duitsland is tans op hande, en moontlik ook nog groter grondwetlike hervorming.  Die 
Suid-Afrikaanse grondwetlike stelsel is maar nog net ‘n dekade lank in werking en die 
finansiële interowerheidstelsel, wat minder ingewikkeld as die Duitse stelsel is, 
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funksioneer redelik goed en benodig tyd om tot sy volle potensiaal te ontwikkel. Die 
stelsel benodig dalk sommige verstellings ten einde verantwoordbaarheid, 
doeltreffendheid en billikheid te verhoog.  ‘n Tekort aan voldoende vaardighede en 
administratiewe vermoëns op munisipale regeringsvlak sowel as in sommige provinsies 
plaas addisionele druk op die finansiële egalisasiestelsel.  Die Bundesverfassungsgericht 
en die Konstitusionele Hof speel belangrike rolle in Duitsland en Suid-Afrika ten einde 
die beginsel van die oppergesag van die grondwet in stand te hou, en maak ‘n 
waardevolle bydrae tot beter begrip van die grondwetlike stelsel en die verdere 
ontwikkeling daarvan.  Hierdie studie het aangetoon dat duidelike beginsels in 
grondwetlike tekste, byvoorbeeld dié wat in die Duitse Grondwet vervat is,  die 
ontwikkeling van toepaslike finansiële wetgewing  beïnvloed en waarde toevoeg tot die 
bepalings oor finansiële egalisasie en hoe dit geïmplementeer word.  Hierdie beginsels in 
die Duitse Grondwet is beregbaar en gee die Bundesverfassungsgericht ‘n belangrike 
instrument om die finansiële wetgewing te kan beoordeel.  Die bestudering van die 
grondwetlike akkommodering van die verdeling van finansiële hulpbronne en 
konstitusionele verpligtinge in Duitsland en Suid-Afrika is nie ‘n abstrakte akademiese 
oefening nie, en moet gesien word binne die bepaalde politieke en sosio-ekonomiese 
konteks waarbinne dit funksioneer.  Die behoefte om gevolg te gee aan die realisering 
van sosio-ekonomiese regte, byvoorbeeld die reg op toegang tot gesondheidsorgdienste, 
stel addisionele eise aan die finansiële egalisasiestelsel.  Die Suid-Afrikaanse 
gemeenskap het ‘n grootskaalse transformasie beleef van die apartheid stelsel na ‘n 
demokratiese konstitusionele orde, wat opsigself ‘n beduidende invloed op finansiële 
interowerheidsverhoudinge het.  Hierdie proefskrif fokus op ‘n besondere deel van die 
staatsreg wat beskryf kan word as finansiële staatsreg.  Die vergelykende analise van die 
twee gevallestudies het sekere lesse verskaf vir die verdere ontwikkeling van Suid-Afrika 
se jong demokrasie, in besonder die finansiële interowerheidstelsel. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1 1 General background  
 
1 1 1 Selection of country studies 
 
This thesis is a comparative study of the constitutional accommodation of financial 
intergovernmental relations in two decentralised constitutional systems, namely 
Germany and South Africa.  The main question addressed is: How are the distribution 
of financial resources and the allocation of constitutional obligations to the various 
spheres of government constitutionally accommodated in Germany and South Africa?  
This study will attempt to explain both theoretical and practical aspects of financial 
intergovernmental relations in these two countries.  The knowledge gained in this 
process may make a contribution towards the further development of South Africa’s 
constitutional system which is still “governance under construction”. 
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The South African dispensation is unique in many ways with effective government 
still challenged by many historical factors, for example the structural imbalances in 
education caused by apartheid, the unequal provision of services and the extremely 
uneven distribution of wealth.  These factors must be addressed as a matter of urgency 
in order to bring about stability.  New solutions have to be found,1 and they must be 
implemented within the context of a modern constitutional state and the structure of 
government provided for in a supreme and justiciable constitution.  The stakes are 
high; it is not only domestic stability that has to be secured.  The new South Africa 
has to implement regional and international policies that will demonstrate to potential 
investors that it is an attractive market for investment; a vital ingredient for economic 
growth.  The previous regime was an isolated one; the new one is a leader on the 
African continent and a prominent international player in areas such as reform in the 
United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).2 
 
A comparative study such as this may deliver useful insights.  The German example is 
used for specific reasons that will be discussed in more detail below.  Despite South 
Africa’s unique historical, political and economic features it has adopted a 
constitution which is based on arrangements, institutions and values that have been 
implemented in several other states and have been in place for a considerable period 
of time.  In the South African context the comparative method is legitimate and is 
sanctioned by the Constitution.3  The Constitutional Court has used the comparative 
method in several instances during the certification process.4 
 
The challenge lies in identifying relevant benchmarks, while demonstrating an 
awareness of local needs and unique features.  To some extent a comparison of 
“formal” aspects in constitutional arrangements is inevitable when the constitution 
making process is kept in mind.  The process was inspired by several developments 
elsewhere in the world.  It should also be remembered that the present South African 
                                                 
1 An example is Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), which is a complicated policy in terms of 
which domestic redistribution of wealth is to result; while existing rights and international obligations 
have to be accommodated. 
2 In the present Doha Development Round of the WTO India, Brazil and South Africa (the IBSA 
configuration) have become leaders for the developing world. 
3 See sec. 39 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 108 of 1996. 
4 See for example paras 50, 71 – 73, 89 – 90 and 112 - 113  in Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC); 1996 110 BCLR 1253 (CC), 
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Constitution is a negotiated product; the negotiating parties brought their own views 
to the negotiations and they were often inspired by examples in other countries.  The 
negotiated Constitution had to deliver, in addition to a basic framework of 
government, a contract and guarantee for peace and stability in a highly divided 
society. 
 
After ten years under the new Constitution the different political challenges in South 
Africa are seen more clearly.  South Africa is faced with strong demands for 
transforming society and forging national unity – and it has to do this within the 
decentralised structure of government where provinces are often directly responsible 
for the delivery of services.  Some would have preferred a stronger unitary approach 
for South Africa, although this would not in itself necessarily guarantee the 
availability of officials and structures in places and locations where services are 
required.  South Africa is in many ways a developing country, without the skills 
required for effective government at some levels.  This demonstrates the need to take 
account of the dynamic nature of governance.  Federalism on the other hand is a 
process that is influenced by contemporary needs.  The “commerce clause” in the 
American constitutional jurisprudence has undergone different interpretations over 
time as the debate on the relations between federal and state powers has evolved. 
 
German domestic developments after the Second World War took place in a different 
context.  West Germany was faced by major challenges regarding reconstruction or 
“Wiederaufbau”, and these could be tackled within a framework of international 
support for its position as a Western ally in the Cold War and for being a founding 
member of the European Communities.  The German people were divided along 
similar lines to those experienced in South Africa.  The challenges of social and 
economic integration and “transformation” only had to be addressed after the 
reunification of Germany in 1990. 
 
These factors and other historical differences influence the manner in which a 
comparative study is undertaken.  One has to show an awareness of differences such 
as party-political and regional developments, while trying to clarify constitutional 
arrangements in their own settings.  In this manner, it is believed, a comparison re the 
meaning of federalism and decentralised government remains possible and valid. 
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 Other countries, for example Canada, India or Australia could also have been chosen 
to study as a comparison to South Africa.  These mentioned  countries fall within the 
broad category of federal or multi-level constitutional systems and would also have 
led to some interesting and valid discussions. Various constitutional systems, 
including these three, did have an influence on the shaping of the South African 
constitutional system after 1990 but the role of the German constitutional system in 
this process is quite significant.  This significance is confirmed by the various high 
level discussions held between South African negotiators and German constitutional 
experts in South Africa as well as in Germany. These discussions helped to find 
solutions for some of the difficult questions that were addressed during the 
constitution making process.  The German model laid the basis for the development of 
“co-operative government” as opposed to “competitive federalism”and for the 
establishment of the National Council of Provinces.5  Despite certain differences 
between the construction and functioning of the two constitutional systems, including 
financial intergovernmental relations, there are similarities that justify a comparative 
study of this kind.  A combination of factors as indicated below motivated choosing 
Germany.  This choice was also made because of the specific focus of this thesis, 
namely the distribution of financial resources of the state in a decentralised system. 
  
Federalism characterised German constitutional development since the early 19th 
century. The concept itself originates from the Latin word “foedus”, meaning 
covenant,6 and has a long history.  The foundation for government at a sub-national 
level predates the federal constitution as some of the Länder already existed when the 
Basic Law was adopted in 1949.  The establishment and development of Länder 
governments and local administrations was one of the decisions taken by the Allied 
leaders at the Potsdam Conference in 1945.7  The Federal Republic of Germany was 
only formally constituted in 1949 with the adoption of the Basic Law.    Issues 
                                                 
5 Haysom Federal Features of the Final Constitution in Andrews & Ellmann (eds) The Post-Apartheid 
Constitutions (2001) 504 513. 
6 Elazar Federalism: An Overview (1995) 1. 
7 The aim of this conference of the leaders of the Allied Forces (Great Britain, the USA and France) 
and the Soviet Union, that took place in Potsdam, Germany from 17 July to 2 August 1945, was to lay 
the basis for the democratic development of post-war Germany and the eradication of Nazism; 
Kimminich Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte (1987) 592; Klein The Concept of the Basic Law in Starck 
(ed) Main Principles of the German Basic Law (1983) 15 23. 
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relating to federalism dominated the discussions that led to the 
Paulskirchenverfassung in 1848.8  A federal culture had developed over a long period 
of time in Germany, but was suppressed by the National Socialist Party in 1934.  The 
development of Germany's constitutional system followed a “bottom up” approach.  
When the Allied Powers were engaged in discussions about Germany’s constitutional 
future after World War II, they generally favoured a federal system and built on the 
federal culture that existed in Germany prior to the War.9   
 
This is in contrast to the “top down” approach followed in the development of South 
Africa's decentralised constitutional system.  The Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa adopted in 1993 created nine new provinces and provided for the 
establishment of local governments throughout South Africa.  The Constitution was 
thus the origin of these new sub-national governments.10   Unlike Germany, there is 
very little in terms of a historical culture of federalism in South Africa.11  The 
constitutional system that was negotiated in the early nineties was new to South 
Africa and not based on any existing models or structures in the country.   
 
Some differences between the fundamental principles on which the constitutional 
orders in Germany and South Africa are based, should be noted.  The German Basic 
Law contains the following fundamental principles, namely:  
 
“The Federal Republic of Germany shall be a democratic and social federal 
state”,12 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 108 of 1996,13 states:  
 
                                                 
8 Kilper & Lhotta Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1996) 35. 
9 See discussion under 2 1 1; Kilper & Lhotta 79. 
10 Sec 124, 174 and Schedule 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 200 of 1993. 
11 See discussion under 1 1 3. 
12 Art 20 (1) read with Art 79 (3) of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated 
by the Parliamentary Council on 23 May 1949. 
13 This Constitution is not an Act of Parliament, but was adopted by the Constitutional Assembly.  It 
can thus not be numbered as ordinary Acts of Parliament are numbered.  Although the reference to Act 
108 of 1996 is commonly used, it is technically wrong.  In contrast, the 1993-Constitution was adopted 
by Parliament and could therefore be numbered as an Act of Parliament. See Van Wyk “’n Paar 
opmerkings en vrae oor die nuwe Grondwet” 1997 (60) THRHR 377 378. 
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“The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the 
following values: 
(a) human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of   
human rights and freedoms, 
(b) non-racialism and non-sexism, 
(c) supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law, 
(d) universal adult suffrage, a national common voters role, regular elections  
and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure   
accountability, responsiveness and openness.”14 
 
Some of the similarities, or at least comparable elements, in the two selected 
constitutional systems are: 
(i) The principle of constitutional supremacy;15 
(ii) The division of powers and functions, including the allocation of 
concurrent powers to the Bund and Länder and national and provincial 
governments respectively;16  
(iii) The role of the second chamber in the national legislative arena, where 
the Bundesrat in Germany provided a basis for the creation of the 
National Council of Provinces in South Africa; and 
(iv) The development of Bundestreue and co-operative government. 
 
The German constitutional system, including the financial intergovernmental relations 
system, had some influence in the development of the new South African 
constitutional system.17  In the area of financial intergovernmental relations, which 
will be discussed in more detail later in this dissertation, there are both differences 
and similarities.  While there is an important difference in the allocation of the main 
taxes in Germany and South Africa, both systems recognise the need for financial 
equalisation of some kind, or special dedicated funding such as the Structural Fund 
                                                 
14 Sec 1 of the 1993-Constitution. 
15 Art 20 of the Basic Law; sec 1 and 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 108 of 
1996, (the 1996-Constitution). 
16  Art 74 and 74a of the Basic Law; sec 44 (1) (a) (ii), sec 104 (1) (b) (i) and Schedule 4 of the 1996-
Constitution. 
17  See discussion under 1 2. 
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and Cohesion Fund in the EU18 in order to address the economic disparities between 
different Länder or provinces. Both make provision for financial equalisation 
mechanisms.  The dire socio-economic conditions in post-war Germany and in the 
new Länder after the reunification of Germany placed huge demands on government, 
both at a federal and at the Länder level.  Financial equalisation mechanisms had to be 
developed and utilised to address questions such as poverty, economic development 
and welfare.  One of the legacies of apartheid in South Africa was the huge gap 
between rich and poor throughout the country.  Large-scale poverty, in particular in 
the rural areas, is one of the biggest challenges for government.  The socio-economic 
needs and disparities between various communities and between provinces in South 
Africa have been put in the spotlight since 1994 after the establishment of the new 
democratic South Africa. This bears some resemblance to the socio-economic 
position in Germany shortly after 1949 and again in the period after 1990.  Similar 
challenges were faced by government in South Africa and financial equalisation 
mechanisms had to be designed and implemented to address some of these socio-
economic questions. 
 
In addition to the purely constitutional issues highlighted above, the socio-economic 
scenarios in South Africa and Germany at important periods in their history provide 
further justification for a comparative study of this kind using these two countries. 
 
1 1 2 Recent constitutional history in Germany and South Africa 
 
The last decade of the twentieth century saw some of the most significant 
constitutional developments in the history of both South Africa and Germany.  The 
unification of Germany in 199019 was arguably the most important development in 
the history of modern Germany since the adoption of the Basic Law in 1949.20  This 
took place at the same time that a process of radical constitutional change in South 
                                                 
18 These Funds are special EU funds to support development in the least developed regions within the 
EU in order to eventually strengthen the socio-economic “cohesion” of member states within the EU. 
19 Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 
über die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands (Einigungsvertrag), agreed to on 31 August 1990 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Deutsche Demokratische Republik; Von Münch 
Staatsrecht Band I (1993) 27. 
20 The Parliamentary Council signed and promulgated the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of 
Germany on 23 May 1949 at Bonn.  For a discussion of the events preceding the promulgation of the 
Basic Law see Von Münch Staatsrecht 18 et seq; Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 68. 
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Africa started.21  In Germany, a country divided as a consequence of war and 
ideology, the unification that took place in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall 
in November 1989, was a significant political development that changed the course of 
history.  Although constitutional changes were made to the German Basic Law in 
order to extend its application to the former Deutsche Demokratische Republik 
(DDR), these changes were not as dramatic as those seen in South Africa because the 
DDR (East Germany) was incorporated into an existing legal order.  Ideology has 
divided South Africa for decades, and significant changes had to take place before a 
new South Africa could be created.  This required radical reform of the constitutional 
order to establish an all-inclusive constitutional democracy that inter alia guaranteed 
the protection of individual rights for all South Africans and established the rule of 
law and supremacy of the constitution. 
                                                
 
In the beginning of 1990 the then State President of South Africa, F. W. de Klerk, 
made the opening moves in the constitutional transformation process in South Africa 
when he announced the unbanning of a number of political movements and the 
release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners from jail.22  In May 1990 the 
first official meeting between the two major political forces, namely the existing 
National Party government and the African National Congress (ANC), the most 
important political grouping outside Parliament at that time, took place in Cape Town.  
This historical meeting produced the Groote Schuur Minute, an agreement that 
identified the obstacles to be removed before proper negotiations could start.23   
 
After a protracted period of various rounds of multi-party negotiations during the first 
three years of the nineties, the South African Parliament adopted an interim 
constitution on 22 December 1993. This radically changed South Africa’s 
 
21 The State President of South Africa at the time, F W de Klerk, made an important announcement on 
2 February 1990 to start political negotiations with all political groupings and to unban prohibited 
political groupings.  The first meeting of political groupings under the name of Codesa, i.e. the 
Conference for a Democratic South Africa, took place on 21 December 1991 at Kempton Park.  It later 
also became known as the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP). 
22 These announcements were made in Pres De Klerk's speech at the opening of Parliament on 2 
February 1990. 
23 De Klerk The Process of Political Negotiation: 1990 - 1993 in De Villiers (ed) Birth of a 
Constitution (1994) 1 6. 
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constitutional order.24  The nature of the constitutional system, including its structural 
elements were hotly debated at the multi-party negotiations in Codesa as well as in the 
debates in the Constitutional Assembly.  Various constitutional models were 
investigated and political parties made their representations to indicate their 
preferences for particular models or combinations of elements from various different 
models.   
 
The more salient features of the constitutional debate and important concepts, such as 
federalism, will be discussed in the following sections, but before doing so, it  should 
be recalled that South Africans were at war with each other at this time and that the 
constitution had to produce a formula for peaceful government. It had to address the 
fears of minorities and had to provide an effective framework to undo the legacies of 
apartheid.  This had to be achieved against the background of an important reality – 
South Africa was one single state.  Fragmentation into different nations was not an 
option and the failed homelands experiment served as a reminder of what the only 
remaining choice was.  Against this background it is easy to understand why some 
political parties put such emphasis on federalism as a constitutional model and  why 
this was such a hotly debated issue. 
 
1 1 3 The federalism question 
 
One of the fundamental questions in these debates was whether South Africa should 
have a unitary system of government or a federal system, and what degree of 
centralisation or decentralisation there should be.  The constitutional system that 
existed until 1994 in South Africa fell within the category of unitary systems, and 
there was not much of a federal constitutional tradition.  In the discussions and 
correspondence between some of the British and Afrikaner leaders prior to the 
National Convention in 1908, a federal system was initially thought to be the best 
model for unification of southern Africa.  There was even a decision to that effect in 
                                                 
24 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993, which was assented to by State 
President FW de Klerk on 25 January 1994 and commenced on 27 April 1994.  See Ebrahim The Soul 
of a Nation (1998) 170 and 173.  This constitution was an interim constitution in terms of which an 
elected Constitutional Assembly had to draft a new Constitution.  The newly elected Parliament acted 
as the Constitutional Assembly, which negotiated and drafted a new Constitution based on a set of 34 
Constitutional Principles adopted at the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum at Kempton Park in 1993. 
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the Cape Assembly in July 1907.25  Two of the most prominent leaders at the time, 
General Jan Smuts and John X. Merriman, together with Sir Henry de Villiers, Chief 
Justice of the Cape, who presided over the National Convention, studied the federal 
constitutions of the United States of America, Canada and Australia but were not 
convinced of the merits of a federal system.  Smuts drafted a suggested constitutional 
scheme for “South African Union”, which was supported by Merriman and others, 
and this formed the basis for the constitutional text produced by the National 
Convention where the constitutional debates resulted in a unitary system of 
government, based on the Westminster model, for South Africa. 
 
 The political adversaries participating in the South African negotiations of the 1990’s 
did not have the same understanding of terms such as “unitary system”, “unity”, 
“federalism” and “federal system”.  Proponents of a federal system saw it as a 
constitutional system that could accommodate the diverse needs and circumstances of 
South Africa.26  The Inkatha Freedom Party, one of the main supporters of a federal 
system, wanted fairly autonomous provinces and a “bottom up” approach of 
constitutional development similar to that of the United States of America.27  In 
contrast, the advocates for a unitary system argued that a federal system could 
fragment South Africa or lead to secession of regions.  For the African National 
Congress and some of the other parties a federal system reminded them of the failed 
apartheid system with its homelands and they therefore opposed it.28  This view was 
further supported by strong centralist ideas expressed by some political parties, 
                                                 
25 Thompson The Unification of South Africa 1902 – 1910 (1959) 101 – 103; Davenport South Africa: 
A Modern History (1987) 245. 
26 The South African Government of that time expressed its support for a federal system in various 
policy documents, eg A new South Africa – documents on constitutional reform dated 12 February 
1993, where it stated on 5 thereof:  “interests existing in certain regions or local environments can best 
be served by the devolution of functions to autonomous regional and local governments.  The 
Government and the National Party are looking at five to nine provinces.  The powers, functions and 
boundaries of each are to be entrenched in the constitution in such a way that no amendment thereof is 
possible without the concurrence of the government of that province.” See also Welsh “Federalisme ‘n 
kuur vir gevare van eenparty-demokrasie” in Die Burger (1995/03/16) 13. 
27 The IFP stated in one of their policy documents (WTC 193 dated 24 June 1993) at the Kempton Park 
process “the IFP proposal would establish federalism and entrench SPRs [states/provinces/regions] 
before the empowerment of a new government and would ensure that the existing territorial local 
autonomy is transformed into SPRs without having to be previously reincorporated into the four 
existing provinces.”  See also Certification of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, 1996 
1996 11 BCLR 1419 (CC) para 14. 
28 Haysom Federal Features 505; Welsh The Provincial Boundary Demarcation Process in De Villiers 
Birth of a Constitution (1994) 223 224. 
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although provision was made for provinces as a second tier of government.29  
Conflicting views on the scope of authority of provinces when compared to that of the 
national level of government created much debate.  Terms such as “federalism” and 
“federal system” were given such a negative connotation that parties to the 
negotiations agreed to refrain from using them. The search for an appropriate 
constitutional system of government that would promote good and effective 
government, while accommodating the views of the various parties finally resulted in 
a compromise. A closer look at the contents of the system agreed upon in the end 
provides some clarity on the type of constitutional system adopted.   
 
The 1993-Constitution created a new constitutional order consisting of three levels of 
government, namely a national, provincial and local level.  Nine provinces were 
created as a consequence of various submissions made at the Multi-Party Negotiating 
Process, but more particularly due to the work of the Commission on the 
Delimitation/Demarcation of States/Provinces/Regions.30  This Commission had to 
take into account a list of ten criteria, which included historical boundaries, 
demographic considerations and economic viability, before making recommendations 
to the Negotiating Council regarding the creation and boundaries of the new 
provinces.31  The new provinces were legally created by the 1993-Constitution and 
received their powers from it.32  This manner of constitutional development is in 
contrast to the development of the constitutional system of the United States of 
America, where a federation was formed by the unification of various pre-existing 
sovereign territories.33  This distinction was emphasised by the Constitutional Court 
in In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, 1996 
                                                 
29 See for example the ANC policy document ANC Regional Policy dated October 1992 where the 
governmental system is described in such a way as to create regional governments with concurrent 
powers with the “central” government, but that the central government will have overriding powers. 
30 This Commission was established by the Negotiating Council of the MPNP on 28 May 1993 and had 
to make recommendations to the Negotiating Council on the demarcation of the 
states/provinces/regions within 6 weeks.  The Commission’s mandate was to make recommendations to 
the Negotiating Council on the boundaries of regions that were relevant to the electoral process as well 
as to the structures of the constitution that was the subject of negotiation.  See Report of the 
Commission on the Demarcation/Delimitation of SPRs (31 July 1993) 4; Ebrahim Soul of a Nation 158.  
31 Commission Report 17; Welsh Provincial Boundary Demarcation 223 – 229. 
32 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC); 
1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC) (First Certification Case) paras 259 - 260. 
33 Elazar Federalism: an overview (1995) 38. 
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1996 11 BCLR 1419 (CC) para 14 when it inter alia found that "the provinces are the 
recipients and not the source of power." 
 
In view of the fact that the 1993-Constitution represented an interim phase in South 
Africa’s constitutional development, a set of 34 Constitutional Principles, that acted 
as the yardstick to test the new constitutional text, was adopted by the Negotiating 
Council of the Multi-Party Negotiation Process.34  A number of these principles relate 
to the structural elements of the constitutional system, and inter alia provided for the 
allocation of powers to the national and provincial governments in a way that 
included both concurrent and exclusive powers.35  In giving effect to these 
Constitutional Principles the new Constitution adopted by the Constitutional 
Assembly in 1996 contained detailed provisions on the establishment of a multi-level 
system of government or, as it is referred to in the 1996-Constitution, a three-sphere 
system of government.36  There are significant differences between the two 
constitutions on this score.  The question regarding the differences in the scope and 
substance of the powers allocated to provinces in the 1996-Constitution when 
compared to the position in the 1993-Constitution was an important issue considered 
by the Constitutional Court in the First Certification Case.  The differences relate to a 
variety of issues, for example, the powers and functions of provinces over police 
matters, the taxing power of provinces and provincial powers and functions pertaining 
to local government.37 
 
The debate about a proper label for the South African constitutional system continued 
even outside of the political negotiations.  Academic writers expressed different views 
on the question of whether it is a federal or a unitary system.  Erasmus and De Waal 
state in this respect, without discussing the question, that the Constitution does not 
create a classic federation.38  Van Wyk, in a short commentary on the Constitution, 
argues with reference to the typical elements of federalism, that the South African 
                                                 
34 De Villiers The Constitutional Principles: Content and Significance in De Villiers (ed) Birth of a 
Constitution (1994) 37; First Certification Case paras 14 - 19. 
35 Constitutional Principle (CP) XIX in Schedule 4 of the 1993-Constitution. 
36 Sec 40 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996; First Certification Case para 
45. 
37 See 2 2 for a discussion of the characteristics of the 1993-Constitution and that of the 1996-
Constitution. 
38 “Die Finale Grondwet: Legitimiteit en Ontstaan” 1997 (1) Stell LR 31 37. 
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system is “structurally” closer to a modern federation than to a classic unitary state.39  
In a fairly detailed discussion of this issue, Watts concludes that South Africa has 
indeed a hybrid system which contains elements typical of federations, but also some 
characteristics common to regionalized unitary states.40  These are but a few of the 
numerous views expressed by various commentators about the nature of the South 
African constitutional system.  It seems clear that one cannot, as often happened in the 
debates during the development of South Africa's constitution, merely use labels such 
as “federal” or “unitary systems” to accurately describe specific constitutional 
systems.  A brief discussion of these concepts is necessary in order to lay a proper 
foundation for further discussions in this thesis. 
 
The terms “federalism” and “federation” or “federal system” are often viewed as 
synonymous.  It is, however, necessary to distinguish between them in order to 
provide clarity.  “Federalism” describes the nature and basic features of a 
constitutional system, whereas “federation” or “federal system” describes the 
institutional organisation of federalism in one country.  Elazar describes federalism as 
more than a structural arrangement, “it is a special mode of political and social 
behaviour as well”.41  The modern view of federalism, as expressed by experts such 
as Watts and Elazar, is that it is not a static concept, but should rather be viewed as 
flexible and varied.42  Originally this was not the case.  Wheare in his classic work on 
federalism, Federal Government, held quite a narrow view on this subject.  He 
described, with reference to the United States of America as an example of federal 
government, the federal principle as the method of dividing powers to produce a 
system that consists of independent central and regional governments.43  Wheare 
focussed on the structural elements of the system and essentially described a system 
of competitive federalism where two levels of government operate independently and 
neither is subordinate to the other.  Over time, the original concept, as Wheare defined 
                                                 
39 “’n Paar opmerkings en vrae oor die nuwe Grondwet” 1997 (60) THRHR 377 391.  This view is 
supported inter alia by Klaaren Federalism in Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 
(loose-leaf 1998) 5-1. 
40 Is the New Constitution Federal or Unitary? in De Villiers (ed) Birth of a Constitution (1994) 86.  
41 Elazar Federalism: an Overview 2. 
42 Watts Contemporary Views on Federalism in De Villiers (ed) Evaluating Federal Systems (1994) 1 
7. See also Delmartino and Deschouwer Grondslagen van het Federalisme in Alen et al Federalisme – 
Staatkundig, politiek en economisch (1994) 9 13; Mackenstein From Cohesion Policy to Financial 
Equalisation? (1997) 34. 
43 Wheare Federal Government (1956) 11. 
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it, developed into a wide spectrum of constitutional systems, supporting the notion of 
a flexible approach.44  The spectrum includes many variations and one can perhaps 
say that each federation is sui generis.  Global as well as national political and socio-
economic developments have an impact on the role and functions of all states, 
including federal systems.  Federal constitutional systems today function within a 
particular modern context and are much more complex and comprehensive than the 
“classical” model described by Wheare.  
 
Simeon distinguishes between two models of federalism, namely the divided model 
and the integrated model.45  Canada and the USA are both examples of the divided 
model of federalism, where a clear division of federal (national) and provincial 
powers and institutions exists.  An example of the integrated model of federalism, 
which is designed to integrate politics at the different levels of government, is 
Germany.  The main features of the integrated model are shared powers, shared 
financial resources and co-operation between the various levels of government.   
 
This background and the fact that the South African constitutional order is a tailor 
made dispensation, must be kept in mind while considering the contents of this thesis. 
 
1 1 4 Essential features of the South African and German constitutional 
systems 
 
It is true that South Africa is neither a classic federation nor a unitary state. It may 
resemble some federations such as Germany, but the constitutional system contained 
in the 1996-Constitution should rather be described as a hybrid system as Watts has 
done.46  Another, perhaps more appropriate, description would be to describe it as an 
“integrated federal system” in accordance with Simeon’s classification.47 The distinct 
structural features of an ‘integrated federal system’ are: 
 
                                                 
44 See Elazar Federalism: an overview 2 – 18 for a useful discussion of the theory and various forms of 
federal systems. 
45 "Considerations on the design of federations: the South African constitution in comparative context” 
1998 (13) SAPR/PL 42 50. 
46 See n 42. 
47 Simeon 1998 (13) SAPR/PL 59. 
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♦ A three sphere system of government, namely national, provincial and 
local government;48 
♦ Constitutional division of powers and functions amongst the three spheres 
of government, where the majority of powers and functions are allocated 
concurrently to national and provincial governments;49  
♦ Division of fiscal resources where the bulk of the taxing powers vests with 
the national government;50 and 
♦ Co-operative government as overarching guiding principle.51 
 
In Simeon's analysis of the Canadian and German models as two clear examples of 
divided and integrated federal systems respectively, it is evident that the model South 
Africa has chosen resembles the integrated model of Germany more than the divided 
federal system of Canada.52  This further supports the selecting of Germany as a 
comparison to South Africa for the purposes of this thesis.  
 
In the period immediately after the end of World War II, there was extensive debate 
over the nature of the new constitutional system to be created for Germany.  The 
federal model was agreed to be the more acceptable and this agreement was the point 
of departure for the shaping of the Basic Law.  (“Federal” is in fact incorporated in 
the name of the country, namely the Federal Republic of Germany.)  Historically 
there was a strong federal tradition in Germany, and the Allied powers emphasized 
this when they considered the nature of the constitutional system for Germany after 
the War.  The first territorial entities formally recognised by the Allied Powers were 
the three Länder; Bavaria, Hessen and Württemberg-Baden. These were constituted 
on 19 September 1945.53  This was the first step in the process of re-building 
democratic rule in Germany and an expression of the federal character of the system 
being developed, at least as far as the western part of Germany was concerned.  In the 
                                                 
48 Sec 40 of the 1996-Constitution. 
49 This is dealt with in various provisions in the 1996-Constitution, eg sec 44 (legislative authority of 
Parliament); sec 104 (legislative authority of provincial legislatures); sec 156 (powers and functions of 
municipalities); Schedule 4 (functional areas of concurrent legislative jurisdiction) and Schedule 5 
(functional areas of exclusive provincial legislative competence). 
50 Sec 228 of the 1996-Constitution. 
51 Sec 41 of the 1996-Constitution. 
52 Haysom Federal Features 507, 513; Simeon 1998 (13) SAPR/PL 68. 
53 Von Münch Staatsrecht 17; Kilper & Lhotta Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
(1996) 83. 
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Soviet occupied zone, (what became known as the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) or the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR)), a centralised, unitary system 
was created. This initially included five former Länder which were later divided into 
14 Bezirke (districts) and developed towards a typically communist dispensation. 
 
At the time of the unification of the two Germany’s the nature of the new system was 
again a point of discussion.  For decades the federal ideology was dead in the DDR.  
The democratic revolution of 1989, however, gave new life to the notion of 
federalism, as this was the constitutional philosophy of the other part of Germany, the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).  The growing support for “federalisation” and 
decentralisation in the DDR eventually assisted the unification process.54  The 
coalition government of the DDR elected on 18 March 1990 officially expressed their 
support for refederalisation of the DDR by proclaiming as one of their aims, the 
creation of a federal republic.55 
 
The implementation of the federal principle by way of the creation of new Länder and 
their incorporation into existing federal structures, was an important part of the 
establishment of the new unified Germany.  Through the Vertrag über die Shaffung 
einer Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion, the first of three treaties between the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the DDR, the legal basis was laid for unification 
and the development of federal structures in the DDR.56  In the ensuing process, the 
governments of the West German Länder provided guidelines for federalism in a 
unified Germany and this contributed to the eventual Unification Treaty signed on 31 
August 1990. 57   
 
                                                 
54 For a discussion of this important chapter in Germany’s constitutional history see Laufer & Münch 
Das föderative System 76 - 83. 
55 “Es ist das Ziel, eine föderative Republik zu schaffen, einschließlich einer notwendigen 
Länderkammer”  Coalition agreement of the DDR coalition government.  See Laüfer & Münch Das 
föderative System 77. 
56 This treaty was signed on 18 May 1990.  See Von Münch Staatsrecht 27; Laufer & Münch Das 
föderative System 79. 
57 A document titled Eckpunkte für den Föderalismus im vereinten Deutschland was produced by the 
Länder governments on 5 July 1990.  See Von Münch Staatsrecht 27; Laüfer & Münch Das föderative 
System 80. 
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Today the German constitutional system is characterised by a number of federal 
elements,58 such as the recognition of Länder, each with its own elected parliament 
and government, and the establishment of the Bundesrat, the chamber representing 
the Länder governments in the federal parliament.  These elements will be discussed 
later in the thesis.   
 
The fundamental principles of the German constitutional system are stipulated in 
Article 20 of the Basic Law, which describes Germany as a democratic and social 
federal state ("ein demokratischer und sozialer Bundesstaat").59  These principles are 
protected against any constitutional amendment.60 
 
It is, however, not only the Basic Law that lists the principles of the constitutional 
system.  The German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has made a 
major contribution by developing one of the essential principles of the German 
constitutional systems, namely Bundestreue, or the federal comity principle.61  In 
view of the significant role of this principle to the functioning of modern Germany, it 
is apt to describe the German system as one of co-operative or integrated federalism.   
 
The principle of Bundestreue formed the basis for the adoption of a set of principles 
on co-operative government contained in the South African Constitution.   The 
importance of this principle to the functioning of the constitutional system, including 
the financial intergovernmental relations, in both South Africa and Germany, warrants 
a more detailed discussion which will follow.62 
 
 
 
                                                 
58 Karpen Federalism in Karpen (ed) The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1988) 205 
209. 
59 Art 20 Par. 1: “The Federal Republic of Germany shall be a democratic and social federal state.”  See 
Currie The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1994) 18. 
60 Art 79 (3) of the Basic Law. 
61 Laüfer & Münch Das föderative System 94; De Villiers Bundestreue: The Soul of an 
Intergovernmental Partnership in Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Occasional Papers March 1995 15. 
62 Heun The Evaluation of Federalism in Starck (ed) Studies in German Constitutionalism (1995) 167 
175. 
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1 1 5 Political context 
 
A study of the constitutional systems in Germany and in South Africa respectively 
would not be complete without considerating the political context within which these 
constitutional systems function.  A brief reference to the political contexts in 
Germany and South Africa follows.  
 
The constitutional development in Germany since 1949 and in South Africa post 1990 
took place in different political contexts.  Multi-party democracy is one of the 
cornerstones of the constitutional systems in both these countries.  In Germany 
various political parties participated in the development and adoption of the Basic 
Law in 1949 and the first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Konrad 
Adenauer, came from the CDU/CSU.63 The current chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, 
belongs to the other major political party in Germany, namely the SPD.  The 
CDU/CSU and the SPD are the two major political forces within Germany.  Between 
1949 and 2004 different parties were in power in the various Länder and at the federal 
level, and most of the time a coalition of political parties formed a Land government 
or the federal government.  One political party could be in government in one Land, 
but in opposition in another or in the Bundestag.  It can happen, and is currently the 
case, that the CDU/CSU is in the majority in the Bundesrat, while the SPD is in the 
majority in the Bundestag.  The political context in Germany is thus characterised by 
coalition politics and the fact that political parties change roles regularly from being 
in government to being in opposition.  This particular political context has a direct 
impact on the functioning of the constitutional system, in particular financial 
intergovernmental relations, and creates an atmosphere where competition between 
the Bund and the Länder is quite acceptable.   
 
After the first democratic election in South Africa in 1994 the political scene has been 
dominated by one party, namely the African National Congress (ANC).  Various 
political parties participated in the general elections in 1994 and thereafter, but the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
63 Laufer & Münch Das föderative System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1997) 69. The CDU 
(Christian Democratic Union) and the CSU (Christian Social Union) are in alliance and is often 
referred to as the “union parties”.   The CDU/CSU and the SPD (Social Democratic Party) are the two 
major political parties in Germany. 
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results have indicated a continuously growing gap between the ANC, as majority 
party, and its closest rivals.64  In terms of the 1993-Constitution, provision was made 
for institutionalised multi-party governments at both provincial and national level. 
This is referred to as government of provincial unity and government of national unity 
respectively.65  This arrangement was part of the negotiated settlement concerning the 
composition of the executive during the period of transition and was not provided for 
in the new Constitution in 1996.  Any coalition governments formed since then, for 
example in the Western Cape and in KwaZulu-Natal after the 1999 and 2004 
elections, were voluntary and not in terms of a prescribed constitutional formula.66  It 
should be noted that for the first ten years of democracy the ANC was in power in 
seven of the nine provinces and after the 2004 elections it governs in all nine 
provinces, albeit with the support of other parties in Western Cape and KwaZulu-
Natal.67  Despite the fact that politics in South Africa is dominated by the ANC, there 
are a variety of political parties represented in the National Assembly as well as 
within the provincial legislatures and they all contribute to the development of 
democracy in South Africa.   
 
The political context in South Africa is characterised by the dominance of the ANC 
and a lack of competition (or perhaps the deliberate exclusion thereof by the ANC) 
between provinces and the national government. This political context clearly 
influences the way in which the constitutional system is functioning, in particular the 
financial intergovernmental relations.68 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
64 In 1994 the ANC received 62, 65% of the votes for the National Assembly with the National Party 
its main opposition at 20,39% support.  The ANC support increased in 1999 to 66, 36%, and increased 
further in 2004 to 69, 69% of the votes for the National Assembly with the Democratic Alliance, the 
official opposition, at 12, 37%; see www.elections.org.za for detailed results of the 1994, 1999 and 
2004 elections. 
65 Sec 84 (Executive Deputy Presidents), 88 (Cabinet), 94 (Appointment of Deputy Ministers) and 149 
(Executive Councils) of the 1993-Constitution. 
66 Malherbe & Brand Sub-National Constitutional Law in Alen, A. et al International Encyclopedia of 
Laws – Sub-National Constitutional Law (2001) 34. 
67 There is a coalition between the IFP and the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal, while in the Western Cape the 
ANC initially formed a government with the New National Party, who later decided to join the ANC.  
68 See discussion in Ch 6 
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1 2 Financial intergovernmental relations: Germany and South Africa  
 
The main objective of this thesis is to provide a comparative analysis of the way 
financial intergovernmental relations are structured and given effect in Germany and 
South Africa.   
 
The German experience is a rich source for comparative study due to its specific need 
to seek a balance between the competing tendencies towards unity and diversity. This 
issue is also central to South Africa’s system of financial intergovernmental relations, 
and was particularly so during the first few years of the new democracy.  A 
comparative study of this kind may contribute to the shaping of South Africa’s 
fledgling system of financial intergovernmental relations, however it will require 
refinement and expansion in order to make it suitable for South Africa’s 
circumstances and needs. 
 
In the wide range of federal systems in existence today, the degree of decentralisation 
or centralisation or, according to Simeon, the degree of conflict or co-operation in a 
particular system, provides some indication of the character of that particular 
system.69  Irrespective of the way federal systems are described, the concepts of 
subsidiarity and solidarity, described below, play a role in their development.  In the 
constitutional systems of both Germany and South Africa, which are characterised by 
co-operation rather than conflict, the concepts of subsidiarity and solidarity are 
particularly relevant.  This study will discuss the constitutional accommodation of 
these concepts and the role they play in regulating financial intergovernmental 
relations in both Germany and South Africa.  
 
Subsidiarity is a guiding principle in a multi-level system of government.  Although 
this principle is today used in the context of constitutional law and democratic rule, it 
has its origin in early Roman Catholic studies, where it was used to limit the 
sovereignty of the state, and later used in the development of constitutional legal 
theory.  According to Johannes Althusius subsidiarity is linked to multi-tiered systems 
                                                 
69 The federal principle allows for unity amongst a number of constituent units, but at the same time for 
some degree of independence of those units.  See Heun The Evaluation of Federalism 168; Simeon 
1998 (13) SAPR/PL 50; Mackenstein Financial Equalisation 14.. 
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of government.  He wrote in as early as 1614, that subsidiarity required that the lower 
level of government be entitled to regulate its own affairs. Only in those matters that 
lower levels of government are not competent to regulate, should the higher level of 
government become involved. 70  In other words, in accordance with subsidiarity, 
governmental decisions in a multi-tiered system of government should be taken as 
closely to the citizens as possible, that is, at the lowest level of government possible. 
 
Until the end of 1992 subsidiarity was not mentioned in the Basic Law.  Due to the 
adoption of the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union, Article 23 of the Basic Law 
was amended to include a reference to the principle of subsidiarity and to provide for 
decision-making by the Länder and the Federal Parliament on European Union 
matters.71  The Basic Law does not define the principle of subsidiarity, but gives 
effect to it in the German constitutional system, in particular in the context of the 
relationship between Germany and the European Union.  It makes any future 
development of the European Union subject to the principles of democracy, rule of 
law, subsidiarity and the social and federal state.  In the Maastricht Case (1993)72 the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht concluded that the principle of subsidiarity does not create 
new powers for the European Union, but that it in fact limits its powers and that it 
imposes an obligation on the European Union to respect the identities of its member 
states. 
 
The Maastricht Treaty on the European Union provides a description of the 
subsidiarity principle, but also demonstrates the need for compromise in an evolving 
regional system with strong supra-national features.73  In this case, the concept 
                                                 
70 Würtenberger “The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle” in Elwein et al Jahrbuch 
zur Staats- und Verwaltungswissenschaft (7) (1994) 65 65; Von Münch Staatsrecht 428. 
71 The Basic Law was amended on 12 December 1992.  See Von Münch Staatsrecht 428.  
72 BVerfGE 89, 155 (12/10/1993). 
73 Art 3b of the Treaty on European Union, Maastricht, 7 February 1992 stipulates as follows:  
“The Community shall act within the limit of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the 
objectives assigned to it therein.  In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as 
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can 
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the  
Community.  Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of this Treaty.” 
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applies to a quasi-federal system which has governmental structures at the European 
Union (supra-national) level, the level of the member states and at regional (or local) 
level.  In the context of constitutional law the subsidiarity principle has the aim of 
ensuring that functions and duties must be allocated to the lowest possible level of 
government that can effectively exercise them.  Simeon rightly refers to the opposing 
effects this principle might have, namely that it can be used to promote centralisation, 
for example through the setting of national standards, while in other cases it can also 
be utilised to strengthen decentralisation.74   
                                                                                                                                           
 
In South African constitutional history the subsidiarity principle is quite recent.  It 
was included in the Constitutional Principles agreed to at the Multi-Party Negotiating 
Process at Kempton Park although it was not mentioned by name.75  It was also not 
mentioned as such in the 1996-Constitution, but its recognition can be seen in various 
provisions, such as section 44 (1) (a) (iii) (assignment of national legislative powers to 
other legislative bodies), section 104 (1) (c) (assignment of provincial legislative 
powers to a municipal council) and section 156 (4) and (5) (assignment of the 
administration of certain matters to municipalities).  In these provisions subsidiarity is 
used to strengthen decentralisation or the devolution of powers.  The principles of 
cooperative government contained in Chapter 3 of the 1996-Constitution further 
support the notion of subsidiarity since it militates against the idea that everything 
must be initiated from the centre.76 
 
The force of centralisation within a federal system is based on notions such as “unity” 
or “solidarity”, which can be seen as counterweights to the principle of subsidiarity.  
The concept of solidarity is a rather flexible notion that can be applied to a variety of 
situations.  In European Union (EU) law, it is referred to in the Maastricht Treaty and 
appears to be a guiding principle in the efforts of the EU to reduce regional disparities 
 
74 Simeon 1998 (13) SAPR/PL 52; see also Rautenbach & Malherbe Constitutional Law 3rd ed (1999) 
93. 
75  CP XXI.1 of Schedule 4 of the 1993-Constitution stated:  
"The level at which decisions can be taken most effectively in respect of the quality and rendering of 
services, shall be the level responsible and accountable for the quality and the rendering of the services, 
and such level shall accordingly be empowered by the Constitution to do so." 
76 Van Wyk “Subsidiariteit as waarde wat die oop en demokratiese Suid-Afrikaanse gemeenskap ten 
grondslag lê” in Carpenter (ed) Suprema Lex (1998) 251 266. 
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between rich and poor Member States and to promote economic and social cohesion 
amongst the Member States.77  In the context of constitutional law, solidarity has a 
similar role to play.  Mackenstein describes it as flowing from a recognition of 
unacceptable differences between various parts and the need for actions to reduce 
these differences in such a way that the stronger players assist the weak.78   
 
The term solidarity does not appear in the German Basic Law.  The concept 
nevertheless finds expression within the Basic Law and it plays an important role in 
the functioning of the German constitutional system.  Solidarity is a key element of 
Bundestreue and should also be seen as related to the notion of a social state 
(Sozialstaat); one of the fundamental principles of the Basic Law.79  The social state 
implies the achievement of a fair social order in Germany. It is aimed at the 
promotion of social justice and addressing the economic needs of all citizens 
irrespective of where they live.80  Reducing disparities among rich and poor Länder is 
thus based on solidarity and the principle of a social state.  The legal basis for this 
approach is also contained in the constitutional provision regarding the objective to 
ensure uniformity or equality in living conditions throughout the federal territory.81 
 
In the South African 1996-Constitution the concept of solidarity is not stipulated as 
such, but it finds expression in a number of ways.  The Preamble includes the phrase 
“united in our diversity”.  In terms of the principles of co-operative government, all 
spheres of government and all organs of state must ensure the well being of the people 
of South Africa and must support and assist one another.82  In the context of financial 
equalisation, solidarity must find some application.  Although no specific reference to 
solidarity is made, it is constitutionally provided for that local government and each 
province is entitled to an equitable share of revenue raised nationally.  One of the 
factors to be considered when the equitable division of revenue is determined is the 
                                                 
77 Art 2 of the Maastricht Treaty inter alia states: “The Community shall have as its task …to promote 
throughout the Community … the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic 
and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.” 
78 Mackenstein Financial Equalisation 87. 
79 Art 20 (1) of the Basic Law. 
80 Von Münch Staatsrecht 115. 
81 Art 106 (3) 2 of the Basic Law; Mackenstein Financial Equalisation 88.  This objective is discussed 
in detail in Ch 5. 
82 Sec 41 (1)(h)(ii) of the 1996-Constitution. 
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economic disparity within and among provinces.83  It seems fair to argue that in 
accordance with the concept of solidarity, as described by Mackenstein, constitutional 
recognition is given to the need to address economic disparity in South Africa.  In the 
South African context,  where huge economic disparities amongst the provinces and 
amongst different parts of the country exist, solidarity must be accommodated.  In the 
field of financial intergovernmental relations, the reduction of disparities among and 
within the provinces is an important aim both in South Africa as in Germany.   
 
In discussing issues such as equivalence in living conditions, financial equalisation 
and financial autonomy of provinces and Länder, consideration will be given to the 
role of subsidiarity and solidarity.  How the constitutional arrangements regarding the 
distribution of financial resources and constitutional obligations to the various spheres 
of government in Germany and South Africa will be considered and an assessment of 
the mechanisms developed in both countries to reduce regional disparities will be 
made.  Hopefully, recommendations regarding the further development of South 
Africa’s financial intergovernmental relations system will result from these 
discussions. 
 
1 3 Context and approach 
 
This thesis, being a comparative study of a very specific part of constitutional law, 
namely the constitutional accommodation of financial intergovernmental relations 
may contribute to the substantial volume of academic writing published in Germany 
on this theme.  In South African constitutional law this is still relatively new.  This 
study will provide an overview of the main features of the two systems while the 
focus will be on the design and functioning of financial intergovernmental relations in 
the two countries.  The constitutional accommodation of the allocation of 
constitutional obligations and the distribution of financial resources to the various 
levels or spheres of government will be discussed. 
 
In decentralised systems of government, there tends to be rich and poor provinces or 
states, and rich and poor municipalities. This, according to economic theory, reflects 
                                                 
83  Sec 214 and 227 of the 1996-Constitution. 
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the underlying inequality in income distribution among individuals within the state.84  
The existence of financial disparities among the various constituent units in 
decentralised systems of government warrants some form of equalisation in order to 
reduce such disparities and to ensure an adequate and equitable provision of public 
goods and services to all.85  The economic rationale for financial equalisation is based 
on two objectives, namely efficient allocation of resources throughout the country and 
equitable treatment of all citizens in the allocation of resources.86  In addition to these 
economic reasons for financial equalisation, important policy considerations such as 
the promotion of political stability or the reduction of poverty should also be 
considered. 
 
Financial equalisation or Finanzausgleich, which is a core element of the German 
system, is a particular mechanism used to address regional disparities in decentralised 
systems.  In South Africa, where there are huge disparities in the economic situation 
in the various provinces, financial equalisation based on the equitable division of 
revenue is at the heart of the financial intergovernmental system.  A comparison 
between the implementation of Finanzausgleich in Germany, where huge regional 
disparities occurred after World War II and after unification, and the equalisation 
approach in South Africa forms an essential part of this study.  The profound impact 
of unification on financial intergovernmental relations, and specifically on 
Finanzausgleich, will be a focus point of this comparison.  It will be argued that there 
are important parallels between the post 1990 situation in Germany and the post 1994 
developments in South Africa.  
 
This study falls within the realm of comparative constitutional law, but since it deals 
with a subject of constitutional law, with public finance and fiscal and economic 
features, consideration will be given to general economic theory as far as it relates to 
the subject matter under discussion.   
 
Broadly speaking constitutional law ordinarily deals with two broad categories, 
namely the protection of human rights and organisational or structural matters such as 
                                                 
84 Musgrave Public Finance in a Democratic Society Vol III (2000) 413. 
85 Musgrave Public Finance 413. 
86 Boadway Burden Sharing or Dividing the Spoils? (1999) 3; see discussion under 3 4 2. 
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the division of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial arms of 
government.  Allocation of powers and obligations to various levels or spheres of 
government as well as the distribution of financial resources, relate to the 
organisational part of constitutional law.  The distribution of financial resources is not 
a theoretical exercise and must take cognisance of political and economic 
considerations within the country.  Furthermore, the actual spending of money by 
various levels or spheres of government to deliver services and give effect to 
constitutional obligations, has political and economic implications.  How does 
constitutional law deal with issues that relate to political or economic matters? For 
example, how does government decide on the allocation of funds to a poverty 
alleviation program in one part of the country?  The principle of supremacy of the 
constitution means that the provisions on financial arrangements are in principle also 
justiciable.  In view of the policy issues related to financial intergovernmental 
relations, the justiciability of the financial constitutional provisions is a complex 
matter. Specific attention will be given to the question regarding the justiciability of 
financial constitutional arrangements in Chapter 7.   
 
There is no definite answer to the question whether the specific scope of this study 
suggests a sui generis part of constitutional law or not.  However, it is argued that it is 
at least a distinct part of constitutional law that has some relation to public finance 
and fiscal and economic policy aspects pertaining to the distribution of financial 
resources and constitutional obligations.  Häde, in his thorough analysis of the 
German financial equalisation system, commented that the nature of the subject 
suggests that matters relating to economic theory and political science should also be 
covered in a constitutional legal study of this kind.87  However, it is not suggested that 
an economic analysis of the law should be undertaken.88  It is rather a question of 
acknowledging the importance of economic and social issues and enriching the 
analysis of the specific part of constitutional law under discussion with an appropriate 
reference to economic theory, public finance and political science.   It will be argued 
that a study of this distinct part of constitutional law, which could perhaps be 
                                                                                                                                            
 
87 Häde Finanzausgleich (1996) 10. 
88 Posner Law and Economics (2001) 1475 et seq. 
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described as financial constitutional law, should at least include a discussion of the 
following issues, namely: 
♦ Economic considerations in the design of financial intergovernmental relations 
in decentralised systems of government; 
♦ The constitutional allocation of financial resources and expenditure functions 
to the various levels of government; 
♦ The way in which the law (the constitution as well as ordinary legislation) deal 
with policy issues pertaining to financial intergovernmental relations; and 
♦ The justiciability of legal provisions dealing with financial intergovernmental 
relations. 
 
The main method adopted in preparing this study, was to analyse published sources 
on legal theory and practice in the two systems under discussion.  A number of 
interviews were also conducted with academics, legal practitioners, politicians and 
officials in the two countries in order to get an understanding of the practical 
functioning of financial intergovernmental relations. 
 
1 4 Overview of thesis  
 
This dissertation covers the period until 1 November 2004.  This study is divided into 
six main chapters preceded by this introductory chapter and followed by a closing 
chapter in which some conclusions are drawn and recommendations made with a view 
to assist in the further development of South Africa’s system of financial 
intergovernmental relations.  The structure of this dissertation aims to deal with the 
various elements of financial constitutional law as suggested above. 
 
In Chapter 2 the basis is laid for the analysis of the financial intergovernmental 
relations in Germany and South Africa by providing an overview of the constitutional 
frameworks in these two countries.  This chapter only provides a brief historical 
overview and an analysis of the main characteristics of the two systems, in particular 
with reference to financial intergovernmental relations.  The role of the concept of 
Bundestreue and co-operative government is discussed in the closing part of Chapter 
2.  It will be argued that these concepts play an instrumental role in the functioning of 
financial intergovernmental relations in both countries. 
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 Chapter 3 starts with a discussion of the theory of public finance as it relates to 
decentralised systems of government.  This is followed by an analysis of the 
economic considerations in the allocation of resources to sub-national governments in 
decentralised systems of government.  A fiscal gap occurs when the allocation of 
expenditure is not matched by the allocation of financial resources to a particular level 
of government.  In the final part of this chapter an analysis is provided of the 
economic considerations as well as the actual revenue sharing mechanisms and 
intergovernmental transfers that can be utilised to address the problem of a fiscal gap. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the actual constitutional accommodation of expenditure 
obligations and distribution of financial resources in Germany and South Africa 
respectively.  This is done with a reference to the theoretical economic framework 
discussed in Chapter 3.  It starts in the first part of the chapter with a discussion of 
the theoretical economic framework applicable to the functioning of decentralised 
systems of government.  This is then compared with the actual constitutional 
accommodation of the division of financial resources in Germany and South Africa.  
An examination of the similarities and differences between the two systems 
underlines the fact that regional disparities exist in decentralised systems and it shows 
the need for particular mechanisms to take care of such disparities.  Both countries 
have, with different objectives in mind, chosen particular constitutional formulations 
for the allocation of financial resources including financial equalisation mechanisms.   
 
The discussion of the constitutional accommodation of financial equalisation in 
Germany and South Africa forms a major part of this thesis and is therefore covered 
in two separate chapters, namely Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.  This thesis will not be 
complete without an examination of some of the underlying fundamental issues that 
play a role in the design and functioning of financial intergovernmental relations in 
decentralised systems.  Against the background of political and economic realities the 
actual allocation of financial resources and constitutional obligations in decentralised 
systems is never static.  It means that the particular constitutional formulas might 
change over time due to a number of factors and issues relating to the particular 
constitutional model.  The relevant factors and underlying fundamental issues in the 
two systems will receive attention in. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
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 Chapter 5 contains an in-depth discussion of financial equalisation in Germany 
(Finanzausgleich).  It is in this chapter that the practical application of the principles 
of equalisation as well as the consequences of the constitutional division of 
obligations and financial resources receive proper attention.  The first part of this 
chapter is devoted to the development, design and functioning of the quite complex 
system of financial equalisation in Germany.  A discussion of the reforms of the 
Finanzausgleich since 1949 as well as the effect of the unification of Germany in 
1990 is covered in the second half of Chapter 5.   
 
Chapter 6 contains an analysis of the development of financial equalisation in South 
Africa, a system that is in existence only since 1997.  This chapter also focuses on the 
application of the various elements of equalisation as they are applied in the South 
African context as well as the practical consequences of the constitutional division of 
financial resources and obligations.  A comparative analysis between the financial 
equalisation system in Germany and that in South Africa is provided in the last part of 
the chapter, with a view to make some recommendations regarding the further 
development of financial intergovernmental relations in South Africa. 
 
Reference will be made throughout the thesis to relevant case law, but since this study 
is a constitutional law study, separate consideration of the relevant case law pertaining 
to the main issues under scrutiny is thus provided in Chapter 7.  Both Germany and 
South Africa have constitutional courts as important constitutional institutions.  The 
role that the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Germany and the South African 
Constitutional Court plays in shaping the financial intergovernmental relations, in 
particular the constitutional accommodation thereof, will be highlighted in this 
chapter. 
 
In the final chapter, Chapter 8, the main results are collated in order to justify the 
main objective of this study, namely to explain and analyse the constitutional 
distribution of financial resources and obligations in Germany and South Africa.  In 
order to make a proper evaluation of the functioning of Finanzausgleich it is also 
necessary to consider the problems and challenges experienced in practice.  In the 
examination of the current problems in the German system, it will be indicated 
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whether there are any lessons to be learned for the development of financial 
equalisation in South Africa.  In scrutinising the financial equalisation mechanisms 
chosen after unification as well as the current reform initiatives in Germany, it will be 
indicated what guidance may be gained from the German experience in the design and 
application of financial intergovernmental relations, for South Africa.  Chapter 8 
concludes with some proposals for reform in South Africa. 
 
2 General constitutional framework 
2 1 German constitutional system 
2 1 1 Historical overview 
2 1 2 Fundamental principles of German constitutional system 
2 2 South African constitutional system 
2 2 1 Historical overview 
2 2 2 Fundamental principles of South African constitutional system 
2 3 Co-operative federalism 
 
Chapter 2 General constitutional framework 
 
2 1 German constitutional system 
 
2 1 1 Historical overview 
 
The development of a federal idea in Germany is marked by a search for national 
political unity.  The rise of Napoleon in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century 
not only led to a large empire under French rule, but also contributed towards the 
ending of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation in 1806.  Emperor Franz II 
of Austria, the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire issued a proclamation on 6 
August 1806 to dissolve the Empire started by Charlemagne in 8001 to prevent 
Napoleon being crowned as Emperor by the Pope in Rome.2  This is seen as the end 
of the First German Empire and the end of any form of political organisation that 
links together the various German territorial entities.   
 
The dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire caused the various kingdoms, 
principalities and other territorial entities on German soil that previously formed part 
of the Empire, to search for a new form of national political organisation – a search 
for the creation of a national German state. On 12 July 1806, 39 German principalities 
and other territorial entities formed the Rheinbund under the protection of Napoleon. 3  
                                                 
1 Kimminich Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte (1987) 15. 
2 Kimminich Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte 286, 288. 
3 Kimminich Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte 313; Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 
derBundesrepublik Deutschland (1997) 34. 
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This was an attempt by Napoleon to consolidate the areas conquered, and was a first 
step in the search for political unity amongst the various German entities.  There were 
two main schools of thought that supported the development of German unity, namely 
the unity movement (Einheitsbewegung) and the constitutional movement 
(Verfassungsbewegung).  The first supported federalism and the joining of the various 
German states, the second school focussed on the limitation of power of the 
monarchies.4  
 
The war against Napoleon was linked to the search for a new German constitutional 
structure.  The defeat of Napoleon culminated in the Congress of Vienna (1 
November 1814 – 9 June 1815), which created the opportunity for a re-organisation of 
Western Europe and included the shaping of German unity.5  The formation in June 
1815 of the Deutscher Bund (German Confederation) was an important milestone in 
the history of German federalism.  It created a confederation of states consisting of a 
loose association of kingdoms, free German cities, principalities and other territorial 
entities, where Prussia and Austria were the main actors.6  The purpose of the 
Deutscher Bund was to protect the external and internal German security, while 
recognizing the independence and inviolability of the various territorial entities.7  In 
May 1820 the representatives of the various German states negotiated the Wiener 
Schlussakte in order to clarify matters not properly dealt with in the Deutsche 
Bundesakte and the Wiener Kongressakte.  The nature of the Deutscher Bund, being a 
confederation of German states, is confirmed in the Wiener Schlussakte, that states 
that the Deutscher Bund is an international law association of sovereign German 
principalities and free German cities. 
 
A political organ, the Bundestag, with its seat in Frankfurt, was created in terms of the 
Deutsche Bundesakte.  Although this was not a parliament, it laid the foundation for 
some of the elements of the political organisation of modern Germany.  The 
                                                 
4 Kimminich Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte 297. 
5 Although the debate about Germany's constitutional future could be distinguished from the debate 
about the re-organisation of Europe, there was a close link between the two.  This resulted in the 
inclusion of the Deutsche Bundesakte of 8 June 1815 in the Wiener Kongresakte of 9 June 1815.  
Kimminich Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte 316 - 326; Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 34; 
Kaufmann Bundesstaat und Deutsche Einheit (1992) 14. 
6 Kimminich Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte 321. 
7 Art 2 of the Deutsche Bundesakte; Kimminich Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte 324; Laufer & Münch 
Das föderative System 34. 
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Bundestag, or Federal Assembly, consisted of delegates or representatives of the 39 
German states (including the states of Baden and Württemberg that joined later in 
1815) with Austria chairing the plenary meetings.  The representatives were 
nominated and instructed by the various member governments and were not elected 
by the people.  There was an unequal voting distribution, with each delegation having 
at least one vote and the larger states, such as Prussia, Austria and Bavaria, receiving 
up to four votes in the plenary meeting.8  There was also a smaller council that 
discussed the more ordinary governmental matters.  The organisation of and voting in 
this Bundestag clearly resembles the current situation in the Bundesrat that consists of 
representatives of the sixteen German Länder governments and where unequal voting 
arrangements exist.  This is one of the significant characteristics of German 
federalism. 
 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century there was a move towards economic 
integration between Prussia and other northern territories on the one hand and the 
southern states dominated by Bavaria on the other.  Various customs unions were 
created between 1818 and the early 1830’s in different parts of the Confederation.  In 
1829 a trade agreement was concluded between the Prussian-Hessen-Darmstadt 
Zollverein (customs union) and the Bavaria-Württemberg Zollverein.  This eventually 
led to the formation of the German Customs Union (Deutscher Zollverein) in March 
1833.9  Liberalisation of trade and the economic integration of the German states 
were the main aims of this Zollverein.  Over a period of about three decades, the 
Deutscher Zollverein succeeded in establishing an integrated German economy by 
eliminating the barriers to free trade that existed between the various territorial 
entities.  On the political level it is evident that the Zollverein was an important step 
towards the process of German political unity.10 
                                                
 
The winds of revolution that blew over Europe during the middle of the nineteenth 
century also affected Germany.  In March 1848 various German states experienced 
revolutionary battles.  At this time the search for a federal Germany with a solid 
 
8 Kimminich Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte 323; Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 35. 
9 Kimminich Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte 403; Mackenstein From Cohesion Policy to Financial 
Equalisation (1997) 62. 
10 Kimminich Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte 405; Mackenstein Financial Equalisation 63. 
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constitutional basis proceeded and led to the so-called Paulskirchenverfassung, a 
proposal for a new constitution discussed by the National Assembly that met in St. 
Paul’s Church in Frankfurt in May 1848.11  The National Assembly or Deutsche 
Verfassungsgebende Nationalversammlung consisted of 830 members directly elected 
by the people in the various member states.  This constitutional proposal provided for 
radical constitutional changes.  For the first time a constitution for the whole of 
Germany as a federal state was being developed.  It was the first attempt to recognise 
basic human rights for Germany and to provide for the establishment of the 
Rechtsstaat.12  Structurally the Paulskirchenverfassung provided for a constitutional 
monarchy based on federal principles.13  The concept of a federal state (Bundesstaat) 
formed an important structural element in this constitutional proposal.  It provided for 
a vertical division of powers, namely between the federal level and the constituent 
states.  The proposal further included a two-chamber parliament, the Reichstag, 
consisting of a Volkshaus (house of assembly) and a Staatenhaus (house of states) 
based on the American model.  Political developments in Prussia and Austria that 
consolidated the old order, however, contributed to the fact that the 
Paulskirchenverfassung was never implemented.  Although this constitution should 
be seen as a proposal, it had a major impact on the political thinking and 
constitutional developments for Germany during the next century. This is evident in 
the Basic Law adopted 100 years later.   
 
The Deutscher Bund eventually came to an end in 1866 when the Austrian-Prussian 
War ended with the defeat of Austria by Prussia under the leadership of Bismarck, 
who then formed the Norddeutschen Bund (North German Confederation).14  The 
constitution of the North German Confederation inter alia made provision for a two 
chamber legislature of the Bund, consisting of the Reichstag and the Bundesrat, with 
Prussia getting 17 of the 43 seats in the Bundesrat. These consisted of representatives 
from the constituent states.  The North German Confederation, dominated by Prussia, 
had a federal character and paved the way for future constitutional developments.  
                                                 
11 Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs vom 28. März 1849; Kimminich Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte 
355; Siemann “Griff der Nation” in Zeitpunkte 1/98 53. 
12 Currie The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1994) 3. 
13 Kimminich Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte 358. 
14 Kimminich Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte 406; Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 38; 
Kaufmann Bundesstaat 16. 
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The southern states, which included the Kingdom of Bavaria, decided to join the 
North German Confederation to establish the German Empire (Deutsche Reich), 
which consisted of twenty-five member states, in 1871.15 
 
Under the leadership of the Minister-President of Prussia, Otto von Bismarck, who 
became the Chancellor of the Reich, a federal constitutional system was established 
with the adoption of the Constitution of the German Empire on 16 April 1871.16  This 
new constitutional monarchy was dominated by Prussia and produced both the 
Reichskanzler (Bismarck) and the Emperor (King Wilhelm I).  The federal nature of 
the system was underlined by the inclusion of the following elements in the 
Constitution, namely: 
♦ The establishment of a Bundesrat (Federal Council), consisting of 
representatives of the governments of the member states, as one of the two 
chambers of parliament; and 
♦  A vertical division of powers between the Empire and the member 
states.17 
 
The Constitution further provided that the legislative competences vested mainly in 
the Reich, while the constituent states would be responsible for the execution of 
federal laws since they all had existing administrations.18  Except for federal 
functions, such as foreign relations, the federal navy and military affairs, no central 
administrative system was created since the individual states provided the system of 
administration for the Reich.  Through prior agreement certain legislative and 
executive rights or competences (Reservatrechte) were excluded from the federal 
domain and allocated to the southern states of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden.19  
The allocation of executive responsibility for federal legislation to the states was 
balanced by providing a supervisory authority over the execution of federal laws to 
                                                 
15 Lerche Principles of German Federalism in Kirchhof & Kommers (eds) Germany and its Basic Law 
(1993) 71; Kaufmann Bundesstaat 17. 
16 The Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs was put into operation on 4 May 1871.  See Venter 
Constitutional Comparison – Japan, Germany, Canada and South Africa as Constitutional States 
(2000) 64; Kimminich Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte 426. 
17 Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 40, 262. 
18 Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 42; Kilper & Lhotta Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (1996) 47. 
19 Kimminich Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte 433; Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 43. 
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the Bundesrat.  The division of legislative and executive competences between the 
Reich and the states and the accompanying supervisory function of the Bundesrat 
resembles the current state of affairs in Germany.  The Basic Law provides that the 
bulk of the administrative responsibility lies with the Länder and that the Bundesrat 
has a supervisory role regarding the execution of federal laws by the Länder.20 
 
The formation of the Reich required specific arrangements regarding finances.  The 
Reich was financially dependent on the states as they retained control over direct 
taxes, for example income tax and property tax.  The main source of income for the 
Reich was customs duties and excise on tobacco, salt and sugar.21  Bavaria, 
Württemberg and Baden retained control over beer taxes.22  There was a clear need to 
have some form of equalisation arrangement amongst the Reich and the 25 states.  
This was provided for in the form of a per capita contribution from each state to the 
Reich and was called the “Matrikular-Beiträge”.  In spite of the fact that the 
Constitution provided for the introduction of a new central tax administration for the 
Reich, it took more than thirty years before meaningful progress was made in this 
respect.23   
 
The end of the First World War brought about a new phase in Germany’s 
constitutional development.  In the wake of military defeat and the existence of 
opposing ideas, such as those supporting the creation of a unitary German state 
dominated by Prussia and the federalist views held by the southern states, a new 
constitution had to be drafted.  The continued search for a united Germany and a 
democratic system of government also influenced this debate.  Eventually the 
National Assembly in Weimar adopted a proposal for a new constitution that created a 
democratic and decentralised system of government.24  The essence of the Weimar 
Constitution was a move away from monarchies and semi-independent states under 
the German Empire, to a parliamentary system of government where the balance of 
                                                 
20 See Art 30, 83, 84 Basic Law; Sachs Grundgesetz Kommentar (1996) 1350 - 1356. 
21 Bundesministerium der Finanzen Unsere Steuern von A-Z (1997) 13. 
22 Kimminich Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte 433. 
23 In 1906 a number of Reichssteurn (federal taxes) was imported into the system.  Laufer & Münch 
Das föderative System 42. 
24 The Secretary of State for Internal Affairs, who was also a public law professor, Hugo Preuss, 
provided the National Assembly in Weimar with a proposal for a new constitution, which came into 
operation on 11 August 1919.  For a detailed discussion on the Weimar Constitution see Kimminich 
Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte 484 - 505; Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 46 – 52. 
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power shifted towards the federal government.  The adoption of the Weimar 
Constitution caused a shift of power from the constituent states, or Länder as they 
were now called, to the federal level of government.25   
 
An organ called the Reichsrat, which was the representative organ of the Länder in 
federal legislative and administrative matters, replaced the Bundesrat as second 
chamber in the federal parliament.26  The composition and status of the Reichsrat 
differed from that of its predecessor.  The Länder were represented by members of 
their respective governments or by their delegates, while the size of their 
representation depended on a formula based on the number of inhabitants in each 
Land.  In view of its size, Prussia dominated the decision-making in the Reichsrat, as 
it did in the previous Bundesrat. The Weimar Constitution stipulated that no Land 
may hold more than two fifths of the votes in the Reichsrat.27  The Reichsrat had far 
less influence in federal legislation than the Bundesrat had under the German Empire.  
While the previous Bundesrat had full veto over legislation, the Reichsrat only had a 
suspensive veto.  Under the 1871-Constitution federal legislation could only be 
adopted when both chambers, the Reichstag and the Bundesrat, agreed.  Thus the 
Bundesrat had full veto over legislative proposals from the Reichstag.28  In terms of 
the Weimar Constitution a no-vote by the Reichsrat could only suspend the legislative 
process, as its decision could be defeated by a two-thirds majority vote in the 
Reichstag.  The Federal President could still proclaim the law or call a referendum.29 
 
The Länder were responsible for the administration of federal laws, while the Weimar 
Constitution went a step further in centralising power to stipulate that federal 
legislation may provide otherwise.  The federal government had a duty to oversee the 
effective performance of the Länder in this respect and could give directions to the 
Länder on the execution of federal laws.30   
 
                                                 
25 Kaufmann Bundesstaat 18. 
26 Art. 60 – 66 Weimar Constitution. 
27 Art. 63 Weimar Constitution; Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 48. 
28 Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 40. 
29 Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 49. 
30 Art 14, 15 Weimar Constitution; Currie The German Constitution 5; Kilper & Lhotta Föderalismus 
49; Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 48. 
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A major shift in financial competences occurred under the Weimar Constitution.  The 
Länder lost their taxing powers in favour of the Reich, that received the legislative 
competence over major taxes, namely income tax, corporate tax, sales tax, inheritance 
tax and property transfer tax.31  The shift of legislative competences from the Länder 
to the Reich was complemented by this shift in financial competences.  The national 
debt caused by World War I and the cost of rebuilding the country were the main 
reasons for centralising fiscal competences and creating a financial administration at 
federal level that was established on 1 October 1919.32  As a result of this radical 
change in the financial intergovernmental relations in the Weimar Republic, the 
Länder became dependent on the Reich.  In this way the Reich created a financial 
system through which it could maintain the functioning of the state administration in 
the Länder.33  The Länder, and through it also the Gemeinden (local government), 
received a fixed percentage of the taxes raised by the Reich.  In addition to this federal 
allocation, the Länder and the Gemeinden, retained some indirect taxes such as taxes 
on trade, fixed property and buildings. 
 
During the time of the Weimar Republic essential federal issues, such as the 
relationship between the Reich and the Länder and the function of the Reichsrat, were 
under the spotlight on various occasions, for example at the Länderkonferenz in 
January 1928. 
 
With the rise of National Socialism (Nazism) in Germany in the 1930’s, it was clear 
that the particular constitutional order of the Weimar Republic did not quite fit into 
the new authoritarian ideology.  The take-over of power by the National Socialist 
Party caused the elimination of all traces of federalism in Germany.  The appointment 
of national socialist Reichskomissäre in the Länder not governed by the National 
Socialist Party, the dissolution of the Länder parliaments and the eventual removal of 
the Reichsrat, substantiate this fact.34  The end of the federal system in 1934 also 
marked the end of democracy in Germany.  It was a dark period in German history 
and lasted until 1945 with the end of World War II, when the German forces 
                                                 
31 Art 11 Weimar Constitution; Laufer & Münch Das födearitve System 50. 
32 Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 49. 
33 Kilper & Lhotta Föderalismus 49. 
34 Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 52; Kaufmann Bundesstaat 22. 
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capitulated and the Western allied powers, namely France, Britain, and the United 
States of America, together with the Soviet Union occupied Germany.35 
 
In the aftermath of the war, a strong view in favour of a federal system developed 
regarding Germany’s constitutional future, in particular in the part that was controlled 
by the three allied powers.  An important step in the constitutional debate was the 
presentation of the so-called Frankfurter Dokumente, by the three military governors 
of the Western occupied zones, to the governments of these zones on 1 July 1948 in 
Frankfurt.  These documents were the result of a conference held in London by the 
three Western occupation forces (USA, Britain and France) and included Belgium, 
Netherlands and Luxembourg. The documents laid the basis for the constitutional 
development of the Western zones and signified the separation of Germany into a 
Western allied state and a Soviet allied state, a step that had profound implications for 
the German people and for the constitutional development of Germany.36  The 
Frankfurter Dokumente inter alia made provision for the establishment of a 
constitutional assembly that would be responsible for the drafting of a new 
constitution based on federal principles for the Western zones.37   
 
The contents of the Frankfurter Dokumente were not fully acceptable to the 11 
minister-presidents in the three zones as they wanted to develop only the 
administrative organization of the Western occupied zones and not to create a new 
smaller German state that would perpetuate the division of the country.38  A 
compromise was made in order to proceed with the constitutional process.  This 
compromise ensured that the terms “parliamentary council” in stead of “constitutional 
assembly”, and “Grundgesetz” in stead of “Verfassung” would be used in the new 
constitution.39  A first important step in establishing the parliamentary council was the 
                                                 
35 Frowein Die Rechtslage Deutschlands und der Status Berlins in Benda et al Handbuch des 
Verfassungsrechts (1983) 28 31. 
36 Hesse Das Grundgesetz in der Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Aufgabe und Funktion 
der Verfassung in Benda et al Handbuch des Verfassungsrechts (1983) 3 7. 
37 There were three Frankfurter Dokumente, namely on the constitutional future of the western 
occupied zones, a new division of Länder and transitional provisions that provided the legal basis for 
the military governors and the proposed new Länder governments.  
38 Hesse Das Grundgesetz in der Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 7. 
39 The minister-presidents were seriously concerned that the terminology proposed by the military 
governors, namely Verfassunggebende Versammlung and Verfassung, sealed the division of Germany 
while there was still a possibility, although remote, of one Germany.  They therefore suggested a softer 
approach, namely to use the terms Parlamentarischer Rat and Grundgesetz instead.  Kilper and Lhotta 
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Herrenchiemsee constitutional convention, a meeting of 26 constitutional experts 
instructed by the minister-presidents of the Western zones to develop a draft 
constitutional proposal to be discussed in the parliamentary council. The meeting was 
tasked with negotiating and drafting of the constitution.   
 
The three most contentious issues debated in the parliamentary council were: 
♦ the composition and competence of the second chamber of the German 
parliament; 
♦ the division of financial legislative and administrative competences 
between the Bund and the Länder; and 
♦ the division of the tax income between the Bund and the Länder. 
 
These issues are central to the federal character of the new West German state.  The 
Länder, that existed at the time of drafting the Basic Law, played an important role in 
the shaping of this new constitution.  After much debate regarding the second 
chamber of the federal level, a choice was made in favour of a Bundesrat.  This 
clearly resembled the Bundesrat in the German Empire of 1871 and consisted of 
representatives of the Länder governments.  It did not receive equal powers to the 
Bundestag, the popularly elected chamber, but had a suspensive veto over ordinary 
legislation and full veto over constitutional amendments and matters affecting the 
Länder.  The Länder remained responsible for the bulk of the administration of 
federal laws.   
 
The division of the Western occupied zones into Länder followed partly historical 
lines and was partly newly created regions.  Berlin, which was divided into allied and 
soviet occupied zones after the War, continued to be so until 1990.  West Berlin was 
regarded as a Land within the Federal Republic of Germany and participated as such 
in the constitutional order of the Federal Republic, while East Berlin was part of the 
German Democratic Republic.40 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Föderalismus 81; Dolzer The Path to German Unity: The Constitutional, Legal and International 
Framework in Kirchhof & Kommers (eds) Germany and Its Basic Law (1993) 365 370. 
40 Frowein Die Rechtslage Deutschlands und der Status Berlins 54. 
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Table 2 1: The Länder in the Western Zones in 1947 
The American Zone 
Bavaria 
Bremen 
Hessen 
Württemberg-Baden 
 
The British Zone 
Hamburg 
Lower Saxony 
North-Rhine Westphalia 
Schleswig-Holstein 
 
The French Zone 
Baden 
Rheinland-Palatinate 
Saarland 
Württemberg-Hohenzollern41 
 
 
The debate regarding the financial issues proved difficult to solve.  Eventually due to 
pressure from the Allied Forces, a compromise was reached in the parliamentary 
council about the financial constitution, or Finanzverfassung as it is referred to in 
German literature.  This implied that the financial administration would be shared 
between the Bund and the Länder and the legislative competence over taxes would be 
divided between the Bund and the Länder.  While the Bund received the legislative 
competence over the major taxes such as personal income tax and corporate tax, the 
Länder through the Bundesrat had an equal say in the adoption of federal tax 
legislation.  Another important element of this constitutional compromise was the 
provision for financial equalisation, or Finanzausgleich, in order to provide a 
                                                 
41 On 9 December 1951 a new Land, namely Baden-Württemberg which included the Länder Baden, 
Württemberg-Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern, came into existence. 
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mechanism through which the principle of Einheitlichkeit der Lebensverhältnisse 
(uniformity of living standards) could be promoted.42 
 
On 8 May 1949 the majority of the parliamentary council voted in favour of the text 
of the new constitution, and between 18 and 21 May 1949 eleven of the twelve 
Länder parliaments (Landtage) voted in favour of the text.43  The adoption of the new 
constitution, Grundgesetz, signified the end of a dark chapter in Germany’s history 
and gave birth to the modern day Germany, that was divided into a western (Federal 
Republic of Germany) and eastern part (German Democratic Republic) until 1990 
when unification took place.44   
 
The Treaty of Unification (Einigungsvertrag) of 31 August 1990 stipulated the 
constitutional issues, in particular the amendments to the Basic Law, that were 
necessary to effect unification.45  The Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR) 
seized to exist on 3 October 1990 when the new Federal Republic of Germany that 
consists of sixteen Länder came into existence. 
                                                 
42 Kilper & Lhotta Föderalismus 96 –98, Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 67. See discussion in 
Chapter 5. 
43 The parliamentary council voted 53 in favour and 12 against the text, while all the Landtage except 
Bavaria supported it.  The argument of the majority in the Bavarian Landtag was that the new 
constitution was not federal enough.  They, however, recognised the legality of the Grundgesetz.  
Kaufmann Bundesstaat 42, Kilper & Lhotta Föderalismus 98. 
44 On 23 May 1949, when the Grundgesetz was signed by the Minister-presidents of the western 
Länder, the Federal Republic of Germany was born.  Later that year the constitutional debate in the 
eastern zones led to the adoption of a constitution for the German Democratic Republic, which came 
into existence on 7 October 1949. 
45 The Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 
über die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands was adopted by the Bundesrat and the Bundestag as 
well as by the DDR-Volkskammer.  It inter alia provided that the newly created DDR-Länder would 
become Länder of the new Federal Republic of Germany. 
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Table 2 2: Länder and votes in the Bundesrat after unification in 199046 
 
 
46 Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 82. 
Land         Votes 
Bavaria    6 
Baden-Württemberg   6 
Lower Saxony    6 
North-Rhine Westphalia  6 
Hessen     5 
Berlin     4 
Brandenburg    4 
Rhineland-Palatinate   4 
 
Land       Votes 
Saxony    4 
Saxony-Anhalt   4 
Schleswig-Holstein   4 
Thuringia    3 
Bremen    3 
Hamburg    3 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 3 
Saarland    3 
 
 
 
2 1 2  Fundamental principles of German constitutional system 
 
For a clear understanding of the German constitutional system, including the system 
of financial intergovernmental relations, a discussion of the fundamental principles in 
the Basic Law is essential. 
There are four fundamental principles on which the constitutional order as described 
in the Basic Law is based. These are the principles of a democratic and social federal 
state based on a Rechtsstaat.47  In addition, another fundamental principle is referred 
to in Article 23 of the Basic Law, namely the principle of subsidiarity.  This is used in 
the context of the European Union and its relationship with the Federal Republic of 
Germany and its constituent units.  It was not originally part of the Basic Law, but 
was included in an amendment of 12 December 1992.48 
 
A democratic state 
Article 20 is one of the cornerstones of the Basic Law and contains the basic 
principles of the German constitutional order that provide the essential features of the 
system.  It is protected against any constitutional amendments by the provisions of 
Article 79 (3).49  Article 20 (1) states that  
 
“[t]he Federal Republic of Germany shall be a democratic and social federal 
state.” 
 
These principles are interrelated and all contribute to the constitutional composition of 
the Basic Law, however they can be distinguished within the context of the Basic 
Law. 
 
Effect is given to the principle of a democratic state in a number of provisions in the 
Basic Law.  Public authority, which emanates from the people, shall be exercised by 
way of elections and referenda, as stated in Article 20 (2).50  The constitutional 
structures, such as the Federal Parliament that consists of the Bundestag and the 
Bundesrat, are also democratic in nature.  Article 21 provides for the establishment 
and functioning of political parties.  Everybody has the right to freedom of expression 
(Article 5) and freedom of association (Article 9), which are essential features of a 
                                                 
47 The official English translation of the Basic Law translates “Rechtsstaat” with “rule of law”. 
48 Würtenberger “The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle” in Elwein et al (eds) 
Jahrbuch zur Staats- und Verwaltungswissenschaft 7 (1994) 65 66. 
49 Art. 79 (3) states: “Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into 
Länder, their participation in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 
shall be prohibited.” 
50 Dürig An Introduction to the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany in Karpen (ed) The 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1988) 18. 
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democratic state.  Article 28 stipulates that the constitutional order in the Länder 
should also conform to the principles of “the republican, democratic and social state 
governed by the rule of law within the meaning of the Basic Law.”  Article 28 further 
provides for elected governments in the Länder, districts and municipalities.  This 
provision, often referred to as the homogeneity clause, extends the fundamental 
principles to the Länder in order to make the Länder constitutions fit within the 
framework of the Basic Law. 
 
The Rechtsstaat 
The principle of the Rechtsstaat, embodied in Article 20 (3) of the Basic Law, is 
regarded as one of the fundamental principles of the Basic Law and establishes the 
supremacy of the constitution.51  An important element of a constitutional state is the 
recognition of the separation of powers, into the executive, legislative and judicial 
branches of government. This is given effect to in the Basic Law.52  All pillars of 
government are bound by this provision, and are protected against constitutional 
amendment by Article 79 (3).  This implies that the Basic Law is higher than any 
other law in the country and that any legislative, executive or judicial action may not 
be in contradiction to the provisions of the Basic Law.  All positive law must conform 
to the values encapsulated in the Basic Law.  The Rechtsstaat thus provides a formal 
and substantial limitation to the powers of the state.   
 
The Rechtsstaat also includes the recognition and protection of human rights listed in 
the Basic Law (Articles 1 – 17) and acts as a guarantee for judicial review of 
administrative action as stipulated in Article 19 (4).53  The strengthening of the 
Rechtsstaat provisions in the Basic Law when compared to the Weimar constitution is 
a reaction to the total disregard for the various elements of the Rechtsstaat during the 
National Socialist regime.54  Although all branches of government are responsible for 
implementing the Basic Law, the courts have an important role as guardians of the 
                                                 
51 Benda Der soziale Rechtsstaat in Benda et al Handbuch des Verfassungsrechts (1983) 477 481. 
52 See for example Art 38 (Bundestag), Art 50 (Bundesrat), Art 62 (Federal Government) and Art 92 
(Judiciary).  Hesse Das Grundgesetz in der Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 18; Benda 
Der soziale Rechtsstaat 492. 
53 Kommers The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (1997) 37; Currie 
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1994) 19; Benda Der soziale Rechtsstaat 494. 
54 Hesse Das Grundgesetz in der Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 9. 
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Basic Law, in particular the Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) as the 
final arbiter in constitutional disputes. 
 
The Social State (Sozialstaat) 
A bill of rights, including social rights, is included in quite a few constitutions in the 
world.  The Basic Law includes a limited provision for direct social rights, for 
example Article 6, that provides a right for the protection and support of mothers and 
the protection of children born outside of marriage.  The drafters of the Basic Law 
included the concept of a social state as a fundamental principle in the Basic Law55 
and this places a duty on the state to act positively in pursuance of the general welfare 
of the people of the country.56  It must be the aim of the state to create an environment 
where human dignity is protected.  The inclusion of this principle in the Basic Law 
should be seen against the background of a country destroyed by World War II and 
the need for direct state involvement in the rebuilding of the economy as well as in the 
improvement of the general welfare of the public.   
 
The social state principle does not create rights, but it creates a constitutional directive 
for the state.57  It is regarded as a fundamental constitutional principle that indicates 
the particular character of the state, namely a social state and this implies that the state 
has a duty to care for its citizens.  This principle can also assist in the interpretation 
and application of the Basic Law, for example, the application of the right to human 
dignity in Article 1.58  There is a duty on both the legislative and the executive 
branches of government to promote public welfare, a duty that, for example, includes 
legislation and practical plans to provide adequate health care facilities for the public. 
 
The social state principle is also entrenched in the context of the financial 
constitution.  Article 106 (3) of the Basic Law lays down the important aim of the 
Finanzausgleichsystem (system of financial equalisation) to ensure “equal living 
conditions” in all of the Länder.59  An underlying philosophy behind this aim is to 
have a basic standard of services provided by the state throughout the federal territory.  
                                                 
55 Art. 20 (1) of the Basic Law. 
56 Currie Constitution of Germany 21. 
57 Benda Der soziale Rechtsstaat 510. 
58 Sachs Grundgesetz Kommentar (1996) 629 –630. 
59 Lerche Principles of German Federalism 71 79. 
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Although there is a formula involved in the Finanzausgleichsystem and it thus has a 
mechanistic element, one can argue that financial equalisation is an application of the 
social state principle.60 
 
The Federal State (Bundesstaat) 
The name “Federal Republic of Germany” (Bundesrepublik Deutschland) already 
indicates that the country has a federal constitutional structure.  This notion is further 
embedded in the Basic Law as one of the fundamental principles that can never be 
amended.61  In Article 20 (1) it is stipulated that the Federal Republic of Germany is a 
federal state (ein Bundesstaat).  The principle of a federal state includes the structural 
division of the country into Länder (the member states) and the Bund (the central or 
national state).  Due to the fact that this principle is protected absolutely in the Basic 
Law, the constitutional division of the country into Länder and the Bund may never 
be amended.62 
 
The federal state principle further includes a constitutional division of functions 
between the various constituent units (Articles 70 – 82). The Länder have 
constitutionally allocated powers, for example, they participate in the federal 
legislative process through the Bundesrat (Articles 50 – 51) and the Bund has a duty 
towards the Länder (Article 28 (3)).  The Länder, that have own legislative, executive 
and judicial institutions, thus have a certain “state quality” and can not be seen as 
administrative extensions of the Bund.63  The constitutional order in the Länder must 
adhere to the fundamental principles of the republican, democratic and social state 
governed by the rule of law.64 Article 79 (3) guarantees the participation of the 
Länder in the legislative process, and implies that they should have some 
constitutionally allocated legislative competence of their own.  It further implies that 
the Länder should also take part in the federal legislative process.65 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
60 This will be discussed in detail in Ch 5. 
61 Art. 79 (3) of the Basic Law.   
62 Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 84. 
63 Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 85; Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence 75. 
64 Art 28 of the Basic Law. 
65 Dürig Introduction to the Basic Law 21. The division of functions will be discussed in detail in Ch 4. 
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An unwritten constitutional principle, that is arguably part of the federal state 
principle in the Basic Law, is Bundestreue, or federal loyalty of the constituent units 
towards the federal state.  Bundestreue is an expression of the Bundesstaat principle 
that compels both the Bund and the Länder to federal-friendly conduct.66  It does not 
only apply to the interaction between the Bund and the Länder, but also to the Länder 
amongst themselves.67 
 
An important element of the federal state principle, and particularly in the context of 
this dissertation, is that there is a constitutional division of financial powers and 
functions between the Bund and the Länder (Articles 104 – 115).  This is a core 
element of the German constitutional system.68  The practical application of 
Bundestreue is quite evident when exercising financial powers and functions.69  This 
underlines the overarching role of the federal state principle in the Basic Law. 
 
The principle of a federal state suggests the creation of federal organs of state, and 
Germany is no exception.  Without reducing the importance of the other federal 
institutions, two are quite relevant to the development of the financial constitution, 
which is an important focus of this dissertation.  These two institutions are the 
Bundesrat and the Bundesverfassungsgericht (the Federal Constitutional Court).  The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht is the highest court in the country and therefore has the 
final word in any constitutional dispute between organs of state, this includes disputes 
concerning the application of the financial constitution.  The Bundesrat, being the 
federal legislative organ that represents the interests of the Länder, plays an important 
role in the federal legislative process, including the processes concerning financial 
legislation.  It is through the Bundesrat that the Länder can influence federal tax 
matters and the division of federal revenue. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
66 Bayer Die Bundestreue (1961) 126. 
67 Von Münch Staatsrecht (1993) 238; Bayer Bundestreue 126. 
68 The division of financial powers and functions is the subject of Ch 4. 
69 See e g the first Financial Equalisation Case (1952) BVerfGE 1, 117. 
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2 2 South African constitutional system 
 
2 2 1 Historical overview 
 
The first constitution for South Africa became operational on 31 May 1910, the 
official birth date of the Union of South Africa.  The creation of this new country took 
place eight years after the signing of a peace treaty, the Treaty of Vereeniging. This 
treaty was entered into by the British Empire and the leaders of the two Boer 
republics, the Orange Free State and Transvaal (Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek).70  The 
signing of the peace treaty marked the end of the three-year long Anglo-Boer War, 
that was fought from 1899 – 1902.  As a result of this treaty the two Boer republics 
came under the jurisdiction of the British Crown.  The territory covered, and later 
known as South Africa, also included two British colonies, namely the Cape of Good 
Hope and Natal.  
 
In the years following the end of the Anglo-Boer War debate in South Africa revolved 
around the need to establish a new country that would include the above-mentioned 
four territories. The debate addressed issues regarding the nature of the new state and 
the particular relationship between the then existing four territories and a new national 
government.  The search for a new united South Africa culminated in the 
establishment of the South African National Convention in October 1908.  It was 
clear from the start of these proceedings that the aim of the various participants was to 
establish a union and not a federal system of government.71  Sir Henry de Villiers, 
President of the National Convention, referred to the search for a union of the self-
governing colonies under the British Crown in his opening address on the first day of 
the National Convention.72  The convention took place during 1908 and 1909 in 
                                                 
70 The Treaty of Vereeniging was signed in Pretoria on 31 May 1902 by Pres. S. W. Burger of the 
Transvaal, other members of his government, Acting Pres. C. R. de Wet of the Orange Free State, other 
members of his government and lord Kitchener and lord Milner, the two representatives of the British 
Government.  For a detailed account of the negotiations and signing of the Treaty see Kestell & Van 
Velden Die Vredesonderhandelinge (1909). 
71 Ebrahim The Soul of a Nation - Constitution-making in South Africa (1998) 6 – 7; Wiechers 
Staatsreg (1981) 196. 
72 Hofmeyr Minutes of Proceedings of the South African National Convention (1911) 1. 
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Durban, Cape Town and Bloemfontein, and aimed to design a constitution for South 
Africa.73   
 
The draft constitution produced by the National Convention was a form of 
constitutional agreement between the four territories.  After approval of the draft by 
the four parliaments it was presented to the British Parliament for enactment.74  The 
new country was a union under the British Empire and was thus an Act of the British 
Parliament, namely, the South Africa Act, 1909.75  It is significant to note that, 
although the new union consisted of four previously self-governing territories that 
each had to pass a parliamentary resolution to join the union, the new constitution did 
away with all the old colonial structures and the Boer republics and created in their 
place a new framework of government. In terms of this, a new national government 
was created and subsequently provincial governments were established.76  Prior to the 
National Convention there were some discussions between various political leaders 
regarding the nature of the future state, namely, whether it should follow a unitary or 
a federal constitutional model.  General Jan Smuts, one of the prominent leaders at the 
time initially favoured a federal system but feared that an American style federal 
model could lead to civil war.  He later changed his mind to favour a unitary system 
where there would be a strong central government, and suggested a model for a union 
(unitary system) of South Africa to the National Convention.77 
 
The four territories became known as four provinces within the Union and retained 
some legislative and executive authority.  Executive and legislative structures were 
created at the national level, but these institutions were still subject to the authority of 
the British Government.  The division of power between the new provinces and the 
                                                 
73 The National Convention consisted of 33 delegates from the parliaments of the four territories and 
met between October 1908 and February 1909.  See Hofmeyr National Convention v - xiv; Wiechers 
Staatsreg 198. 
74 In addition to the formal resolutions taken by the four parliaments, Natal also had a referendum on 
the question whether it should enter such a union in terms of the draft constitution.  On 16 June 1908 an 
overwhelming majority of the voters supported a proposal to join the other three territories in the 
proposed union.  See Hofmeyr National Convention vi. 
75 South Africa Act, 1909 (Edw VII c 9). 
76 Brand The Union of South Africa (1909) 54. 
77 Davenport South Africa: A Modern History (1987) 245; Thompson The Unification of South Africa 
1902 – 1910 (1959) 105. 
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Union resulted in an overwhelming weight of authority that vested in the Union.78  
The principle of parliamentary sovereignty became the basis of the South African 
constitutional system that developed since 1910.  This principle is in contrast to the 
principle of supremacy of the constitution that became the fundamental basis of the 
South African constitutional system in 1994.   
 
South Africa became independent from the British Crown in 1961 when the Republic 
of South Africa was established on 31 May 1961.79  At this time South Africa was a 
racially divided country where non-white people did not have the right to vote.  A 
system of apartheid, or separate development, for the different race groups was 
implemented by way of a range of specific legislation, for example the Natives Land 
Act of 1913 and the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959.  The South 
African Parliament adopted the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 32 
of 1961, but it was never the supreme law of the country because the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty was dominant.  The 1961-Constitution, like the South 
Africa Act, did not establish a federal system of government, but rather a unitary 
system in which the four provinces were subordinate to the national level of 
government.  The provinces each had an elected provincial council with limited 
legislative authority, while their executive consisted of an administrator and an 
executive council.  The 1961-Constitution provided for a two-chamber parliament that 
consisted of a national assembly and a senate.  The executive branch of government 
consisted of a state president, a prime minister and a cabinet appointed by him.  The 
judiciary, which was nationally organised and appointed, formed the third branch of 
government.   
 
It took more than twenty years after South Africa’s independence from Britain for 
major constitutional changes to be introduced.  During this time more and more 
voices for major changes to South Africa’s constitutional system were heard, both 
from within and from outside the country.  In an attempt to extend democracy to non-
white people, Parliament adopted a new Constitution in 1983. This introduced a new 
                                                 
78  Brand The Union of South Africa 53. 
79 A referendum was conducted in 1960 on the question of independence from Britain and the majority 
of voters elected to establish an independent republic.  See Wiechers Staatsreg 212. 
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tri-cameral system to South Africa and was based on the policy of self-determination 
for the various population groups.80   
 
It made provision for a three-chamber parliament, namely the Assembly (for whites), 
the House of Representatives (for coloureds) and the House of Delegates (for 
Indians).81  Still no provision was made for black people to vote and the system was 
still based on race.  The tri-cameral system introduced the concept of own affairs (for 
each population group) and general affairs (matters of common interest to everybody).  
The respective Houses of Parliament each had legislative competence for its own 
affairs and they shared the responsibility for general affairs.  The 1983-Constitution 
established a President’s Council that acted both as an advisory body and as arbitrator 
to rule on disputes between the Houses of Parliament.82  Each of these Houses of 
Parliament had a ministers council that acted as executives for the own affairs of that 
particular population group.  In addition there was a national cabinet chaired by the 
state president.83  There was no provision for a prime minister.   
 
Under the 1983-Constitution South Africa was still a centralised unitary state, 
although provision was made for the continued existence of the four provinces (Cape 
of Good Hope, Natal, Transvaal and the Orange Free State) and the division of 
functions for different population groups.  Power, including the taxing power, was 
still concentrated in the national government and the typical features of a federation 
were absent.  The provincial councils were abolished in 1986.84  It should be noted 
that the 1983-Constitution was not the supreme law of the country and that the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty still applied.85  The constitutional system was 
highly centralised in respect of whites, coloureds and Indians, while attempts were 
made to decentralise and devolve power to blacks.86  The policy of the South African 
Government during the seventies and eighties included the devolution of power to 
some of the black ethnic groups by way of establishing so-called homelands, some of 
                                                 
80 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1983 (Act 110 of 1983) was approved on 23 
September 1983.  See Booysen & Van Wyk Die ’83-Grondwet 24.   
81 Sec 37 of Act 110 of 1983; Booysen & Van Wyk Die ’83-Grondwet 95. 
82 Booysen & Van Wyk Die ’83-Grondwet 109, 127. 
83 Sec 19 – 21 of Act 110 of 1983. 
84 It was abolished by the Provincial Government Act 69 of 1986. 
85 Booysen & Van Wyk Die ’83-Grondwet 40. 
86 Van Wyk Introduction to the South African Constitution in Van Wyk et al (eds) Rights and 
Constitutionalism - The New South African Legal Order (1994) 133. 
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which received “independence” from South Africa (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, 
Venda and Ciskei) and others which received a more limited form of self-rule.  A 
practical consequence of this was that black people could not vote for South Africa’s 
Parliament.  It was clear that the 1983-Constitution did not create an all-inclusive 
democracy for South Africa, but it was a transitional step in South Africa’s 
constitutional development. 87  Under the Westminster system of government in South 
Africa, the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy led to no constitutional checks or 
limitations on the exercise of the power of the South African Parliament.  This meant 
that the system, characterised by parliamentary supremacy, made it easier for 
apartheid to be implemented.88 
 
Political violence in South Africa increased during the eighties and more demands 
were made for drastic changes to the constitutional system. A constitutional 
democracy that included all the people of South Africa and which made provision for 
the recognition and protection of human rights was being demanded.  Economic, 
diplomatic, cultural and sport sanctions were implemented against South Africa by a 
number of countries.  By the beginning of the last decade of the twentieth century, it 
was clear that South Africa was in dire need of radical reform and that it had to be 
done sooner rather than later.  At this time, world politics changed dramatically with 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
These events undoubtedly contributed to the climate for constitutional change in 
South Africa.   
 
Without detracting from the important role that individuals, organisations and 
political parties played in the constitutional negotiations in the early nineties, there 
were two leaders with vision who were the main actors that contributed to South 
Africa’s “peaceful revolution” during the first half of the nineties. These are F. W. de 
Klerk, State President of South Africa and leader of the National Party, and Nelson 
Mandela, leader of the major political movement outside Parliament, the African 
                                                 
87 In Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature and Others v President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others 1995 4 SA 877 (CC); 1995 10 BCLR 1289 (CC) para 7 the Court stated that the 
challenge was to change from an authoritarian system under strong central government to a 
constitutional system “establishing a constitutional State based on respect for fundamental human 
rights, with a decentralised form of government…”  This was achieved by the 1993-Constitution. 
88 Currie & De Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Vol I (2001) 50. 
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National Congress (ANC). Both played key roles in the constitutional negotiations 
between 1990 and 1993.  Mandela eventually became South Africa’s first 
democratically elected President in 1994 and De Klerk became one of two Deputy-
Presidents in a Government of National Unity. 
 
The constitutional negotiating process consisted of various stages that included a 
National Peace Accord and “talks about talks” before the actual constitutional 
negotiations took place.89  Various rounds of bilateral and multi-party negotiations 
took place during 1991 and 1992.  Eventually in March 1993 the process received 
new impetus when a multi-party planning conference set up the Multi-Party 
Negotiating Process (MPNP).90  The result of this process was an agreement that 
there will be a two-phase constitution drafting process, namely that a first or interim 
constitution would be drafted by the MPNP and that the next phase would be an 
election for a new parliament. This would act as a constitutional assembly and would 
draft the so-called final constitution.  In November 1993 the MPNP accepted a draft 
constitution with sufficient consensus and Parliament debated and formally adopted it 
in December 1993.91 
 
The constitutional concepts of regionalism and federalism were tainted by the failure 
of and discriminatory nature of separate development under the system of apartheid.92  
During the constitutional negotiations various political parties held different views 
regarding the constitutional needs of South Africa, but it is safe to state that there 
were basically two main schools of thought. One supported a strong federal-type of 
system that included fairly autonomous provinces with substantial legislative and 
executive powers entrenched in the constitution.  The main proponents of this view 
                                                 
89 A number of church, business and trade union leaders helped to create a climate of peace and 
stability within South Africa that was necessary for the further constitutional negotiation process.  This 
led to the signing of the National Peace Accord in September 1991 by all the major political groupings 
in South Africa.  De Klerk The Process of Political Negotiation: 1990 – 1993 in De Villiers (ed) Birth 
of a Constitution (1994) provides a concise overview of the main events that took place during this 
important period of South Africa’s constitutional history. 
90 The MPNP consisted of a plenary meeting of all the parties, a negotiating council and seven 
technical committees.  Ebrahim Soul of a Nation 150 – 152; De Villiers & Sindane Managing 
Constitutional Change (1996) 4 – 7.   
91 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 200 of 1993, commenced on 27 April 1994 with 
the first democratic election for the whole of South Africa. 
92 De Villiers “A constitutional scenario for regional government in South Africa: the debate continues” 
in 1993 (8) SAPR/PL 86 90. 
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were the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the Democratic Party (DP) and the National 
Party (NP) Government.  In their submissions to the Multi-Party Negotiating Process 
in May 1993, these parties expressed the view that a federal constitutional model with 
strong provincial governments and power to raise taxes at national, provincial and 
local level should be designed for South Africa.93  Prior to 1990, the NP was very 
critical of federalism, but it changed its views to support a federal-type of system or 
regionalism, as it was often referred to.  In its submission to the Multi-Party 
Negotiating Process, the NP expressed its support for a constitutional model that 
would provide for three levels of government, each with “appropriate and adequate” 
legislative and executive powers and functions, that would be entrenched in the 
constitution.94 
 
The other main school of thought supported regionalism in terms of which there 
would be regional governments (provinces) with constitutionally entrenched powers 
and functions and a strong national government that would have both concurrent 
functions with the provinces as well as overriding powers.  In other words, a strong 
central government with provinces with concurrent powers over certain provincial 
issues.  The African National Congress was the main supporter of this school of 
thought.   While the ANC initially, in 1990, proposed a unitary form of government 
that would include some delegated powers for regional and local government, it has 
later, after a study visit to Germany in 1991, supported the idea of meaningful 
regional governments with constitutionally entrenched powers that would be 
exercised concurrently with that of the national government.95  
 
The result of the constitutional negotiations at Kempton Park was a compromise that 
included a decentralised system of government consisting of three levels, namely a 
                                                 
93 DP Submission to the Multi-Party Negotiating Process Technical Committee on Constitutional 
Issues (13 May 1993); IFP Submission to the Multi-Party Negotiating Process Technical Committee on 
Constitutional Issues (18 May 1993). 
94 South African Government Principles governing constitution making in South Africa – a discussion 
document (12 May 1993) 2. 
95 ANC Submission to the Multi-Party Negotiating Process Technical Committee on Constitutional 
Issues (12 May 1993); De Villiers “A constitutional scenario for regional government” 93. 
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national government, nine provincial governments and local government.96  Another 
important feature was the inclusion of a justiciable bill of rights97 and the principle of 
supremacy of the constitution.  It also included the following federal characteristics, 
namely: 
♦ three orders of government; 
♦ distribution of legislative and executive authority (sections 59 – 62, 126, 
Schedule 6); 
♦ distribution of financial resources (sections 155 – 159); 
♦ participation by provinces in the national legislative process (section 48); 
and 
♦ a constitutional court that can be the final arbiter on constitutional disputes 
between governments (sections 98 – 100). 
 
In view of the particular distribution of legislative and executive powers between the 
national and provincial governments and the distribution of financial resources, the 
constitutional system created by the 1993-Constitution can best be described as a 
hybrid system with both federal and unitary characteristics.98   
 
The weight of legislative powers for taxation was vested in national government, 
while provinces were given a limited degree of own tax powers.  In order to fulfil 
their constitutional duties, provinces needed to have other sources of income. This 
was provided for in the form of a constitutional guarantee of “an equitable share of 
revenue collected nationally”.99  The division of revenue among the national 
government, provinces and municipalities was based on a formula that was stipulated 
in the Constitution and details had to be developed by the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission (FFC).  The basic scheme of financial intergovernmental relations 
                                                 
 
96 Sec 124 of Act 200 of 1993 established the following nine provinces: Eastern Cape, Eastern 
Transvaal (later renamed to Mpumalanga), KwaZulu-Natal; Northern Cape; Northern Transvaal (later 
renamed as Northern Province and later as Limpopo), North West, Orange Free State (later renamed as 
Free State), Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (later renamed as Gauteng) and Western Cape. 
97 Ch 3 of Act 200 of 1993. 
98 Watts Is The New Constitution Federal or Unitary? in De Villiers (ed) Birth of a Constitution 75 86; 
see also discussion under 1 1. 
99 Sec 155 of Act 200 of 1993; Basson South Africa’s Interim Constitution (1995) 224- 226. 
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developed in the 1993-Constitution, including the concept of an equitable share, was 
continued in the 1996-Constitution. 
 
An important element of the multi-party agreement reached at the MPNP at Kempton 
Park in 1993, was that the new constitution that would be drafted by the constitutional 
assembly should be tested against a set of 34 Constitutional Principles.  In view of the 
importance of the agreement on these Constitutional Principles, it is referred to as a 
“solemn pact” between the negotiating parties and being “foundational to the new 
constitution”.100  This created the framework within which the elected Constitutional 
Assembly had to work to draft a new text and it was also the yardstick against which 
the new Constitution had to be measured before the Constitutional Court would 
certify it.101 
 
Two years after receiving submissions and negotiating a new constitutional text the 
Constitutional Assembly eventually adopted the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, Act 108 of 1996, on 8 May 1996.  In the first round before the Constitutional 
Court, the text did not fully comply with the requirements of the Constitutional 
Principles and it was referred back to the Constitutional Assembly.  Despite the fact 
that a variety of issues were argued before the Constitutional Court, much attention 
was given to the particular relationship between the national and provincial 
governments.  The non-compliance of the constitutional text to Constitutional 
Principle XVIII. 2 (the scope of provincial powers) was one of the reasons for the 
Court’s refusal to certify.102  An amended text was adopted on 11 October 1996 in 
                                                 
100 In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC); 
1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC) (First certification case) para 15; Ebrahim Soul of a Nation 178; Van Wyk 
“’n Paar opmerkings en vrae oor die nuwe Grondwet” 1997 (60) THRHR 377 381; Basson Interim 
Constitution 365; De Villiers The Constitutional Principles: Content and Significance in De Villiers 
(ed) Birth of a Constitution 37 41. 
101 First certification case paras 16 – 18; Erasmus & De Waal “Die Finale Grondwet: Legitimiteit en 
Ontstaan” 1997 (1) Stell LR 31 41. 
102 First certification case para 471.  Constitutional Principle XVIII.2: “The powers and functions of 
the provinces defined in the Constitution, including the competence of a provincial legislature to adopt 
a constitution for its province, shall not be substantially less than or substantially inferior to those 
provided for in this Constitution.” 
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accordance with the judgement in the First certification case, whereafter the 
Constitutional Court certified the new text on 4 December 1996.103 
 
The essential structural features of the 1993-Constitution were retained in the new 
1996-Constitution, however it was not a mere amendment to the former but rather a 
completely new text.  The most important characteristics of the 1996-Constitution are: 
♦ Supremacy of the Constitution104; 
♦ A justiciable bill of rights105; 
♦ Three spheres of government, namely national, provincial and local 
government106; 
♦ A division of powers and functions among the three spheres of 
government107; 
♦ Co-operative government as overarching guiding principle for 
intergovernmental relations108; 
♦ A system of financial intergovernmental relations109; and 
♦ A constitutional court as final arbiter in constitutional disputes between 
spheres of government110. 
 
Specific provision is made for provincial and, to a limited extent, local representation 
in the national legislative sphere of government.  The National Council of Provinces, 
modelled to a large degree on the German Bundesrat, was created as a second 
chamber of Parliament and was designed to act as a house where provincial interest is 
represented.111  Provinces are represented by multi-party delegations of ten each. 
These ten consist of six permanent and four special delegates.  Although provision is 
                                                 
103 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Amended Text of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC) (Second certification case) 
para 204; Ebrahim Soul of Nation 232 – 235. 
104 Sec 1,2 of Act 108 of 1996. 
105 Sec 7 – 39. 
106 Sec 40. 
107 Various provisions spread through the Constitution stipulate the detail of this division, e g sec 43, 
44, 85, 104, 125, 142 – 145, 153, 156 and Schedules 4 and 5.  See the discussion of the allocation of 
powers and functions to the various spheres of government in Ch 4. 
108 Sec 41. 
109 Sec 213 – 230. 
110 Sec 166 – 167. 
111 Sec 60; see discussion in Ch 4. 
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made for voting as a province on provincial matters, the practical realities of political 
party discipline and current support of political parties contribute to the fact that the 
National Council of Provinces has not yet developed to its full potential as a house 
representing provincial interest. 
 
There was a deliberate change in wording from the 1993-Constitution to the 1996-
Constitution in the description of the orders of government in an attempt to move 
away from the traditionally rigid hierarchical description of levels of government.  
The constitutional order is now formally described as consisting of three spheres of 
government, namely national, provincial and local government. This suggests some 
degree of autonomy for the different spheres.112  Although government in South 
Africa consists of three spheres, the main emphasis in the 1996-Constitution, as well 
as in practice, is on the national government and provincial governments and their 
particular relationships.  The functioning of these two spheres as well as their mutual 
relationship is an essential focus of this thesis. 
 
2 2 2 Fundamental principles of the South African constitutional system 
 
The principles on which the South African constitutional system, as described in the 
1996-Constitution, are based can be traced back to the 34 Constitutional Principles 
agreed to at the Multi-Party Negotiating Process in Kempton Park in 1993.113  This 
groundbreaking agreement not only mapped the way for the next phase in constitution 
making, but also laid down fundamental principles for the new constitutional system.  
These Constitutional Principles can be divided into different categories according to 
the issues dealt with, namely: 
 
♦ Supremacy of the constitution and the Rechtsstaat; 
♦ Bill of rights issues; 
♦ Separation of powers; 
                                                 
112 Sec 40. 
113 Schedule 4 to Act 200 of 1993; De Villiers The Constitutional Principles – Content and 
Significance in De Villiers (ed) Birth of a Constitution 37; Venter “Requirements for a new 
constitutional text: the imperatives of the constitutional principles” 1995 (32) SALJ 32 et seq. 
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♦ Structural elements of government, division of powers and the 
intergovernmental relationship; 
♦ Financial intergovernmental relations; 
♦ Creation of independent institutions supporting democracy; 
♦ Neutrality of security forces; and 
♦ Transitional arrangements. 
 
Formally, the Constitutional Principles were repealed when the 1996-Constitution was 
promulgated, but it is clear that the spirit of these principles continues to exist.  The 
Constitutional Court hinted at the future influence of the Constitutional Principles 
when it referred to them as “broad constitutional strokes on the canvas of constitution 
making in the future.”114 
 
Section 1 of the 1996-Constitution contains the fundamental values on which the 
Constitution is based.  These values are human dignity, equality and the promotion of 
human rights; non-racialism and non-sexism; supremacy of the constitution and the 
rule of law; regular elections based on universal adult suffrage and a multi-party 
system of democratic government to ensure accountability, responsiveness and 
openness.  These founding principles form the value base of the Constitution and act 
as guidance to the interpretation of the Constitution.115  In addition to these 
foundational values there is another set of principles in the Constitution that plays a 
crucial role in the new constitutional order in South Africa, namely the principles of 
co-operative government and intergovernmental relations.116 
 
The values contained in section 1, due to their fundamental nature, should be less 
vulnerable to constitutional amendments and therefore deserve stricter protection than 
other provisions of the Constitution.  Although not absolutely entrenched as the 
fundamental principles of the German Basic Law are, they do enjoy a high level of 
protection.117   Only section 1 and section 74 (amendment clause) require a 75% 
majority of the members of the National Assembly and six provinces in the National 
                                                 
114 First certification case para 36; Van Wyk 1997 (60) THRHR 381. 
115 Malherbe “Die wysiging van die grondwet: die oorspoel-imperatief van artikel 1” in 1999 (2) TSAR 
191. 
116 Sec 41.  See discussion under 2 3 . 
117 Art 79 (3) of the Basic Law.  See also the discussion under 2 1 2. 
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Council of Provinces to agree to an amendment before it can be made.118  Other 
constitutional amendments can be made using less strict requirements. 
 
The foundational values in section 1 can be grouped into three “principles”, namely  
♦ Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law; 
♦ Human rights; and 
♦ Democracy. 
 
 
Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law 
This fundamental value is reiterated in section 2 where the supremacy of the 
Constitution is set beyond doubt.  Any law or conduct inconsistent with the 
Constitution is invalid.  The rule of law or the Rechtsstaat is an overarching 
characteristic of this Constitution.  This provision provides the formal basis of 
constitutionalism in South Africa.  It directs all state action, including the judiciary, 
the legislative and executive branches of government.   
 
The concept of the Rechtsstaat as it was developed in German constitutional law is 
now also a cornerstone of the South African constitutional order.  The South African 
Constitution contains the following main elements of a modern Rechtsstaat: 
♦ Supremacy of the constitution; 
♦ Equality before the law, distribution of authority and judicial control over 
the exercise of authority; and 
♦ The constitutional protection of fundamental human rights.119 
 
 
Human rights 
The first two fundamental values in section 1, namely “human dignity, the 
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms, and non-
racialism and non-sexism”, are clearly human rights related values.  A full chapter, 
                                                 
118 First certification case para 153. 
119 See Wiechers “Grondslae van die Moderne Rechtsstaat/Foundations of the Modern Rechtsstaat” in 
1998 (61) THRHR 624 for a discussion of the Rechtsstaat with reference to the current South African 
constitutional order. 
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Chapter 2, on human rights is contained in the 1996-Constitution.  It contains not only 
first and second generation rights, but also some socio-economic rights, such as the 
right to have access to adequate housing and the right to have access to health care 
services.120  Further effect is given to human rights values by the establishment of 
three separate constitutional institutions, namely the Human Rights Commission, the 
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and 
Linguistic Communities and the Commission for Gender Equality.121 
 
Democracy 
Section 1 starts by referring to South Africa as a democratic state and then lists a few 
elements of democracy, in particular it mentions elections and the way in which 
government functions.  Every adult has the right to vote in regular elections and a 
constitutional guarantee is given for a multi-party system of government.  This is not 
only inherent in a democracy, but also provides one of the checks on government that 
is required under constitutionalism.  Provision for a multi-party system of government 
at least lays the basis for opposition parties to exist and to play an important role in 
keeping government on its toes. 
 
The values that specifically relate to the way in which government should function, 
namely accountability, responsiveness and openness are not only stipulated in section 
1, but are echoed in other provisions in the Constitution as well.  One of these 
provisions that is central to the financial administration of all governments in the 
country is section 215, that requires that budgets and budgetary processes must 
promote accountability, transparency and effective financial management. 
 
2 3 Co-operative federalism 
 
Both Germany and South Africa currently have decentralised systems of government 
that fall within the wide range of modern federal systems.122  In the Basic Law this is 
very explicitly stated in the title of the document as well as in Article 20, where the 
                                                 
120 Sec 26 and 27. 
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existence of a federal state is determined.  The fact that there are different levels of 
government is supported by other provisions of the Basic Law as well, such as Article 
28 (federal guarantee of Land constitutions and local government) and Article 79 (3) 
(absolute protection of the division of the Federation into Länder). 
 
In the case of South Africa, the description of the nature of the system of government 
is not so explicitly formulated as in the Basic Law, but various provisions of the 1996-
Constitution contribute to the formulation of the South African constitutional system.  
Section 40, describes government in South Africa as “national, provincial and local 
spheres of government, which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated.”  This 
is a clear indication of a decentralised system of government.  Detailed provisions on 
provincial and local government and the distribution of legislative and executive 
competences among the three spheres further supports the notion of a decentralised 
system of government.123 
 
As noted before in the introductory part of this study, Wheare’s view of federalism is 
rather narrow and perhaps outdated.  He described essentially a system of competitive 
federalism, where the different levels of government function independently from one 
another.124  In this definition, no space is left for co-operation between the different 
levels of government.  Elazar, on the other hand, stated that federalism includes a 
commitment to partnership and co-operation as well as respect for the integrity of 
each constituent unit.125  This is particularly true about modern federal systems, the 
scope of which includes a variety of organisational arrangements.  In fact, the scope 
of federal arrangements is so wide that one can perhaps argue that each federal system 
is sui generis.   
 
According to De Villiers federalism includes “a civil and political culture that is 
simultaneously conducive to power-sharing and to autonomy, exhibits a tolerance 
towards diversity and experimentation, and provides for a managerial style that 
respects and cherishes the importance of co-operation and consultation between 
                                                 
123 Eg sec 44, 104, 156 and Schedules 4 and 5. 
124 Wheare Federal Government (1956) 11. 
125 Elazar Federalism: an Overview 2. 
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different levels of government.”126  This is in addition to the legal framework 
provided in a constitution.   
 
Simeon's recent discussion on the categories of modern federal systems where he 
distinguishes between two models, namely the divided federal model and the 
integrated federal model, provides a useful basis for discussions regarding current 
federal systems.127  In terms of his analysis, Canada is a good example of the divided 
model.  Germany, on the other hand, is perhaps the best example of an integrated or 
co-operative federal system.128  The specific allocation of powers to the different 
spheres of government in a particular constitutional system gives rise to the question 
about the interaction between the various spheres.  In other words, how do they relate 
to or interact with each other?  Practical necessity often dictates that the various 
constituent units co-operate with each other in executing their duties as 
governments.129  In the case of both Germany and South Africa, it is evident that the 
particular constitutional design requires co-operative behaviour between the various 
constituent units.  South Africa's constitutional system, with its emphasis on 
concurrency and co-operative government, clearly relates to the co-operative or 
integrated federal model.130   
 
The federal state principle in the Basic Law, referred to under 2 1 2, includes the way 
in which the Bund and the Länder interact with each other.  Due to the particular 
division of functions between these two spheres of government and the participation 
of the Länder in the federal legislative process, co-operation is a practical necessity.  
The principle of Bundestreue, which is essential to co-operative federalism, describes 
the relationship between the Bund and the Länder. 
 
Bundestreue is defined by De Villiers as  
                                                 
126 De Villiers Bundestreue: The Soul of an Intergovernmental Partnership in Occasional Papers 
(March 1995) 4. 
127 Simeon "Considerations on the design of federations: the South African constitution in comparative 
context" 1998 (13) SAPR/PL  42 50. 
128 Simeon 1998 (13) SAPR/PL 55. 
129 First Certification Case para 290. 
130 Simeon 1998 (13) SAPR/PL 68.  See also discussion of federal issues under 1 1 3. 
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“the duty of national and regional governments within a federal state to take 
each other’s interests into account in the exercise of their respective 
responsibilities.”131 
 
An essential element of this principle is mutual trust and respect between the 
respective governments within the federal state.  Although not stipulated explicitly in 
the Basic Law, Bundestreue is a fundamental principle of the German constitutional 
system.  It has its origin in the Constitution of the German Empire of 1871.  When the 
southern states joined the North German Bund to form the German Empire 
agreements or treaties were concluded between them.  These treaties were based on 
Vertragstreue or treaty trust.132  The principle of Bundestreue was not explicitly 
described in the 1871-Constitution, but formed part of the unwritten constitutional law 
of Germany.   
 
The German Constitutional Court, Bundesverfassungsgericht, was instrumental in 
developing Bundestreue as a significant constitutional principle in modern Germany.  
It is recognised as a fundamental unwritten constitutional norm (Verfassungsnorm) 
that places a duty on both the Bund and the Länder to act in good faith towards each 
other in a friendly relationship (Pflicht zu bundesfreundlichen Verhalten).133 
Bundestreue is the glue that binds the Bund and the Länder in a federal 
intergovernmental relationship.  The Bundesverfassungsgericht in one of its first cases 
concluded that this unwritten constitutional principle of Bundestreue governs the 
relations between the Bund and the Länder as well as between the respective Länder.  
It implies a constitutional obligation on both the Bund and the Länder that is essential 
for the effective functioning of the constitutional arrangements under the Basic 
Law.134 
 
Apart from the Bundesrat and other intergovernmental institutions where the Länder 
co-operate with each other, or with the Bund as the case may be, Bundestreue is of 
particular importance in the development of the financial constitution of Germany.  In 
                                                 
131 De Villiers Bundestreue 6. 
132 De Villiers Bundestreue 10. 
133 De Villiers Bundestreue 15; Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 94. 
134 BVerfGE 1, 299 315; De Villiers Bundestreue 15, Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 95. 
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a federal system where there is an uneven distribution of resources, both vertically 
and horizontally, it is essential that the various governments interact with each other 
in a spirit of mutual trust and respect.  Article 107 of the Basic Law lays down the 
basis for financial equalisation and inter alia requires the consent of the Bundesrat to 
pass a federal law on financial equalisation.  Clearly, Bundestreue plays a central role 
in this instance.  The Bundesverfassungsgericht realised this in an early decision on 
financial equalisation when it concluded that  
 
“the equalisation statute would offend the federal principle if it would weaken 
the [financial] capacity of the contributing states or lead to a financial levelling 
of the states.”135 
 
In the development of South Africa’s new constitutional order, attention was already 
given to intergovernmental relations at the Multi-Party Negotiating Process in 1993.  
A number of the Constitutional Principles agreed to in this process provided the 
framework for the future constitutional design of intergovernmental relations in South 
Africa.  It was perhaps not realised at the time, but the seed of Bundestreue was 
planted at this point.  Constitutional Principle XXII for example stipulated that  
 
“The national government shall not exercise its powers (exclusive or 
concurrent) so as to encroach upon the geographical, functional or institutional 
integrity of the provinces.”136 
 
An important difference between the 1993-Constitution and the 1996-Constitution is 
the fact that in the 1993-Constitution nothing was said about the way the three levels 
of government had to interact with each other.  However, in the 1996-Constitution the 
position changed and in fact a separate chapter on cooperative government and 
intergovernmental relations was included, making it clear that the South African 
constitutional system is characterised by a cooperative relationship among the three 
spheres of government. 
                                                 
135 BVerfGE 1, 117 131; De Villiers Bundestreue 17; Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence 91. 
136 Schedule 4 of Act 200 of 1993. 
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  The influence of German constitutional law on the shape of South Africa’s new 
constitutional system was quite strong, in particular in the period between 1994 and 
1996 when the Constitutional Assembly designed the current Constitution.  This is 
evident, for example, in the provisions that established the National Council of 
Provinces and the allocation of exclusive and concurrent legislative and executive 
powers to the various spheres of government.  In view of the legal imperative of the 
Constitutional Principles, provision had to be made in the 1996-Constitution for 
specific provisions governing intergovernmental relations.  The principle of 
Bundestreue, as it has developed in German constitutional law, was used as the 
foundation for the inclusion of chapter 3 of the 1996-Constitution on principles of co-
operative government and intergovernmental relations.137  This set of principles is 
foundational to the functioning of South Africa’s constitutional system.  The 
Constitutional Court confirmed that it was appropriate to co-operative government.138 
 
The 1996-Constitution creates various centres of competence within the constitutional 
order.  The reference to three spheres of government in section 40 not only indicates a 
move away from a traditional hierarchical structure, but also suggests some form of 
constitutional autonomy that recognises the integrity of each sphere of government.  
This is confirmed by the principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental 
relations listed in section 41 (1), namely: 
 
“All spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must – 
(a) preserve the peace, the national unity and the indivisibility of the Republic; 
(b) secure the well-being of the people of the Republic; 
(c) provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government for the 
Republic as a whole; 
(d) be loyal to the Constitution, the Republic and its people; 
(e) respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of 
government in other spheres; 
                                                                                                                                            
137 Eight principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental relations are included in sec 41 
(1) of Act 108 of 1996; Haysom Federal Features of the Final Constitution in Andrews & Ellmann The 
Post-Apartheid Constitutions (2001) 504 514. 
138 First Certification Case para 289. 
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(f) not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms 
of the Constitution; 
(g)  exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not 
encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of 
government in another sphere; and 
(h) co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by – 
(i) fostering friendly relations; 
(ii) assisting and supporting one another; 
(iii) informing one another of, and consulting one another on matters of 
common interest; 
(iv) co-ordinating their actions and legislation with one another; 
(v) adhering to agreed procedures; and 
(vi) avoiding legal proceedings against one another.” 
 
These principles are applicable to all intergovernmental relationships, whether they 
are bilateral or multi-lateral, informal or formal such as in the National Council of 
Provinces.  Similar to the position in Germany these principles also play an important 
role in the financial intergovernmental relations in South Africa.  The Budget Council 
and the Financial and Fiscal Commission are two important institutions that play a 
key role in the development and functioning of financial intergovernmental relations 
in South Africa. 
 
The Budget Council was formally established in 1997 by the Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Relations Act.139  This intergovernmental forum consists of the Minister of Finance, 
who chairs the Budget Council, and the Member of the Executive Council responsible 
for finance of each province.  The Budget Council, which is a consultative body, 
meets regularly throughout the year to discuss intergovernmental financial matters, 
such as the annual division of revenue.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
139 Sec 2 of Act 97 of 1997.  These persons together with the top officials in the National Treasury and 
the nine provincial treasuries refer to themselves as “Team Finance”.  See Ajam The evolution of 
devolution: fiscal decentralisation in South Africa in Abedian & Biggs Economic globalization and 
fiscal policy (1998) 54 69.  See discussion of the role of the Budget Council in the financial 
equalisation process under 6 3.  
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The Financial and Fiscal Commission was established under the 1993-Constitution as 
an independent advisory body on intergovernmental financial and fiscal matters.140  
The FFC plays an instrumental role in the process of the distribution of revenue 
between the national, provincial and local spheres of government as well as between 
the provinces.  Under the 1996-Constitution continuity was ensured by the 
confirmation in section 220 (1) that “there is a Financial and Fiscal Commission for 
the Republic of South Africa”.  The constitutional provisions are supplemented by the 
Financial and Fiscal Commission Act, 1997.141  The members of the Commission are 
appointed by the President and include a chairperson and deputy chairperson and 
seven other persons.142   
 
Co-operation among the different role players as well as mutual trust and respect is 
essential for the effective exercise of South Africa’s financial intergovernmental 
relations.  Financial equalisation, as envisaged by section 214 of the Constitution, 
requires a great deal of co-operation between the various governments. 
 
It is evident from the above discussion that co-operative federalism is a common 
characteristic of both the German and South African constitutional systems, although 
in South Africa the term “co-operative government” is used to describe the nature of 
intergovernmental relations.  The application of this notion to the development of the 
financial constitution in both countries is of particular value to this dissertation. 
 
 
140 Sec 199 of Act 200 of 1993; Mokgoro Interprovincial Fiscal Equalization: The Role of the 
Financial and Fiscal Commission in De Villiers (ed) Birth of a Constitution (1994) 281 285. 
141 Act 99 of 1997.  See discussion of the role of the FFC under 6 2 and 6 3. 
142 Initially the FFC included nine persons nominated by the provinces, two persons nominated by 
organized local government and nine other persons, but the Constitution was amended in 2001 (Act 61 
of 2001) in order to have a smaller Commission.   
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Chapter 3 Economic and financial considerations in the design of 
decentralised systems 
 
3 1 Public finance 
 
According to traditional economic theory public finance includes both expenditure 
and revenue issues relating to the functioning of government.1  Within this definition 
matters such as the allocation of resources, distribution of income and economic 
growth are also included.  Although Musgrave's framework for public finance is 
based on a unitary system of government, the majority of economic theories on 
decentralised systems use this framework as the standard for the evaluation of 
decentralised systems.  In this chapter an overview of economic considerations 
relating to expenditure as well as revenue allocation in the design of decentralised 
systems of government will be provided.  Musgrave's widely used framework for 
public finance forms a useful point of departure for this discussion. 
 
Musgrave describes the public economy of an imaginary state in terms of a fiscal 
department with three branches, namely the Allocation, Distribution and Stabilisation 
                                                 
1 Musgrave The Theory of Public Finance (1959) 3. 
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Branches.2  In terms of this framework the Allocation Branch is responsible for 
determining the allocation of resources, adjustments required, the cost implications 
and deciding on the applicable revenue and expenditure policies.  The Distribution 
Branch is responsible for adjustments in the distribution of income and wealth, while 
the Stabilisation Branch has the responsibility for ensuring economic stabilisation 
throughout the state.  Although their functions are clearly defined, these branches are 
fundamentally interdependent.  Ajam argues that when this framework is applied to a 
decentralised system of government a further function should be added, namely the 
constitutional function.  This refers to the assignment of functions and responsibilities 
to the various levels of government.3 
 
In applying the above approach to a federal or multi-level system of government, 
Musgrave described a system consisting of two levels of government, namely a 
federal and a state level, where decisions are taken at both levels and all individuals 
are citizens of both levels of government.4  Oates defines "federalism" as a system of 
government that consists of two or more levels of government where decision-making 
regarding the provision of public services, takes place at both levels.5  In terms of this 
approach, he argues that in economic terms most systems of government are federal in 
nature, but that they vary in terms of degree of centralisation or decentralisation.  
According to Oates, "federalism" accommodates the notion of different preferences 
for public services by consumers in various regions. This leads to a variety of public 
services, or at least to a varying degree in the level of public services provided in the 
various regions.  In her discussion on the evolving system of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations in South Africa, Ajam describes "fiscal federalism" as the structure of public 
finances in a multi-tier system of government that includes issues relating to the 
                                                                                                                                            
2 Musgrave Public Finance 5. 
3 Ajam The Evolution of devolution: fiscal decentralisation in South Africa in Abedian & Biggs 
Economic globalization and fiscal policy (1998) 54 79. 
4 Musgrave Public Finance 179.  See also Musgrave Public Finance in a Democratic Society (Vol II) 
(1986) 3 - 8 for a discussion on multi-level finance.   
5 Oates Federalism and Government Finance in Quigley & Smolensky (eds) Modern Public Finance 
(1994) 127; Oates Fiscal Federalism (1993) 14 - 17; Oates The Political Economy of Fiscal 
Federalism (1977) 4. 
 
 
 
 71
allocation of taxing, spending and regulatory functions to the various levels of 
government and the transfer of funds between them.6   
 
In the field of political science, the concept of "federalism" has evolved over time 
from a fairly narrow definition according to Wheare to a more inclusive notion that 
covers a variety of multi-level systems of government.  Wheare described a federal 
system of government as one that consists of two independent levels of government 
with powers being divided between the two.7  Currently a commonly accepted 
approach, as developed by constitutional experts that include Elazar, Watts and 
Simeon, is that "federalism" includes a wide range of various multi-level systems of 
government.8  Simeon suggests that each federation seems to be sui generis in view of 
political and other factors that when combined with the basic federal design, impact 
on the nature and functioning of the federal system.9 
 
In terms of Musgrave's framework, public services are provided by both levels of 
government. Some services are provided throughout the country by the federal 
government while other services are provided by each state or region for its respective 
area of jurisdiction.  Services such as defence, that benefit the whole country, are 
provided at national level, while public services such as refuse removal, that have a 
local impact, are provided at local level.10  It follows that services provided at 
national level should be paid for with taxes levied on a nation-wide basis, while 
locally provided services should be financed by local taxes.  This is in line with the 
economic principle of benefit finance that stipulates that services provided by any 
jurisdiction should be paid for by the members of that jurisdiction. 11   
                                                
 
This economic framework provides that taxes are levied at the federal as well as the 
regional12 level of government, and assumes that regional taxes may differ from one 
region to another, in order to fund the public services provided within that 
 
6 Ajam Fiscal decentralisation in South Africa 54. 
7 Wheare Federal Government (1956) 11. 
8 For a discussion on the terms "federalism" and "federal system" see 1 1 3. 
9 Simeon "Considerations on the design of federations: the South African constitution in comparative 
context” 1998 (13) SAPR/PL 42 50. 
10 Musgrave uses a two level model of government, namely a federal and a state or regional level.  His 
reference here to the local level is thus a reference to the state or regional level of government. 
11 Musgrave Public Finance in a Democratic Society (Vol III) (2000) 411. 
12 In this Chapter the term "region" is used as reference to a province/state/Land. 
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jurisdiction.  Musgrave further argued that the people living in various states or 
regions could express different preferences for public services.  This may lead to 
differences in the levels of public services provided and taxation levied at state level. 
This issue falls within the sphere of the Allocation Branch.  Musgrave concluded his 
discussion on fiscal federalism by stating, "The heart of fiscal federalism thus lies in 
the proposition that the policies of the Allocation Branch should be permitted to differ 
between states, depending on the preferences of their citizens.  The objectives of the 
Distribution and Stabilisation Branches, however, require primary responsibility at 
central level."13  This conclusion by Musgrave is supported in literature by 
economists such as King and Oates.14   
                                                
 
It would be fair to state that macro-economic stability and policies for the 
redistribution of wealth and income are primarily functions of a central government, 
while the accommodation of a variety of consumer preferences, for the provision of 
public goods, is best at the sub-national government level.  In a more recent 
publication, Musgrave described the allocation of functions in modern multi-level 
systems of government and concluded that a decentralised provision of public goods 
paid for by those who benefit from them, together with a centralised distribution 
policy seems to be the most appropriate design for these systems.15  This approach to 
fiscal federalism provides some guidance for the design of decentralised systems of 
government when considering the allocation of expenditure and the revenue functions 
of the various levels of government.   
 
Economic literature generally suggests that in decentralised systems the allocation of 
expenditure responsibilities takes place before the allocation of revenue sources due 
to the uncertainty of the quantum of revenue required at regional or local level.  It 
might, however, be useful to consider the allocation of both expenditure 
responsibilities and revenue sources simultaneously in order to improve the matching 
of expenditure and revenue sources at regional government level.16  Be that as it may, 
 
13 Musgrave Public Finance 181. 
14 Oates Federalism and Government Finance 129; Oates Political Economy 5 - 6; King Fiscal Tiers: 
The Economics of Multi-Level Government (1984) 36. 
15 Musgrave Democratic Society (Vol III) 333. 
16 Shah The Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Developing and Emerging Market 
Economies (1994) 9. 
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it is essential that the issue of revenue assignment not be discussed in isolation and 
that the allocation of expenditure responsibilities be closely involved in the 
discussions. 
 
In the discussion below, the general trend found in economic literature will be 
followed, namely a discussion about expenditure allocation followed by revenue 
allocation. The issue of revenue sharing and intergovernmental grants will also be 
discussed. 
 
3 2 Expenditure allocation 
 
The provision of public goods, for example education or health services, is the 
primary responsibility of the government while the consumers or citizens pay for it by 
way of taxes.  According to basic economic theory concerning multi-level systems, 
the residents of the area that benefit from the service should pay for it.17  In line with 
this basic economic theory, Oates, in his discussion on decentralisation in federal 
systems, stated that a decentralised solution to the question of resource allocation and 
the provision of public services is the preferred option for a federal system.18  This 
implies that sub-national governments are better placed to take care of the variety of 
local demands when providing public services within their respective jurisdictions.  
The validity of this approach depends on two conditions, namely the absence of any 
spill over effects and existing economies of scale.  Spill over effects would occur 
when one sub-national government delivers services that people from another area 
also use without paying for the services. An example of this is where an advanced 
hospital attracts patients from outside the area in which it operates.  Economies of 
scale can be created if the central government provides a service, which can be 
provided by the various sub-national governments, at a more cost-effective basis.   
 
Oates' decentralisation theory further provides for a decentralised system of 
government consisting of multiple levels of government, where each government is 
responsible for the provision of public services in the most efficient manner for 
                                                 
17 Musgrave Democratic Society (Vol III) 331. 
18 Oates Political Economy 5 - 6, Oates Fiscal Federalism 35 - 38. 
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consumers within their respective jurisdictions.  Local provision of services is 
efficient if the benefits are local, for example the provision of household water.  If 
benefits are gained countrywide, the service required may be provided more 
efficiently at the national level.19 In practical terms, it implies that the functions of 
defence and foreign affairs should be allocated to the national level of government, 
while functions, where different needs of consumers must be accommodated and 
where services can be performed more efficiently on a decentralised basis, such as 
education, health and police, should be allocated to the regional level of government.   
 
This economic framework for the allocation of expenditure functions thus suggests 
that functions should be allocated to the lowest possible level of government if such 
level of government can perform such functions efficiently.20  Realities such as 
differences in economic strength, fiscal capacity or social welfare issues of the 
various sub-national governments however cast some shadows over this theoretical 
framework. These realities clearly need to be considered when decisions are made 
regarding the constitutional allocation of expenditure responsibilities and revenue 
sources.21 
 
3 2 1 Advantages of decentralised provision of public goods 
 
Regional and local governments, due to their close proximity to the citizens or 
consumers within their areas of jurisdiction, generally have more information about 
the needs and preferences of their citizens than the national government has.  They 
can thus package the provision of services more accurately in accordance with their 
consumer’s preferences.  This is an attractive economic perspective, as it would lead 
to a more efficient provision of public services.22  Regional and local governments, 
being closer to the people, are thus more likely to produce a variety of public goods 
with a varying degree of quality and quantity in order to accommodate consumer 
preferences.  If the same service, for example primary education, is provided at the 
                                                 
19 Musgrave Democratic Society (Vol III) 331. 
20 Shah Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 9, Musgrave Democratic Society (Vol III) 331.  See 1 2 for 
a brief discussion of the subsidiarity principle, which has some bearing on the arguments raised in the 
literature about the economic theory of fiscal federalism. 
21 Musgrave Democratic Society (Vol III) 332. 
22 Ajam Fiscal decentralisation in South Africa 93. 
 
 75
national government level and not at the regional or local level, the variety of 
consumer preferences cannot be accommodated since uniform centralised policy 
requires that uniformity in the provision of the service must exist throughout the 
country. This may result in a loss of efficiency.  Economic efficiency is enhanced 
when a government is more responsive to the preferences of its citizens in the 
provision of public services.23   
 
When public services are delivered at differing levels of quality and quantity by 
various regional or local governments, consumers are left to decide which package of 
public services best suit their needs.  The theoretical model for provision of public 
services by sub-national governments developed by Tiebout (1956) suggests that the 
citizens or consumers can vote with their feet by moving to the community or region 
that best reflects their preferences.  This model presupposes complete mobility of 
citizens between the various jurisdictions.  In practice there are, however, a number of 
factors that impact on this model.  In a country like South Africa, where there are 
huge socio-economic disparities and other differences between the various provinces, 
factors such as poverty, fiscal capacity and administrative ability of provinces and 
municipalities to deliver public services have a significant influence on the mobility 
of the citizens or consumers. This also impacts on the economic efficiency of the 
provision of public services.   
 
Another advantage is enhanced competition and innovation.  Decentralised provision 
of public services and decentralised decision-making leads to healthy competition 
between various regional or local governments.  Competitive pressures in turn lead to 
more innovation in search for new and improved ways of providing public services.  
Centralisation of functions generally provides little scope for experimentation and 
innovation for the provision of public services and can easily lead to rigid practices 
being implemented.24  In their endeavours to search for improved efficiency for the 
provision of public services, regional and local governments can experiment with new 
techniques of production that may result in lower costs than would be possible at the 
                                                 
23 Wellisch The Theory of Public Finance in a Federal State (2000) 14; Oates Fiscal Federalism 13; 
Oates Political Economy 7; King Fiscal Tiers 20. 
24 Ajam Fiscal decentralisation in South Africa 94. 
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level of national government.25  Successful innovation experiments can also be 
exported to other regions, for example if, in the case of South Africa, the Western 
Cape has developed a successful client care model for the payment of social support 
grants, that model can be exported to the other eight provinces in the country.   
 
Successful competition and innovation may, however, also have negative effects that 
need to be addressed.  A province may for example have excellent primary schools 
and it will draw learners from areas outside that province where the quality of primary 
school education is not so good.  It might cause a need for more classrooms or new 
schools.  This places additional demands on the budget of that province.  One possible 
way of addressing this demand would be by way of grants from the national 
government. 
 
Decentralised decision-making and the provision of public services eliminates the 
need for a central administration as well the need for regional or local branch offices.  
This results in a more cost-effective provision of public services at the regional or 
local level, while the national government can focus its attention on the performance 
of purely national public functions.  In geographically larger or more populous 
countries, this benefit is more important in view of the increasing complexity to 
provide public services to larger communities.  In other words, decentralised 
provision of public services is more cost-effective in a country covering a large 
geographical area or having a large population.26 
 
A further advantage of the sub-national provision of public goods is the potential it 
holds for the promotion of good governance values such as accountability, public 
participation and the accommodation of diversity.  These values should be pursued 
with equal vigour throughout the country, but are highlighted at provincial and local 
government levels where government is closer to the people.  Decentralisation of 
public services creates more opportunities for the citizens of a particular region or 
municipality to engage their elected representatives in policy issues and the actual 
                                                 
25 Wehner Fiscal Federalism in South Africa (1999) 19; Oates Fiscal Federalism 13. 
26 Wehner Fiscal Federalism in South Africa 19. 
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provision of public services.27  Regional and local governments can create various 
mechanisms to enhance effective public participation for the benefit of the citizens of 
their particular jurisdictions.  Bringing government closer to the people will enhance 
their ability to discuss and debate policy and delivery issues with the respective 
regional or local governments.  Accountability of regional and local governments can 
be strengthened through direct and regular interaction with the citizens in their area of 
jurisdiction.  
 
3 2 2 Considerations in favour of national provision of public goods 
 
There are limits to the extent to which decentralisation of expenditure responsibilities 
is desirable, even from a purely theoretical economic perspective.  Some public 
services can, due to economies of scale, be provided more efficiently at a national 
level, for example national defence, where the benefits are for the whole country and 
not only for a particular regional or local government.28  This argument is also valid  
where regional governments provide certain services more cost effectively than the 
local governments within their area of jurisdiction, for example the provision of 
primary education.  
 
Spill over effects can exist in case of benefits and cost. Both these can result in an 
inefficient provision of public services at regional or local level.  In view of the 
openness of regional and local economies, benefit spillovers develop when non-
residents also benefit from the provision of services within a particular region, for 
example unique or better hospital services in one region attract people from other 
regions who can also benefit from it.  Cost spillovers exist when the cost of a service 
is exported from one region to another, for example when a regional or local 
government cuts its spending on health services, its residents might decide to use 
similar services in neighbouring areas.29  In order to limit spill over effects or where 
the benefits of a specific public service are national in character, public services can 
be provided more efficiently at national level.  Likewise, if the benefits of a specific 
                                                 
27 Ajam Fiscal decentralisation in South Africa 94. 
28 Ajam Fiscal decentralisation in South Africa 94; Oates Fiscal Federalism 37. 
29 Wehner Fiscal Federalism in SA 20; Oates Fiscal Federalism 32. 
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public service are regional rather than local in character, such service can be provided 
more efficiently at the regional level. 
 
There is general acceptance amongst economists that the macro-economic 
stabilisation and redistribution functions should be allocated to the national level of 
government in view of the limited scope for regional and local redistribution and 
stabilisation policies.30  Although regional governments have some role to play in 
redistribution policies, for example providing basic education to all residents, the 
scope for redistribution across regions is limited.  If a regional or local government 
decides to redistribute income to other areas, it would cause a decrease in 
consumption for their own residents. This is an inefficient resource allocation.  
Redistribution of income and wealth among regions or local governments can thus be 
achieved more efficiently at national level.  Macro-economic stabilisation policies, 
such as monetary policy and setting inflation and debt targets are national in character 
and should be performed at national level and31 according to economic theory not be 
allocated to regional or local governments. 
 
3 2 3 Theoretical framework for expenditure allocation 
 
In accordance with the above discussion, the following provides a theoretical 
economic framework for the allocation of expenditure responsibilities in a 
decentralised system of government. 
 
The basic approach followed is that expressed by Oates, namely that each particular 
jurisdiction (government) is responsible for the provision of public services for the 
consumers within their own jurisdiction in the most efficient way possible.32  
Musgrave stated, with reference to the provision of public services in decentralised 
systems of government, that the benefits of public services are enjoyed jointly by 
consumers in various jurisdictions, but that the spatial range of benefits gained 
                                                 
30 Wellisch Public Finance 20; Oates Federalism and Government Finance 128 - 129; Oates Fiscal 
Federalism 33; King Fiscal Tiers 44; Musgrave Public Finance 181. 
31 Wehner Fiscal Federalism in South Africa 18; Ajam Fiscal decentralisation in South Africa 85. 
32 Oates Fiscal Federalism 35 - 38. 
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differs.33  The most economically efficient allocation is achieved when the cost of 
provision of particular public goods is determined and paid for by the consumers or 
citizens of the area that benefit from those goods.   
 
This theoretical framework for expenditure allocation depends on a division of public 
goods into distinct categories, namely national public goods on the one hand, and 
regional or local public goods on the other.  In reality, most public goods provided by 
governments do not fit neatly into one of these categories and this warrants some form 
of shared responsibility.34  An example of "mixed public goods" is education, where 
the actual provision of education can for example be the responsibility of the regional 
governments, while policy and the setting of national standards are the responsibility 
of the national government.  In constitutional law, these public goods are referred to 
as concurrent functions.  The provision of “mixed public goods” is quite important in 
the case of South Africa, where most of the provincial government functions fall 
within the category of concurrent functional areas.35  
 
Public services where the cost and benefits are national in scope, should be provided 
for by the national government. Examples of these are defence, currency and banking 
and immigration.  Regional and local governments should provide those public 
services where cost and benefits are limited to their respective areas of jurisdiction, 
for example primary and secondary education (regional responsibility) and street 
lighting and refuse removal (local responsibility).  In view of the fact that most public 
services are so-called mixed goods, public services could be allocated to more than 
one level of government, for example health services and agriculture.36  The costs and 
benefits of these services are shared in some way by the respective jurisdictions.  In 
addition to this basic economic framework, it should be noted that there are various 
factors that impact on the particular assignment of expenditure responsibilities such as 
                                                 
33 Musgrave Democratic Society (Vol III) 331, 411. 
34 Wehner Federalism in South Africa  21; Shah Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 12. 
35 Schedule 4 of the 1996-Constitution contains 33 functional areas of concurrent national and 
provincial legislative competence. 
36 Shah Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 12. 
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the administrative capacity of regional governments, equity considerations and 
political choices. 
 
3 3 Revenue allocation 
 
In the basic economic model of Musgrave consumers pay for public services in 
accordance with the benefits they receive by paying taxes.  This benefit pricing 
structure suggests a very simplistic model of financing public services.  In a federal 
system the financing of public services is compounded by the existence of more than 
one level of government.  In Musgrave's model the Allocation Branch, both at 
national and at regional level, is responsible for financing the cost of the public 
services it provides. It does this by levying taxes.  It is evident that, according to 
Musgrave's approach, each level of government must have sufficient revenue sources 
in order to finance its expenditure functions.  This basic model of benefit pricing does 
not take into account issues such as the existence of benefit and cost spillovers from 
one jurisdiction to another, or the fact that taxes are not always based on the benefit 
rule, but often on residents’ ability to pay. 37  In view of the limited application of 
benefit pricing to finance public services, this basic economic model does not provide 
the final answer to the question of revenue allocation to the various levels of 
government in a federal system.  In addition to the allocation of expenditure 
functions, it must be determined how taxes or revenue should be assigned to the 
various levels of government. 
 
Based on the Musgrave model the following guidelines are commonly used for the 
allocation of taxes:38 
 
Highly progressive taxes, such as personal income tax with a sliding scale of tax rates, 
with redistributive objectives should be the responsibility of the national government.  
According to Tiebout's reasoning consumers will shop among different regions to find 
the region where the prices (taxes) of public services fit their needs the best.  A 
                                                 
37 Musgrave Democratic Society (Vol III) 412. 
38 Oates Federalism and Government Finance 131.  See also Wehner Federalism in South Africa 24 - 
26. 
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regional or local government that wants to increase its revenue in order to redistribute 
income from rich residents (high income tax) to poor residents (low or no income tax) 
might find itself in an unwanted situation where it looses rich residents to other 
regions and it draws poor residents.  In order to avoid such a scenario progressive 
personal income tax should be assigned to the national government.39 
 
Taxes on highly mobile tax bases such as personal and corporate income tax should 
be centralised.  Economic problems occur when these taxes are levied at local 
government level.  Individuals and businesses are mobile and will choose the area 
with the tax regime that is more beneficial to them.  Due to competition, different 
income tax rates will lead to a relocation of individuals and businesses from an area 
with a high tax rate to an area with a lower rate of income tax.  This may cause 
distortion in the economy and erosion of the tax base.40  There is, however, a 
possibility that the responsibility for income tax can be shared in some way between 
the national and regional governments.  In some countries like Germany both personal 
and corporate income tax are shared between the Bund and the Länder by way of a 
constitutional guarantee to that effect.41  It should, however, be noted that it is the 
revenue from these taxes that is shared, while the tax rate is determined by the Bund. 
Another way of sharing taxes is tax co-ordination of the same tax base between 
different levels of government.42  In practice, this means that the lower level 
government is allowed to add a levy or surcharge onto an existing tax base levied by 
the national or regional government, such as onto income or sales tax.  A proposal to 
this effect was made by the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) in the 
development of the financial intergovernmental relations system in South Africa.43  
However, to date there has not yet been any provincial levy or surcharge on a national 
tax base. 
 
Taxes with tax bases distributed unevenly between various regions should be 
allocated to the national government in order to avoid distortions in revenue allocation 
                                                 
39 Oates Federalism and Government Finance 131. 
40 Oates Federalism and Government Finance 131. 
41 Art 106 (3) of the Basic Law. 
42 Oates Fiscal Federalism 148. 
43 FFC Framework document for Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in South Africa (1995) 20.  This 
matter will be discussed in more detail under 4 3 1. 
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among the various jurisdictions.44  Taxes on natural resources such as oil and 
minerals are examples of these taxes. 
                                                
 
Economies of scale in tax administration at the national level of government result in 
a cost saving in nationally administered taxes such as income tax and value-added 
tax.45  In addition to the above-mentioned benefits of allocating the authority to levy 
these taxes to the national government, there is an additional advantage in the 
centralisation of certain taxes, namely saving in administrative costs. 
 
According to the arguments raised above, it seems that the most important taxes or the 
taxes with potentially the highest yield should be the responsibility of the national 
government.  Not all taxes should however be centralised.  The following are some 
economic arguments for decentralisation of some taxes and other sources of revenue. 
 
Taxes on immobile tax bases such as land or fixed property tax should be 
decentralised to regional or local governments in view of the fixed nature of the tax 
base.46  Any competition among regional or local governments regarding such taxes 
will have a limited effect on the movement of residents from one area to another, thus 
making it appropriate to be assigned to regional or local governments. 
 
Benefit taxes such as user charges or licence fees can be levied at all levels of 
government, although it is more attractive for regional and local governments.47  User 
charges or user fees are fees that are levied by a government for the provision of a 
public service where the benefits accrue to the consumers or citizens within that 
particular jurisdiction, for example fees for the use of a public nature reserve.  The 
users of public roads within a particular region can for example be charged with a 
motor vehicle license fee in order to cover the costs of that public service. 
 
In accordance with Musgrave's benefit pricing structure, consumers must pay for 
public services according to the benefits they receive.  The cost to the government for 
 
44 Musgrave Democratic Society (Vol III) 298; Oates Federalism and Government Finance 131. 
45 Oates Political Economy 15. 
46 Oates Federalism and Government Finance 131. 
47 Musgrave Democratic Society (Vol III) 299. 
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providing public services can be in the form of taxes, as discussed above, or in the 
form of user fees or licenses, where there is a direct link between the benefit to the 
consumer and the cost of the service.  Due to the close link between cost and benefits 
to particular consumers, user fees have limited potential for distorting incentives to 
move from one area to another.  In Tiebout's mobility model consumers will choose 
their area of residence according to their preferred price package; that is, their 
preferred combination of taxes and public services.48  User fees will in this context 
enhance the efficiency of resource allocation due to more efficient decisions by 
mobile consumers.49 
 
Shah used an alternative framework for tax assignment in his discussion on fiscal 
intergovernmental relations.50  This framework consists of only two criteria, namely 
efficiency in tax administration and fiscal need; that is, the amount of revenue 
required to satisfy the allocated expenditure responsibilities.  More efficient tax 
administration is provided by allocating taxing authorities to the level of government 
that is likely to have the best available information on a tax base.  In accordance with 
this criterion, property taxes should be allocated to the local government level.  The 
application of fiscal need implies that revenue sources should be matched as closely 
as possible with expenditure responsibilities.  The following are examples of tax 
assignment in accordance with Shah's framework, namely: 
Customs duty, value added tax   National government; 
Motor vehicle licenses    Regional government; 
Property and land tax Regional and local 
government.51 
 
It seems from the above discussion, that the two different approaches to allocation of 
revenue responsibilities produce, in general, the same results.   
                                                 
48 Musgrave Democratic Society (Vol III) 297; Oates Fiscal Federalism 149. 
49 Oates Federalism and Government Finance 131; Oates Political Economy 7. 
50 Shah Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 18 - 21. 
51 Shah Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 19. 
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3 4 Revenue sharing and intergovernmental grants 
 
A fiscal gap occurs when there is a mismatch between the allocation of expenditure 
responsibilities and revenue sources to a particular tier or sphere of government.52  In 
decentralised systems of government, a vertical fiscal imbalance can occur when most 
of the high yielding revenue sources are allocated to the national government, while 
proportionally more expenditure responsibilities are allocated to the regional or local 
governments.  Such a situation can be the result of various factors including economic 
considerations, historical development and political choices.  According to Boadway, 
efficient fiscal decentralisation focuses on the decentralisation of expenditure 
responsibilities rather than revenue-raising responsibilities, a situation that is quite 
common in decentralised systems of government.53  In this scenario a fiscal gap or 
fiscal imbalance is created and this leads to the need for some form of revenue sharing 
among the various governments, or the introduction of intergovernmental grants or 
both.  Two types of fiscal gaps can occur, namely a horizontal fiscal gap, if there is an 
uneven distribution of financial resources in relation to expenditure responsibilities at 
the same level of government, and a vertical fiscal gap if more expenditure 
responsibilities than financial resources are decentralised.54 
 
In addition to the basic economic requirements that each level of government should 
have sufficient revenue in order to fund its expenditure functions, it should be noted 
that there are also social and political considerations that influence fiscal 
decentralisation, for example social development programs or political commitment to 
decentralisation.  One of the important features of a decentralised system of 
government is the redistribution of income by national-regional transfers. These can 
be based on economic, social or political considerations.  Boadway argues that 
                                                 
52 Ajam Fiscal decentralisation in South Africa 57. 
53 Boadway Burden Sharing or Dividing the Spoils (1999) 4; Boadway & Keen Efficiency and the 
Optimal Direction of Federal-State Transfers in Wildasin Fiscal Aspects of Evolving Federations 
(1997) 41. 
54 Wehner Fiscal Federalism in South Africa 28. 
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redistributive intergovernmental transfers are an indispensable complement to the 
decentralisation of expenditure responsibilities.55  This is evidenced in both the 
German and South African constitutional systems. 
 
Intergovernmental revenue sharing and grants are the mechanisms used to narrow or 
close fiscal gaps.  It is, however, not merely a mathematical exercise, as various other 
considerations impact on the design of intergovernmental revenue sharing and transfer 
arrangements.  Some of these are the need for redistribution of revenue (for example 
in post-1994 South Africa) and the existence of imbalances in the fiscal capacity of 
the various regions, for example the disparities between the new and old Länder after 
unification of Germany in 1990.  In search of an appropriate intergovernmental 
revenue sharing and transfer scheme for a particular decentralised system of 
government, all the relevant factors should be considered.  In any decentralised 
system of government, financial intergovernmental arrangements, including the 
allocation of expenditure and revenue responsibilities, but change over time and will 
reflect the balance of centrifugal (decentralising) and centripetal (centralising) forces 
at any particular point in time.56   
 
A number of different criteria, that are often in conflict with each other, should be 
considered in the design of financial intergovernmental arrangements,57 namely: - 
 the degree of fiscal autonomy of regional and local governments; 
 allocation of sufficient revenue to regional and local governments; 
 ensuring an equitable allocation of funds; 
 predictability of regional and local governments' financial allocations; 
 ensuring efficiency of resource allocation to regional and local 
governments without compromising their decision-making authority to 
decide on their internal resource allocation; 
 simplicity of design based on objective factors; 
 inclusion of incentives to improve sound financial management and to 
discourage inefficient financial management; and 
                                                 
55 Boadway Burden Sharing 1; Oates Federalism and Government Finance 133. 
56 Ajam Fiscal decentralisation in South Africa 57; Oates Federalism and Government Finance 149. 
57 Shah Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 30. 
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 guarantees, in the case of borrowing, for ensuring the achievement of the 
grantor's objectives. 
 
A carefully obtained balance when considering these criteria in the design of financial 
intergovernmental arrangements will enhance the successful implementation of such a 
scheme. 
 
Revenue sharing58 and intergovernmental grants differ from one system to another 
and depend largely on the nature and content of the expenditure responsibilities and 
revenue sources allocated to the various regions.  Various considerations in the design 
of revenue sharing mechanisms and intergovernmental grants in decentralised systems 
are discussed below. 
 
3 4 1 Revenue sharing 
 
In a federal system the benefits of centralised taxes combined with that of 
decentralised expenditure functions could be maximised through revenue sharing 
between the different levels of government.59  Regional governments can effectively 
use the national government as tax collecting agent while retaining their expenditure 
responsibilities.  Such an arrangement has the advantage of a cost saving on tax 
administration in view of the economies of scale at the national government level.  
Due to the additional income received by way of revenue sharing, sufficient scope to 
accommodate a variety of consumer preferences at regional government level is thus 
provided.  
 
Revenue sharing relationships can substantially reduce vertical fiscal imbalances and 
realise more efficient resource allocation among the various levels of government, but 
this depends on the exact relationships formed.  Revenue sharing does not relieve 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
58 Although revenue sharing and sharing of taxes might prima facie seem to be the same, it can be 
easily distinguished.  Sharing a particular tax, e.g. personal income tax, is a much narrower concept 
than revenue sharing, which can include revenue from a number of taxes as well as revenue obtained 
through loans.  See Shah Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 23. 
59 Oates Political Economy 14. 
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regional or local governments from their responsibility to raise a substantial portion of 
their own revenue.  An increase in own revenue creates more scope for discretion in 
setting expenditure priorities and accommodating consumer preferences at regional 
and local government levels.  This is in line with the basic economic theory, discussed 
earlier in this Chapter, namely that each government should finance its own 
expenditure functions.  It also leads to fiscally responsible regional or local 
government. 
 
Revenue sharing mechanisms are quite common in decentralised systems of 
government, but they are shaped in various forms.  They can be based on a formula 
incorporating various factors such as population, number of school-going children and 
regional fiscal capacity.60  Such arrangements exist in South Africa where provincial 
and local governments are entitled to an equitable share of nationally raised 
revenue.61 Alternatively, revenue sharing can be a simple arrangement whereby 
regional governments are allocated a fixed percentage of nationally raised revenue.  
From a legal perspective, such revenue sharing arrangements would require national 
legislation or constitutional provisions or both, to provide legal certainty to the 
relevant governments as well as to the citizens of the country.  Both Germany and 
South Africa have included particular provisions regarding revenue sharing in their 
respective constitutions, thus laying a sound basis for the actual revenue sharing 
arrangements.62  This will be discussed in more depth in Chapters 5 and 6 
respectively. 
 
3 4 2  Intergovernmental grants 
 
3 4 2 1  Objectives 
 
Specific considerations apply to intergovernmental grants. They are not merely given 
to ensure that there is sufficient revenue for regional and local governments to fund 
their expenditure functions.   
 
                                                 
60 Shah Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 23. 
61 Ajam Fiscal decentralisation in South Africa 69; Sec 214 of the 1996-Constitution. 
62 Art 106, 106a and 107 of the Basic Law; sec 214, 227, 228 and 229 of the 1996-Constitution. 
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The process of developing fiscal decentralisation results in some regions having 
bigger fiscal capacity to provide public services and raise revenue than others.  This 
net fiscal benefit varies from one region to another for a number of reasons.63  One 
reason is that certain regions may have more natural resources or economic activities 
that increase their revenue raising capacity. Another reason is that some regions may 
have less expenditure needs, for example fewer school-going children or fewer old 
age homes.  These differences imply different levels of fiscal benefits to consumers in 
the various regions and result in horizontal inequities.64  Vertical inequity, which is 
also a common feature in federal systems, will occur when more expenditure 
responsibilities than revenue raising responsibilities are decentralised. 
 
In a situation of horizontal inequity people in equal positions residing in different 
regions are not treated equally by the respective regional governments.  In order to 
address this situation, intergovernmental grants can be transferred from regions with 
higher fiscal capacity to regions with lower fiscal capacity.  This should enable all 
regions to deliver comparable public services at comparable tax rates to their 
consumers.  Ideally, such equalisation grants would still allow regional governments 
the freedom to determine their own expenditure priorities according to their specific 
needs. 
 
Vertical inequity can be addressed either by way of a revenue sharing arrangement, as 
discussed above, or by way of intergovernmental grants or both. These arrangements 
should put regions in a better financial position to fund their expenditure 
responsibilities. 
 
Intergovernmental grants can be used for various reasons.  There are two fundamental 
considerations applicable to decisions on intergovernmental grants, namely equity and 
efficiency.  Fiscal equalisation grants aimed at eliminating or reducing differential net 
fiscal benefits between regions, can enhance the equity as well as the efficiency of a 
federal system.65  From a purely economic perspective, redistribution is not an end in 
itself, but is introduced to ensure that individuals in equal positions are treated equally 
                                                 
63 Shah Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 29. 
64 Boadway Burden Sharing 5. 
65 Shah Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 29. 
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throughout the federation.66  Redistribution is, however, not a neutral economic 
concept as it has a distinct political character.  Redistribution of land or income in a 
country such as South Africa with huge disparities, can have distinct political aims, 
for example, economic empowerment and the economic objective of equal treatment 
of all individuals. 
 
Equity is thus an important consideration underlying both vertical and horizontal 
equalisation.  It should be noted that the objective of equity does not only relate to 
pure economic reasoning, but it requires a value judgement, which introduces a 
subjective political element.  Implicit in decentralised expenditure responsibilities is a 
degree of discretion that allows regions to take decisions.  Intergovernmental transfers 
used for equalisation put regions in a position to provide comparable public services 
at comparable cost (tax rates), but do in principle not require uniformity.67   
 
Efficient provision of public services by a regional or local government will result in 
spillovers, for example if a region provides excellent health services they will not only 
be used by its residents but also by residents from neighbouring regions that do not 
provide a high standard of health services.  Regional governments will need extra 
funding in order to effectively take care of such spillovers.  Alternatively, they may 
choose to provide such public services only to its residents and improve its own 
resource allocation.  This solution, however, does not take practicalities such as the 
mobility of people between regions into account, and is therefore not a useful 
alternative.  Intergovernmental transfers aimed specifically at reducing inefficiencies 
caused by spillovers are necessary to provide regions with the extra funding they 
require.68 
 
A further aim of intergovernmental grants is the requirement of minimum standards of 
delivery of particular public services by regional or local governments.  Apart from 
social or political considerations for the setting of common minimum standards for 
public services, considerations of economic efficiency also justify such minimum 
                                                 
66 Boadway Burden Sharing 6.  The principle that people in equal positions should be treated equally is 
a widely accepted principle of equity in taxation - see Musgrave Public Finance 160. 
67 Boadway Burden Sharing 6; Ajam Fiscal decentralisation in South Africa 92; Oates Fiscal 
Federalism 85; King Fiscal Tiers 146. 
68 Wehner Fiscal Federalism in SA 29; Oates Fiscal Federalism 85. 
 90
standards throughout a federation.69  Labour mobility is for example improved by the 
establishment of minimum standards for the provision of social services. 
 
3 4 2 2  Design of intergovernmental grants 
 
Various types of intergovernmental grants can be used and the design of these is of 
critical importance to the financial health of the regional and local governments.  The 
various objectives discussed above should be carefully considered when deciding on 
the types and scope of intergovernmental grants.  
 
A useful classification of intergovernmental grants that is commonly used is to have a 
basic distinction between conditional or specific grants and unconditional or general 
grants.70  An alternative classification is that used by Shah when he distinguished 
between non-matching (conditional or unconditional) grants and selective matching 
(conditional) grants.71  Conditional or specific grants are grants where the grantor 
defines the purposes for which the recipient government must use the grants, or 
specific conditions are attached to the allocation of the funds.72  Due to the setting of 
conditions the freedom of recipient governments to utilise conditional grants is 
limited.  General or unconditional grants, on the other hand, are funds allocated to the 
recipient government to be used at its discretion.  These grants are sometimes also 
referred to as block grants.  Recipient governments prefer unconditional grants that 
can increase flexibility in their decision-making.   
 
Conditional grants can be divided in two subdivisions, namely matching grants and 
non-matching grants.73  Matching grants require that the recipient government uses 
the grant for specific purposes and it matches the receipt of funds to a specified 
degree from its own sources.  An example of a matching conditional grant would be 
when the national government allocates a grant to a regional government to be used 
for the improvement of technical schools on a 50% matching basis.  By using 
matching grants the national government is able to influence spending priorities at 
                                                 
69 Wehner Fiscal Federalism in SA 29; Shah Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 29. 
70 Oates Fiscal Federalism 65; King Fiscal Tiers 87.  
71 Shah Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 24. 
72 Oates Fiscal Federalism 65; King Fiscal Tiers 87. 
73 Shah Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 26; Oates Fiscal Federalism 65; King Fiscal Tiers 88. 
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regional or local government level.  Matching grants can be further subdivided into 
capped and open-ended matching grants.74  In the case of capped grants a limit is 
placed on the amount to be transferred by stipulating for example that the grant is on a 
50% matching basis but limited to a maximum of R1 million spent by the recipient 
government.  Open-ended matching grants do not have any limit for the total amount 
of the grant and are merely determined by stipulating a percentage of the recipient's 
expenditure, for example 50%.  This type of grant can be used to correct inefficiencies 
at regional or local government level caused by benefit spillovers, where the cost of 
the benefits of a particular service to non-residents is used to determine the extent of 
the grant.75   
 
Conditional grants can be used to ensure that minimum or national standards for the 
provision of specific public services are maintained throughout the country.  The 
recipient regional or local government is obliged to achieve the minimum standards in 
order to receive the conditional grant.  This creates a limitation at regional or local 
government level when deciding on expenditure priorities.  The national government 
on the other hand establishes a degree of budgetary control over spending priorities at 
regional or local level by providing conditional grants.  In contrast, unconditional 
grants are free of any restraints on the discretion of recipient governments and they 
determine their own expenditure priorities using the funds made available.  The use of 
unconditional grants broadly is in line with the essence of federalism, namely the 
existence of different levels of political decision-making mechanisms.76  There are 
sound reasons for the use of conditional grants in particular cases, for example, to 
contribute to the equity and national efficiency objectives of the government.   
 
3 5 The South African situation 
 
A discussion of economic and financial considerations in the design of decentralised 
systems of government should not be limited to an abstract theoretical discussion.  It 
should be placed within the proper practical context.    
                                                 
74 Shah Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 26; King Fiscal Tiers 88. 
75 Shah Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 26. 
76 Boadway Burden Sharing 8. 
 
 
 92
 When applying the economic framework discussed in this Chapter to South Africa, 
particular care is required.  One should be sensitive to local conditions such as the 
very high unemployment rate77 (and its potential to cause political instability) and the 
uneven distribution of the tax base.  Government income is mainly derived from 
personal income tax, company tax and value added tax which are all nationally levied 
taxes.  The ability of many of the provinces to generate own income is very limited 
and on average provinces generate about 3 – 4% of their own income.78  South Africa 
is a country with huge developmental needs, reflected by large areas of extreme 
poverty.  Although progress has been made with social transformation and economic 
development during the first decade of South Africa’s democracy, South Africa 
remains a country of extremes; very affluent societies in many urban areas on the one 
hand and many rural and urban areas of extreme poverty on the other hand.   
 
Industrial development has traditionally happened only in a selected number of areas 
and often coincided with mining, for example in Gauteng.  In an attempt to address 
this situation of unequal economic development, government has introduced 
economic or industrial development zones in various provinces. One such area is 
around Coega in the Eastern Cape.  The economic inequality amongst the nine 
provinces is underlined by the fact that Gauteng is responsible for more than 40% of 
the country’s gross domestic product, while its population accounts for approximately 
18% of the country’s population.79  Other provinces with a mostly rural character 
such as Eastern Cape and Limpopo, face many developmental needs, for example, the 
building of schools, clinics and roads. The communities are very poor and 
unemployment is high.   It is evident that a great deal of government funding is 
required in these areas in order to address their needs. 
 
The unique developmental challenges of South Africa have a significant impact on 
government policy, in particular on the allocation of financial resources to the various 
spheres of government.  Bridging the gap between the rich and the poor and thereby 
                                                 
77  There is speculation that the national unemployment figure could be as high as 40%, but the official 
figure in March 2003 was  31,2%.  See National Treasury Budget Review 2004 42. 
78  See discussion under 4 3 1. 
79 National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2003 3. 
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reducing the economic inequality in the country, remains one of the key objectives of 
the national economic policy.  In order to create higher economic growth, more 
employment and improved social conditions, the national government has increased 
public spending on aspects such as investment in infrastructure, skills development 
and school education during the last few years.  Addressing the challenges resulting 
from situations of severe poverty in many areas of South Africa, places high demands 
on the limited available financial resources and this has a direct impact on the 
equitable division of revenue.  For example, provincial spending on pro-poor social 
services such as basic health care, housing and education remains a priority and 
therefore a substantial part of the provincial budgets.80  The national annual budget is 
utilised as the most important government tool for the redistribution of wealth in the 
country. 
 
3 6 Conclusion 
 
The basic economic model for a unitary system of government developed by 
Musgrave is a useful point of departure for a discussion on public finance.  Although 
the situation is more complex in a multi-level system of government, the principles 
developed by Musgrave can be utilised.  The functions of the Allocation, Distribution 
and Stabilisation Branches are still applicable in a federal system.  It is, however, also 
evident that the existence of more than one level of government requires the 
consideration of other essential factors, such as the existence of vertical and 
horizontal inequalities and the need to redistribute income and wealth among the 
various jurisdictions.   
 
There is no single economic blueprint for the design of a financial intergovernmental 
system in a federal or decentralised system of government.  Some economic 
guidelines or principles have been developed and are commonly used in the design of 
such systems.  In accordance with the modern approach to federal systems of 
government, a wide range of permutations under the umbrella of federal systems is 
possible and these should apply economic principles in their design.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
80 National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2003 13. 
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Economic theory with respect to fiscal federalism suggests that expenditure 
responsibilities and decision-making should be decentralised.  In accordance with the 
economic framework suggested by Oates, welfare will be optimised in a federal 
system when each level of government is responsible for providing the most efficient 
level of public goods to the people within its area of jurisdiction.81  This implies that 
macro-economic stabilisation, redistribution of income and the provision of those 
public goods that affect the welfare of all citizens should be centralised.  Those public 
services that can best be provided at a regional or local level and are primarily aimed 
at the benefiting of the people within a specific area, should be decentralised.  
 
It is evident from the above analyses that two major objectives should be considered 
in the design of a decentralised system of government, namely efficiency and equity.  
In terms of economic theory, efficiency requires that the most efficient resource 
allocation should be obtained.  Equity considerations suggest that the resource 
allocation to various levels of government should be fair and aimed at reducing 
economic disparities.   Equity in the case of South Africa implies that financial 
resources must be utilised in a manner that will result in bridging the gap between the 
rich and the poor and improving the quality of life of all people.  
 
In developing a decentralised system of government, the question is; what expenditure 
responsibilities and revenue sources should be decentralised to regional and local 
governments, or put differently, what should the extent of decentralisation be?  In 
order to increase accountability and efficiency, the allocation of expenditure 
responsibilities should match the allocation of revenue sources as closely as possible. 
This should reduce the need for revenue sharing or intergovernmental grants.  It is 
however inevitable in any decentralised system of government that there will be a 
need for some form of fiscal equalisation in order to reduce vertical and horizontal 
inequalities.  This can be done by way of particular revenue sharing arrangements or 
various intergovernmental grants or both.  Equity and efficiency considerations are 
crucial to the development of fiscal equalisation mechanisms. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
81 Oates Fiscal Federalism 37. 
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In conclusion, economic theory suggests that decentralisation of expenditure 
responsibilities and revenue sources for the most efficient and equitable results should 
be the basic premise.  The complexities of multi-level government, however, require a 
balanced approach to the design of decentralised systems of government, including a 
carefully designed balance of the relevant, and sometimes conflicting, demands on the 
system. In terms of this approach the benefits of the centralisation of functions can be 
combined with the benefits of decentralisation to produce the most efficient and 
equitable solution.  Actual economic, financial and political considerations have a 
significant impact on the eventual design and implementation of financial 
intergovernmental relations.  Financial intergovernmental arrangements should not be 
seen as the end result, but should be reviewed from time to time, as various factors 
impact on the design of decentralisation of responsibilities and these change 
continuously over time.  
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resources 
 
4 1 Introduction 
 
An important part of this study is the analysis of the division of functions or 
obligations and the allocation of financial resources to the various levels of 
government in Germany and South Africa.  An obvious question to ask is: What 
motivated or influenced the current constitutional provisions?  Constitutional history 
is important to any constitutional system and contributes to a better understanding of 
it.  Chapter 2 provides an overview of the historical development and fundamental 
principles of the Basic Law and of the South African Constitution.  This will lay the 
foundation for a detailed discussion regarding the actual division of obligations and 
allocation of financial resources to the various levels of government in both Germany 
and South Africa.    
 
It is evident from economic theory discussed in Chapter 3, that economic 
considerations and developmental needs provide the basis for the allocation of 
expenditure responsibilities or functions and revenue resources to the various levels of 
government in a decentralised system of government.  In this chapter, the focus is on 
constitutional considerations for the allocation of obligations and financial resources 
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to the various levels or spheres of government in Germany and South Africa.  
Reference will, however, be made to the role of economic considerations in the 
development of these two constitutional systems.   
 
The allocation of obligations and financial resources cannot be viewed in isolation.  It 
has to be considered with due reference to the institutions responsible for the 
performance of functions of government and objectives regarding economic 
development.  Questions such as the following must be answered: What is the scope 
of the legislative and executive jurisdiction of each level of government, and what 
financial resources does each level of government have?   Although this study is a 
comparison of the relevant constitutional provisions in the Basic Law and the South 
African Constitution, considerations that influenced these provisions and the way in 
which the constitutional provisions operate in practice, will also be discussed. 
 
4 2 Constitutional division of obligations 
 
4 2 1 Germany 
 
One of the most contentious and difficult issues in the debates preceding the drafting 
of the Basic Law in 1949, was the question of the division of powers and the division 
of revenue resources between the Bund and the Länder.1  During the development of 
German federalism, balancing the need for political unity and the preservation of the 
autonomy of the Länder was always an issue.  This was still the case in the period 
immediately preceding the adoption of the Basic Law.  Decentralization of powers 
and the strengthening of Länder were supported by the Länder and by the Western 
Occupation Forces who were not in favour of a concentration of power at the federal 
level.  However, the dire needs for rebuilding the country devastated by war dictated 
that most of the taxing powers should be allocated to the Bund.2   
 
The Herrenchiemsee constitutional convention in August 1948 produced a draft text 
for a future constitution for (West) Germany.  This was presented to the Parliamentary 
                                                 
1 The historical development that led to the adoption of the Basic Law in 1949 is discussed under 2 1 1. 
2 Fischer-Menshausen "Die Abgrenzung der Finanzverantwortung zwischen Bund und Ländern" in Die 
Öffentliche Verwaltung (November 1952) 673. 
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Council (Parlamentarischer Rat) that met in Bonn for debate.3  The division of 
powers and the division of revenue resources were fiercely debated in the 
Parliamentary Council but eventually a compromise was reached.  Important 
considerations that influenced the debates in this Parliamentary Council were: 
 The advancement of a modern economy; 
 The advancement of a welfare state in accordance with the principle of 
uniformity of living standards (Einheitlichkeit der Lebensverhältnisse); and 
 The advancement of the financial autonomy of the Länder.4 
  
There were opposing views regarding the financial administration system to be 
adopted.  The Occupation Forces argued for a two-tiered financial administration in 
order to limit the powers of the Bund, while the majority in Parliamentary Council 
wanted a single financial administration to be placed at the federal level.  This was not 
acceptable to the Occupation Forces and their two-tier model of financial 
administration, namely a separation of powers between the Bund and the Länder, was 
adopted.5  In adopting a model in terms of which there would be a division of powers, 
in particular with respect to financial matters, it was envisaged that this particular 
constitutional arrangement would provide both the Bund and the Länder with 
sufficient financial powers.  
 
The Basic Law was adopted in the Parliamentary Council on 8 May 1949, ratified by 
more than two thirds of the Länder governments and eventually confirmed in a public 
session of the Parliamentary Council on 23 May 1949.6  In terms of the Basic Law 
there is a vertical division of powers between the Bund and the Länder and a 
horizontal division of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches 
of government.  In terms of the vertical division of powers, Article 70 of the Basic 
Law allocates the legislative powers in principle to the Länder, however the Bund 
utilized the legislative powers most and the bulk of legislation was thus federal 
                                                 
3 Kilper & Lhotta Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1996) 91; Von Münch Staatsrecht 
Band I (1993) 20. 
4 Kilper & Lhotta Föderalismus in Deutschland 97. 
5 Vogel Grundzüge des Finanzrechts des Grundgesetzes in Isensee & Kirchhof Handbuch des 
Staatsrechts Band IV (1990) 7. 
6 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany published in the Federal Law Gazette on 23 May 
1949; Kilper & Lhotta Föderalismus in Deutschland 98. 
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legislation.7 Most of the administration of legislation is executed by the Länder.  This 
is so for their own laws and in respect of most federal laws.8  
 
A fundamental principle in the allocation of obligations and resources is that the Bund 
and the Länder should both enjoy a substantial degree of financial autonomy.  They 
should be enabled, within the available resources, to fund all the obligations or duties 
allocated to them.9  Art 104a (1) of the Basic Law makes it clear that the Bund and the 
Länder should each finance the expenditure resulting from the fulfilment of their 
respective obligations, except where the Basic Law provides otherwise.  Historically 
the focus of financial power shifted between the Bund and the Länder.  Under the 
1871 Constitution of the German Empire, the Reich was dependent on the Länder that 
had financial autonomy.  The Weimar Constitution in 1919 reversed this position to 
make the Reich financially autonomous by allocating the legislative authority over the 
most important taxes to the Reich.10  The situation changed again in 1949 with the 
adoption of the Basic Law.  The balanced approach in the Basic Law appears to be an 
attempt to reconcile two opposing concepts, namely financial autonomy on the one 
hand and financing of joint responsibilities and financial equalization to ensure 
uniform living standards on the other hand.11 Against the background of a country in 
ruins after World War II, there were also important economic considerations that 
underpinned constitutional aims.  There was a clear need for economic restructuring 
and rebuilding of the country.  The responsibility of the federal government for the 
payment of war debts required that the balance of the taxing powers should be located 
at the Bund.12  Improvement of the living standards of all the people was dependent 
on the creation of enough jobs and the establishment of a social security system that 
could support those in need.   While this was true for the whole country, the territory 
of Saarland was in a unique situation that warranted special attention.  The economy 
                                                 
7 Heun The evolution of federalism in Starck (ed) Studies in German Constitutionalism (1995) 167 177; 
Leonardy Intergovernmental Relations in German Federalism (1994) 19. 
8 Art 70 – 75, 83 – 87 of the Basic Law; Venter Constitutional Comparison – Japan, Germany, Canada 
and South Africa as Constituitonal States (2000) 232 – 234; Kilper & Lhotta Föderalismus in 
Deutschland 103; Leonardy Intergovernmental Relations 17; Von Münch Staatsrecht Band I  20.  
9 Würtenberger The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle in Elwein et al (eds) 
Jahrbuch zur Staats- und Verwaltungswissenschaft 7 (1994) 65 71. 
10 Laufer & Münch Das Föderative System des Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1997) 50; Vogel 
Grundzüge des Finanzrechts 10. 
11 Vogel Grundzüge des Finanzrechts 11. 
12 Fischer-Menshausen DÖV 22 (Nov 1952) 673. 
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of Saarland was heavily dependent on the coal and steel industry, which suffered 
many job losses after the end of World War II.  In addition, Saarland was in an 
insecure constitutional situation since it was firstly part of the French Zone after the 
war and later the subject of international treaties between Germany and France before 
that territory eventually, in 1957, became a Land again within the Federal Republic of 
Germany.13  
 
The current allocation of obligations and division of revenue resources in the Basic 
Law has the following basic features: 
 Most legislative authority is allocated to and utilized by the Bund, whereas 
most federal laws are executed by the Länder;14 
 the allocation of legislative authority for the most important taxes to the 
Bund, where the Bundesrat must consent to any federal bills on taxes to 
the benefit of Länder or municipalities, 15 
 division of financial administration between the Bund and the Länder;16 
and 
 horizontal and vertical financial equalization mechanisms.17 
 
Von Münch described the Finanzverfassung (financial constitution), a term that is 
often found in German literature and in practice, as consisting of the rules relating to 
the division of competences between the Bund and the Länder, the allocation of 
legislative authority for financial matters to the Bund and the Länder and the 
allocation of revenue resources to the Bund and the Länder.18  In early literature, the 
Finanzverfassung is defined as the constitutional rules relating to public finance and 
the tax system of the state and its subdivisions.19   While it might be useful to have a 
                                                 
13 BVerfGE 4, 157 (Saarstatut); BVerfGE 86, 148 247; Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 61. 
14 Art 70 - 75 (legislative competences) and Art 83 - 90 (administrative obligations) of the Basic Law; 
Häde Finanzausgleich (1996) 19 – 30; Leonardy Intergovernmental Relations 19 
15 Art 105 of the Basic Law; Leonardy Intergovernmental Relations 23. 
16 Art 108 of the Basic Law. 
17 Art 106, 106a and 107 of the Basic Law; Häde Finanzausgleich 208. 
18 Von Münch Staatsrecht Band 1 221; Klein Bund und Länder nach der Finanzverfassung des 
Grundgesetzes in Benda et al (eds) Handbuch des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
(1983) 863 - 866.  The Finanzverfassung of Germany is stipulated in Chapter X (Finance), the relevant 
provisions in Chapter VII (Federal legislation), the relevant provisions in Chapter VIII (Implementation 
of federal legislation, federal administration) as well as Chapter VIIIa (Joint responsibilities) of the 
Basic Law. 
19 Hettlage Die Finanzverfassung im Rahmen der Staatsverfassung (1956) 3.  See also Vogel 
Grundzüge des Finanzrechts  5. 
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collective term, such as the Finanzverfassung, for the constitutional rules pertaining to 
the division of competences and allocation of revenue resources, it is the content, 
meaning and application of these constitutional rules rather than the “label” that is 
important.   
 
The Basic Law provides that all powers not specifically allocated to the Bund are 
reserved for the Länder, including legislative and executive powers.20  Article 30 
stipulates: 
 
“Except as otherwise provided or permitted by this Basic Law the exercise of 
governmental powers and the discharge of governmental functions shall be 
incumbent on the Länder.” 
 
The legislative authority of the Bund and the Länder is described as follows in Article 
70 (1): 
“The Länder have the right to legislate in so far as this Basic Law does not 
confer legislative powers on the Federation.” 
 
Further division of legislative authority is achieved by listing the areas of exclusive 
federal legislation (Article 73), areas of concurrent legislation (Articles 74 and 74a) 
and areas of federal framework legislation (Article 75).  As far as concurrent 
legislative authority is concerned, Article 72 (1) provides that the Länder may 
legislate to the extent that the Bund has not done so.  The Federal Parliament used 
these provisions extensively since 1949 by passing the bulk of legislation in the 
country. This entailed a decrease in Länder legislative authority.21  Roman Herzog, a 
former President of the Bundesverfassungsgericht and Federal President, described 
this as “the undermining of the distribution of federal state authority that has taken 
place in the last 40 years in the sector of legislation.”22   
 
                                                 
20 Art 30 and 70.  Häde Finanzausgleich (1996) 17 - 19; Currie The Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Germany (1994) 25; Würtenberger The Principle of Subsidiarity 71 - 74. 
21 Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 97; Leonardy Intergovernmental Relations 19. 
22 Herzog The Separation and Concentration of Power in the Basic Law in Kirchhof & Kommers (eds) 
Germany and its Basic Law (1993) 391 394. 
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The dominance of the Bund in the legislative field is balanced to an extent by the 
dominant position of the Länder in the field of administration.  In view of the fact that 
the Länder are responsible for the administration of their own legislation and for 
federal legislation, as if it were their own law, unless the Basic Law provides 
otherwise, most of the administrative obligations rest with the Länder.23  In general, 
the administration of those responsibilities that cannot effectively be dealt with by the 
individual Länder, are performed by the Bund.  This vertical division of 
administrative responsibility is a clear indication of the relevance of the principle of 
subsidiarity in German constitutional law.24   
 
The allocation of expenditure responsibilities to the Bund and the Länder respectively 
is in accordance with the allocation of obligations to them, except where the Basic 
Law provides otherwise.25  In other words, in terms of the basic approach of financial 
autonomy for each level of government, the Bund and the Länder are separately 
responsible to fund the exercise of obligations allocated to them.  It also means that in 
principle the Länder obligations should not be funded by federal sources and the 
obligations of the Bund should not be funded by Länder sources.   This approach is in 
line with economic theory applicable to federal systems, namely that the provision of 
services by a particular jurisdiction (level of government) should be paid for by that 
jurisdiction.26   
 
The principle that expenditure responsibility follows the allocation of functions or 
obligations is referred to as the Konnexitätsprinzip, loosely translated as the 
connecting or linking principle, as stipulated in Article 104a of the Basic Law.27  
This means that when the Länder administer federal legislation in their own right, in 
terms of Article 83 of the Basic Law, they must provide the funding for such 
 
dministration. 
                                                
a
 
23 Art 30 and 83 of the Basic Law; Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 103. 
24 Fischer-Menshausen DÖV 22 (Nov 1952) 676. 
25 Art 104a (1) of the Basic Law.  Von Münch Staatsrecht (Band I) 221; Fischer-Menshausen DÖV 22 
(Nov 1952) 675. 
26 See discussion under 3 1. 
27 Hummel & Nierhaus Die Neuordnung des bundesstaatlichen Finanzausgleichs im Spannungsfeld 
zwischen Wachstums- und Verteilungszielen in ifo studien zur finanzpolitik 54 (1994) 7; Von Münch 
Staatsrecht Band I  221; Vogel Grundzüge des Finanzrecths 16.  The basic principle is stipulated in Art 
104a (1), viz: 
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 This connecting principle demarcates the financing of obligations of the Bund and the 
Länder respectively; it also prohibits the financing of expenditure by one level of 
government on behalf of another level of government.28  While this is the general 
rule, there are exceptions to the Konnexitätsprinzip.  Firstly, when the Länder act on 
behalf of the Bund, the latter must provide the funding.  The fact that the Bund has 
substantial influence in such matters and can monitor the performance of the Länder 
in executing such functions, provides support for allocating the financing 
responsibility to the Bund.29  The second exception relates to the implementation of 
federal cash benefit laws.  When the Länder are tasked to implement federal laws that 
involve the disbursement of funds, such funds may be partly or wholly provided by 
the Bund, as is stipulated in law.30  No maximum contribution by the Bund is 
stipulated in Article 104a (3) and it is possible that the specific federal law can divide 
the funding responsibility between the Bund and the Länder by way of fixed 
percentages.  Thirdly, the Bund may provide financial assistance to the Länder for 
major investments by them and by municipalities.  A federal law may stipulate that 
financial assistance be given to the Länder if the investments are necessary to 
maintain the economic equilibrium, or to provide equalization of economic capacities 
or to promote economic growth.31  An example of such investment programs that 
attracted financial assistance from the Bund is the Structural Assistance Act, 1988.  In 
terms of this a number of Länder could get financial support for structural 
improvement projects to equalize differences in their respective economic 
erformances. 
                                                                                                                                           
p
 
It should be noted that the Basic Law makes specific provision for the financing of 
joint responsibilities between the Bund and the Länder, for example, for provisions 
included as part of the constitutional reform in 1969.  Article 91a provides for the 
participation of the Bund in the execution of Länder obligations relating to building 
 
“The Federation and the Länder shall separately finance expenditure resulting from the discharge of 
their respective responsibilities in so far as this Basic Law does not provide otherwise.” 
28 Klein Bund und Länder nach der Finanzverfassung 868. 
29 Art 104a (2) and Art 85.  Häde Finanzausgleich 62; Klein Bund und Länder nach der 
Finanzverfassung 870. 
30 Art 104a (3).  Häde Finanzausgleich 63 - 66; Klein Bund und Länder nach der Finanzverfassung 
873. 
31 Art 104a (4).  Vogel Grundzüge des Finanzrechts 17. 
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and extending of higher education institutions, improvement of regional economic 
structures and the improvement of agricultural structures and coastal preservation.  
The financial involvement of the Bund is dependant on the fulfilment of two 
conditions, namely that the particular programs are relevant to the community as a 
whole and that federal involvement is necessary in order to improve living 
conditions.32  It is further possible that the Bund and the Länder may conclude 
agreements for co-operation in any of the following areas; education planning, the 
promotion of research institutions and projects of supraregional importance.  Such 
agreements specify the exact division of funding responsibilities between the two 
levels of government.33  Another way of co-operation between the two levels of 
government is joint planning between the Bund and the Länder. This takes place in 
the planning committees (Planungsausschüsse) on joint projects by the Bund and the 
änder. 
 be exercised if any one of 
Land law to the interests of other Länder or 
m 
living conditions in more than one Land. 
                                                
L
 
With respect to the allocation of legislative powers, the Basic Law provides for two 
types of concurrent jurisdiction, namely the "ordinary" concurrency where the Bund 
and the Länder may legislate on the same matter, and areas of federal framework 
legislation.  In the latter case, the Bund may enact a framework law on one of the 
listed areas of jurisdiction with the aim of leaving enough scope for the individual 
Länder to enact supplementary legislation that will "complete" the law, for example 
legislation on the principles of higher education.34  Article 72 lays down certain 
conditions for the enactment of concurrent legislation, that apply to framework 
legislation.  The Länder may enact a law in the concurrent field as long as, and to the 
extent that, the Bund does not exercise its legislative powers.  On the other hand, the 
right of the Bund to legislate on concurrent matters can only
the three conditions listed in Article 72 (2) is met, namely; 
(i) the inability of individual Länder to effectively regulate a matter; or 
(ii) the possible prejudice of a 
the country as a whole; or 
(iii) the need to maintain legal and economic unity, in particular unifor
 
32 Art 91a (1) of the Basic Law. 
33 Art 91b of the Basic Law; Bernd Spahn Financing Federal and State Governments (1991) 6; Klein 
Bund und Länder nach der Finanzverfassung 876. 
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 The question about the need for federal legislation as stipulated in Article 72 (2) does 
not place an obligation on the Bund to pass a law if any of these conditions is met, but 
 merely provides the right to the Bund to legislate.35   
 administer, and therefore also on the funding 
r the administration of legislation.38  
                                                                                                                                           
it
 
The Länder play a role in the federal legislative process through their participation in 
the Bundesrat, the second chamber in the Federal Parliament.  The Bundesrat gives 
expression to intergovernmental coordination and co-operation because of the fact 
that it is a federal legislative organ that consists of representatives of the executive of 
the Länder.36  Depending on the subject of a Bill, the Bundesrat must either give its 
consent (“consent Bills”), for example in case of Bills affecting the constitutional 
relations between the Bund and the Länder, or object  (“objection Bills”), for example 
in case of a law on defence matters.37  Roughly speaking, all Bills relating to the 
administrative power of Länder and those that have financial implications for the 
Länder, are consent Bills, while the rest fall into the category of objection Bills.  The 
Länder through their participation in the Bundesrat, have a significant influence on 
the adoption of the legislation that they
fo
 
The question can be asked whether the fact that the Bundesrat must give its consent to 
a potentially wide range of Bills, does not have a limiting effect on the passing of 
legislation and the functioning of the constitutional system in Germany?  The answer 
is no.  The fact that different political parties may be in the majority in the Bundesrat 
than the party or parties in government, is an implied reality in the German 
constitutional system.  This is the political context within which the constitutional 
system functions.  Constitutional institutions and political parties must adhere to the 
principle of Bundestreue or federal loyalty, and must thus cooperate to uphold the 
Basic Law.39  Leonardy, in his discussion of this question, came to the conclusion that 
 
34 Von Münch Staatsrecht Band I 212. 
35 Von Münch Staatsrecht Band I 214 - 216. 
36 Art 50, 51 of the Basic Law, Leonardy Intergovernmental Relations 2. 
37 Art 50, Art 104a of the Basic Law; Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 124; Leonardy 
Intergovernmental Relations 21. 
38 Leonardy “The Länder and the Bundesrat today – Co-operative federalism or Gridlock?” 1997 
Politik 8. 
39 See discussion of Bundestreue under 2 3. 
 
 106
Bundestreue sets a standard of political behaviour and places a constitutional 
obligation on political parties and on constitutional institutions to act within the spirit 
f federal loyalty or “mutual considerateness of each other’s functions.”40 
 2 2  South Africa 
provinces in South Africa in 1994.  The Constitutional Court confirmed that the 
                                                
o
 
4
 
The division of powers and functions between the various levels of government in the 
new constitutional order was one of the most contentious issues during the 
constitutional negotiations in the early nineties in South Africa. This was mainly 
because of the conflicting views on centralization and decentralization amongst the 
negotiating parties.41 .  Part of the debate concerned the creation of new provinces or 
regions, and their number and size.  The Negotiating Council of the Multi-Party 
Negotiating Process in Kempton Park eventually appointed an independent 
commission to investigate some issues and to make recommendations on the 
demarcation of regions in South Africa.  In the second half of 1993, the Commission 
on Demarcation/delimitation of States/Provinces/Regions submitted its report to the 
Negotiating Council and recommended that nine provinces be created.42 They based 
their recommendations on a variety of criteria. These included economic aspects, 
geographic coherence, institutional and administrative capacity and socio-cultural 
issues.43  With respect to economic viability the Commission noted that an 
economically viable region (province) should have “an economic base to provide 
jobs, produce goods and services and a sufficient tax base to provide fiscal 
capacity”.44 The Commission, however, recommended that although economic 
viability is important, the critical factor for the demarcation of regions should be 
economic functionality, or level of economic activity, of the proposed regions.  The 
report formed the basis for the constitutional provisions that established the nine new 
 
40 Leonardy 1997 Politik 9. 
41 See discussion under 1 1 2 and 1 1 3. 
42 Report of the Commission on the Demarcation/Delimitation of SPR’s (1993); Welsh The Provincial 
Boundary Demarcation Process in De Villiers (ed) Birth of a Constitution (1994) 223 224.  Those 
provinces were Western Cape, Northern Cape, Orange Free State (now known as Free State), 
KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Transvaal (now Mpumalanga), Northern Transvaal (later Northern Province 
and now Limpopo), PWV (now Gauteng) and North-West Province. 
43 Report on Demarcation of Regions 17. 
44 Report on Demarcation of Regions 18. 
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provinces were created by the Constitution and that they received their powers and 
functions from it.45 
 
During the constitutional negotiations, a growing consensus developed between the 
major political role-players that there should be a new constitutional order in terms of 
which there would be some form of division of powers between the various levels of 
government.  The exact nature of this division, however, proved to be a very 
contentious and complex issue and was hotly contested until the final stages of the 
negotiations.   
 
The 34 Constitutional Principles agreed to in the Multi-Party Negotiating Process 
provided the framework for the new constitution that was to be adopted by the 
Constitutional Assembly in 1996.46  The fact that nine of the Constitutional Principles 
(XVIII - XXVI) dealt with the constitutional division of competences and obligations 
between the levels of government and the financial relations between the various 
spheres, indicates the importance of this aspect.  It was very difficult to reach a 
compromise between the various opposing views on this subject.    Although there is 
no hierarchy of Constitutional Principles, Constitutional Principle XX probably 
described the duty of the Constitutional Assembly in the clearest terms.  It determined 
that: 
 
"Each level of government shall have appropriate and adequate legislative and 
executive powers and functions that will enable each level to function 
effectively.  The allocation of powers between different levels of government 
shall be made on a basis which is conducive to financial viability at each level 
of government and to effective public administration, and which recognises 
                                                 
45 In re: The National Education Policy Bill No 83 of 1995 1996 3 SA 289 (CC); 1996 4 BCLR 518 
(CC) para 23; Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC); 1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC) 
paras 258 – 260; In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, 1996 1996 
11 BCLR 1419 (CC) para 14.  The provinces were created by the 1993-Constitution and confirmed by 
the 1996-Constitution. 
46  For a discussion on the role and importance of the Constitutional Principles see 2 2 1 and 2 2 2; De 
Villiers The Constitutional Principles – Content and Significance in De Villiers (ed) Birth of a 
Constitution 37; Venter “Requirements for a new constitutional text: the imperatives of the 
constitutional principles” in 1995 (32) SALJ 32 et seq.  The Constitutional Principles are contained in 
Schedule 4 of the 1993-Constitution. 
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the need for and promotes national unity and legitimate provincial autonomy 
and acknowledges cultural diversity." 
 
The Constitutional Principles encompass elements of a federal system without 
mentioning the word "federalism".   It has been argued that the current South African 
constitutional system falls within the category of integrated or co-operative federal 
systems.  This provides an indication of the relationship between the various spheres 
of government, namely, a co-operative relationship.47  The subsidiarity principle, 
referred to in CP XXI, was also a guiding principle for the design of the new 
constitution.48  The allocation of concurrent legislative and executive functions to 
provincial and national governments and exclusive functions to provinces supports the 
notion of subsidiarity, in terms of which decisions should be taken at the lowest 
possible level or, stated differently, functions should be allocated to the level where 
they can be exercised most efficiently.  Van Wyk argued that although the 
Constitution was not drafted with an express subsidiarity purpose in mind, a number 
of provisions in the Constitution support the notion of subsidiarity, for example, the 
provisions regarding the division of competences between the different spheres of 
government.49  The application of the subsidiarity principle requires a co-operative 
relationship among the various levels of government. 
 
Another important consideration that influenced the allocation of financial resources 
and obligations in terms of the Constitution, was the requirement in Constitutional 
Principle XXVI that each level of government shall have a constitutional right to an 
equitable share of revenue.  The provinces and local governments were to be placed in 
a position where they are able to fund the provision of basic services and the 
                                                 
47 Simeon "Considerations on the design of federations: the South African constitution in comparative 
context" in 1998 (13) SAPL/PR 42 59; First Certification Case para 290: "Intergovernmental co-
operation is implicit in any system where powers have been allocated concurrently to different levels of 
government…".  See also In re: The National Education Policy Bill 83 of 1995 1996 3 SA 289 (CC), 
1996 4 BCLR 518 (CC) para 34. 
48 Carpenter Co-operative government, devolution of Powers and Subsidiarity: the South African 
Perspective in Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Seminar Report: Subnational Constitutional Governance 
(1999) 45 - 53; Simeon 1998 (13) SAPR/PL 52.  See also First Certification Case paras 237 to 244 for 
a discussion on the meaning of CP XXI.  The Constitutional Court concluded in para 252 that the 
division of functions and powers described in the constitutional text complied with the requirements of 
CP XXI.l 
49 Van Wyk Subsidiariteit as waarde wat die oop en demokratiese Suid-Afrikaanse gemeenskap ten 
grondslag lê in Carpenter (ed) Suprema Lex (1998) 251 262. 
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execution of the functions allocated to them.  This is in line with economic theory 
applicable to federal systems, in terms of which each jurisdiction should fund the 
functions it is responsible for.50  Constitutional Principle XXVI incorporated 
economic theory into the design of the new Constitution.   
 
The huge economic disparities in South Africa, both between the provinces and 
within the provinces, also influenced the discussion regarding the allocation of 
financial resources and obligations to the various levels of government.51  The 
urgency to address socio-economic development needs dictated an allocation of 
financial resources that would ensure redistribution or financial equalization could 
take place.  Macro-economic stability and redistribution of wealth are issues that 
should be dealt with by the central government.52   
 
Economic development considerations played a major role in the development of 
South Africa's constitutional system.53  The huge economic imbalances in South 
Africa is a dominant feature of the country and this warranted serious attention in 
order to create a constitutional framework that would assist government in dealing 
with the economic development needs of the country.  The importance of economic 
development, financial equalization and macro-economic stability in a decentralised 
system of government cannot be over emphasized.  These issues were addressed in 
two key sections in Chapter 13 of the Constitution, namely section 214 (equitable 
shares and allocations of revenue) and section 227 (national sources of provincial and 
local government funding).54  The high priority given to economic development 
issues in government policy is captured in the following statement by the National 
Treasury: 
s are firmly anchored in the bedrock of our democratic 
and economic order: 
                                                
 
“,,,our budget policie
 
50 See discussion under 3 1. 
51 Momoniat Fiscal decentralization in South Africa: A practitioner’s perspective (2001) 2; Mokgoro 
Interprovincial Fiscal Equalization: The Role of the Financial and Fiscal Commission in De Villiers 
(ed) Birth of a Constitution (1994) 281 284. 
52 See discussion under 3 1. 
53 SA Government Principles governing constitution making 3; CBM Multi-tier Fiscal Relations: 
Financing Regions in South Africa (1993) 6. 
54 The application of CP XXVI to the new constitutional text is discussed in First Certification Case 
paras 414 to 442. 
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• The Reconstruction and Development Programme informs public spending 
priorities and Government’s broader social and development policy 
agenda. 
• The Constitution provides a division of functions between national, 
provincial and local governments and serves as the point of departure for 
cooperative arrangements between the spheres of government.”55 
 
In South African constitutional law, unlike in Germany, the term "financial 
constitution" is not commonly used.  The Constitution has a chapter specifically 
devoted to financial matters, namely Chapter 13.  One can describe the South African 
“financial constitution” as being Chapter 13, constitutional provisions relating to the 
division of competences between the spheres of government and the financial 
legislation required in terms of Chapter 13, for example, the annual legislation on the 
equitable division of revenue and the Budget.56 
 
Provinces have original legislative power as well as assigned legislative power.57  In 
Ex Parte Western Cape Provincial Government: In Re DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v 
North West Provincial Government the Constitutional Court held that a provincial 
legislature had the authority to amend and repeal its provincial legislation, including 
legislation assigned to it by the national government.58  The residual legislative 
authority rests with Parliament.59  Schedules 4 (concurrent legislative functional 
areas) and 5 (exclusive provincial legislative functional areas) of the Constitution list 
functional areas, that are not clearly defined and which potentially create overlaps, for 
example, between “regional planning and development” (concurrent functional area) 
and “provincial planning” (exclusive provincial functional area).  According to the 
Constitutional Court, the constitutional scheme requires that meaningful content must 
be given to an exclusive provincial functional area “by defining its ambit in a way that 
                                                 
55 National Treasury Budget Review 2003 2. 
56 Brand "The South African Constitution - Three Crucial Issues for Future Development" in 1998 (2) 
Stell LR  182 188. 
57 Sec 104 (1) (b) of the Constitution; First Certification Case paras 258-259; Currie & De Waal The 
New Constitutional and Administrative Law Vol I (2001) 201; Malherbe & Brand South Africa - Sub-
national Constitutional Law in Alen et al (eds) Sub-national Constitutional Law (2001) 49 – 56; 
Rautenbach & Malherbe Constitutional Law (1999) 278 et seq; Chaskalson & Klaaren Provincial 
Government in Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of SA 4-12 et seq. 
58 2000 4 BCLR 347 (CC). 
59 Sec 44 of the Constitution; First Certification Case para 239. 
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leaves it ordinarily distinct and separate from the potentially overlapping concurrent 
competences set out in Schedule 4”.60  This implies that each case of contested 
concurrent or exclusive legislation must be considered on its own merits in order to 
give meaningful content to the scope of the relevant functional area.   
 
Section 100 of the Constitution61 provides for national intervention in provincial 
executive activities and stipulates as follows: 
 
“When a province cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation in terms of 
the Constitution or legislation, the national executive may intervene by taking 
any appropriate steps to ensure fulfillment of that obligation, including - …” 
 
Such intervention should only be utilized in limited situations when there is a serious 
failure of government and should be subject to the principles of co-operative 
government.62  This was emphasized by the Constitutional Court when it stated: 
 
“This power of intervention is defined and limited.  Outside that limit the 
exclusive provincial power remains intact and beyond the legislative 
competences of Parliament.”63 
 
In a similar way, provision is made in section 139 for provincial intervention in 
municipal executive activities.  The lack of effective service delivery in many parts in 
South Africa is a major concern.  These intervention provisions have been used where 
there were serious problems at provincial or municipal government level that 
negatively influenced the delivery of services to the citizens.64  The inclusion of 
sections 100 and 139 in the Constitution implies the possibility that the newly created 
provinces and municipalities may struggle due to a lack of capacity, and enables the 
                                                 
60 Ex Parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 732 (CC) para 
56; Malherbe “Die Drankwetsontwerp: Vooraf kontrole en Grondwetlike gesagsverdeling verder 
omlyn” in 2000 (63) THRHR 321.  This judgement is discussed in 7 4 1. 
61 It was amended by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act, 2003 
(Act 3 of 2003). 
62 First Certification Case paras 263 – 266; Murray “Municipal integrity and effective government: the 
Butterworth intervention” 1999 (14) SAPR/PL 332 342. 
63 First Certification Case para 257; Malherbe 2000 (63) THRHR 321 331. 
64 See Murray 1999 (14) SAPR/PL 335. 
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national and provincial governments to intervene through appropriate means to 
correct such a situation.  During the first ten years of democracy it became evident 
that there are many municipalities and a number of the provinces that simply lack 
sufficient administrative capacity and professional skills to be effective modern 
governments.  Intervention is a particular mechanism created by the Constitution to 
deal with this inability or unwillingness of governments to perform their duties.  It is 
aimed at correcting the problem that occurred, but does not address the question 
regarding the lack of sufficient administrative capacity.   
 
In Germany provision is made in the Basic Law for federal supervision of the 
implementation of federal legislation by the Länder.  The Federal Government may, 
with the consent of the Bundesrat, issue general administrative rules and may send 
commissioners to the Länder to ensure implementation of federal legislation.65 
 
Section 125 (3) of the Constitution requires the national government to assist 
provinces to develop the “administrative capacity required for the effective exercise 
of their powers and performance of their functions referred to in subsection (2)”.  
National and provincial government have the duty in terms of section 154 (1) to assist 
municipalities by strengthening their capacity to administer their own affairs, to 
exercise their powers and to perform the functions allocated to them.  Intervention is 
potentially a drastic measure, that should be used sparingly in order to protect the 
integrity of the respective spheres of government and to adhere to the constitutional 
principles of co-operative government.  Capacity building and support, from one level 
or sphere to another, should be utilized more to strengthen the ability of provinces and 
municipalities to provide a better service for their citizens.  The Minister of Finance, 
Trevor Manuel, has criticized provinces in the past for the underspending of funds 
allocated in particular for infrastructure development as this has limited the economic 
growth potential of the country.66  One reason for this situation is the lack of 
sufficient administrative capacity and technical and management skills at provincial 
and local government level. 
                                                
 
 
65 Art 84 and 37 of the Basic Law. 
66 National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2003 18. 
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One of the first cases of provincial intervention into local government affairs 
happened in 1998 when the Eastern Cape Provincial Government intervened in the 
Butterworth municipality by appointing administrators to manage the municipality.67 
Political disputes, various court cases, a lack of funding due to a payment boycott and 
poor administrative capacity led to this situation.  This case study was a useful testing 
ground for the application of section 139 of the Constitution.  The Eastern Cape 
Provincial Government and the NCOP had to develop rules that would guide the 
process. Although section 139 (1) (a) and (b) lists some possible acts of intervention, 
the question of what is appropriate intervention had to be addressed.   What 
constitutes appropriate steps would depend on the nature of the problem being 
addressed.  The Butterworths case underlines the importance of checks and balances 
in the intervention process.  Section 139 clearly creates a duty for a province to 
intervene in a municipality under particular circumstances and at the same time 
requires the national government, the provincial legislature and the NCOP to monitor 
the situation and to ensure that the province exercises this intervention power 
correctly. 
 
Murray, in a detailed analysis of the Butterworths intervention process, stated that 
provincial intervention in municipal affairs must be constitutionally justified and that 
it should be aimed at finding a balance between the “constitutional imperative to 
respect the municipality’s integrity” and the need for effective government.68  Both 
these factors form an integral part of the framework for government in South Africa 
and must be respected.  A large number of municipalities in South Africa lack 
sufficient capacity to provide basic services and to perform their obligations.  This 
implies that there is potentially a large scope for provincial intervention to support 
good governance.69  There should, however, be a continuous drive to build sufficient 
capacity at municipal government level to avoid interventions in order to maintain the 
integrity of the respective spheres of government and to adhere to the principles of co-
operative government.  This duty to assist and strengthen municipal capacity can be 
costly and places an additional burden on the financial resources of provinces.  
Provinces should make provision in their budgets to give effect to their constitutional 
                                                 
67 Murray 1999 (14) SAPR/PL 332. 
68 1999 (14) SAPR/PL 355. 
69 Murray 1999 (14) SAPR.PL 358, 377. 
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obligation to supervise local government and to strengthen their capacity.70 The duty 
to assist provinces requires additional funds from the national government and 
provision should be made for this. 
 
Municipal councils have a limited legislative role in terms of which they are allocated 
the authority to make by-laws for the effective administration of matters entrusted to 
them.71  By-laws can be on local issues falling within the concurrent and exclusive 
functional areas listed in Part B of Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution. Included are 
areas such as air pollution, electricity and gas reticulation, fire fighting services 
(concurrent functional areas) and licensing of dogs and traffic and parking (exclusive 
provincial functional areas).72  The legislative authority of local government depends 
on the scope of its executive powers, and it is not the usual situation where the 
executive authority follows the legislative powers. This gives a clear indication that 
municipalities are primarily focused on the delivery of services and not on creating 
legislation.73  
 
Provinces have the constitutional obligation to administer their own provincial 
legislation.  Provinces also have the executive authority to administer national 
legislation falling within the functional areas listed in Schedules 4 and 5 of the 
Constitution, but only to the extent that they have the administrative capacity to 
exercise such executive authority.74  The expenditure responsibility is implied in the 
obligation to administer provincial or national legislation.  In some cases, for example 
the payment of stipulated welfare grants in terms of national legislation, provinces are 
like a conduit for channelling funds to the recipients of such grants.  The national 
government has the obligation to assist provinces in developing the necessary 
administrative capacity to be effective provincial governments.  Such assistance could 
include training of personnel, additional funding to get specific expertise or seconding 
                                                 
70 Sec 139, 154 (1) and 155 (6) & (7) of the Constitution.  
71 Sec 156 (2) of the Constitution; Executive Council of the Western Cape v Minister of Provincial 
Affairs and Constitutional Development 2000 1 SA 661 (CC). 
72 Malherbe & Brand 118 South Africa – Sub-national Constitutional Law et seq. 
73 Currie & De Waal Constitutional and Administrative Law 217 - 220 
74 Sec 125 (2) (b) and (3) of the Constitution; Malherbe & Brand South Africa – Sub-national 
Constitutional Law 78 – 80; Currie & De Waal Constitutional and Administrative Law 258 -259; 
Rautenbach & Malherbe Constitutional Law 286.  
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personnel to a province for a limited period in order to build the required 
administrative capacity.  Some provinces started with low administrative capacity in 
1994 and faced huge challenges to create a new provincial administration. Limpopo 
and Eastern Cape for example had to incorporate previous homeland administrations 
and parts of previous provincial administrations.75  This created a heavy burden for 
these provinces that have predominantly rural populations.  They had to merge 
different systems, for example different sets of bookkeeping and personnel records, 
while developing a new functional provincial administration that would serve the 
people of these provinces.  
 
A further category of provincial executive authority is the administration of national 
legislation that falls outside the functional areas listed in Schedules 4 and 5, and that 
was assigned to a province.76   
 
The provinces play a role in the national legislative process by way of their 
participation in the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), a chamber of Parliament 
that was created to ensure that provincial interests are taken into account in the 
national sphere of government.77  The NCOP has 90 members consisting of nine 
provincial delegations of ten members each.78  Organised local government may also 
participate in the debates of the NCOP by appointing a maximum of ten part-time 
representatives, but these representatives have no voting rights.79  Each provincial 
delegation consists of six permanent delegates and four special delegates, who must 
be members of the provincial legislature.  The idea behind the provision for special 
delegates is that there must be an opportunity for members of the provincial executive 
to form part of the province’s delegation to the NCOP.80  The special delegates are 
                                                 
75 Wehner Fiscal Federalism in South Africa (1999) 64. 
76 Sec 125 (2) (c) of the Constitution; Ex Parte Western Cape Provincial Government: In re DVB 
Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North West Provincial Government 2000 4 BCLR 347 (CC).  For a discussion on 
assignment of legislation see Brand Development of Concurrent Legislation - A New South African 
Perspective in Subnational Constitutional Governance (1999) 37 - 44. 
77 Sec 42 (4) of the Constitution.  See Murray & Simeon "From Paper to Practice: The National 
Council of Provinces after its first year" in 1999 (14) SAPR/PL 96 - 141 for a useful analysis of the 
operation of the NCOP; Malherbe “The South African national council of provinces: Trojan horse or 
white elephant?” 1998 (1) TSAR 77. 
78 Sec 60 (2) of the Constitution. 
79 Sec 67 of the Constitution; Currie & De Waal Constitutional and Administrative Law 149. 
80 Malherbe & Brand South Africa – Sub-national Constitutional Law 36; Currie & De Waal 
Constitutional and Administrative Law 148 – 153; Malherbe 1998 (1) TSAR 88. 
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mostly, but not necessarily, members of the provincial executive.  The Premier of a 
province, or a member of the province’s delegation designated by the Premier, leads 
the province’s delegation to the NCOP.81  The creation of the NCOP followed a study 
visit by a multi-party delegation from the Constitutional Assembly, late in 1995, to 
Germany. It is safe to say that this visit had a significant influence on debates about a 
second legislative chamber in Parliament and on the thinking around co-operative 
government.82  The NCOP is loosely modelled on the Bundesrat, but there are two 
important differences.  Firstly, the Bundesrat is composed of members of the 
executive of the Länder, while the provinces are represented by members of both the 
legislature and the executive.  Secondly, the sixteen Länder delegations to the 
Bundesrat differ in size between three and six members, while each province has a 
delegation of ten members to the NCOP.  The NCOP is the embodiment of the notion 
of co-operative government within the legislative sphere, because it creates the 
opportunity, and the obligation, for representatives of the national, provincial and, to a 
lesser extent, local spheres of government to cooperate in the national legislative 
arena.83 
 
Provincial delegations to the NCOP each have one vote, except where the 
Constitution provides otherwise.84  In the case of ordinary Bills affecting provinces, 
for example Bills regarding issues within Schedules 4 or 5, each delegation has one 
vote.85  Bills within this category are also discussed by the individual provincial 
legislatures, who must confer a mandate on their delegation to vote in the NCOP.  In 
case of Bills not affecting provinces, the individual delegates each have a vote and 
voting takes place along party political lines.  Money Bills, which include the annual 
budget, must be adopted in accordance with the section 75-procedure, that states that 
the NCOP decides on the basis of individual delegates’ votes and that the National 
Assembly can override the decision of the NCOP with a simple majority.86  
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
81 Sec 60 (3) of the Constitution. 
82 Malherbe 1998 (1) TSAR 82. 
83 Malherbe 1998 (1) TSAR 86. 
84 Sec 65 (1) of the Constitution. 
85 Sec 76 of the Constitution; Malherbe & Brand South Africa – Sub-national Constitutional Law 38 – 
39; Currie & De Waal Constitutional and Administrative Law 175 – 178. 
86 Sec 77 (2) of the Constitution. 
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Provinces, through their participation in the NCOP, are able to influence the adoption 
of national legislation, in particular where it affects provinces, this includes legislation 
envisaged in Chapter 13 of the Constitution that affects the financial interests of 
provinces, such as the annual Division of Revenue Act.87  In its first few years of 
existence, the NCOP had to develop its own procedures and establish itself as a 
unique forum for provincial interests.  It has not yet achieved its full potential, but 
according to Murray and Simeon has the ability to still grow into a meaningful 
institution that will enrich South Africa’s democracy.88 The accommodation of more 
political diversity in the NCOP would contribute to strengthening its role in 
Parliament, but this is not envisaged in the near future.  The ability of the various 
provincial delegations to play a meaningful role could be enhanced by providing them 
with sufficient technical support both at the NCOP and at their respective provinces.  
Draft legislation needs to be studied carefully and appropriately qualified staff would 
add value to the functioning of provincial delegations at the NCOP.   
  
In the areas of concurrent jurisdiction, there is nothing in the Constitution that 
provides a pre-emptive right to pass legislation in either Parliament or a provincial 
legislature.89  Both institutions have an equal opportunity to legislate on concurrent 
matters.  It should, however, be noted that there are extensive conflict regulatory 
provisions in section 146 of the Constitution. These apply when there is a conflict 
between national and provincial legislation while dealing with a matter that falls 
within Schedule 4 (concurrent functional areas).90  In terms of these provisions, a 
national law will only prevail if it complies with a number of conditions, such as the 
necessity to have national legislation for the maintenance of economic unity or 
national security.  The application of these conflict regulatory provisions is 
objectively justiciable in a court of law.91  Concurrency thus creates the possibility of 
national as well as provincial legislation in the same functional area, for example 
                                                 
87 Sec 75 (ordinary bills not affecting provinces) and sec 76 (ordinary bills affecting provinces) of the 
Constitution.  See Venter Constitutional Comparison 247 – 249; Rautenbach & Malherbe 
Constitutional Law 179 - 180. 
88 1999 (1) SAPR/PL 130. 
89 Brand Concurrent legislation 37 et seq. 
90 Rautenbach & Malherbe Constitutional Law 277 - 279. 
91 In re Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
1997 2 SA 97 (CC) para 155. 
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education, which in turn has an impact on the expenditure needs of both the national 
and the provincial (education) departments.  
 
The principles of co-operative government listed in Chapter 3 of the Constitution 
provide the lubrication for the engine of government in South Africa.92  They guide 
the exercise of intergovernmental relations in South Africa and each sphere of 
government must exercise its powers and fulfil its obligations subject to the principles 
of co-operative government.   
 
4 2 3 Interim conclusions 
 
An important historical difference in the development of the current constitutional 
order in the two country studies is that Germany followed partly a “bottom up” 
approach in the design of their system, as there were Länder before 1949, although 
some were created by the Basic Law.  The opposite occurred in the case of South 
Africa, where a “top down” approach was followed with the new Constitution that 
created nine new provinces in 1994.  This historical difference had an impact on the 
further development of the constitutional systems in both countries.  Many of South 
Africa’s provinces started with a capacity deficit due to the huge burden of 
incorporating various old homeland and provincial administrations.  The shortage of 
skills and administrative capacity that still exists after ten years of democracy has 
slowed down the growth of provincial government in South Africa. 
 
It appears from the overview of the allocation of legislative competences to the Bund 
and the Länder, that there is little scope for Länder legislation, although the Länder 
have a substantial influence on federal legislation through their participation in the 
Bundesrat, in particular on legislation that affects the financial position of the Länder.  
The opposite situation exists as far as the allocation of administrative obligations is 
concerned.  The division of competences between the Bund and the Länder in terms 
of the Basic Law is sometimes referred to as "executive federalism" in view of this 
                                                 
92 See discussion under 2 3; see also Bray “The constitutional concept of co-operative government and 
its application in education” in 2002 (65) THRHR 514; First Certification Case para 469; Liquor Bill 
Case para 40 – 41; Premier of the Western Cape v President of the RSA 1999 4 BCLR 382 (CC) para 
58. 
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particular division of executive obligations.93  The fact that the Länder carry the bulk 
of the administrative obligations requires that there should be proper funding 
arrangements in terms of Article 104 (5) of the Basic Law, whether it  be through own 
or shared sources of revenue or some financial equalization mechanisms. 
 
It is evident that provinces in South Africa, similar to the position of the Länder in 
Germany, have extensive executive responsibilities, whereas the national government 
is responsible for most of the policy formulation and legislative activity in the 
country.  Provinces are responsible for most of the administration of national and 
provincial legislation.  Due to the particular constitutional division of functions in 
South Africa, the bulk of provincial obligations fall within the concurrent areas of 
jurisdiction.  Education, health and social services, which are all concurrent functional 
areas, account on average for approximately 80% of provincial expenditure.   
 
The NCOP has not yet lived up to the constitutional expectations of an important 
legislative chamber where provincial interests should be reflected.  Provinces have not 
asserted themselves in the NCOP, contrary to the effective role that the Länder play in 
the Bundesrat. 
 
4 3 Allocation of financial resources 
 
4 3 1 Legislative authority to levy taxes 
 
Fiscal federalism entails the division of expenditure responsibilities on the one hand 
and the division of revenue on the other, between the respective constituent 
governments, and the allocation of the legislative authority to levy taxes.  There is no 
rule that in federal systems the legislative authority to levy taxes should be allocated 
to either the national or the provincial governments.  There are however several 
possibilities for different constitutional systems that fall within the broad category of 
federal or decentralized systems of government. 
 
                                                 
93 Häde Finanzausgleich 44. 
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In the case of Germany, historical factors had an important influence on the current 
shape of the provisions governing the distribution of the taxing responsibility.  A 
significant part of the financial system created by the formation of the German Reich 
in 1871 was the introduction of federal taxes.  The Reich had the legislative authority 
on customs duties and on excise taxes on important consumer goods such as tobacco, 
salt and sugar.94  Some Länder, such as Bavaria and Württemberg, retained their right 
to legislate on excise taxes on brandy and beer.   
 
Legislative authority for direct taxes, such as income tax, stayed with the Länder until 
early in the twentieth century when it passed to the Bund.  Radical changes to the tax 
system were necessitated by the dire financial position of the state after World War I. 
The new economic realities that faced the new state required a new approach to the 
allocation of taxes. The huge amount of funds needed to rebuild the country was 
enough cause for centralization of the tax system.95  The Weimar Constitution made 
provision that the Bund will have legislative authority for taxation in order to fulfil its 
constitutional obligations.96  The need for federal taxes and expenditure 
responsibilities was even more evident after World War II when the structural and 
social needs caused by the War were regarded as a federal concern.  Special provision 
was made in the Basic Law that the Bund will be responsible for the expenditure 
relating to occupation costs and other war burdens.97 The economic reality of high 
federal debt and the increased need for social support on a countrywide basis, 
warranted that the Bund be given the authority to raise the major taxes, such as 
personal income and corporate tax.  Another factor that contributed to the dominant 
position of the Bund as far as taxes is concerned, was the fact that it could provide 
some form of financial equalization across Länder boundaries.98  
 
The original focus in 1949, largely influenced by the Western Occupation Forces, was 
to create a clear division of powers between the two levels of government, and not to 
focus on co-operative elements.99  In terms of the current provisions in the Basic Law, 
                                                 
94 Art 35 Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs, 1871; Bundesministerium der Finanzen An ABC of Taxes 
in the Federal Republic of Germany (1997) 16. 
95 Bundesministerium der Finanzen An ABC of Taxes 17; Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 49.. 
96 Art 8 Weimar Constitution, 1919. 
97 Art 120 of the Basic Law; Fischer-Menshausen DÖV 22 (Nov 1952) 673. 
98 Fischer-Menshausen DÖV 22 (Nov 1952) 673. 
99 Fischer-Menshausen Das Finanzwesen in Von Münch Grundgesetzkommentar (1996) 871 876. 
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the bulk of legislative authority on taxes is allocated to the Bund.  Article 105, 
regulating the legislative authority on taxes, is a lex specialis on the general legislative 
authority contained in Article 70 of the Basic Law.  Exclusive federal legislative 
authority is provided in Article 105 (1) over customs duties (Zölle) and fiscal 
monopolies (Finanzmonopole).100  In view of the development of a common internal 
market in the European Union and the consequential abolition of customs duties 
within the internal market, this provision is not so significant anymore.101 
 
Concurrent legislative authority is allocated to the Bund and the Länder in Article 105 
(2) of the Basic Law to legislate on all other taxes, the revenue of which accrues 
wholly or in part to the Bund, or where the conditions for federal legislation in the 
concurrent field apply.  This provision forms the nucleus on legislative authority to 
impose taxes since it relates to the most important taxes in Germany.  In terms of the 
first requirement for concurrent federal legislative authority, the Bund may inter alia 
legislate on income tax, corporate tax and turnover tax which all accrue jointly to the 
Bund and the Länder.102  Federal authority over these taxes is substantiated by the 
second requirement contained in Article 105 (2), namely the conditions applicable to 
concurrent legislative authority contained in Article 72 (2) of the Basic Law.103  The 
need for the maintenance of legal and economic unity, referred to in Article 72 (2) is a 
strong motivation for locating the major taxes at the federal level. The practical 
consequence of the application of these two Articles is that all the major taxes in 
Germany are federal taxes.   
 
It is, however, important to note that the Basic Law gives the Länder an important say 
in this legislative process.  Article 105 (3) presents the Länder through their 
participation in the Bundesrat with a veto, since the consent of the Bundesrat is 
required for all federal legislation on taxes the revenue from which accrues wholly or 
in part to the Länder or the municipalities.  This is quite a significant collective power 
                                                 
100 Häde Finanzausgleich 154 - 156; Currie Constitution of Germany 53; Von Münch Staatsrecht Band 
I 222.  Traditionally there were income producing state enterprises in goods such as matches and 
brandy, but today there is only a fiscal monopoly on brandy.  No new fiscal monopolies may be created 
in view of the protection of freedom of occupation in Art 12 of the Basic Law as well as provisions in 
the EU competition law. 
101 Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 153. 
102 Art 106 (3) of the Basic Law.  See Häde Finanzausgleich 159. 
103 Häde Finanzausgleich 159; Currie Constitution of Germany 53; Klein Bund und Länder nach der 
Finanzverfassung 882. 
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that the Länder have in the federal legislative process.104  The fact that the Länder do 
not have the legislative authority over important taxes such as personal income tax is 
partly offset by the fact that they play a key role in the federal legislative process 
when decisions are taken about federal taxes and other fiscal issues.  While this is a 
meaningful constitutional arrangement that provides the Länder with a potentially 
strong power, the question whether the veto power of the Bundesrat cannot be 
misused to block important financial legislation is valid.  In terms of the current 
division of political parties (2003) in Germany the main opposition party, the 
Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union, is in the majority in the 
Bundesrat and can effectively veto legislative proposals by the Social Democratic 
Party coalition in government, or use its position to bargain for concessions in the 
proposed legislation before Parliament.  While the German economy is struggling and 
the ageing population places high demands on the pension and health systems, there is 
a need for a wide range of reform measures that require the support of the Bundesrat 
as well.  Some commentators suggest that it is a stalemate where it is difficult to get 
any decisions taken.105 
 
The Basic Law assigns exclusive legislative authority to the Länder in terms of 
Article 105 (2a) to legislate on local excise taxes as long and in so far as they are not 
identical to federally imposed taxes.106  Examples of these Länder own taxes are 
hunting and fishing tax, beverage tax and entertainment tax.107  Although these taxes 
have a geographical element and are thus relevant for particular individual Länder, 
they are not the main sources of tax revenue for the Länder.  The scope of these taxes 
is in fact fairly limited.   
 
Many debates were entertained during 1995 - 1996 on the issue of a restructuring of 
the legislative competences over taxes.  Some, like the Federal Minister of Finance at 
the time, Theo Waigel, argued for more Länder tax autonomy with a view to giving 
them more responsibility over income and corporate tax.  The fact that the Bund saw 
itself as the funder for the unification of Germany implied at least a potential loss of 
                                                 
104 Häde Finanzausgleich 159; Klein Bund und Länder nach der Finanzverfassung 883. 
105 Schultze “German federalism at the crossroads” 2003 (Vol 3 Nr 3) Federations 13 15. 
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tax income to the old Länder.  This stimulated the debate about tax reform, a debate 
that occurs from time to time when Länder feel that their relative financial autonomy 
is under threat.  The situation, however, remains that the Bund has the legislative 
authority over the major taxes.108 
 
The Unification of Germany in 1990 required specific financial arrangements in order 
to finance the huge needs of the new Länder.109  On the taxation side a special tax, 
called the solidarity surcharge (Solidaritätszuschlag) was instituted from 1 January 
1995.110  This surcharge is payable on all income and corporate tax and the revenue is 
allocated to the Bund, that utilizes it for contributing to the economic reconstruction 
of the new Länder.   
 
Table 4 1 Legislative authority to levy taxes in Germany111 
Assignment of legislative authority in terms of Article 105 of the Basic Law 
  To the Bund     To the Länder 
Exclusive power  Concurrent power  Power to legislate 
to legislate on   to legislate on the  - if the conditions for 
customs duties  remaining taxes if  concurrent legislation by 
and fiscal monopolies  the Bund is entitled to  the Bund are not fulfilled;  
    the whole or a part of  - insofar as the Bund does 
    the proceeds; or  not exercise its powers of 
    the conditions for federal concurrent legislation;  
    legislation in the con-  - on local excise taxes,  
    current field apply  insofar as they are not  
        identical with taxes  
        imposed by federal legis- 
        lation; and 
                                                                                                                                            
 
108 Laufer & Münch Das föderative System 155. 
109 See discussions under 5 5. 
110 Art 31 FKPG (Gesetz zur Umsetzung des Föderalen Konsolidierungsprogramms von 23. Juni 1993 
BGBl 1 944); Bundesministerium der Finanzen Steuern von A bis Z (2001) 90; Renzsch “Neuregelung 
der Bund/Länder-Finanzbeziehungen: Volle Einbeziehung der neuen Länder ab 1995” in 
Gegenwartskunde 1/1994 75 79.  The rate of the surcharge was initially 7,5%, but was changed in 1998 
to the current 5,5%. 
111 Bundesministerium der Finanzen  An ABC of Taxes in the Federal Republic of Germany (1997) 50. 
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- on church tax (Article 
140 of the Basic Law)112 
 
In the case of South Africa the current division of legislative authority regarding taxes 
was also influenced by historical developments and political and economic realities.  
Before 1994, South Africa had a centralised system of government and taxes were 
thus centralised.  Parliament had the authority to legislate on all taxes, except for 
municipalities who could levy property rates.  In 1992 the national government 
collected about 86% of the total tax revenues in the country.113  The creation of a new 
constitutional system in which provinces were to become important constitutional 
entities posed a challenge to the negotiators and drafters of the constitution to design a 
new fiscal intergovernmental relations system.  Aims such as national unity and 
provincial autonomy had to be taken into consideration in this process.  In their 
proposals to the Multi-Party Negotiating Process, some of the political parties 
indicated the need for a balanced approach that would make provision for appropriate 
financial resources to the national and regional levels of government, including a 
division of the power to raise taxes.114  In one of the discussion papers presented to 
the Multi-party Negotiation Process (MPNP) at Kempton Park two basic options were 
contrasted, namely a detailed shared tax system in terms of which the provinces 
would be entitled to a range of shares in a variety of taxes on the one hand versus an 
entitlement to the regional level of government to a minimum share of all nationally 
collected taxes.115  The result of the negotiations at Kempton Park was the inclusion 
of a tax system, which was effectively a combination of these two proposals.  
Provinces were given a right to an equitable share of specified taxes, which in turn 
was mainly composed of percentages to be fixed by an Act of Parliament.116  
                                                 
112 Häde Finanzausgleich 177. 
113 Mokgoro Interprovincial Fiscal Equalisation 282. 
114 SA Government Principles governing constitution making in South Africa 2; ANC Regional Policy  
- submission to the Technical Committee on Constitutional Issues (May 1993) 12; DP Submission to 
the Technical Committee on Constitutional Issues 4. 
115 CBM Multi-tier Fiscal Relations: Financing Regions in South Africa (1993) 14. 
116 Sec 155 (1) and (2) of the 1993-Constitution: 
“(1) A province shall be entitled to an equitable share of revenue collected nationally to enable it to 
provide services and to exercise and perform its powers and functions. 
 (2) The equitable share of revenue referred to in subsection (1) shall consist of – 
(a) a percentage, as fixed by an Act of Parliament, of income tax on individuals which is collected 
nationally; 
(b) a percentage, as fixed by an Act of Parliament, of value-added tax or other sales tax which is 
collected nationally; 
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 Provision was also made for provinces to raise taxes, levies and duties other than 
income tax, value-added tax or sales tax, and to impose surcharges on taxes.  This was 
quite a limited scope of legislative authority given to provinces to develop their own 
tax sources.  The legislative authority on taxes was even further limited by the 
condition that taxes levied by provinces should not be detrimental to national 
economic policies, interprovincial commerce, or the national mobility of goods, 
services, capital and labour.117  Provinces do not have equal tax bases due to the fact 
that the main centres of the economy are in three of the nine provinces, namely, 
Gauteng, Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal.  The allocation of significant taxing 
powers to the provinces would thus have strengthened this inequitable economic 
situation.  The distribution of tax raising powers was done in such a way that the 
national government retained the legislative authority over the major taxes, such as 
personal and corporate income tax and value-added tax, while provinces could raise 
taxes other than these major taxes and could impose a surcharge on taxes if authorised 
by an Act of Parliament to do so.118  Although the provinces were not allocated the 
legislative authority over substantial own sources of revenue, the fact that a fixed 
percentage of specified national taxes was constitutionally guaranteed served as some 
counterbalance to the provinces to alleviate the vertical fiscal imbalance.   
 
There were also compelling economic reasons that supported the approach taken in 
the drafting of the 1993-Constitution. These reasons included the need to provide 
basic services to various communities throughout South Africa to alleviate poverty 
and the need for macro-economic stability.  The existence of horizontal fiscal 
inequalities between the various provinces right from their inception and the obvious 
need to address it posed a challenge to the creation of the new system of financial 
intergovernmental relations.119  It appears that national concerns, in particular the 
need to address horizontal imbalances and the promotion of national unity, had an 
important influence on the design of the tax system.  Centralization of the legislative 
                                                                                                                                            
(c) a percentage, as fixed by an Act of Parliament, of any national levy on the sale of fuel; 
(d) any transfer duty, collected nationally, on the acquisition, sale or transfer of any property situated 
within the province concerned; and 
(e) any other conditional or unconditional allocations out of national revenue to a province.” 
117 Sec 156 (2) of the 1993-Constitution.  See Mokgoro Interprovincial Fiscal Equalization 281 283. 
118 Sec 156 (1) of the 1993-Constitution. 
119 Mokgoro Interprovincial Fiscal Equalization 284. 
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authority over the major taxes is in line with economic theory on decentralized 
systems of government that state that powers relating to macro-economic stability and 
redistribution of finances should be allocated at the national level of government.120   
 
In the development of the current Constitution, the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission121 that played an influential role in the creation of the current financial 
intergovernmental relations system, argued that a balance had to be achieved between 
the competing aims of nation building and fiscal autonomy.122  An important 
underlying aim of the new fiscal system was to encourage accountability of all levels 
of government. This implied that ideally each level of government should raise its 
own revenue needed to fund its constitutional functions.  If sufficient financial 
resources are not allocated to provincial and local governments, it must be 
supplemented by some form of revenue sharing.  The Financial and Fiscal 
Commission also suggested that other norms, such as equity in the provision of public 
services and the certainty of revenue and administrative efficiency, should be taken 
into account in the eventual allocation of financial resources.123  
 
In South African society the importance of nation building cannot be underestimated; 
this is acknowledged in the Preamble and section 1 of the Constitution.  Nation 
building is not a precise concept, but refers to the notion of building a new South 
African nation by bringing together people from diverse backgrounds and 
communities with a view to overcome the legacy of apartheid.124  One of the 
objectives listed in the Preamble to the Constitution is to “build a united and 
democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the 
family of nations”.  In economic terms, this aim includes redistribution of financial 
resources to alleviate poverty and to contribute to economic growth throughout the 
country.  Nation building was a key political objective of the newly elected 
                                                 
120 Mokgoro Interprovincial Fiscal Equalization 283; Oates Federalism and Government Finance in 
Quigley & Smolensky (eds) Modern Public Finance (1994) 131.  See also the discussion of allocation 
of revenue responsibilities under 3 3. 
121 The FFC was established by sec 198 of the 1993-Constitution and reconfirmed by sec 220 of the 
1996-Constitution.  In terms of sec 220 (3) the FFC must function in terms of an Act of Parliament and 
this Act is the Financial and Fiscal Commission Act, 99 of 1997. 
122 Visser & Erasmus The Management of Public Finance – A Practical Guide (2002) 262; FFC 
Framework Document for Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in South Africa (1995) 5, 7. 
123 FFC Framework Document for Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in South Africa 9. 
124 FFC Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in SA 5.  
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government in 1994, and has been actively pursued since then. The design of a 
financial intergovernmental relations system is a careful balancing act between the 
opposing aims of fiscal autonomy and nation building.125   
 
The aim of fiscal decentralization fosters the development of responsible government 
at all levels and it also allows for differentiation at regional government level.126  
Fiscal decentralization has the potential to strengthen good governance values such as 
accountability and public participation and to accommodate diversity if the respective 
provinces have sufficient administrative capacity to educate the citizens about their 
developmental needs and their preferences regarding the delivery of services.127 All 
these considerations played a role when the Constitutional Assembly considered the 
constitutional provisions regarding the legislative authority on taxes.  The scheme 
created under the 1993-Constitution was continued under the current Constitution, 
while certain amendments were made in an attempt to balance competing norms and 
other important issues.  The most important change was the inclusion of a 
constitutionally entrenched right of provinces to levy taxes, in contrast to the rather 
weak provision in the 1993-Constitution that created a limited and qualified scope to 
raise own taxes at the provincial level.128 
 
The basic premise in Chapter 13 (Finance) of the Constitution is that each government 
within all three spheres of government should be in a financial position to perform the 
functions allocated to them.  Proper funding arrangements, whether by way of own or 
shared sources and some equalization mechanisms are thus envisaged. Chapter 13 
determines the provincial and municipal legislative authority regarding taxes with 
reference to national taxes, although the national legislative authority is not listed.  
Provinces may impose taxes, levies and duties other than national and municipal taxes 
and may impose flat-rate surcharges on certain nationally levied taxes, levies and 
duties.129  Provinces are also allowed to impose user fees.130  The right of provinces 
                                                 
125 Murray & Simeon 2000 (15) SAPR/PL 496; FFC Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 9. 
126 Oates Federalism and Government Finance 131.   
127 Ajam The evolution of devolution: fiscal decentralization in South Africa in Abedian & Biggs (eds) 
Economic globalisation and fiscal policy (1998) 54 94. 
128Chaskalson & Klaaren Provincial Government 4-19. 
129 Sec 228 (1) of the Constitution. 
130 First Certification Case para 438. 
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to legislate on taxes is limited by the Constitution, namely it may not be exercised in 
such a way that materially and unreasonably prejudices national economic policies, 
cross-provincial economic activities or the national mobility of goods, services, 
capital or labour.  It must also be regulated by an Act of Parliament, and in 2001, such 
an Act, namely the Provincial Tax Regulation Process Act, 53 of 2001, was adopted 
by Parliament.131   
 
Provincial taxes would mostly benefit the economically stronger provinces such as 
Gauteng and the Western Cape. This requires that the needs of those provinces with 
below average tax raising capacity should be considered in the financial equalization 
process.  The approach of the National Treasury towards provincial taxes is that the 
national government should maintain firm control and approve any provincial tax 
before a province can institute it.132  This approach is reflected in the Provincial Tax 
Regulation Process Act, which requires a province to submit a proposal for a new 
provincial tax to the Minister of Finance who must, after consideration and 
consultation with the Budget Council, publish a further Bill to regulate the proposed 
provincial tax.  Only after that is done may a province impose a provincial tax by way 
of a provincial law.  The scheme of the Act, in particular the dominant role given to 
the national Minister of Finance on a matter that falls within the constitutionally 
allocated powers of a province, is questionable, since it creates the impression that 
this Act goes beyond mere “regulation”, as required in section 228 (2) of the 
Constitution, and in fact encroaches on the right of a province to impose taxes, levies 
and duties.133  The Constitutional Court stated in the First Certification Case with 
reference to section 228, that this section gives provinces specific and guaranteed 
taxing powers and that the national legislation envisaged by section 228 (2) is “to 
ensure the coherence of the taxing system”.134   This Act has not yet been utilized by 
any province; however, some provinces are considering various tax options, for 
example during 2003 the Western Cape started a process to investigate the possible 
introduction of a tourism bed levy and a fuel levy.135   
                                                 
131 Sec 228 (2) of the Constitution.  This Act was assented to on 4 December 2001 and published in 
Government Gazette No 22918 of 10 December 2001 
132 Momoniat Fiscal decentralization in South Africa 7. 
133 Murray & Simeon “South Africa’s financial constitution: towards better delivery?” in 2000 (15) 
SAPR/PL 477 482. 
134 First Certification Case para 439. 
135 Western Cape Provincial Treasury Budget Speech 2003 21. 
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 The Constitution makes specific provision in section 229 for the fiscal powers and 
functions of municipalities.  Municipal own sources of revenue are mainly property 
rates and surcharges on fees for provision of electricity and water.  Municipalities 
may impose rates on property and surcharges on fees for services rendered by them or 
on their behalf.136  There are, however, some constraints applicable to the 
implementation of this competence, for example it may not materially prejudice 
national economic policies, and it may also be regulated by national legislation.137  It 
is further provided by the Constitution in section 229 (1) (b) that if allowed by 
national legislation, municipalities may also impose other taxes, levies and duties 
appropriate to local government, but excluding income tax, sales tax or value-added 
tax and customs duty.   
 
Table 4 2 Legislative authority to levy taxes in South Africa 
Assignment of legislative authority in terms of section 228 of the Constitution 
 To the national government    To the provinces 
Exclusive power to legislate on:   Exclusive power to legislate on: 
Personal income tax,     taxes, levies and duties other than 
corporate tax,      income tax, value-added tax,  
value-added tax,    general sales tax, rates on  
general sales tax, and    property or customs duties; and 
customs duties. flat-rate surcharges on any 
nationally imposed tax, levy or 
Power to regulate a province's   duty except corporate income 
right to impose taxes, levies,    tax, value-added tax, rates on 
duties and surcharges     property or customs duties 
        
Provincial taxes account on average for approximately 4 % of total provincial 
revenue, while the balance is obtained by way of the equitable share of nationally 
collected revenue.  These own sources of revenue include motor vehicle licenses, tax 
on horse racing and tax on casinos.  The development of more own sources of revenue 
                                                 
136 Sec 229 (1) of the Constitution. 
137 Sec 229 (2) and (3) of the Constitution. 
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is a continuous point of debate in South Africa.  Since 1997 two main schools of 
thought regarding a provincial surcharge on a national tax base have emerged.  On the 
one hand, the Katz Commission of Inquiry proposed a provincial surcharge on the 
national fuel levy.138  The Financial and Fiscal Commission on the other hand has 
suggested, on more than one occasion, that tax room should be created in order to 
allow for provinces to levy a surcharge on personal income tax. 139  This proposal 
included the creation of tax room by the national government to ensure an overall 
limit of the level of taxation, which means that the national government would have to 
lower the maximum rate of personal income tax. The Budget Council under the 
guidance of the Minister of Finance during 2000 rejected this proposal by the FFC.140  
Both the above proposals could provide a source of own revenue for provinces and 
could contribute to fiscally accountable government. Both are also linked to economic 
growth and thus provide an incentive for provinces to promote the economy within 
their respective jurisdictions.  It is unfortunate that neither of these proposals have so 
far been accepted or implemented. 
 
In the case of municipalities, the situation is the opposite to that in provinces since 
they collect most of their revenue by way of property rates and surcharges or user fees 
for services such as water and electricity.  Many municipalities buy services and 
goods such as electricity and water in bulk and then resell it to the inhabitants of that 
area at a higher price.  Local government collectively and not individual 
municipalities are entitled to an equitable share of the nationally collected revenue. 
 
The electricity distribution industry in South Africa is currently undergoing a major 
reconstruction process, that involves all municipalities and Eskom, the national 
electricity supplier.  The view of the national government is that the current 
arrangements regarding distribution of electricity in South Africa are financially 
unsustainable, inefficient and inequitable.141 Evidence of the critical financial 
                                                 
138 The Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa led by Prof. 
Michael Katz. 
139 FFC Recommendation and Comments – the Allocation of Financial Resources to National, 
Provincial and Local Governments for the 1998/99 Fiscal Year (1998) 25 et seq.  See also Wehner 
Fiscal Federalism in South Africa 70; Murray & Simeon “South Africa’s financial constitution” 482. 
140 National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2000 73 
 
141 Department of Minerals and Energy Electricity Distribution Industry Restructuring Blueprint 
Report (February 2001) 4. 
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situation is presented by the fact that many municipalities that distribute electricity to 
consumers have suffered severe financial losses during the last few years.142  It is 
envisaged that the restructuring process will result in the establishment of six regional 
electricity distributors (RED’s) for the whole country.  Eskom and the municipalities 
will be shareholders in these new electricity distribution companies.   
 
It is evident that this process will have an impact on municipalities, both as far as 
expenditure for the delivery of services is concerned, and as far as the income of the 
municipalities is concerned.  The Department of Minerals and Energy recognizes this 
fact and have proposed that there should be special arrangements to provide for the 
maintenance of the current levels of financial transfers from electricity services to 
municipalities.143  The total impact on local government finances however remains to 
be seen. 
 
Municipalities are responsible for the delivery of water and sanitation services within 
their area of jurisdiction and they also receive revenue from the provision of these 
services.  The service is subsidized by the national government in order to implement 
the national policy of provision of free basic water services to the public.  This has  
meant that a conditional grant (Municipal Infrastructure Grant) has been allocated to 
local government within each province to finance the development of the 
infrastructure required for the provision of basic services, such as water and 
sanitation, to poor households.144  Without such a specific allocation to fund the 
provision of basic services so desperately needed by the community, it would be 
extremely difficult for municipalities to improve the quality of life of poor people.  
 
Provinces have a limited legislative competence to impose taxes in view of the fact 
that the major taxes are governed by national legislation.  However, in the national 
legislative process provinces, through their participation in the National Council of 
Provinces, have an influence on the adoption of national legislation envisaged in 
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Chapter 13 of the Constitution and this affects the financial interests of provinces.145  
This is not insignificant as it also includes the Act of Parliament that determines the 
equitable division of revenue.146    In practice this potential for more provincial 
involvement in the national legislative process has not been fully explored yet. This is 
due to various practical factors including the limited time and research capacity in the 
provinces and the NCOP, and the reality that most important discussions and 
negotiations between the provinces and the national government regarding the 
division of revenue takes place in the Budget Council.147   
 
4 3 2 Apportionment of revenue 
 
The apportionment of revenue in the German Basic Law is done independently and 
separately from the allocation of the legislative competence on taxes.  In terms of 
Article 106, detailed provision is made for the allocation of revenue from specific 
taxes solely to the Bund, the allocation of other revenue solely to the Länder and for 
the sharing of revenue from particular joint taxes.  The limitation in the power of the 
Länder to legislate on taxes is in a way compensated for by providing the Länder with 
a constitutional guarantee to a substantial share of some federal taxes.148   
 
Federal taxes in terms of Article 106 (1) include inter alia customs duties, capital 
transaction taxes and levies within the framework of the European Union.  Examples 
of Länder taxes as found in Article 106 (2) are motor vehicle tax, inheritance tax and 
beer tax.  In addition to these exclusive taxes that accrue to either the Bund or the 
Länder there are also some joint taxes that account for the biggest source of tax 
revenue in the country.  These taxes are income tax (Einkommensteuer), corporate tax 
(Körperschaftsteuer) and turnover tax (Umsatzsteuer).  Revenue from income tax and 
corporate tax are constitutionally allocated to the Bund and the Länder in equal 
shares, except for the fact that municipalities are also entitled to a share of these taxes, 
                                                 
145 Sec 76 (4) of the Constitution. 
146 First Certification Case paras 419 – 421. 
147 Wehner Fiscal Federalism in South Africa 73; Currie & De Waal Constitutional and Administrative 
Law 176 - 177. 
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which share has to be fixed by a federal law.149  Currently the municipalities are 
entitled to 15% of the revenue from income tax, while the balance is divided equally 
between the Bund and the Länder.  In view of the close link between income tax and 
the state of the economy, it is evident that the budgets of the Bund and the Länder, in 
particular as far as they depend on the revenue from income tax, are influenced by the 
growth in the economy.  By providing for a meaningful percentage of the revenue 
from income tax to be allocated to the Länder, recognition is given to the link 
between income tax and the economic strength of a Land.150  A substantial amount of 
income tax generated in particular Länder can thus flow back to it to be utilised by the 
respective Länder governments.  Municipal taxes include property tax and local 
excise taxes, such as dog tax and entertainment tax.151 
 
The division of revenue from turnover tax is the subject of a federal law that requires 
the consent of the Bundesrat and which forms part of the financial equalisation 
arrangements.152  The Basic Law, however, lays down some requirements for the 
allocation of revenue from turnover tax.  Such allocation must be based on the 
following principles, namely that the Bund and the Länder have an equal claim to 
funds from current revenue to finance their necessary requirements, and that such 
allocation shall be aimed at ensuring equal living conditions throughout Germany.153  
Since turnover tax is directly linked to economic growth, there is a built in incentive 
to promote the economy.  Higher growth means more turnover tax and thus a larger 
source of revenue for both the Bund and the Länder.  
 
The vertical division of revenue as described above is often referred to as the vertical 
financial equalisation (vertikaler Finanzausgleich) or primary financial equalisation 
(primärer Finanzausgleich).154  The division of revenue amongst the Länder, which is 
in fact the most significant part of financial equalisation in Germany, is then referred 
                                                 
149Art 106 (3), (4) and (5) of the Basic Law.  See Bundesministerium der Finanzen An ABC of Taxes 52 
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150 Von Münch Grundgesetzkommentar 812. 
151 Art 106 (6) of the Basic Law.  See Bundesministerium der Finanzen An ABC of Taxes 53. 
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to as horizontal financial equalisation (horizontaler Finanzausgleich) or secondary 
financial equalisation (sekundärer Finanzausgleich). 
 
The South African Constitution follows a different approach.   While the Constitution 
makes provision for limited provincial and local government legislative authority over 
taxes, it compensates these two spheres of government to an extent by providing 
provinces, and local government, with a right to an equitable share of revenue 
collected nationally.155  This means that all the major taxes, such as income tax, 
corporate tax, value-added tax and the fuel levy are in fact shared taxes since the 
proceeds of all these taxes are included in the national pool of funds that must be 
distributed equitably according to section 214 of the Constitution.  Provinces can, 
through their participation in the NCOP, influence the legislation providing the 
equitable division of revenue since it has to follow the procedure according to section 
76 (1) of the Constitution.  The current practice, however, is that most of the 
discussions about the division of revenue takes place within the Budget Council, a 
statutory forum where the national Minister of Finance meets regularly with his 
provincial counterparts. This has the effect that the NCOP will not easily agree to 
major changes to the actual division of revenue.   
 
Unlike the situation in Germany, South African provinces are not entitled to a specific 
percentage of the nationally collected revenue, but merely to an equitable share, 
which can lead to different percentage shares over time.  There are quite a number of 
factors to be considered before a determination about the division of revenue can be 
made, for example, the national interest, the fiscal capacity of provinces and 
municipalities and the economic imbalances between and within provinces.156  The 
equitable division of revenue is the main financial equalisation instrument used in 
South Africa.157  In terms of section 214 (1) of the Constitution, there is a vertical 
division of revenue between the three spheres of government, and also a horizontal 
division of revenue that applies to the nine provinces.  Such constitutional provision is 
to be expected in a decentralised system of government where there are various 
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inequalities between the different spheres of government as well as at regional, or 
even local, government level. 
 
4 3 3 Borrowing 
 
Proceeds from loans are in accountancy terms and in the context of company law not 
referred to as own capital, but regarded as an external source of funds.158  
Governments just like companies, ordinarily make use of borrowing as a way to 
supplement their own sources of revenue.  Revenue from taxes forms the primary 
sources of funding for the state, while borrowing can be regarded as a secondary 
source of funds.  In the context of public finance, borrowing is a significant and 
legitimate source of revenue that allows a government additional funds for longer-
term expenditure responsibilities, in particular it creates more scope for capital 
projects.  In order to get a complete picture of the constitutionally recognised sources 
of revenue for government, a discussion of the borrowing arrangements in both 
Germany and South Africa is included. 
 
In the German Basic Law in Article 115 provision is made for the borrowing of funds 
that will lead to expenditure in future financial years, with the requirement that federal 
legislation must authorise it and provide the necessary details about the loan.  A 
further condition contained in this section is that the revenue from borrowing may not 
exceed the amount available for investment as provided for in the budget.  Borrowing 
relates to the macro-economic situation in the whole country, hence the requirement 
for federal legislation to provide further details.  Article 109 (1) stipulates that the 
Federation and the Länder shall be autonomous and mutually independent in their 
budget management.  It is, however, evident that the common duty of the Bund and 
the Länder in Article 109 (2) to take the requirements of macro-economic equilibrium 
into account, binds them together economically speaking and supports the fact that 
federal legislation is necessary to authorise the borrowing of funds and the assumption 
of guarantees.  These arrangements place the management of public finance firmly 
within the constitutional context.  This nexus is further strengthened by the fact that 
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the responsibility for economic stability and well being of the community can be 
linked to one of the fundamental principles in the Basic Law, namely the social state 
principle.159 
 
In South Africa borrowing arrangements for all three spheres of government are 
constitutionalised as they are in Germany.  During the process of negotiations that led 
to the adoption of the current Constitution, the Financial and Fiscal Commission 
argued that the financial intergovernmental relations system should be structured in 
such a way that provinces have reasonable access to sources of funding in addition to 
their share of revenue from taxes.160  Long-term infrastructure projects by provinces 
require loan financing that can be incurred by provinces and structured over the same 
period as the project for which the capital is required.  In this way, the cost of long-
term capital projects can be spread over time.  The same argument would apply to the 
borrowing arrangements for local government. 
 
The result of the constitutional negotiations was the inclusion of a number of 
provisions relating to borrowing arrangements.  The basic legal requirements for 
budgets for all three spheres of government are contained in section 215 (3) of the 
Constitution. These inter alia require that budgets must indicate clearly any intended 
borrowing and other forms of public liability that will increase public debt.  
Furthermore, government guarantees may only be given in accordance with 
conditions stipulated in national legislation.161  Specific provision is made in the 
Constitution for provincial and municipal loans.  Section 230 and 230A stipulate that 
provinces and municipalities may, in accordance with national legislation, raise loans 
for capital or current expenditure.162  Loans for current expenditure may only be 
raised when necessary for bridging purposes within a fiscal year.   
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 In addition to this basic framework for loans and guarantees found in the Constitution, 
there is national legislation that deals with the matter in more detail.  The Borrowing 
Powers of Provincial Governments Act, 48 of 1996, provides certain conditions to the 
right of provinces to raise loans.163  This Act has to date never been used to obtain 
loans for provinces.  The Public Finance Management Act, 1 of 1999, contains more 
comprehensive provisions regarding loans, guarantees and other financial 
commitments by national and provincial governments as well as government 
institutions referred to in this Act.  Both these Acts are aimed at the promotion of 
efficient financial management and accountable government in accordance with the 
Constitution.  In view of the existence of the Loan Co-ordinating Committee, created 
by the Borrowing Powers of Provincial Governments Act, 1996, and the strong views 
of the Minister of Finance in this respect, the de facto position currently is that 
provinces are not allowed to obtain long-term loans.  Bridging finance, such as 
overdraft arrangements with banks, does however take place.  Loans for capital 
expenditure such as building and maintenance of roads, schools and clinics could 
enhance economic growth and it is hoped that there will be a change in the de facto 
situation in order to open new sources of funding to provinces.   New comprehensive 
financial management legislation for local government, covering issues such as 
management of financial affairs of municipalities and borrowing, was adopted by 
Parliament during the second half of 2003.164 
 
4 3 4 Interim conclusion 
 
In Germany a distinction is made between the legislative authority to raise taxes and 
the allocation of the revenue received from taxes.  The Basic Law provides for 
exclusive federal, exclusive Länder and concurrent legislative authority on taxes 
(Article 105) and in a separate provision determines the allocation of revenue from 
taxes (Article 106), providing exclusive tax revenue to the Bund as well as exclusive 
tax revenue to the Länder.  The major taxes, such as income tax, corporate tax and 
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value-added tax are shared taxes.  The fact that there is a distinct provision for 
exclusive legislative authority and exclusive revenue to both levels of government 
does not detract from the importance of the shared taxes that require a great deal of 
co-operation between the Bund and the Länder in the legislative and actual 
distribution processes.  In this respect, the Länder have a strong voice in the federal 
legislative process through their participation in the Bundesrat, a role that is 
constitutionally guaranteed in terms of Article 79 (3) of the Basic Law. 
 
These constitutional arrangements in the Basic Law create a balanced approach in 
terms of which the distinct roles of the Bund and the Länder are stipulated, but the 
dominant feature is that there must be co-operation between the two levels of 
government.  The principle of Bundestreue is fundamental to the effective functioning 
of the federal system, in particular with respect to financial intergovernmental 
relations.165  The particular design and functioning of the 'financial constitution' is 
essentially an exercise of co-operative federalism or co-operative government, as it is 
referred to in the South African Constitution.166  The interaction between the Bund 
and the Länder in the development of federal tax laws and the division of revenue 
from federal taxes can only effectively take place in a co-operative spirit.   
 
In South Africa the constitutional arrangements follow a somewhat different 
approach, namely that exclusive legislative authority over the major taxes is allocated 
to the national government, while provinces’ legislative authority on taxes is fairly 
limited and subject to national regulation.  The South African provinces have a 
potentially important role to play in the National Council of Provinces, but they are in 
a weaker position than the German Länder as far as national legislation on taxes is 
concerned.   
 
An essential characteristic of the South African constitutional system is the principles 
of co-operative government contained in Chapter 3 of the Constitution.  Simeon 
                                                                                                                                            
 
165 Von Münch Staatsrecht 237, 240.  See also discussion of Bundestreue under 2 3. 
166 Lerche Principles of German Federalism in Kirchhof & Kommers (eds) Germany and its Basic Law 
(1993) 71 81; Chapter 3 (Co-operative Government) of the Constitution. 
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described the South African constitutional system as shared federalism, while 
specifically referring to the fiscal arrangements where the focus is also on "shared, 
concurrent governance".167  The principles of co-operative government play an 
overarching role in the functioning of government in South Africa, similar to the 
position in Germany, and are thus important in the field of taxes and allocation of 
revenue. 
 
4 4  Conclusion 
 
This Chapter provides a comparison of the constitutional arrangements pertaining to 
the division of powers and obligations and the allocation of financial resources in 
Germany and South Africa.  The comparison, although focused on the text of the 
Basic Law and the South African Constitution respectively, also includes references 
to historical and economic factors in both countries in an attempt to create a better 
understanding of the current constitutional position. 
 
Different approaches were used in the design of the German Basic Law and the South 
African Constitution, in particular as far as they relate to the division of powers 
between the various levels or spheres of government.  An important difference in 
design, for example, is the long list of exclusive federal legislative powers in the 
Basic Law, while in the case of South Africa these powers are not listed and are 
residual powers of the national government.  In both constitutional systems, much use 
is made of concurrency, while the Basic Law creates a pre-emptive power to federal 
legislation in the concurrent field.168  The Constitution on the other hand does not use 
this approach, but provides extensive arrangements to deal with conflict between 
national and provincial legislation in the concurrent field.169 This reflects a different 
basic philosophy in South Africa compared to the German Basic Law, namely that 
both spheres of government continue to have full jurisdiction in the concurrent 
                                                 
167 Simeon 1998 (13) SAPR/PL 68. 
168 Art 72 of the Basic Law.  See Currie Constitution of Germany 49; Von Münch Staatsrecht 214 - 
215; Von Münch Grundgesetzkommentar 24 - 30. 
169 Sec 146 - 150 of the Constitution. 
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field.170 In both countries, the national government has utilized its legislative 
authority in the concurrent field extensively leaving little scope for concurrent 
legislation by the Länder and provinces respectively. 
                                                
 
In reviewing the provisions in the 'financial constitution' in both Germany and South 
Africa, there are also a number of apparent differences, such as the right of the Länder 
to influence federal tax legislation.  In fact, the Länder through their participation in 
the Bundesrat have an equal say to the Bund in the adoption of federal tax legislation 
which in practice accounts for the major sources of tax revenue in Germany.  In 
addition, the consent of the Bundesrat is also required for federal legislation 
pertaining to financial equalisation (Finanzausgleich).171  These constitutional 
arrangements obviously strengthen the fiscal autonomy of the Länder.  Herzog 
commented that the ‘political independence’ of the Länder is due to their strong 
position in the Bundesrat.172 
 
The provinces in South Africa are not in a similarly strong position.  A national Bill 
that imposes taxes is regarded as a money Bill and does not require the consent of the 
National Council of Provinces.173  The financial equalisation legislation, that is the 
Act that provides for an equitable division of revenue, however, requires the approval 
of the National Council of Provinces.174  In this case provinces can thus influence the 
actual division of revenue law, although in reality the Budget Council is where most 
of the intergovernmental discussions regarding the division of revenue takes place. 
The dominance of the ANC in South African politics currently limits the possibility of 
the NCOP playing a stronger role.  Constitutional provisions contribute to the 
development of a province's fiscal autonomy. When the two systems  (the German 
system and the South African system) are compared, one concludes that the provinces 
in South Africa do not enjoy the same degree of autonomy as the Länder in Germany. 
 
 
170 Haysom Federal Features of the Final Constitution in Andrews & Ellmann The Post-Apartheid 
Constitutions (2001) 504 508. 
171 Art 106 (3) and 107 of the Basic Law. 
172 Herzog Separation and Concentration of Power 395. 
173 Sec 77 read with sec 75 of the Constitution.  See First Certification Case para 416. 
174  Sec 76 (4) (b) of the Constitution.  See First Certification Case paras 419 - 421. 
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Co-operative government is essential to the functioning of financial 
intergovernmental relations in South Africa. The Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 
Act, 97 of 1997, gives expression to the spirit of co-operative government in the area 
of intergovernmental fiscal relations, inter alia through the establishment of the 
Budget Council and the Budget Forum.175  Wehner is probably correct in stating that 
the Budget Council has become the most powerful institution for intergovernmental 
fiscal decisions, but it should be added that the Extended Cabinet, which includes the 
nine Premiers and Members of the Executive Councils responsible for Finances, is the 
highest co-operative mechanism for finalizing the division of revenue.176 The process 
of debating the actual division of revenue between the spheres of government resulted 
in the annual Division of Revenue Act and is a clear example of co-operative 
government. 
 
In both Germany and South Africa the focus of legislative activities, including the 
legislative authority over the main taxes, is at the federal or national level of 
government while most of the administration or implementation of national legislation 
is done by the Länder and provinces respectively.177 Vertical fiscal imbalances due to 
particular constitutional arrangements regarding taxes exist in both countries and this 
creates a need for some form of financial equalization arrangements.  Given the fact 
that South Africa has huge horizontal or inter-provincial imbalances in income 
distribution, the Constitution had to provide for a revenue sharing model for the 
redistribution of the nationally collected revenue.  While the emphasis in South Africa 
is on redistribution of revenue to address historical inequalities, to alleviate poverty 
and thus to improve the overall quality of life of all the people, the focus in Germany 
is to provide equal living conditions throughout the country as stipulated in the Basic 
Law.178  The Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2003 makes it clear that the focus in 
South Africa is on the improved delivery of services “to ensure the progressive 
                                                 
175 The Budget Council is a consultative forum consisting of the Minister of Finance and his or her nine 
provincial counterparts, while the Budget Forum also includes representatives of local government. 
176 Wehner Fiscal decentralization in South Africa 12; National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Review 2003 6. 
177 National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2003 5; Schultze 2003 (Vol 3 nr 3) Federations 
13. 
178Art 106 (3) of the Basic Law. 
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realization of improved quality of life for all South Africans.”179 These socio-
economic aims in both countries are aims that can only be effectively addressed in a 
spirit of co-operative government.   
 
The development of intergovernmental fiscal relations in South Africa is still in its 
childhood and South Africa can learn from the development of the German system as 
they also faced huge developmental challenges in their early years.  After only a few 
years, the various institutional elements and practical mechanisms have been 
established in and between the various levels of government in South Africa.  The 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2000 states that there is a systematic unfolding of a 
set of intergovernmental fiscal relations in South Africa characterized by co-operative 
governance.180 There was a distinct move towards fiscal decentralization in many 
countries during the past few decades, and South Africa’s developments since 1994 is 
in line with these global trends.181  In this unfolding process towards decentralization, 
one of the challenges facing South Africa is how to balance the competing notions of 
provincial fiscal autonomy and national unity.  The challenge is to find the right 
balance between fiscal centralization and decentralization within the political and 
socio-economic context in South Africa. 
 
179 National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2003 14. 
180 National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2000 10. 
181 Wehner South Africa’s provinces and intergovernmental fiscal relations: A review of some key 
developments in the period 1997/98 to 2002/03 and issues to be resolved in the years ahead (1 
November 2002) 1. 
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5 1 Introduction 
 
One of the fundamental principles of the German constitutional system, which is 
stated clearly in Article 20 (1) of the Basic Law, is that it is a federal state.  This 
implies inter alia that there is a constitutional division of powers and functions 
between the Bund and the Länder.  The financial constitution or Finanzverfassung, is 
a crucial element of this federal system since it sets the foundation for realising the 
constitutional obligations of both the Bund and the Länder.  A significant part of the 
financial constitution is the provisions in the Basic Law that concern the allocation of 
financial resources to the Bund and the Länder. This was discussed in Chapter 4.  
The various constituent units within the federal state have, in view of their interwoven 
financial relations, a common constraint, namely, that they must take account of the 
limited tax capacity of the whole economy in their financial interaction.1 There are 
only limited financial resources that can be claimed by both the Bund and the Länder.  
Their budgetary and financial planning must be aimed at managing the limited 
financial resources in such a manner that both can fulfil their constitutional mandates 
effectively and so benefit the country.  The problem is that taxes are assigned 
unevenly to the two levels of government.  If the Länder have more constitutionally 
allocated functions than they have financial resources, while the Bund has excess 
                                                 
1 Fischer-Menshausen in Von Münch (hrsg) Grundgesetzkommentar Band 3 (1996) 874. 
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financial resources available to fund its obligations, there is a financial imbalance.  
This is referred to in economic terms as a vertical fiscal gap and is common in multi-
level systems of government.2  This problem is compounded by the fact that there are 
economic disparities and differences in financial capacity between the various 
Länder. Some Länder cannot fulfil their constitutional obligations fully while others 
have no such problem. This is referred to as a horizontal fiscal gap.  In Chapter 4 
brief reference was made to the constitutional accommodation of addressing these 
financial imbalances by way of financial equalisation (Finanzausgleich). 
 
Financial equalisation is fundamental to the functioning of the constitutional systems 
of both Germany and South Africa.  The purpose of this chapter is to provide a 
detailed description of the purpose and functioning of financial equalisation in 
Germany.  This analysis will include a discussion on the effect the unification of 
Germany had, and still has, on financial equalisation.  Current problems with the 
application of the constitutional provisions will be highlighted with a view to 
ascertain what lessons can be learnt from them.  This analysis is done in order to 
compare the situation in South Africa to that in Germany. A detailed analysis will 
follow in Chapter 6. 
 
5 2 Economic situation in post-War Germany 
 
Economic considerations can, and often do, play a role in designing the financial 
intergovernmental relations in a decentralised or federal system of government.  This 
appears to be the case in Germany immediately after World War II when the new 
constitutional model was developed, and the process of rebuilding the country was 
started.   
 
When World War II ended in 1945 Germany and large parts of Europe were left in 
ruins.  Infrastructure such as roads, bridges and dams were damaged and thousands of 
buildings in towns throughout Germany were partly or completely destroyed.   
Agriculture was severely hampered through a lack of fertilizer and seed and many 
farmlands that became battlefields still had unexploded bombs.  The economy was 
                                                 
2 Ajam The evolution of devolution: fiscal decentralisation in South Africa in Abedian & Biggs 
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wrecked, normal trade almost came to a standstill and the people were very poor and 
had to find whatever food they could.3  There was a massive need for the 
reconstruction of the German economy.  In addition to the economic and social issues 
related to rebuilding the German economy, there were also important constitutional 
and political questions that had to be addressed. This included the development of a 
new constitutional system for Germany.   
 
It was not only Germany that was in ruins; the rest of Europe was also in a state of 
devastation and in need of huge economic reconstruction.  Many European nations 
were in serious economic trouble and could not address their immediate needs on 
their own.  In 1947 a conference of 16 nations that took place in Paris, France, 
focussed on the economic needs of Europe. As a result of this, the Organisation for 
European Economic Cooperation was formed.4  Although Germany’s situation was 
unique in the sense that it was under the control of the Allied Occupation Forces and 
the Soviet Union, the economic situation in Germany should not be seen in isolation 
as it was part of Western Europe and the recovery of the German economy was 
therefore part of the economic recovery of Europe.   
 
The United States of America responded to the dire needs in Europe, particularly in 
Germany, by the adoption of the Marshall Plan. This was a massive assistance plan 
for the recovery of Europe in cooperation with sixteen European nations.5  The 
establishment of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation was a positive 
response to the American initiative. Thus both sides of the Atlantic became involved 
in the long-term project of cooperation for the European economic recovery.6  Soon it 
became clear that the improvement of economic conditions in Western Europe was 
dependent on the economic recovery of Germany and specific attention was given, in 
terms of the Marshall Plan, to assist in the rebuilding of the German economy.  When 
                                                                                                                                            
Economic globalization and fiscal policy (1998) 54 57. 
3 Mayer German Recovery and the Marshall Plan 1948 – 1952 (1969) 7. 
4 Mayer German Recovery 19.  The 16 nations that attended the conference and formed the OEEC were 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom.  Germany was not 
represented at the conference but became a member later.  The establishment of the OEEC paved the 
way for economic integration in Europe that followed in the second half of the 20th century. 
5 Mayer German Recovery 9.  In June 1947 the US Secretary of State, George C Marshall, proposed 
this assistance plan for the reconstruction of Europe. 
6 Mayer German Recovery 18 – 21; 102 - 105. 
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the Federal Republic of Germany was established in 1949, a special cabinet minister 
was appointed for the administration of the Marshall Plan and Germany became a full 
member of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation.  The 
implementation of the Marshall Plan in Europe, more specifically in Germany, 
contributed significantly to what became known as the German Wirtschaftswunder 
(economic miracle), that was achieved with the active cooperation of the German 
people and their new political leaders, including Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and 
Professor Ludwig Erhard.7  
 
It was Erhard’s vision that prosperity for all must be achieved through competition.8  
Democracy and a free economy had to be restored in order to support the recovery of 
Germany.  The economic policy followed by the new government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, established in 1949, was a social market economic policy that 
was clearly linked to Erhard’s vision of prosperity for all.  In a relatively short period 
of time, this economic policy made a significant contribution to the reconstruction of 
Germany. This recovery can be seen in the dramatic increase in gross domestic 
income from 1949 (DM 47,1 milliard) to 1956 (DM 85,8 milliard).9  The economic 
policy had to be in line with the new constitutional framework provided by the Basic 
Law. It is evident that a social market economy suits the fundamental principles of a 
democratic and social federal state as outlined in Article 20 of the Basic Law. In 
particular, the social state principle requires positive action from the state to promote 
public well-being.10 
 
5 3 Purpose of financial equalisation 
 
In order to have a clear understanding of the purpose of financial equalisation, as it is 
acknowledged and implemented currently in Germany, a brief overview of the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
7 Mayer German Recovery 99.  Konrad Adenauer became the first Chancellor of the FRG and Ludwig 
Erhard, an economics professor who played a key role in the economic recovery of the American and 
British occupied zones, was appointed Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Economic Affairs.   
8 Erhard Prosperity through competition (1958) 2 – 3. 
9 Erhard Prosperity through competition 3, 8. 
10 Currie The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1994) 20 – 24. 
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historical development of financial constitutional arrangements since 1949, is 
provided. 
 
The design of the original financial constitution for Germany in 1949 was strongly 
influenced by the Western occupation forces and favoured a clear division of 
competences between the Bund and the Länder. This created various centres of 
authority in the country and therefore a divided model of federalism.  One of the aims 
of the Western occupation forces was to financially weaken the Bund, a view that was 
clearly influenced by the horrific consequences of the preceding years of authoritarian 
national-socialist rule.11  The legislative authority for taxes was, however, still 
concentrated at the federal level.  Despite various rounds of negotiations between the 
Parliamentary Council and the military governors in the Western occupied territory, 
they could not agree on all the provisions relating to the division of financial 
resources.12  As a result it was decided that only provisional arrangements would be 
made for financial intergovernmental relations in the Basic Law. This created scope 
for later finalisation by the Federal Parliament.  A law, that contained financial 
constitutional arrangements, was adopted in 1955, and these provisions formed the 
legal basis for financial equalisation until 1969.13   
 
Major financial reform took place in 1969 as a result of the work of the Troeger-
Kommission of investigation.14  These reform measures changed the character of the 
federal system from a divided model to a co-operative model, inter alia by 
constitutionally accommodating the already common forms of co-operation between 
the Bund and the Länder.  The constitutional division of functions between the Bund 
and the Länder was amended to make provision for the cooperation on joint functions.  
A major change to the tax arrangements was made to extend the scope of joint taxes 
so that both the Bund and the Länder would share the revenue raised from income tax, 
corporate tax and turnover tax.15  Some of the amendments to the Basic Law in 1969 
                                                 
11 Klein Bund und Länder nach der Finanzverfassung des Grundgesetzes in Benda Handbuch des 
Verfassungsrechts (1983) 863 864.  
12 Wieland "Die verfassungsrechtliche Rahmenordnung des Finanzausgleichs" Jura 1988 (8) 410 411; 
Fischer-Menshausen in Von Münch GG Komm 876; Klein Bund und Länder nach der 
Finanzverfassung 865. 
13 Finanzverfassungsgesetz of 23 December 1955.   
14 Laufer & Münch Das föderative System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1997) 158; Fischer-
Menshausen in Von Münch GG Komm  876; Klein Bund und Länder nach der Finanzverfassung 865. 
15 Art 106 of the Basic Law. 
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were the inclusion of Article 91a and 91b, on joint responsibilities between the Bund 
and the Länder, Article 104a, on the apportionment of expenditure between the Bund 
and the Länder and Article 105 (2a) that regulated the power of the Länder to 
legislate on local excise taxes.  These amendments all supported the notion of co-
operative federalism. 
 
The last major financial reform took place after the unification of Germany in 1990.  
The new Länder in the former Deutschen Demokratische Republik (DDR) constituted 
approximately 25% of the population of the Federal Republic of Germany while its 
estimated economic output was about 10%.16  Low wages, low productivity, a 
distorted structure of prices, wages and subsidies, a very limited range of products and 
high foreign debts were characteristic of the economic situation in the new Länder.  
These issues had to be addressed in order to achieve successful economic integration 
and were linked to the political integration of the new Länder with the old Länder.  
 
In a united Germany, the new Länder had to change from a centrally planned 
economy to a market economy where the free play of market forces existed within an 
institutional framework that provided social security. In other words, a social market 
economy.17  The new Länder also had to be brought into the existing financial 
intergovernmental system.18  This could not be done immediately as special 
arrangements that supported the rebuilding of the new Länder and their eventual 
participation in the financial equalisation process, had to be made.  As the new Länder 
were initially excluded from participation in the financial equalisation process, a 
substitute arrangement was made with the establishment of a special fund, namely the 
Fonds Deutsche Einheit (German Unity Fund) to which both the Bund and old Länder 
in the West contributed.19  Special measures were adopted to address the critical 
needs of the new Länder, for example, covering their huge budget deficits, providing 
support for the transformation to a market economy and the rebuilding of 
                                                 
16 Lipshitz & McDonald German Unification – economic issues (1990) 3. 
17 Lipshitz & McDonald German Unification 5, 166. 
18 The Vertrag über die Schaffung einer Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion (Unification Treaty) 
of 18 May 1990 laid the foundation for the integration of the new Länder into the existing economy 
and structures of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
19 Fischer-Menshausen in Von Münch GG Komm 884. 
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infrastructure.20  Since 1 January 1995 new arrangements were implemented, in terms 
of which the new Länder participated fully in the operation of the financial 
constitution, this included participating in the financial equalisation process.21  The 
effect of unification on the financial equalisation process will be discussed in 5 5. 
 
One of the fundamental principles of the German constitutional system is the federal 
principle (Bundesstaatsprinzip) contained in Article 20 (1)22 of the Basic Law, and 
constitutionally entrenched in Article 79 (3).23  This principle describes the 
constitutional system and acknowledges the existence of a number of constituent units 
and the inequality between them, that in practice leads to differences in the level of 
economic activity and living standards in the various constituent units.24 The practical 
reality of economic disparities and differences in financial capacity between the 
Länder amongst themselves and between the Länder and the Bund, warrants special 
arrangements to distribute the available financial resources in such a way that both 
levels of government can perform their constitutionally allocated functions properly.   
 
In terms of the federal principle, a degree of autonomy of the individual constituent 
units is recognised.  Within the German constitutional system, the federal principle 
requires searching for a balance between the autonomy of the Länder and the 
solidarity within the state.  The principle of Bundestreue is applicable in this and 
implies that both the Bund and the Länder, recognising each other's constitutional 
roles, have a duty to assist one another.25   
 
The purpose of financial equalisation is firstly to create a balance in the finances of 
the Bund and the Länder in relation to each other, and amongst the individual 
                                                 
20 Fischer-Menshausen in Von Münch GG Komm 883. 
21 Renszch "Neuregelung der Bund/Länder-Finanzbeziehungen: Volle Einbeziehung der neuen Länder 
ab 1995" Gegenwartskunde 1/1994 75 77. 
22 Sachs Grundgesetz Kommentar (1996) 630 et seq; Currie The Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (1994) 18; Von Münch Staatsrecht Band I (1993) 196.  See also discussion of fundamental 
constitutional principles under 2 1 2. 
23 Art 79 (3): “Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their 
participation in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be 
prohibited.” 
24 Häde Finanzausgleich (1996) 256. 
25 Häde Finanzausgleich 257. 
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Länder.26  In an important judgement by the Bundesverfassungsgericht in 1986, the 
Court stated that the purpose of financial equalisation is to put the Bund and the 
Länder in a financial position that allows them to perform their constitutionally 
allocated duties, and to enable them to develop their respective autonomies and own 
responsibilities regarding constitutional obligations.27  Financial equalisation in 
Germany consists of three elements, namely vertical equalisation (vertikalen 
Finanzausgleich), horizontal equalisation (horizontalen Finanzausgleich) and 
additional grants from the Bund to individual Länder (Bundesergänzungs-
zuweisungen). Each of these contributes to the overall aim of balancing the financial 
resources of both levels of government.  The Bund and the Länder are equal partners 
in terms of the federal financial equalisation process.  They both have a 
constitutionally guaranteed claim to the financial resources available to fund the 
functions assigned to them.  Article 106 (3) states explicitly that "the Federation and 
the Länder shall have an equal claim to funds from current revenue to finance their 
necessary expenditure."  The financial equalisation process is therefore aimed at 
creating an equilibrium position where neither of the two levels of government is 
required to financially carry the responsibilities of the other.28 
 
The individual Länder are responsible for fulfilling their own constitutional duties 
with the financial resources available to them. However there are differences in 
financial needs and differences in financial capacity between the Länder. This is a 
common characteristic in a federal state.  The purpose of horizontal financial 
equalisation is to create a position of "reasonable equalisation" of the financial 
disparity between the various Länder, taking into account the differences in financial 
capacity of the municipalities (Gemeinden) within each Land.  The provision in 
Article 107 (2) of the Basic Law that bases the horizontal financial equalisation on 
financial need of the various Länder, firmly links financial equalisation to the 
principle of federal solidarity, therefore means that, being part of a federal state, the 
                                                 
26 Fischer-Menshausen in Von Münch GG Komm 981. 
27 A judgement of the Bundesverfassungsgericht delivered on 24 June 1986 - BVerfGE 72, 330 383.  
See discussion under 7 3 2; also Mußgnug "Der horizontale Finanzausgleich auf dem Prüfstand des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts - BVerfG, NJW 1986, 2629" JuS 1986 (11) 872; Wieland 
“Rahmenordnung des Finanzausgleichs” 419. 
28 Häde Finanzausgleich 223; Fischer-Menshausen in Von Münch GG Komm 981. 
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Länder are mutually bound to support each other.29  In one of its early judgements the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht stated that the federal solidarity principle implies that there 
is a duty on the financially strong Länder to support the financially weak Länder 
within pre-determined limits.30  The Court further said that the federal solidarity 
principle would be violated if the financial equalisation leads to a situation of absolute 
equality (Nivellierung) of the finances of the Länder.  This implies that there are 
limits to the application of the federal solidarity principle.  Article 109 (1) of the Basic 
Law states clearly that the Bund and the Länder are mutually independent and 
autonomous for their budget management.  The duty of the Länder to assist one 
another places a constraint on their financial autonomy, but does not nullify it.  
Financial equalisation must therefore be implemented in such a way that a balance is 
found between the duty to assist one another and the prohibition against absolute 
equality by acknowledging the constitutional stipulated financial autonomy of the 
Länder.31 
 
In terms of Article 106 (3) of the Basic Law a fair balance must be established in co-
ordinating the financial requirements of both the Bund and the Länder taking into 
account the requirement to ensure equal living conditions throughout the country.    In 
analysing the wording of Article 107 (2) of the Basic Law, it is apparent that the 
development of equal living conditions throughout the country is included in the aim 
of a reasonable equalisation of financial disparities.  There is no general constitutional 
duty on the Länder to ensure an absolute equality of living conditions; the aim is 
merely to develop equal living conditions within the parameters of reasonable 
equalisation.32  In view of the recognition of financial autonomy of the Länder and 
the use of the term "reasonable equalisation", the provision of financial support to the 
weaker Länder through financial equalisation may not have the result of an absolute 
equality of Länder finances.  Every financial equalisation arrangement is thus a 
                                                 
29 Arndt Finanzausgleich und Verfassungsrecht (1997) 4; Fischer-Menshausen in Von Münch GG 
Komm 1027. 
30 A judgement of the First Senate of the Bundesverfassungsgericht delivered on 20 February 1952 - 
BVerfGE 1, 117 131.  See discussion under 7 3 1. 
31 Arndt Finanzausgleich 5; Maunz - Dürig Grundgesetzkommentar Band IV (1991) 107 7. 
32 Arndt Finanzausgleich 17. 
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compromise between the social responsibility of the Länder on the one hand and their 
claim to financial autonomy on the other.33 
 
5 4 The financial equalisation process 
 
The various steps in the financial equalisation process are placed in a particular order 
for good reason.  The first step is the vertical equalisation that is aimed at providing 
sufficient finances to the overall needs of both the Bund and the Länder.  Both levels 
of government have, in terms of Article 106 (3) of the Basic Law, an equal claim to 
funding their constitutionally allocated functions.  When the vertical equalisation is 
completed, the next step is to focus on the horizontal financial equalisation, that is, the 
financial equalisation between the individual Länder.  In terms of Article 107 (2) of 
the Basic Law, it must be ensured through federal legislation that there is a reasonable 
equalisation of financial disparities between the individual Länder.  This provision 
envisages the horizontal transfer of funds from one Land to another within the 
framework of Länder equalisation.  The last step in the order of events is the 
possibility of additional grants by the Bund to financially weak Länder to supplement 
their general financial needs.34  These three steps in the financial equalisation process 
are designed to follow in a logical order by first looking at the overall balance in 
finances, then at the equilibrium at the Länder level and lastly to provide additional 
assistance to individual Länder needs. 
 
The financial equalisation process is, however, not a mere mechanical exercise 
dealing with the division of funds, but includes important political and social issues 
such as the aim to provide equal living conditions and proper budgeting and financial 
management in the Länder. The process also addresses the question of what a 
reasonable equalisation of financial disparities is.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Fischer-Menshausen in Von Münch GG Komm 1028. 
34 Art 107 (2) of the Basic Law; Häde Finanzausgleich 223. 
 
 153
5 4 1  Vertical financial equalisation 
 
This part of the financial equalisation process is relatively uncomplicated as it is set 
out clearly in the Basic Law.  Article 106 (3) of the Basic Law stipulates that the 
revenue from the three major taxes, namely income tax, corporate tax and turnover 
tax shall accrue jointly to the Bund and the Länder, except for that part of the income 
tax that will be allocated to the municipalities in terms of Article 106 (5).  The 
municipal share of income tax is transferred by each Land to their municipalities.  The 
revenue from income tax and corporate tax is shared by the Bund and the Länder and 
is constitutionally guaranteed as such.  The division of the revenue from turnover tax 
is not fixed since it must be determined by federal legislation, and this requires the 
consent of the Bundesrat.35   
 
The following division of revenue from income tax and corporate tax, was adopted as 
part of the financial reform of 1969, and still reflects the position:36 
Income tax:   Municipalities  15% 
    Bund   42, 5% 
    Länder   42. 5% 
 
Corporate tax   Bund   50% 
    Länder   50% 
 
The municipalities (Gemeinden) form constitutionally part of the Länder and are 
treated as such in the financial equalisation process.  Specific reference is, however, 
made to the municipalities in Articles 106 and 107 of the Basic Law, for example, in 
relation to their share of income tax in Article 106 (3) and (5).  The Länder are 
responsible for the finances of the municipalities located within their respective 
geographical areas of jurisdiction, while the municipalities are responsible for 
managing the affairs of the local communities as regulated by provincial law.37  The 
                                                 
35 Art 106 (3) and 107 of the Basic Law; Fischer-Menshausen in Von Münch GG Komm 991; Isensee 
& Kirchhof Handbuch des Staatsrechts Band IV (1990) 20. 
36 Gemeindereformgesetz of 8 September 1969; Fischer-Menshausen in Von Münch GG Komm 991; 
Mußgnug 1986 (11) JuS  872. 
37 Art 28 (2) of the Basic Law; Isensee & Kirchhof Handbuch des Staatsrechts 1062. 
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financial needs of the municipalities are thus included as part of the financial needs of 
each Land and must be taken into account in the financial equalisation process.38  
Article 107 (2) of the Basic Law stipulates that the financial capacity and 
requirements of the municipalities and associations of municipalities, must be 
considered in the horizontal financial equalisation process. 
 
The municipal share of income tax must be paid over to the various Länder, which is 
then responsible for distributing that revenue to the individual municipalities on the 
basis of income tax paid by their population.  The subsequent distribution of those 
funds is regulated by the Gemeindefinanzreformgesetz (Municipal Financial Reform 
Act) of 1969.39   
 
The fact that the division of turnover tax between the Bund and the Länder is not 
constitutionally fixed, as is the case with the income tax and corporate tax, creates 
some flexibility in the financial equalisation process.  While there are fixed 
percentages of revenue from income tax and corporate tax allocated to the Bund and 
the Länder, the percentage shares of the revenue from turnover tax varies over time 
since it is the subject of federal legislation.  The flexibility of this provision is 
necessary to accommodate changes in the financial demands of the Bund and the 
Länder.  The division of turnover tax is the crux of the vertical financial equalisation 
since it determines the eventual financial position of the Bund and the Länder.40   
 
In view of the fact that the Bundesrat must give its consent to the federal law 
determining the actual division of turnover tax, the Länder, through their participation 
in the Bundesrat, are in a strong position to influence the distribution of these funds.  
It can therefore be expected that tough negotiations take place about the Federal 
Government's Bill regarding this financial equalisation.  A few guiding principles are 
given to the Federal Parliament to consider in the process of developing and adopting 
this law, namely: 
 The recognition of equal claims of the Bund and the Länder to the funds 
from current revenue to finance their necessary expenditure; 
                                                 
38 Art 106 (9) of the Basic Law.  
39 Art 106 (5) of the Basic Law; Isensee & Kirchhhof Handbuch des Staatsrechts 1063.  
40 Fischer-Menshausen in Von Münch GG Komm 993. 
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 The determination of the necessary expenditure of both levels of 
government on the basis of multi-year financial planning; 
 The need for a fair balance in the consideration of the financial 
requirements of the Bund and the Länder; 
 The duty to consider the strength of the economy in order to prevent 
excessive burdens on the taxpayer; and 
 The duty to ensure equal living conditions in the federal territory.41 
 
These principles provide some guidance to the legislators, but do not establish 
objective legal criteria.  They thus leave room for political negotiations and choices, 
for example, the stipulation that the Bund and the Länder have equal claims to fund 
their necessary expenditure does not provide an objective measure.  It is debatable 
what "necessary expenditure" can include and clearly leaves scope for subjective 
political judgements.  A convention has developed where the contents of this matter 
are discussed and agreed upon, at the highest political level between the Bund and the 
Länder.  The actual division of revenue takes place in terms of what was agreed to.42 
 
The unification of Germany in 1990 placed huge demands on the economy of the 
western part of Germany.  An indication of the huge economic disparities between the 
old and the new Länder at the time of unification is the following: the tax capacity of 
the new Länder in 1990 was about 50% of the average of that of the old Länder, and 
the per capita gross domestic product in the new Länder was about 30% of the 
average of that of the old Länder.43   As a result there was a bigger financial need in 
the East than there was in the West.  Due to huge demands and the lack of sufficient 
capacity, the financial equalisation process could not be extended in its existing 
format to the new Länder at the time of unification.  Special arrangements were thus 
made for the period 1990 to 1994 with a view to implement the financial equalisation 
process stipulated in the Basic Law throughout the federal territory from 1 January 
                                                                                                                                            
 
41 Art 106 (3) of the Basic Law; Fischer-Menshausen in Von Münch GG Komm 994. 
42 The Federal Chancellor and the Ministers-President of the Länder would meet to seek agreement on 
the issue; Benda et al Handbuch des Verfassungsrechts (1983) 884 - 885. 
43 Renzsch Gegenwartskunde 1/1994 75; Peffekoven Wirtschaftsdienst 1990/VII347. 
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1995.44  These arrangements included the establishment of the German Unity Fund 
that had to substitute the participation of the eastern Länder in the financial 
equalisation process until the end of 1994, and a solidarity tax (Solidaritätszuschlag) 
that was payable on income and corporate tax from 1 January 1995.45   
 
In view of the special arrangements governing the period 1990 to 1994, no 
amendments were made in 1990 to the provisions governing the vertical financial 
equalisation process.  The division of turnover tax between the Bund and the Länder 
was thus not altered.  When the new financial arrangements were implemented from 1 
January 1995, the percentage share of the Länder from turnover tax increased to take 
care of the higher needs of the Länder, particularly the needs of the new Länder.  The 
changes to the division of turnover tax to the Bund and the Länder during the first five 
years after unification are as follows: 
      Year   Bund    Länder 
1989 - 1992   65,0   35,0 
1993 - 1994   63,0   37,0 
1995    56,0   44,046 
 
The specific division of revenue from a Land’s share of income and corporate tax to 
the individual Länder is done according to the principle of place of origin (Prinzip des 
örtlichen Aufkommens). This means that revenue is allocated to a particular Land to 
the extent that the taxes are collected in that particular territory.47  The idea is that the 
taxes should be returned to the place where they were economically generated.  The 
application of this principle has led to an unfair distribution of income and corporate 
tax among the Länder, as is evidenced by the influx of corporate tax to the Land 
Hessen due to the fact that all the major banks have their headquarters in Frankfurt in 
Hessen.  This and other unfair consequences of the application of the principle of 
                                                 
44 Renzsch Gegenwartskunde 1/1994 76; Waigel Rede des Bundesministers der Finanzen beim 
Sondersitzungen von Bundesrat und Bundestag am 22. Mai 1990 in Der Vertrag über die Schaffung 
einer Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik - Erklärungen und Dokumente (1990) 12 19.  These arrangements 
will be discussed in more detail under 5 5. 
45 Bundesministerium der Finanzen Steuern von A bis Z (2001) 90. 
46 Hummel & Nierhaus Die Neuordnung des bundesstaatlichen Finanzausgleichs im Spannunsfeld 
zwischen Wachstums- und Verteilungszielen in ifo studien zur finanzpolitik 54 (1994) 13. 
47 Art 107 (1) of the Basic Law; Arndt Finanzausgleich 2; Maunz- Dürig GG Komm 107 9. 
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place of origin were taken care of in the financial reform of 1969, that made provision 
for a more detailed arrangement in federal legislation to divide part of income tax 
according to place of residence and corporate tax according to place of location of 
operations.48 
 
The division of turnover tax between the Bund and the Länder concludes the first 
stage (vertical financial equalisation) of the financial equalisation process.  The next 
stage is the horizontal financial equalisation after which there is still room for limited 
vertical equalisation by transfer of additional federal allocations to individual Länder. 
 
5 4 2 Horizontal financial equalisation 
 
This part of the financial equalisation process is not only the most complicated, but 
also the most important part as it is by way of horizontal financial equalisation that 
significant changes in the financial position of the Länder, including the 
municipalities, is effected.  The principle of federal solidarity is also given expression 
through horizontal financial equalisation.49  The complexity of this part of the 
financial equalisation process was briefly referred to under 5 3 and will be explained 
in more detail in this section. 
 
The legal foundation for financial equalisation among the Länder is provided by 
Article 107 of the Basic Law and the complementary federal legislation envisaged in 
that section.50  As long as there is a need for financial equalisation among the Länder, 
federal legislation that requires the consent of the Bundesrat must be adopted to 
provide the detail of such financial equalisation.  The legislation that, until 2004, gave 
effect to this provision was the Finanzausgleichsgesetz (FAG) of 23 June 1993.  The 
main elements of this law, that indicate the different stages in the equalisation 
process, are the division of turnover tax between the Bund and the Länder, the 
financial equalisation between the Länder and the supplementary grants from the 
                                                                                                                                            
48 Fuest & Lichtblau Finanzausgleich im vereinten Deutschland (1991) 17; Benda et al Handbuch des 
Verfassungsrechts 886. 
49 Arndt Finanzausgleich 4; Fischer-Menshausen in Von Münch GG Komm 1027. 
50 Hettlage "Die Finanzverfassung im Rahmen der Staatsverfassung" in Veröffentlichungen der 
Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer Heft 14 (1956) 2 23. 
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Bund to financially weak Länder.51  As a consequence of the judgement of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht in BVerfGE 101, 158 on 11 November 1999, major 
financial legislative reform had to be undertaken. This included new legislation 
regarding financial equalisation being developed and becoming effective from 1 
January 2005.52  
 
The purpose of the financial equalisation legislation is apparent from the wording of 
Article 107 (2) of the Basic Law, namely, "…ensure a reasonable equalisation of the 
financial disparity of the Länder, due account being taken of the financial capacity 
and requirements of the municipalities (association of municipalities)".  The subject 
of horizontal financial equalisation is thus the financial capacity of the Länder, and 
includes the revenue of the Länder and not their expenditure.53  In the process of 
equalising the disparities in financial capacity due account must, however, be taken of 
the financial requirements of the Länder. 
 
The complexity of the horizontal financial equalisation process is emphasised by the 
elaborate legal provisions in the Financial Equalisation Act, 1993 and the complex set 
of calculations that give effect to it.  The first stage in the process is the division of 
turnover tax between the Bund and the Länder, that is determined in Article 1 of the 
Financial Equalisation Act, 1993 as follows for the years 1995 - 1998:   
 
Year    Bund   Länder 
1995    56%   44,0% 
1996    50,5%   49,5% 
1997    50,5%   49,5% 
1998    50,5%   49,5% 
 
The next stage in the horizontal financial equalisation process is the division of the 
Länder share of turnover tax between the individual Länder.  In terms of Article 107 
(1) of the Basic Law the Länder share of turnover tax must be divided among the 
                                                 
51 Fischer-Menshausen in Von Münch GG Komm 1030. 
52 Bundesministerium der Finanzen “Der neue bundesstaatliche Finanzausgleich ab 2005” 
Monatsbericht 02.2002 (25/02/2002) 1.  See discussion of this judgement under 7 3 4. 
53 Häde Finanzausgleich 225; BVerfGE 72, 330 400. 
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Länder on a per capita basis.  Federal legislation may provide that not more than 25% 
of the Länder share of turnover tax is utilised as supplementary payments to 
financially weak Länder whose per capita income from Land taxes and from income 
and corporate tax is below the average of all the Länder.  This is referred to in the 
literature as a preceding equalisation (Vorwegausgleich).54  Since this is not an 
obligation, it provides some discretion for the Federal Parliament to determine the 
detail of supplementary payments up to a maximum of 25% of the Länder share of 
turnover tax.55   
 
The Financial Equalisation Act, 1993 provides in Article 2 that 75% of the Länder 
share of turnover tax must be divided on a per capita basis, while the other 25% must 
be allocated in accordance with Article 2 (2) of the Financial Equalisation Act, 1993 
that stipulates that the Länder whose revenue from a list of taxes is lower than 92% of 
the Länder average will get supplementary payments from the Länder share of 
turnover tax to bring their stipulated tax revenue up to a maximum of 92% of the 
Länder average.56  The balance of the Länder share of turnover tax is then distributed 
on a per capita basis to all the Länder.  By far the largest part of the Länder share of 
turnover tax is divided on a per capita basis, which means that the key to the division 
of turnover tax among the Länder is the number of inhabitants (Einwohnerzahl), this 
being an objective measure for division.57 
 
Some commentators, such as Fischer-Menshausen, regard the division of turnover tax 
between the Länder as part of the primary division of revenue and not as part of the 
horizontal financial equalisation.58  Nevertheless, the division of the Länder share of 
turnover tax has a definite horizontal effect although it might be seen in a narrow 
sense as part of the primary financial equalisation process. It would be appropriate to 
say that the heart of financial equalisation is the actual Länder financial equalisation.   
 
                                                 
54 Fischer-Menshausen in Von Münch GG Komm 1033; Fuest & Lichtblau Finanzausgleich 18. 
55 Maunz - Dürig GG Komm 107 19. 
56 The list of taxes is income tax, corporate tax, business tax and Land taxes as determined in the FAG.  
See Fischer-Menshausen in Von Münch GG Komm 1033; Maunz - Dürig GG Komm 107 21; Fuest & 
Lichtblau Finanzausgleich 18. 
57 Häde Finanzausgleich 225; Maunz - Dürig GG Komm 107 19. 
58 Fischer-Menshausen in Von Münch GG Komm 1033. 
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The next step in the financial equalisation process is the actual horizontal financial 
equalisation, that is based on the provisions of Article 107 (2) of the Basic Law as 
well as Articles 4 - 10 of the Financial Equalisation Act, 1993.  It is in particular this 
part of financial equalisation that is central to the search for a balance between the 
autonomy of the Länder, which includes the acceptance of differences between them, 
and the federal solidarity between the Länder, that includes the development of equal 
living conditions.59   
 
Horizontal financial equalisation takes place by way of payments by the Länder that 
are bound to make these payments (ausgleichspflichtige Länder or contributing 
Länder) to the Länder that are entitled to receive these payments 
(ausgleichsberechtigte Länder or receiving Länder).60  A comparison is made of the 
financial capacity of all the Länder in order to determine who the contributing and 
who the receiving Länder must be.  Article 107 (2) of the Basic Law states quite 
clearly that it is the financial capacity of the Länder that must be considered, and not 
only their tax revenue.  The financial capacity of the Länder includes all their sources 
of revenue, for example, all fees and other financial contributions paid to them.  In 
this respect, the Bundesverfassungsgericht said that the capacity of the Länder is 
based on their total financial position and not only on their tax revenue.  If this is not 
so, it could lead to unfair results where some Länder would have to supplement the 
inadequate tax provision of other Länder.61 
 
The Financial Equalisation Act, 1993, created two yardsticks for the calculation of the 
equalisation payments, namely the financial capacity measure (Finanzkraftmeßzahl) 
and the equalisation measure (Ausgleichsmeßzahl).  The contributing Länder are those 
Länder whose financial capacity measure is higher than their equalisation measure in 
the particular year for which the financial equalisation is done. The receiving Länder 
are those Länder whose financial capacity measure is lower than their equalisation 
measure.62  The financial capacity measure of each Land is the total of all the tax 
                                                 
59 Häde Finanzausgleich 234; Fischer-Menshausen in Von Münch GG Komm 1034; Maunz - Dürig GG 
Komm 107 21. 
60 Art 4 of the FAG; Maunz - Dürig GG Komm 107 23. 
61 BVerfGE 72, 330 398; Häde Finanzausgleich 231. 
62 Art 6 (1) of the FAG. 
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revenue of a Land, including half of the tax revenue of its municipalities.63  As the 
name indicates, this is a measurement of the financial capacity of the individual 
Länder.   
 
The equalisation measure on the other hand is a mathematical average of the total 
revenue of all the Länder.  It is calculated by adding together the revenue of the 
Länder, including the Länder share of turnover tax and the preceding equalisation 
from turnover tax, and half of the revenue of the municipalities as stipulated in 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Financial Equalisation Act, 1993.  The result is divided by the 
total population of the country and multiplied by the number of inhabitants in a Land 
to get the equalisation measure for that particular Land.64  
 
The calculation of the equalisation benefits, which is further explained below, consists 
of three steps, namely; 
(i) determination of the financial capacity of a Land according to the 
financial capacity measure; 
(ii) determination of the financial need of a Land according to the 
equalisation measure; and 
(iii) determination of the contributing and receiving Länder and the 
equalisation contributions.65 
 
 
(i) Determination of the financial capacity of a Land according to the financial 
capacity measure. 
 
In calculating the financial capacity of the individual Länder provision is made in 
Article 7 (3) of the Financial Equalisation Act, 1993, to take special financial burdens 
into account, for example, the maintenance and improvement of the coastal harbours 
of Bremen, Bremerhaven, Hamburg, Rostock and Emden.  The practical result of this 
                                                 
63 Art 6 (1) of the FAG; Arndt Finanzausgleich 5. 
64 Art 6 (2) of the FAG; Fischer-Menshausen in Von Münch GG Komm 1040; Arndt Finanzausgleich 
5; Fuest & Lichtblau Finanzausgleich 19. 
65 Fuest & Lichtblau Finanzausgleich 19. 
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stipulation is that the following amounts (1995-figures) must be deducted from the 
provisional financial capacity of the respective Länder: 
Bremen   DM 90m 
Hamburg   DM 142m 
Lower Saxony   DM 18m 
Mecklenburg-Pomerania DM 50m66 
 
The financial capacity of the individual Länder is therefore the actual total revenue of 
each Land plus half of the revenue of the municipalities, subject to the correction of 
the harbour burdens of the four above-mentioned Länder.   
 
(ii) Determination of the financial need of a Land according to the equalisation 
measure. 
 
The average equalisation measure, calculated in accordance with Article 8 of the 
Financial Equalisation Act, 1993, must be multiplied by the number of inhabitants of 
each Land, as valued in terms of Article 9 of the Financial Equalisation Act, 1993, to 
arrive at the equalisation measure for individual Länder.  The basic norm in the 
determination of the financial need of a Land is that the per capita financial need is 
the same in all the Länder.  This is qualified by a differentiation in the valuation of the 
inhabitants of the Länder and the municipalities.  The number of inhabitants of each 
Land is valued at 100%, with the exception of the city-states Berlin, Bremen and 
Hamburg that are valued at 135%.  This higher valuation of population, referred to in 
the literature as Einwohnerveredelung (freely translated as "population valuation"), is 
based on the premise that communities with a higher population density normally 
have higher infrastructure expenditure.67  Based on the same premise, a refinement 
takes place for the valuation of the number of inhabitants in the communities - the 
higher the number of inhabitants, the higher the valuation, for example, the first 5 000 
inhabitants of a community are valued at 100% while the next 15 000 are valued at 
                                                 
66 Art 7 (3) of the FAG; Fuest & Lichtblau Finanzausgleich 19. 
67 Art 9 (2) of the FAG; Arndt 5; Fischer-Menshausen in Von Münch GG Komm 1040. 
68 Art 9 (3) of the FAG. 
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110%.68  The population valuation has the result that the higher the value of the 
number of inhabitants of a Land, the higher will its equalisation measure be.  
 
(iii) Determination of the contributing and receiving Länder and the equalisation 
contributions. 
 
The next step in the calculation of equalisation benefits is the determination of which 
Länder will qualify as equalisation contributors and which Länder will qualify as 
equalisation recipients.  If its financial capacity measure exceeds its equalisation 
measure, there will be a surplus and such a Land will be an equalisation contributor.  
If the equalisation measure of a Land exceeds its financial capacity measure, a deficit 
exists and such a Land will be a receiving Land.   
 
The population valuation is a controversial measure in view of its practical effect.  
The higher valuation of the inhabitants of financially strong Länder, for example 
Hamburg, creates a smaller surplus of the financial capacity measure over the 
equalisation measure and thus a lesser amount available for equalisation.  In two cases 
before the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Court ruled that the consideration of the 
particular nature of the city-states by the use of this population valuation is 
constitutional.69  In the latest judgement of the Bundesverfassungsgericht on financial 
equalisation the Court, however, questioned the validity of this special measure for 
population valuation and said that the Federal Parliament had the constitutional duty 
to adopt a law that provides objective measures treating the Länder equally and that 
the Financial Equalisation Act, 1993, does not in all respects meet this requirement.  
This constitutional duty includes a re-examination of the population valuation as it 
appears in Article 9 of the Financial Equalisation Act, 1993.70 
 
The calculation of the actual equalisation contributions is done in accordance with a 
scale stipulated in Article 10 of the Financial Equalisation Act, 1993.  On the part of 
the receiving Länder, the equalisation payment is determined as follows: 
                                                 
 
69 BVerfGE 72, 415; BVerfGE 86, 148. 
70 BVerfGE 110, 158 - a judgement of the Second Senate delivered on 11 November 1999. 
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 100% of the deficit financial capacity, if it is less than 92% of the 
equalisation measure; and 
 37,5% of the deficit financial capacity, if it falls between 92% and 100% 
of the equalisation measure.71 
 
In the case of the contributing Länder the equalisation contributions are determined as 
follows: 
 If the financial capacity of a Land is between 100% and 101% of the 
equalisation measure, 15% of its surplus must be contributed; 
 If the financial capacity is between 101% and 110% of the equalisation 
measure, 66% of its surplus must be contributed; and 
 If the financial capacity exceeds 110% of the equalisation measure, 80% of 
its surplus must be contributed.72 
 
The equalisation contributions by the contributing Länder are paid into a pool that is 
distributed among the receiving Länder according to the calculations stipulated above.  
The equalisation surpluses to be paid by the contributing Länder are raised or lowered 
by a factor to make the total equalisation surpluses equal to the total equalisation 
contributions.73  The result of the horizontal financial equalisation is an increase in 
the financial capacity of the financially weak Länder to at least 95% of the national 
average.  The following table illustrates the effect of the horizontal financial 
equalisation on the financial capacity of all the Länder in 1995, the first year that 
financial equalisation was implemented throughout the country. 
 
Table 5 1: The effect of the Länder financial equalisation (1995)74 
 Land   before equalisation  after equalisation 
Hessen     112,2    103,4 
Baden-Württemberg   109,7    103,0 
                                                 
71 Art 10 (1) of the FAG; Fuest & Lichtblau Finanzausgleich 21. 
72 Art 10 (2) of the FAG. 
73 Bundesministerium der Finanzen (BMF) Die Finanzverteilung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
(1996) 32. 
74 Bundesministerium der Finanzen Die Finanzverteilung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 33. 
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Bavaria    107,7    102,5 
North Rhine-Westphalia  107,0    102,3 
Hamburg    103,5    102,2 
Schleswig-Holstein   102,5    101,2 
Lower Saxony    96,2    97,6 
Rhineland-Palatinate   96,2    97,6 
Saarland    90,9    95,0 
Brandenburg    86,6    95,0 
Saxony    85,4    95,0 
Saxony-Anhalt   85,0    95,0 
Thüringen    85,0    95,0 
Mecklenburg-Pomerania  84,6    95,0 
Bremen    80,9    96,3 
Berlin     72,7    95,0 
 
The actual Länder contributions and funds received by Lander are illustrated in the 
following table, that also indicates the effect of the inclusion of the new Länder in 
1995: 
 
Table 5 2: The Länder financial equalisation in 1994 and 199575 
  [Contributions (-) and receipts (+) are indicated in DM million] 
 Land    1994    1995 
Old Länder 
Baden-Württemberg      -410    -2 803 
Bavaria       -669    -2 532 
Bremen      +568      +562 
Hamburg        +60       -117 
Hessen     -1 827    -2 153 
Lower Saxony      +958      +452 
North Rhine-Westphalia    +156     -3 449 
Rhineland-Palatinate     +657      +229 
Schleswig-Holstein       +72       -141 
                                                 
75 www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/fag.htm#neuordnung 2001 
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Saarland      +434      +180 
New Länder 
Berlin     none    +4 222 
Brandenburg    none       +862 
Mecklenburg-Pomerania  none       +771 
Saxony    none    +1 773 
Saxony-Anhalt   none    +1 123 
Thüringen    none    +1 019 
 
The Basic Law does not require a complete equalisation of financial disparities 
between the Länder, but merely a reasonable equalisation of their financial capacity.  
The use of the word "reasonable" indicates room for decision-making for the Federal 
Parliament.  Complete financial equalisation will cause absolute equality 
(Nivellierung), that will violate the autonomy and own financial responsibility of the 
Länder.76  Some protection against absolute equality is built into the Financial 
Equalisation Act, 1993, namely, the so-called guarantee clauses in Article 10 (3) to 
(5).  Receiving Länder are guaranteed a minimum equalisation of their financial 
capacity to 95% of the Länder average in terms of Article 10 (3) of the Financial 
Equalisation Act, 1993.  Articles 10 (4) and (5) provide guarantees to the contributing 
Länder against excessive contributions by them and for the preservation of their 
original ranking of financial capacity.  The question of what a reasonable equalisation 
really means in practice, has been central to many political debates both inside as well 
as outside the Bundesrat, and has also been considered by the Court. 
 
When confronted with this question in the most recent case regarding the matter, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht confirmed the prohibition against an absolute equalisation 
in 1999, when the Court inter alia stated that the constitutional obligation to ensure a 
reasonable and not an absolute equalisation of the financial capacity of the Länder, 
prohibits a reversal of the financial capacity ranking of the Länder within the 
framework of horizontal equalisation.77 The reasonable equalisation in terms of 
Article 107 (2) of the Basic Law has the effect of reducing the gap between all the 
                                                                                                                                            
76 BVerfGE 86, 215; Arndt Finanzausgleich 88; Maunz-Dürig GG Komm 107 30. 
77 BVerfGE 101, 158.  See discussion under 7 3 4. 
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Länder without erasing it.  The Court confirmed this important cornerstone of the 
financial equalisation process and stated that the application of the federal solidarity 
duty reduces the differences in financial capacity of the Länder, but does not 
eliminate it.   
 
5 4 3 Additional grants 
 
The last stage of the financial equalisation process is the possible payment of 
additional grants (Bundesergänzungszuweisungen) by the Bund to financially weak 
Länder.  Provision is made in the last part of Article 107 (2) of the Basic Law that the 
federal legislation on financial equalisation may include provisions dealing with the 
payment of additional federal grants to financially weak Länder, "to complement the 
coverage of their general financial requirements".  These additional grants may be 
determined on two grounds, namely to assist in the covering of a general financial 
deficit (Fehlbetrags-Bundesergänzungszuweisungen) or to assist in the payment for 
special needs (Sonderbedarfs-Bundesergänzungszuweisungen).78  These grants are 
not conditional, but are general grants made available to the receiving Länder to use 
at their discretion.  In comparison to the rest of the financial equalisation process, 
these additional grants play a subsidiary role.  This is the last part of the process 
where additional adjustments can be made to the vertical financial equalisation. 
                                                                                                                                           
 
Article 11 of the Financial Equalisation Act, 1993, contains detailed provisions for the 
payment of additional grants by the Bund to financially weak Länder.  Provision is 
initially made to assist those Länder whose financial capacity is, after financial 
equalisation, still very low.  Additional grants, of a maximum of 90% of the 
difference between the financial capacity measure, and the equalisation measure may 
be paid to the Länder that qualify.79  While the horizontal financial equalisation is 
aimed at bringing the financial capacity of all the Länder to a comparable level, the 
additional federal grants to cover general financial deficits are aimed at assisting those 
individual Länder whose financial capacity is still very low.80  The horizontal 
financial equalisation should result in bringing the financial capacity of the financially 
 
78 Art 11 of the FAG; Häde Finanzausgleich 241; Fischer-Menshausen in Von Münch GG Komm 1041. 
79 Art 11 (2) of the FAG. 
80 Häde Finanzausgleich 242. 
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weak Länder to at least 95% of the Länder average.  In addition to this more general 
equalisation, the Bund is responsible through its additional grants to raise the financial 
capacity of the financially weak Länder to 99,5% of the Länder average.81  It may, 
however, not have the effect of increasing the financial capacity of financially weak 
Länder to a higher level than the Länder average, since that would be in violation of 
the prohibition against absolute equalisation (Nivellierung).82   
 
Additional allocations on the basis of special needs are further made to a list of 
Länder who have above average special financial burdens of government.83  These 
include special allocations to cover above-average administration costs, to reduce 
special financial burdens due to the previous division of Germany, and for budget 
consolidation purposes.  This last category of special needs is aimed at the repayment 
of debt to the benefit of Bremen and Saarland.84  The general financial requirements 
of the Länder and of the municipalities are taken into account for purposes of the 
horizontal financial equalisation. This is done in terms of the first part of Article 107 
(2) of the Basic Law, without allowing for special needs of individual Länder.  In 
contrast, the provision for additional grants by the Bund clearly allows for special 
needs of individual Länder to be considered.85 The additional grants paid by the Bund 
in terms of Article 107 (2) of the Basic Law and Article 11 of the Financial 
Equalisation Act, 1993, account for approximately 2% of the revenue from turnover 
tax.86 The smaller Länder, such as Saarland and Bremen, and the new Länder from 
the East are the main beneficiaries of additional federal grants.  Berlin, that has a 
history of being a divided city that existed in two separate states, became the new 
capital of the unified Germany.  Berlin was partly an old Land and partly a new Land 
while also the capital city.  In view of its history and its new position of being the 
capital, huge reconstruction of the city had to be undertaken. To address these special 
                                                                                                                                            
 
81 Häde Finanzausgleich 243. 
82 BVerfGE 72, 330 (405); BVerfGE 101, 158. See discussion under 7 3 2 and 7 3 3. 
83 Art 11 (3) - (6) of the FAG; Fischer-Menshausen in Von Münch GG Komm 1042; BVerfGE 72, 330 
402; BVerfGE 86, 148 270. 
84 Saarland, one of the smaller Länder, only started to participate in the financial equalisation process in 
1961.  See Peffekoven "Finanzausgleich im vereinten Deutschland" in Wirtschaftsdienst 1990/VII 346 
349. 
85 Häde Finanzausgleich 245. 
86 Fuest & Lichtblau Finanzausgleich 24. 
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needs, Berlin receives special financial assistance in terms of the Federal 
Consolidation Program introduced on 23 June 1993.87   
 
In the 1999-judgement in the Bundesverfassungsgericht on financial equalisation the 
Court considered the application of the provisions concerning additional grants and 
stated that through the payment of additional federal grants the financial capacity of 
the financially weak Länder must be raised in such a way that the financial capacity 
of the receiving Länder does not exceed the Länder average.88  With specific 
reference to the special financial assistance to Bremen and Saarland, the Court stated 
that Article 11 (6) of the Financial Equalisation Act, 1993, was only a temporary 
measure aimed at helping Bremen and Saarland to help themselves.  This assistance 
had to be reduced over time in order to end this particular additional grant in 2004.  
The Court ruled the Financial Equalisation Act, 1993, to be unconstitutional and said 
that it could still apply as a transitionary measure, but that new legislation that must 
comply with the requirements of Articles 106 and 107 of the Basic Law should be in 
place by 1 January 2005.89 
 
5 5 Effect of unification on financial equalisation 
 
The unification of Germany in 1990 created a new Federal Republic of Germany 
consisting of sixteen Länder, namely, eleven from the West and five from the East.  
The five new Länder are Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-
Anhalt and Thüringen while Berlin (West Berlin was already part of the Federal 
Republic of Germany) was enlarged by the addition of East Berlin.  In terms of the 
unification, two fundamentally different economic systems had to be merged into one.  
Incorporating the economies of these new Länder into that of the Federal Republic of 
Germany while protecting the interest of the old Länder was a daunting task.   
 
It was evident that the financial and economic unification process could not be done at 
once and that an incremental process was required.  The Unification Treaty therefore 
                                                 
87 Gesetz zur Umsetzung des Föderale Konsolidierungsprogram (FKPG) vom 23. Juni 1993; Renzsch 
Gegenwartskunde 1/1994 77, 79; Weinzen Berlin 298 – 301. 
88 BVerfGE 101, 158. 
89 Spahn “The German Constitutional Court takes on the principle of ‘solidarity’” 2001 (Vol 1 nr 1) 
Federations 1. 
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envisaged a two-phase process.  The first phase introduced, in accordance with Article 
7 of the Unification Treaty, special financial arrangements for the new Länder that 
would apply till the end of 1994.  In terms of the second phase, new arrangements for 
the financial intergovernmental relations between the Bund and the Länder, including 
the Länder financial equalisation, would be implemented from 1 January 1995.90  
This phased in process was aimed at gradually increasing the financial and economic 
capacity of the new Länder to allow them to reach a comparable level to that of the 
old Länder.  Selmer suggested that there should be a third phase, that could take place 
after a transitionary period of about 10 years when a new federal financial constitution 
should be under consideration.91 
 
In terms of the first phase of financial arrangements to give effect to the Unification 
Treaty, a special fund, the German Unity Fund (Fonds Deutsche Einheit), was 
established.92  The total funds made available to provide financial assistance to the 
development of the new Länder amounted to DM 115 billion over a period of almost 
five years.  The funds were partially obtained through savings from the Bund, while 
most of it (DM 95 billion) was obtained through credit, with the Bund and the Länder 
responsible for equal portions.93  The credit financing is paid for by way of an annual 
subsidy by both the Bund and the Länder. There is an understanding that the total debt 
should be paid off by 2018.94  The individual Länder contributed to this funding by 
way of a special per capita levy (Solidaritätszuschlag), which totalled DM 1 000 m in 
1991, the first year they had to pay it.95  
 
During the period from 1990 to the end of 1994, special attention was thus paid to the 
economic upliftment of the former Deutsche Demokratische Republik with the main 
instrument for this being the German Unity Fund.  This was a drastic measure that 
placed huge demands on the western part of Germany, but it was also a transitionary 
                                                                                                                                            
 
90 Art 31 Gesetz zu dem Vertrag vom 18. Mai 1990 über einer Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialunion zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 
vom 25. Juni 1990, (Gesetzes zum Staatsvertrag) BGBl 1990 II 518. 
91 Selmer Die gesetzliche Neuordnung der bundesstaatlichen Finanzbeziehungen in Andel (Hrsg.) et al 
Finanz Archiv (1994) 331 332. 
92 Art 31 of the Gesetzes zum Staatsvertrag. 
93 Art 31 of the Gesetzes zum Staatsvertrag; Peffekoven Wirtschaftsdienst 1990/VII 346. 
94 Art 31 (6) of the Gesetzes zum Staatsvertrag; Peffekoven Wirtschaftsdienst 1990/VII 346. 
95 Peffekoven Wirtschaftsdienst 1990/VII 347. 
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measure.  The new Länder had to be prepared for inclusion into the financial 
intergovernmental relations system as provided for in Articles 106 and 107 of the 
Basic Law.  The constitutional aim of providing equal living conditions throughout 
the federal territory was extended after unification to include the new Länder.  Due to 
the fact that they had a much higher financial need than the western Länder and a very 
low financial capacity, an immediate inclusion in the financial equalisation system, 
which focuses on financial need as well as financial capacity, was not feasible.  The 
bridge to get to the start of a new financial equalisation process in 1995 was the 
German Unity Fund. 
 
A new federal law was passed in 1993, after a meeting of the Federal Chancellor and 
the Ministers-President of the Länder.  In terms of this a program for financing the 
new Länder from 1995 was adopted.96  Article 33 of this Law, that was the main 
element of a financial consolidation program, stipulated that the new arrangements for 
financial equalisation must be applied from 1 January 1995.  While it kept the basic 
structure of the financial equalisation process the same, a number of changes were 
made to the Financial Equalisation Act, 1993. The more important changes are listed 
below: 
 
(i) All the Länder, including the unified Berlin, were included in the 
financial equalisation process from 1 January 1995 without any 
amendments to the Basic Law.97 
(ii) The Länder share of turnover tax was increased in 1995 to 44% 
compared to 37% in 1994 in order to alleviate the disproportionate 
burdens of the old Länder in the financial equalisation process.98 
(iii) In calculation of the equalisation measure a population valuation figure 
of 135% was used for Berlin, being a city-state. 
                                                 
96 Föderale Konsolidierungsprogram (FKPG) vom 23. Junie 1993.  
97 In view of the division of Berlin after World War II, West-Berlin received special treatment by the 
Federal Republic of Germany from 1949 till 1990 as far as the financial equalisation in terms of the 
Basic Law is concerned.  See Hidien "Der finanzrechtliche Status des Landes Berlin im 
bundesstaatlichen Finanzausgleich des Grundgesetzes von 1949 bis 1995" in 1998 (4) Landes - und 
Kommunalverwaltung (LKV) 135; Weinzen Berlin und seine Finanzen (1995) 298 - 300. 
98 Art 33 1 (1) of the FKPG; Renzsch Gegenwartskunde 1/1994 78. 
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(iv) The horizontal financial equalisation would from 1 January 1995 
provide to all the Länder a minimum financial capacity of 95% of the 
Länder average.99   
(v) The financial capacity ranking of the individual Länder after horizontal 
financial equalisation would be protected.100 
(vi) Specific provision was made for additional grants to the financially 
weak Länder, that were mainly the new Länder. This was to 
compensate for financial deficits that remained after horizontal 
equalisation and for special burdens resulting from the previous 
division of Germany.101  Bremen and Saarland were still the main 
beneficiaries of additional federal grants among the old Länder. 
 
The inclusion of all the Länder in the financial equalisation process had a significant 
financial impact on both the contributing and the receiving Länder.  While the new 
Länder all benefited from the new financial arrangements, the financially weak old 
Länder found themselves in financially more difficult positions than before, as they 
could not easily claim contributions from the financial equalisation process any more.   
 
It was evident, already at the beginning of the unification process, that major 
economic reform and development was needed over a couple of years to reconstruct 
and develop the area previously known as the DDR.  The Unification Treaty captured 
this view, inter alia in Article 1, by stating that the basis for the economic union 
between the two parties is the building of a social market economy.102  The level of 
economic development in a specific geographic area, for example, a community or 
Land, has a direct impact on the taxes raised within that area.  This in turn impacts on 
the financial capacity of that particular Land.  In view of the fact that the financial 
equalisation process focuses on financial capacity and financial needs, it is important 
                                                 
99 Art 33 10 (3) of the FKPG; Häde Finanzausgleich 278; Renzsch Gegenwartskunde 1/1994 78.  The 
effect of this provision in the first year of application (1995) is illustrated in Table 1. 
100 Art 33 10 (3) of the FKPG.  
101 Art 33 11 of the FKPG. 
102 Art 1 (2) of the Unification Treaty: “Grundlage der Wirtschaftsunion ist die Soziale Marktwirtschaft 
als gemeinsame Wirtschaftsordnung beider Vertragsparteien.  Sie wird insbesondere bestimmt durch 
Privateigentum, Leistungswettbewerb, freie Preisbildung und grundsätzlich volle Freizügigkeit von 
Arbeit, Kapital, Gütern und Dienstleistungen;…” 
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that attention be paid to the economic development of the unified Germany, but in 
particular also to the economic development of the new Länder.   
 
The second phase of the financial arrangements pertaining to the Unification Treaty 
did not only signify important financial reforms by the inclusion of all the Länder in 
the financial equalisation process, it also led to an array of economic and political 
discussions on the economic development of the whole country.103  These included 
discussions and reform proposals by individual Länder as well as by the federal 
Ministry of Finance.  The two major financial constitutional reforms since the 
establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 took place after 
specifically tasked commissions produced reports on fundamental questions relating 
to the financial constitution.104  In case of the unification of Germany that route was 
not followed and the basis for financial constitutional reform was laid in Articles 5 
and 7 of the Unification Treaty, these provided for the establishment of the Fonds 
Deutsche Einheit and the new financial arrangements incorporating all the Länder 
from 1 January 1995.  The reform measures did not incorporate any amendments to 
the Basic Law, but did require a number of legislative amendments and some new 
legislation. 
 
The inclusion of the new Länder into the financial equalisation process led to an 
increase in the volume of equalisation contributions, but also raised questions about 
the stipulations and functioning of the financial equalisation process, in particular 
regarding some aspects of the Financial Equalisation Act, 1993.  Two of the 
financially strong Länder, namely, Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, took the lead in 
debating the issues that concerned them. They argued for a major reform of the 
financial equalisation process.105  This led to a case before the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht where these two Länder and Hessen contested the 
constitutional validity of a number of the provisions of the Financial Equalisation Act, 
1993.106  Although the whole financial equalisation process was under scrutiny, the 
                                                 
103 Selmer Die gesetzliche Neuordnung 333. 
104 Selmer Die gesetzliche Neuordnung 334; Eckertz "Der gesamtdeutsche Finanzausgleich im System 
des geltenden Verfassungsrechts" Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 46. Jahrgang 1993 (7) 281 282.  
105 Bayerisches Staatsministerium der Finanzen Die Reform des Finanzausgleichs - Föderale, 
ökonomische und verfassungsrechtliche Aspekte (1998) 1. 
106 BVerfGE 101, 158.  The case will be discussed in more detail in Ch 7. 
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main issues regarding the Länder complaints were the population valuation that 
benefited the city-states and the overall result of financial equalisation that, so it was 
argued, caused an absolute equalisation of financial capacity of the Länder.  The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht held that the constitutional obligation to achieve a 
reasonable equalisation of the financial capacity of the Länder meant that the gap in 
financial capacity between the Länder would be narrowed but not closed.  An 
absolute equalisation was thus unconstitutional.  The Court further said that the 
population valuation had to be re-examined by the legislator, which had the 
constitutional duty to regulate financial equalisation in a way that treats all the Länder 
fairly.   
 
5 6  Financial legislative reform 
 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht, in its judgement of 11 November 1999, ruled that the 
Finanzausgleichgesetz, 1993, did not comply with all the requirements of Articles 106 
and 107 of the Basic Law and directed the Federal Parliament to develop a new 
legislative framework for regulating financial equalisation.107 The Court, however, 
ruled that the current financial equalisation legislation should be treated as a 
transitionary measure until 1 January 2005 when the new legislation must be 
implemented.  In order to give effect to the Court’s decision, the Federal Government 
and the Ministers-President of the 16 Länder on 23 June 2001 agreed to a revised 
financial equalisation process and a new solidarity agreement (Solidarpakt II) 
between the old and new Länder aimed at the economic and social development of the 
new Länder.108    After the scheduled end of the first solidarity agreement on 31 
December 2004, the second solidarity agreement will be in operation from 1 January 
2005 for the next 15 years.  At this time the new financial equalisation arrangements 
will take effect.  These arrangements include a standards act (Maßstäbegesetz) that 
will provide measures or norms according to which the actual financial equalisation 
must be done and a new financial equalisation law which will cover the detailed 
                                                 
107 BVerfGE 101, 158 para C II.1 - 4.  See discussion under 7 3 4. 
108 Anon “Bundesregierung und Länder einigen sich auf Länderfinanzausgleich und Solidarpakt II” 
www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Themen_A-Z/Aufbau-Ost-,6771/Laenderfinanzausgleich-und-
Sol.htm  
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division of funds and the equalisation effects thereof.109  The aim of this legislative 
reform is not only to give effect to the Court’s decision, but also, and perhaps more 
importantly, to give effect to the constitutional requirement of the provision of equal 
living conditions in the eastern and the western Länder. 
 
The two-phased legislative approach as directed by the Court is criticised by some 
commentators.  Kämmerer stated that there is no constitutional basis for the creation 
of a standards act (Maβstäbegesetz) with a superior legislative status.110  Such 
approach suggests a hierarchy of laws that is not prescribed, nor envisaged, in Articles 
106 and 107 of the Basic Law.  The Basic Law is the supreme law in Germany and all 
legislation must be measured against it.  The new Standards Act is equal in status to 
the Financial Equalisation Act and cannot have a superior status.  The Federal 
Parliament thus followed a constitutionally questionable process and should rather 
have opted for one law consisting of two parts, namely a set of standards, as required 
by the Court, complemented by the actual financial equalisation provisions in the 
second part of the same law.111 
 
The Standards Act, 2001, passed by the Bundestag and the  
Bundesrat112 consists of the following elements: 
 Provisions regarding the vertical division of turnover tax 
(Umsatzsteuerverteilung) (Articles 3 – 6); 
 Provisions regarding the Länder financial equalisation.  The population 
valuation is set as the criterion for determining the financial capacity of a 
Land. (Articles 9 and 10); and 
                                                 
109 Bundesministerium der Finanzen Monatsbericht 02.2002 (25/02/2002) 99.  This will be discussed in 
detail in Ch 8. 
110 “Maβstäbe für den Bundesfinanzausgleich? – Dramaturgie einer verhinderten Reform” JuS (2003) 
Heft 3 214 215; Kämmerer Föderalismus als Solidarprinzip in Vitzthum & Winkelman (hrsgs) 
Bosnien-Herzegovina im Horizont Europas – Demokratische und föderale Elemente der Staatswerdung 
in Südosteuropa (2003) 195 - 199. 
111 Kämmerer Föderalismus als Solidarprinzip 207 n 51. 
112 Gesetzes über verfassungskonkretisierende allgemeine Maβstäbe für die Verteilung des 
Umsatzsteueraufkommens, für den Finanzausgleich unter den Ländern sowie für die Gewährung von 
Bundesergänzungszuweisungen (Maβstäbegesetz vom 21. November 2001). 
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 Provisions regarding the additional federal allocations (Bundesergänzungs-
zuweisungen), with a specific reference to the need to address the financial and 
economic situation of Berlin and the new Länder (Articles 12 – 14).113  The 
Standards Act also stipulates that the Bundesergänzungszuweisungen should 
always be seen as a complementary financial aid to the financially weak 
Länder and that it should form a small percentage of the total financial 
equalisation. 
 
The Federal Parliament attempted to give effect to the directions given by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht and used some of the wording of the judgement of 11 
November 1999, but failed to provide the objective standards, envisaged by the Court, 
on which the actual financial equalisation should be based.114  It seems that the basis 
for the new financial equalisation is not the Standards Act, but an agreement between 
the Bund and the Länder concerning the various elements of the financial equalisation 
process.  The Finanzausgleichgesetz (Financial Equalisation Act), 2001,115 was in fact 
part of a package of financial reform arrangements agreed upon between the Bund and 
the Länder. 
 
The new Financial Equalisation Act, 2001, follows the general pattern of the previous 
Financial Equalisation Act, 1993, but is further characterised by the following 
elements, namely: 
 Incentives for the Länder.  The introduction of a Prämienmodell (bonus 
system) in terms of which the Länder with a per capita tax increase, that is 
more than the average per capita tax increase, can exclude such tax increase 
from the financial equalisation process.116  This innovation supports 
competition amongst the Länder, and the contributing Länder receive a 
guarantee that they will retain part of their increase in tax revenue. 
                                                 
 
113 Bundesministerium der Finanzen “Das Maβstäbegesetz – Neuregelung der Grundlagen des 
bundesstaatlichen Finanzausgleichs” Monatsbericht 09. 2001 67 68. 
114 Kämmerer 2003 (3) JuS 215; Kämmerer Föderalismus als Solidarprinzip 212 – 216. 
115 Finanzausgleichgesetzes von 20. Dezember 2001. 
116 Bundesministerium der Finanzen Der neue bundesstaatliche Finanzausgleich 100; Kämmerer 
Föderalismus als Solidarprinzip 218. 
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 Recognition of federal solidarity amongst the Länder and between the Bund 
and the Länder, by way of increased support for financial aid to and economic 
development of the new Länder.  This is evidenced by the substantial 
additional federal allocations to Berlin and the new Länder determined for the 
period 2005 – 2019 in terms of the Solidarpakt II, namely an amount of euro 
105 billion over 15 years.117  Furthermore, in addition to the higher population 
valuation of the city-states in the horizontal financial equalisation, a 
population valuation of higher than 100% is introduced for the Länder 
Mecklenburg-Pomerania, Brandenburg and Saxony-Anhalt.118 
 The provision of a long-term financial equalisation plan. This Act stipulates 
that it will be valid from 2005 till 2019, which provides certainty in terms of 
financial planning. 
 
It remains to be seen whether the Standards Act, 2001, and the new Financial 
Equalisation Act, 2001, will reduce the number of court applications regarding 
financial equalisation.  While the Federal Parliament attempted to give effect to the 
judgement of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, it is clear that there are quite a few 
constitutional question marks about the new legislation and it is quite possible that it 
will be the subject of a court application long before the end of its predetermined 
lifespan. 
 
5 7 Conclusion 
 
The federal state principle (Bundesstaatprinzip) contained in Article 20 of the Basic 
Law is one of the pillars of the German federal system, and it is given practical 
application in the particular division of powers between the various constituent units 
within the whole state.  The federal state principle as well as the federal financial 
equalisation contains an inherent tension between diversity and unity.  This implies on 
the one hand the recognition of the diversity of Länder, each with its own 
characteristics and financial capacity, while they are on the other hand united in one 
                                                 
117 Bundesministerium der Finanzen Der neue bundesstaatliche Finanzausgleich 101; Kämmerer 
Föderalismus als Solidarprinzip 220. 
118 These three eastern Länder will get a population valuation of between 102 and 105% in view of the 
fact that they are not so densely populated.  See Bundesministerium der Finanzen Der neue 
bundesstaatliche Finanzausgleich 100; Kämmerer Föderalismus als Solidarprinzip 220.  
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federal state where financial equalisation implies some degree of redistribution of 
financial resources.  The application of the federal state principle requires a weighing 
up of two opposing aims, namely that of autonomy (diversity) and solidarity 
(unity).119  The tension between diversity and unity is recognised by the Basic Law, 
that provides for the financial autonomy of both the Bund and the Länder, while at the 
same time determines that there must be financial equalisation between the various 
constituent units of the Federation.120  The principle of Bundestreue guides the Bund 
and the Länder in their financial relations and implies in practice that they have a duty 
to assist each other.   
 
The application of the federal state principle to the financial intergovernmental 
relations implies that through financial equalisation there must be a process aimed at 
creating a balance in the financial position of the Bund vis-à-vis that of the Länder, 
and among the individual Länder. 121  Although the financial equalisation among the 
Länder is aimed at creating equal living standards throughout the country, this must 
be done within limits and cannot lead to a situation of absolute equality 
(Nivellierung).  The asymmetry between the Länder and their autonomy must 
therefore be recognised. 
 
Although the structure of financial equalisation is quite simple, consisting of three 
elements, namely vertical financial equalisation, horizontal financial equalisation and 
additional federal grants to individual Länder, this analysis shows that the financial 
equalisation process itself is quite complex.  Pleas to simplify the financial 
equalisation legislation have so far not been successful.  An opportunity to provide a 
simpler set of rules was lost when the Federal Parliament enacted the new 
Finanzausgleichgesetz, 2001, that is still too complicated. 
 
While the vertical financial equalisation is a stable predictable allocation of funds 
between the Bund and the Länder, horizontal financial equalisation consists of a 
complex set of rules that leads to results where the constitutional correctness may be 
questioned.  It is in particular the constitutional obligation to ensure a "reasonable 
                                                 
119 Selmer Die gesetzliche Neuordnung 341. 
120 Art 104a (1), 106, 107 and 109 (1) of the Basic Law; Häde Finanzausgleich 256. 
121 BVerfGE 72, 330 383. 
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equalisation of the financial disparity of the Länder" that is continuously under 
scrutiny.  Financially strong Länder, such as Hessen, Baden-Württemberg and 
Bavaria, have in the past questioned the application of this provision in practice.122  
The Bundesverfassungsgericht made it quite clear that it does not mean an absolute 
equalisation of financial capacity, but merely a reasonable equalisation of the 
financial capacity of the various Länder.123  In practical terms, it also means that the 
ranking of the Länder in terms of their financial capacity should not be changed due 
to horizontal financial equalisation.   
 
Although financial equalisation is on the one hand a mechanical process where 
mathematical calculations direct the process, there is another very important 
substantive side to it.  The essence of financial equalisation is about giving effect to 
the constitutional provisions regarding the development of equal living conditions 
throughout the country and the reasonable equalisation of financial disparities 
between the Länder.  These concepts do not have fixed boundaries and change over 
time, for example, equal living conditions during the first few years after 1949 were 
quite different from what they are today.  It is evident that the constitutional aim of 
creating equal living conditions throughout the country is not attached to a specific 
time limit, but it suggests a continuous endeavour by both the Bund and the Länder to 
improve the quality of life of the citizens throughout the country.  By the inclusion of 
this aim in the Basic Law, the importance of the purpose of financial equalisation is 
confirmed and must be adhered to at all times irrespective of which political party is 
in power.  
 
The unification of Germany placed heavy burdens on both the Bund and the old 
Länder.  This was not only politically justified, since it was an inevitable consequence 
of the Unification Treaty, but it was also constitutionally justified in terms of the 
federal state principle and the constitutional obligation to ensure equal living 
conditions in all the Länder.  The economic woes of the new Länder still require a lot 
of attention and may be the reason why a new solidarity agreement (Solidarpakt II) 
will be implemented from 1 January 2005. 
                                                 
122 These three Länder were the main parties in the 1999-case about financial equalisation that was 
before the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfGE 101, 158). 
123 BVerfGE 101, 158. 
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The incorporation of all the Länder in the financial equalisation process since 1 
January 1995, has highlighted some difficulties in the implementation of the financial 
equalisation system.  Some of the elements of financial equalisation previously 
questioned by the financially strong Länder, such as the population valuation and the 
effect of horizontal equalisation on the ranking of the financial capacity of the 
individual Länder, were often under the spotlight since 1995.  The inherent tension in 
financial equalisation between the constitutionally recognised autonomy of the 
Länder and their solidarity duty to assist one another as members of a united Germany 
requires a continuous balancing of interests.  This tension became even more acute 
since 1995, when the volume of financial equalisation contributions increased sharply 
and the problems with the system became more visible.124   
 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht gave some direction for legislative reform in its 1999 
judgement on financial equalisation, although it was criticised for acting too much 
like a legislator.125  While it confirmed the constitutional pillars of financial 
equalisation, it also directed the Federal Parliament to reform the Financial 
Equalisation Act, 1993, in order to comply with the requirements in Articles 106 and 
107 of the Basic Law.  The Court in this judgement  pleaded for a simpler law and a 
simpler financial equalisation process.  The agreement between the Bund and the 
Länder on 23 June 2001 to develop a new regulatory framework for financial 
equalisation is the first significant reform of the financial equalisation system since 
the unification of Germany.  These financial equalisation reform measures were 
complemented by a new solidarity agreement (Solidarpakt II) aimed at the 
reconstruction and economic development of the new Länder.  Whether the new 
Maßstäbegesetz and the Finanzausgleichgesetz, 2001, would survive an onslaught in 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht is still to be seen.  It is, however, evident that there will 
always be a need to find a balance between the recognition of financial autonomy of 
the Länder and solidarity among the Länder. This search may lead to applications 
before the Bundesverfassungsgericht. 
 
 
124 Bayerisches Staatsministerium der Finanzen Die Reform des Finanzausgleichs 1. 
125 BVerfGE 101, 158; Kämmerer Föderalismus als Solidarprinzip 200. 
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6 1 Introduction 
 
When the new democratic South Africa was established in 1994 a major feature of the 
economic state of affairs in the country was the existence of huge disparities between 
the various provinces and between various classes within the community.  According 
to research done in 1998 the poorest 40% of the population earned only 11% of the 
income, while the wealthiest 10% of the population earned about 40% of the income.1  
The diverse geographic, demographic and economic features of the nine provinces 
confirm the inequalities of their financial capacity. This is manifested inter alia in 
different quality of living conditions in the various parts of the country.  The new 
constitutional system reflected both a vertical imbalance that is, a disparity between 
expenditure responsibilities and revenue-raising powers, and a horizontal imbalance, 
that is, a difference in financial capacity of the various provinces.2  These imbalances 
had to be addressed.  Particular financial arrangements in terms of which provision is 
made for some form of financial equalisation were required. Redistribution of wealth 
is important in the promotion of political stability and socio-economic development, 
and in a decentralised system of government this is inter alia done by financial 
                                                 
1 Momoniat Fiscal Decentralisation in South Africa: a Practitioner's Perspective (2001) 2. 
2 Mokgoro Interprovincial Fiscal Equalization: The Role of the Financial and Fiscal Commission in 
De Villiers (ed) Birth of a Constitution (1994) 282. 
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equalisation among the constituent units.3 The financial equalisation system in South 
Africa is a crucial part of the constitutional system and warrants focussed attention.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the distribution of constitutional obligations and financial 
resources to the Federation and the Länder in Germany and the national, provincial 
and local governments in South Africa, is done in such a way that there is a need for 
sharing of revenue or financial equalisation.  In both these countries supremacy of the 
constitution is a fundamental principle of the constitutional system. This implies that 
the legal arrangements pertaining to revenue sharing or financial equalisation must be 
measured against this principle.  
 
This chapter will provide a detailed account of the development of the system of 
financial equalisation implemented in South Africa since 1994.  A comparison will  
be made between financial equalisation as developed and implemented in Germany 
and the newly developed system of financial equalisation in South Africa. The 
purpose of this is to ascertain what lessons could be learnt from the experience of 
Germany.  In a comparative study it is not only important to analyse the individual 
country studies, but it is also useful to do a direct comparison of particular elements of 
financial equalisation in the countries.  While the German financial equalisation 
system evolved over a long period of time, the South African system was created 
quite recently.  The comparison with Germany is not a snapshot of the current 
situation, but one that will provide valuable insight regarding the functioning of the 
financial equalisation system under various economic and political conditions.   
 
6 2 Purpose of financial equalisation 
 
In order to understand the purpose of financial equalisation in the South African 
context, it is necessary to refer to the Constitutional Principles that formed the basis of 
the current South African Constitution.  While the Constitutional Principles in general 
influenced the shaping of the structure of government and the accompanying 
allocation of powers and functions, there are three particular Constitutional Principles 
that influenced the development of the "financial constitution", namely Constitutional 
                                                 
3 Musgrave Public Finance 414. 
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Principles XXV, XXVI and XXVII.4 These Constitutional Principles are well 
reflected in the Constitution and sections 214, 227, 228, 229 and 230 are noteworthy 
in this respect.   
 
In accordance with Constitutional Principle XXV the fiscal powers and functions of 
the national and provincial governments must be defined in the Constitution while the 
constitutional framework for local government shall include appropriate fiscal powers 
for the different categories of local government.  Constitutional Principle XXVI states 
clearly that each level of government shall have a constitutional right to an equitable 
share of revenue collected nationally to enable them to provide basic services and to 
exercise their  allocated functions.  This is in line with economic theory that suggests 
sufficient allocation of financial resources to the various levels of government to 
allow them to perform the public services or functions allocated to them.5 
Constitutional Principle XXVII recognises the particular South African context when 
it refers to "economic disparities between the provinces", "the population and 
developmental needs" and "other legitimate interests of each province".6  The 
foundation for primary allocation of financial resources to all levels of government, as 
well as some form of financial equalisation, was thus laid in the Constitutional 
Principles and although they were not detailed prescripts, they clearly shaped the 
constitutional provisions concerning financial matters.7   
 
In accordance with economic theory and with due recognition of the socio-economic 
situation in South Africa, the purpose of financial equalisation is to provide equality 
in provinces' capacity to provide public services to all the people without having to 
impose hugely differential taxes and charges at a provincial level as these could 
                                                 
4 Schedule 4 of Act 200 of 1993.  See In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC); 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) paras 410 – 442.  See discussion under 2 
2 1 and 4 2 2. 
5 See discussion in Ch 3. 
6 CP XXVII: “A Financial and Fiscal Commission, in which each province shall be represented, shall 
recommend equitable fiscal and financial allocations to the provincial and local governments from 
revenue collected nationally, after taking into account the national interest, economic disparities 
between the provinces as well as the population and developmental needs, administrative 
responsibilities and other legitimate interests of each of the provinces.”  
7 Ch 14 of the Constitution.  See First Certification Case para 30; De Villiers The Constitutional 
Principles: Content and Significance in De Villiers (ed) Birth of a Constitution (1994) 37 43. 
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enhance existing disparities. 8  The focus of financial equalisation is on financial 
capacity and not on actual performance.  This resembles the situation in the German 
system where horizontal equalisation is aimed at a reasonable equalisation of the 
financial capacity of the Länder.9  
 
Section 227 (1) of the Constitution stipulates as follows: 
“Local government and each province – 
(a) is entitled to an equitable share of revenue raised nationally to enable it to 
provide basic services and perform the functions allocated to it; and 
(b) may receive other allocations from national government revenue, either 
conditionally or unconditionally.” 
 
The statement in section 227 (1) of the Constitution contains two elements, namely 
the right of local government and each province to an equitable share of revenue, and 
secondly, the stipulation that local government and each province must use the 
equitable share to provide basic services and to perform the functions allocated to it.  
This is the only indication of the purpose of financial equalisation found in the 
Constitution.  The wording suggests that the equalisation of financial capacity is 
geared towards specific expenditure obligations such as the provision of basic 
services. This is a somewhat mechanistic approach.  The provision in section 227 (1) 
falls short of an overarching constitutional aim, such as the improvement of the 
quality of life for everyone, that would be in line with the basic values of dignity and 
equality contained in section 1 of the Constitution. 
 
Despite the mechanistic formulation in section 227 (1), financial equalisation should 
have substantive results such as improved living conditions that will go a long way in 
addressing the socio-economic needs of South Africa.  The allocation of funds for the 
purpose of equalisation of financial capacity is only one side of a coin.  The other side 
is the ability of provinces and municipalities to utilise these funds for the performance 
of their functions.  If provinces and municipalities underspend their budgets, as is the 
                                                 
8 Musgrave Public Finance 413; Oates Fiscal Federalism (1993) 35 – 38; Mathews Fiscal equalisation 
in a federal system (1970) 1; Mokgoro Interprovincial Fiscal Equalisation 286. 
9 Art 107 of the Basic Law.  See discussion under 5 3. 
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case in many instances during the last few years, it is an indication of their inability to 
manage their budgets properly or their inability to perform their functions as 
governments.  In these situations the purpose of financial equalisation has not been 
achieved.    
 
It is evident that the level of services provided by each province and local government 
and therefore the financial needs of each province and local government, is not static 
and will change over time.  Although the various provinces provide different levels of 
services, according to their needs and budget priorities, there can be national 
minimum standards that should apply to all provinces.  The existence of such 
standards will have an effect on a province’s budget as this can limit the discretion of 
provinces to determine their own budget priorities.  In concurrent fields, such as 
education, health and social services, national legislation can lay down national or 
minimum standards for service delivery, for example, the Norms and Standards for 
School Funding promulgated in terms of the South African Schools Act, 84 of 1996.  
In cases of exclusive provincial functional areas such as ambulance services and 
libraries, national legislation can, in terms of section 44 (2) of the Constitution, be 
enacted to ensure that minimum standards for service delivery are applicable 
throughout the country.10 
 
The Constitution provides the basic framework for financial equalisation, but this 
must be complemented by an Act of Parliament that would provide the detail of the 
actual financial equalisation or division of revenue, as it is termed in the 
Constitution.11  Such an Act can only be enacted after the provinces, local 
government and the Financial and Fiscal Commission have been consulted and a 
range of policy objectives have been considered.12  The Constitutional Court said that 
the importance of these provisions warrants direct consultation with provinces, hence 
the requirement that such legislation must follow the section 76 (1) legislative 
                                                                                                                                            
 
10 Currie & De Waal Constitutional Law 165 – 169. 
11 Sec 214 of the Constitution. 
12  Sec 214 (2) of the Constitution; Wehner “Fiscal Federalism in South Africa” 2000 Publius 47 61. 
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procedure, in terms of which provinces have a significant say through their 
participation in the National Council of Provinces.13   
incial government to “stretch” their budgets. 
                                                
 
Unlike the situation in Germany, where local government forms part of the 
constitutional order of the Länder and is treated as such in the financial equalisation 
process, local government is a distinct sphere of government in South Africa and also 
participates in the financial equalisation process.14  Local government in South 
Africa, consisting of various categories of municipalities, is responsible for the 
provision of basic services to communities and for the promotion of social and 
economic development, and is entitled to receive an equitable share of nationally 
raised revenue to enable it to provide these services and to perform the functions 
allocated to it.15  In view of the fact that municipalities in South Africa raise most of 
their revenue by way of user charges (electricity and water) and property taxes, there 
is not the same need for financial equalisation, as is the case with provinces.16  
However, the situation is changing due to the restructuring of the provision of 
electricity services that will have an impact on municipal finances.17  Many 
municipalities in South Africa however, have to address dire socio-economic needs 
with large parts of the population who cannot afford to pay for basic services.  With 
the Western Cape becoming an increasingly popular province to reside in, the 
migration of mostly poor unemployed people to the province places additional 
pressure on municipalities and the prov
 
Any increase in the equitable share allocation to local government, might mean less 
available for distribution to the provinces.  Although this is an important factor to bear 
in mind, financial equalisation is primarily aimed at reducing financial disparities 
between the national and provincial governments (vertical financial equalisation) and 
between the provinces (horizontal financial equalisation).  Local government, in view 
of its significant own tax base, receives by far the smallest percentage allocation in 
 
13 First Certification Case para 419. 
14 Art 106 and 107 of the Basic Law; sec 40, 214 and 227 of the Constitution.  See discussion under 5 4 
1 regarding the constitutional incorporation of the German municipalities under the Länder, and the 
implications thereof in the financial equalisation process. 
15 Sec 152 (1) and 227 (1) of the Constitution; Currie & De Waal Constitutional Law 217 – 218. 
16 Momoniat Fiscal decentralisation 5. 
17 See discussion under 4 3 1. 
 
 187
terms of the equitable division of revenue.18  The discussion in this Chapter will 
primarily focus on the financial equalisation between the national and provincial 
governments and between the provinces. 
 
6 3 The financial equalisation process 
 
The Constitution determines a financial equalisation process in terms of which all 
revenue collected nationally must be distributed between the various spheres of 
government.19  This must be done in an equitable way with the purpose of enabling 
provinces and local government to provide basic services and perform the functions 
allocated to them.  Although the term "financial equalisation" is not used in the 
Constitution, it is evident that the distribution of nationally raised revenue to the three 
spheres of government is a financial equalisation exercise.  In view of the fact that the 
major sources of tax revenue are located at the national sphere of government, some 
form of financial equalisation had to be provided for in the Constitution.  Sections 214 
and 227 of the Constitution provide the framework for the financial equalisation 
process to take place.  The pool of revenue that forms the source for financial 
equalisation is the revenue raised nationally and thus per definition excludes revenue 
raised by the provinces and municipalities.  Furthermore, the Constitution explicitly 
excludes own revenue raised by provinces and municipalities from the financial 
equalisation process and states that it may in fact not be deducted from the equitable 
share of a province or municipality or from any other allocations from the national 
government to them.20   
 
Section 214 (1) stipulates a financial equalisation process consisting of three 
elements, namely: 
(i) A vertical financial equalisation, that is an equitable division of 
nationally raised revenue between the national, provincial and local 
spheres of government;  
(ii) A horizontal financial equalisation, that is an equitable division of the 
provinces' share of that revenue among the nine provinces; and 
                                                 
18 See Table 6 2. 
19 First Certification Case para 281 - 284. 
20 Sec 227 (2) of the Constitution. 
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(iii) Additional allocations from the national government share of that 
revenue to provinces, local government or municipalities.21 
 
This financial equalisation process must be dealt with in detail in an Act of Parliament 
that has to comply with the requirements stipulated in section 214 (2) of the 
Constitution.  One way of giving effect to this constitutional requirement is to have an 
Act that stipulates the detail of the financial equalisation process and which contains a 
formula that takes into account the various considerations contained in section 214 
(2). The Act must be operative for an agreed number of years.22  The idea of a law 
containing a rigid formula did not find support with the National Treasury, who is 
responsible for this legislation, and it has therefore been decided to use a different 
approach, namely, an annual Act of Parliament, the Division of Revenue Act, that 
provides for the actual equitable division of revenue.23  The Division of Revenue Act 
is the result of a cooperative process involving the three spheres of government and is 
only partially based on a formula used to determine the equitable shares of individual 
provinces.  This Act operates in conjunction with the Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Relations Act, 97 of 1997, that stipulates the process of giving effect to section 214 of 
the Constitution. 
 
The Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act, 1997, makes it clear that the FFC, as an 
independent and impartial constitutional institution, has an important role to play in 
making recommendations to the nine provincial legislatures, both houses of 
Parliament and the national Minister of Finance regarding the actual division of 
revenue among the three spheres of government.  In making its recommendations the 
FFC must take into account the matters listed in section 214 (2) of the Constitution.  
                                                 
21 Sec 214 (1): “An Act of Parliament must provide for –  
(a) the equitable division of revenue raised nationally among the national, provincial and local 
spheres of government; 
(b) the determination of each province’s equitable share of the provincial share of that revenue; 
and 
(c) any other allocations to provinces, local government or municipalities from the national 
government’s share of that revenue, and any conditions on which those allocations may be 
made.” 
22 This approach is for example taken in Belgium where a detailed Act of Parliament makes provision 
for the division of taxes and revenue to the regional governments and this Act is then operative for ten 
years.  It has a built in adjustment for inflation over the duration of the Act.  See Brand "The South 
African Constitution - three crucial issues for future development" in 1998 (2) Stell LR 182 190.  
23 Momoniat Fiscal Decentralisation 9. 
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This requires a careful balancing act to take into account diverse issues such as "the 
needs and interests of the national government", "the need to ensure that the provinces 
and municipalities are able to provide basic services and perform the functions 
allocated to them" and "the fiscal capacity and efficiency of the provinces and 
municipalities".  The Minister of Finance must consult the nine provincial 
governments, organised local government and the FFC before the actual division of 
revenue is done and provided to Parliament in the form of the Division of Revenue 
Bill.24   This consultation process takes place in the Budget Council, the Budget 
Forum and an extended Cabinet meeting to which the nine Premiers are invited, and 
where the final allocation to the three spheres of government is decided.25 The actual 
division of revenue is effected by the Minister of Finance and the officials of the 
National Treasury, taking into account the recommendations of the FFC and the input 
of the provinces and organised local government. 
 
Although there is some bargaining within the Budget Council, it is evident from the 
actual process that the Minister of Finance has a strong influence in the final division 
of revenue between the three spheres of government.  He who pays the piper calls the 
tune.  It is the expressed view of the National Treasury that the division of revenue is 
based on a political judgement by Cabinet based on the information generated through 
a consultative process with the FFC, the provinces and local government.26  The 
dominance of the centre in this process is not surprising given the current political 
context where the ANC is in the majority in all three spheres of government.  
Contrary to the situation in Germany, there is no real opposition or competition 
between the provinces and the national government. The South African system has 
been tested in only one political scenario.  However if say five of the nine provinces 
were governed by political parties other than the majority party in the national 
government, the division of revenue process could result in more intense debates and 
this could possibly lead to compromises between the “provincial” view and the view 
of the National Treasury.  It is arguable whether such a scenario would result in a 
                                                 
24 Sec 10 of the Fiscal Intergovernmental Relations Act, 97 of 1997.  See Wehner “Does South Africa 
still need the Financial and Fiscal Commission?” Budget Brief No. 71 (July 2001); Ajam Fiscal 
decentralisation in SA 69 et seq. 
25 Momoniat Fiscal Decentralisation 9. 
26 National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2000 A.7; Murray & Simeon 2000 (15) 
SAPR/PL 485; Dept. of Finance Budget Review 1999 (Feb. 1999) 258. 
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more efficient financial equalisation system when compared to the current situation.  
It is, however, evident that the good cooperation between National Treasury and its 
provincial counterparts (“Team Finance”) contributes to the effective functioning of 
the financial equalisation system in the current political context. 
 
The Constitution gives high status and an important role to the FFC in financial 
intergovernmental relations. It must be an independent institution that gives advice 
and recommendations regarding the equitable division of the available pool of funds 
in the country.  It would, however, seem that the profile of the FFC has diminished 
over time and that its recommendations are often ignored.  The FFC itself indicated in 
2000 that it experienced problems related to the way government responds, or fail to 
respond, to its inputs.27 At the FFC’s tenth anniversary conference in 2004 the 
Minister of Finance thanked the FFC for the crucial role it played in the creation of 
the architecture of financial intergovernmental relations in South Africa, but also 
expressed concern about the “formulaic approach” of the FFC regarding the division 
of financial resources and argued for more policy room for government.28  These 
comments confirm the current situation where the National Treasury would like to 
dictate the division of revenue (and to a large degree does) based on policy 
considerations.  The FFC however must guide the division of revenue process from an 
independent perspective, that includes to a large degree a “formulaic approach”, that 
could depoliticize the debates about the division of revenue.  It remains to be seen 
how this relationship between the FFC and the National Treasury will develop. 
 
6 3 1 Vertical financial equalisation 
 
There is a fiscal imbalance between the expenditure obligations of provinces and their 
own sources of revenue, referred to as a fiscal gap.29  Vertical financial equalisation 
can be defined as the process of revenue sharing through which this fiscal gap is 
                                                 
27 FFC Annual Report 1998 – 1999 (2000) 33; Wehner “Does South Africa still need the Financial and 
Fiscal Commission?” in Budget Brief No. 71 (2001) 1 – 4. 
28 Min Trevor Manuel, Minister of Finance Address to the FFC 10th Anniversary Conference (11 
August 2004) 6. 
29 Visser & Erasmus Management of Public Finance 267; Ajam Fiscal decentralisation in SA 57; Van 
Zyl “Financing the provinces in South Africa” Occasional Paper No. 3 (November 1997) 1. 
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closed.  The first step in the financial equalisation process or division of revenue, as it 
is labelled in the Constitution, is a vertical division of the nationally raised revenue 
between the national, provincial and local spheres of government.30  This division of 
revenue is applied to a pool of revenue that includes all the major taxes, namely 
personal and corporate income tax, value-added tax and the fuel levy.  In terms of 
section 155 (1) of the 1993 Constitution, the provinces were entitled to an equitable 
share that consisted of percentages of a specified list of taxes, namely personal 
income tax, value-added tax, the fuel levy and any transfer duty on the sale or transfer 
of property.  The current provision in section 214 of the Constitution does not list the 
taxes included in the financial equalisation process, but stipulates an all-inclusive pool 
of nationally raised revenue.  This increases the potential scope of financial 
equalisation since the pool of revenue utilised for this process is larger than what the 
position was under the 1993 Constitution.  It is an important conceptual change from 
the allocation of equitable shares of a limited number of taxes to the nine provinces, to 
a pool of revenue to which the three spheres of government all have a right to claim 
an equitable share.   
 
During the period from 1994 to 1997 provincial budgets were in fact the sum total of 
various functional allocations determined at national government level.  The 
Department of Finance was responsible for the transfer of the consolidated allocations 
per functional area to the individual provinces.  The de facto situation of financial 
intergovernmental relations in South Africa during that period was a reflection of the 
transitional phase in which South Africa’s constitutional development was at the time.  
It was not only a question of getting the nine provinces and local government properly 
established and functioning, but it also included the complex situation of integrating 
the existing infrastructure and personnel of all the previous administrations at 
provincial level. This included integrating the previous “black homelands” into the 
new provincial administrations.  This mammoth task required the involvement of the 
national Department of Finance to guide and assist the provinces to become fully 
functional and included the development of financial management and budgeting 
                                                 
30  Sec 214 (1) of the Constitution. 
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skills.  The situation changed in 1997 when the new financial equalisation provisions 
took effect and provinces had to draw up their own budgets for the first time.31 
 
The vertical financial equalisation is based on the division of functions in terms of the 
Constitution and the basic premise is that funds should follow function.  In terms of 
the constitutional allocation of functions to the various spheres of government, the 
delivery of major public services such as health, education (other than tertiary 
education) and welfare is the responsibility of the provinces.  This implies that a 
substantial percentage of the pool of revenue to be distributed should be allocated to 
the provinces.  Before the actual division takes place, provision is made for debt 
service costs and a contingency reserve kept by the National Treasury.32  It is 
questionable why there is a “top slicing” to deduct debt service costs from the pool of 
revenue to be distributed, while almost all debt is incurred at national level and the 
servicing thereof should thus be included in the national share of revenue. 
 
The National Treasury has to acknowledge the constitutional requirement that 
provinces and local government should be financially enabled through the equitable 
division of revenue to provide basic services and perform their own constitutionally 
allocated functions.  In its Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2000 the National 
Treasury confirmed that the provinces have a constitutional obligation to provide the 
major social functions of school education, health and welfare services.  Health 
services include the provision of primary health care and regional, specialised and 
academic hospitals.  Local government is responsible for the provision of basic 
household infrastructure services such as municipal roads and street lighting, (tax-
funded services) and the provision of household electricity and water (primarily 
funded by user charges).33  This practical application of the constitutional division of 
obligations as well as the requirements of sections 214 (2) and 227 (1) of the 
Constitution are given effect in the first step in the financial equalisation process, 
namely the vertical division of revenue.  In its submission to Parliament, in the form 
                                                 
31 Wehner Fiscal Federalism in South Africa (1999) 46. 
32 This is referred to as “top slicing”.  In practice it means that the pool of revenue is reduced by the 
cost of servicing the national debt and the amount set aside for a contingency reserve. Only after this 
top slicing took place can the pool of revenue be divided between the three spheres of government.  See 
Momoniat  Fiscal decentralisation 9.  
33 National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2000 5 – 6. 
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of the annual Budget Review, National Treasury explains in detail how the various 
factors, or policy objectives in section 214 (2) of the Constitution, are taken into 
account when determining the equitable division of revenue.34 
 
In 2001 the FFC put the process of determining the equitable shares of the three 
spheres of government under the spotlight and as a result, it was suggested that a 
research study be undertaken to provide clear definitions of basic service obligations 
and other constitutional obligations.35  In its recommendations the FFC proposed that 
the equitable division of nationally raised revenue, after the deduction of debt 
servicing and a contingency reserve, should include a priority claim for meeting 
constitutionally mandated basic service obligations, before the needs for the 
management and administration of the various institutions within each sphere of 
government and the funding of other constitutional functions, be addressed.   Such 
research can assist in providing clarity of definitions and perhaps also in developing 
objective criteria to determine the actual vertical split. This would limit the potential 
for political manipulation, but does not change the basic elements of the financial 
equalisation process, it only assists in refining it. 
 
The debate continues from another angle.  Various provinces and municipalities have 
not succeeded in properly fulfilling their constitutional mandates as a result of their 
inability to spend their budgets.  Expectations were raised in 1994 that the newly 
created provinces would develop rapidly into “mature” institutions of government that 
can effectively perform all the functions allocated to them.  After ten years of 
democracy the expectations are still there but the flaws in the system are becoming a 
serious concern.  In critical areas such as education, health and housing, there 
continues to be a substantial underspending in many provinces, which implies that not 
enough houses are built for the poor, not enough school classrooms are available and 
that people have to walk long distances to reach the nearest medical clinic.  It is thus 
not enough that the equitable division of revenue should result in sufficient funding to 
provinces, but it is implied that provinces must utilise their budgets fully and 
effectively. 
                                                 
34 This is done in Annexure E: Explanatory memorandum to the division of revenue.  See for example 
National Treasury Budget Review 2003 239 et seq.  
35 FFC Submission – Division of Revenue 2002 – 2003 (June 2001) 6. 
 194
 6 3 2 Horizontal financial equalisation 
 
The horizontal division of revenue is an important component of the financial 
equalisation process in view of its potential to reduce disparities between provinces.  
The actual demand for basic services, which is based on the demographic and 
economic profiles of the individual provinces, is a key indicator that guides the 
horizontal division of revenue.36  Poverty and lack of infrastructure development in 
particular provinces, for example, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and the Eastern Cape,  
contribute to a disparate situation and leads to an increase in the allocation to these 
provinces.  The division of revenue amongst the nine provinces or horizontal financial 
equalisation is formula driven and takes into account the policy objectives or factors 
listed in section 214 (2) of the Constitution.  The allocation of the horizontal division 
among the provinces, as reflected in the annual Division of Revenue Act, is not 
appropriated in the national budget, but only in the individual provincial budgets, 
since it is regarded as a direct charge against the national revenue fund.37 
 
In its Framework Document for Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in South Africa 
the FFC has analysed the various economic concerns, constitutional requirements and 
policy considerations regarding intergovernmental fiscal relations and came to the 
conclusion that the development of a formula that contains objective elements, is 
necessary to provide more certainty regarding revenue allocations and to avoid any 
arbitrary allocations.38  Based on the Framework Document the FFC recommended, 
in 1996, a formula for the horizontal division of revenue that was applied from the 
following financial year, namely 1997/98.39  This formula was phased in over a 
period of five years.  An allocation formula, according to the FFC, is designed to 
achieve an equitable division of public resources between the three spheres of 
government, and more specifically to achieve an equitable division of revenue 
                                                                                                                                            
 
36 Min. of Finance Medium Term Budget Policy Statement 1997 (2 December 1997) 41. 
37 Sec 213 (3) of the Constitution; Momoniat Fiscal decentralisation 11. 
38 FFC Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 11. 
39 FFC The Financial and Fiscal Commission’s Recommendations for the Allocation of Financial 
Resources to the National and Provincial Governments for the 1997/98 Financial Year 
(Recommendations for 1997/98) (May 1996) 7; Van Zyl Occasional Paper No 3 (Nov 1997) 8. 
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between the provinces.  Using a formula reduces the risk of political manipulation and 
arbitrary decision making, and it introduces objective criteria in terms of which the 
actual allocation is made.  In 1997 a new medium term expenditure framework 
(MTEF), in terms of which budget planning would be done on a three-year basis, was 
also introduced.40  The MTEF coupled with the formula for the horizontal division of 
revenue provide certainty of revenue, which is important for provincial planning and 
udgeting. 
 funds to provide primary and secondary education 
hospitals in the Western Cape, Gauteng, 
uring an 
rovince to finance its basic 
to fulfil its constitutional obligations according to provincial 
priorities. 
ws, namely: 
 (provincial allocation) = S + m + T + I + B.41 
                                                
b
 
The FFC formula consists of the following elements: 
• S = a minimum national standards grant, which is aimed at supplying 
provinces with sufficient
and primary health care; 
• m = a spillover grant to provide funding for the services that have a spillover 
effect, such as the academic 
KwaZulu-Natal and Free State; 
• T = a fiscal capacity equalisation grant, which is aimed at ens
equitable provincial taxing capacity and to encourage accountability; 
• I = an institutional grant to provide funds to each p
administration as required by the Constitution; and 
• B = a basic grant to enable provinces to establish and maintain the institutions 
necessary 
 
The provincial formula can be expressed as follo
P
 
This formula is population driven and therefore depends on accurate demographic 
statistics (normally provided by the national census) or population estimates for the 
education, health and social security components and the basic share.  The minimum 
national standards grant consists of two elements, namely education and primary 
health.  Population figures are important in both cases.  The determination of the 
 
40  Min. of Finance Budget Policy Statement 1997 4. 
41 FFC Recommendations for 1997/98 ii, 7; Ajam Fiscal decentralisation in SA 70 – 74. 
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minimum standards grant in a province’s equitable share is dependent on the number 
of people eligible for these basic services per province, the average cost thereof and 
e national minimum standards for example a teacher: learner ratio of 1:38.42 
cal equalisation grant fills the gap created by a lack of significant provincial 
xes. 
ng seven components, each has a different weighting. 
standards for funding of schools as determined 
by the national government.46 
th
 
 The FFC proposed the fiscal capacity equalisation grant in order to supplement 
provincial revenue where the fiscal or taxing capacity is below the national average, 
thus promoting financial equalisation.  Since this formula was first introduced for the 
1997/98 financial year the FFC has recommended continuously that provinces’ own 
revenue sources must be augmented by the introduction of a surcharge on personal 
income tax.43  This proposal has not yet been supported by the Minister of Finance.  
The fis
ta
 
The FFC’s recommendations must be taken into account in the process of determining 
the equitable division of revenue, but it need not be accepted.44  The Minister of 
Finance only partially accepted the FFC recommendations for the 1997/98 financial 
year, the first year of implementation of this formula.  The final formula that has been 
adopted consists of the followi
This formula is still utilised:45 
• An education component, which is determined by the number of actual 
learners enrolled and the average size of the school-age population. The 
provision of primary and secondary school education and further education 
and training colleges is the responsibility of provinces, and due to previous 
different and discriminatory school systems for the various population groups, 
forms a focus point for financial equalisation aims.  Provinces must budget for 
the provision of education and determine their spending priorities giving due 
recognition to the norms and 
                                                 
42 FFC Recommendations for 1997/98 7 – 11, Ajam Fiscal decentralisation in SA 70 – 74. 
/98 14. 
997 41; Momoniat Fiscal decentralisation 11; Wehner 
iscal Federalism in South Africa 83 – 86. 
43 FFC Recommendations for 1997
44 Sec 214 (2) of the Constitution. 
45 Min. of Finance Budget Policy Statement 1
F
 
46 Sec 12 (provision of public schools), 35 (norms and standards for public schools) and 36 
(responsibility of governing body) of the South African Schools Act, 84 of 1996 read with the Norms 
and Standards for School Funding promulgated on 12 October 1998 by General Notice 2362 
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• A health component, that provides funding for the responsibility of provinces 
to deliver primary and secondary health services.  Although all citizens are 
eligible for health services provided by the state, this component focuses on 
the section of the population without private medical aid or medical insurance. 
• A welfare component, which addresses the provinces’ responsibility to 
provide social security grants to various categories of people, such as the 
elderly, entitled to such grants. 
• A basic component, which is based on the province’s share of the total 
population with an additional weighting in favour of rural communities to 
address poverty.  This rural weighting in the basic component fell away when 
the backlog component was introduced in the 1999/00 financial year. 
• An economic output component.  This component has a dual purpose, namely 
to compensate provinces for a lack of own provincial taxes, and to reflect the 
distribution of economic activity across the provinces.  The gross geographic 
product (GGP) figures are used as an indicator of economic activity per 
province. 
• An institutional component, that is aimed at covering the cost of running each 
provincial government.  This is equally divided between the nine provinces. 
• A backlog component was added in the 1999/00 financial year in order to 
address the backlog in infrastructure development. It consists of three 
elements, namely, capital needs relating to schools, hospital facilities and rural 
infrastructure.47  
 
The above elements of the provincial equitable share do not serve as directives to 
provinces on how they should allocate their resources, but rather reflect estimates of 
the demand for basic services.  Provinces must budget for all their functions and 
prioritise their spending needs within their overall resource constraints.  The 
                                                                                                                                            
(Government Gazette 19347).  In Ex Parte Speaker of the National Assembly: In re Dispute concerning 
the constitutionality of certain provisions of the National Education Policy Bill 83 of 1995 1996 3 SA 
289 (CC) para 27 the Court ruled that in view of the fact that education is a concurrent legislative 
function, consultation and cooperation between national and provincial governments in the field of 
education, as was envisaged by the Bill, is consistent with the constitutional arrangements.  
Determination of national norms for provision of school education by provinces clearly requires 
consultation and cooperation between the two spheres of government. 
47 Dept of Finance Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 1999 (Sept 1999) 2.6; Wehner Fiscal Federalism 
in South Africa 85. 
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provincial budget process takes place within the MTEF applicable throughout the 
country.  This implies that provincial departments must individually plan and budget 
for a three year period and the provincial treasuries must compile the provincial 
udget in cooperation with the various provincial departments. 
or the 2002/03 financial year, with reference to each component of the 
rmula. 
ducation   H
b
 
The FFC proposed in 1996, and it was so adopted, that the formula for the division of 
revenue should be phased in over five years.  It was done to avoid serious disruptions 
in provincial allocations in view of differences between the initial allocation to 
provinces and the target shares.  Due to the equalisation effect of the horizontal 
division of revenue, it is in particular the so-called richer provinces, namely Gauteng 
and Western Cape, that stand to loose more over the short term if the formula was not 
phased in.  The phase-in period was changed in 1998 when new census data was 
incorporated into the financial equalisation process.  The new target date for the five-
year phase-in period was agreed to be the 2003/04 financial year and the formula is 
now fully implemented.48  The following table shows the horizontal division of 
revenue f
fo
 
Table 6 1  Determination of equitable share of each province49 
P e re   Basic   Economic   Institu-   Backlog   Target rovinc    E ealth   Welfa
           Share   Activity  tional         Shares  
Weightin 41, 0     19,0       18,0        7,0        7,0              5,0           3,0    100,0% g 
Eastern 18,4     17,0       19,6       15,5       6,5             11,1          20,6      17,0  
Cape 
Free State         6,3            6,5         7,1        6, 5      5,3              11,1           5,7          6,6 
g          12,6         14,7       13, 9       18,1     41, 6            11,1           5,1       15,4 Gauten
KwaZulu-      22,0          21,7       19,6        20,7     17,0             11,1         22,9       20,6 
Natal 
po       15,4   13,3        13,7         12,1      3,0              11,1        22,9       13,6 Limpo
Mpuma-          7,3           7,2          6,5          6,9       4,9              11,1          8,5         7,2 
langa 
Northern         1,9            2,0          2,2          2,1      1,7             11,1            1,3        2,4  
Cape 
 West    8,0             8,6          8,7           8,3      5,7              11,1          9,4         8,3 North
Western         8,0             8,9          8,8           9,7     14,4             11,1          3,7         8,9 
Cape 
                                                 
48 National Treasury Budget Review 2003 260; National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 
2000 A.10. 
49  National Treasury Budget Review 2003 260. 
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Total         100   100      100          100      100     100         100        100 
 
Note:  1. The target shares indicate the percentage division of revenue between the provinces aimed at 
in the 2003/04 financial year. 
2.   The weighting percentages indicate the relative weight attached to each component of the 
formula. 
 
 
The incorporation of the 1996 census figures in the 1998/99 division of revenue was 
cause for some controversy because of the differences between the preliminary 
figures, that were used in the 1998/99 provincial allocations, and the final census 
figures that were used since then, and the impact that these figures have on the actual 
division of revenue.  While provinces such as the Northern Province (Limpopo), 
Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal gained from the adjusted census figures, the 
Western Cape lost significantly.  The Western Cape was the only province whose 
population figure decreased in the adjustment process, and this has consequentially 
caused a reduced percentage share of the total provincial equitable share.50    
 
The horizontal division of revenue between the nine provinces recognises the 
different demographic and economic profiles of the various provinces and therefore 
also the disparities in socio-economic development.  The equitable share formula is 
aimed at financial equalisation or redistribution of financial resources, in order to 
promote a better quality of life for all South Africans.  In view of its aim of financial 
equalisation, the equitable share allocation results in a higher per capita allocation to 
the poorer rural provinces.51  The equitable share formula is a significant policy 
instrument in the hands of the national government. It can influence provincial 
spending patterns through the stipulation of national standards in areas such as 
primary and secondary school education and primary health care, or by changing the 
relative weight of the different components of the equitable share formula. The 
autonomy of provinces to determine their own spending priorities in order to meet the 
demand for more and better quality public services is however recognised by the 
                                                 
50 The preliminary population figure for the Western Cape was 4,1m and it was reduced to 3,9 m in the 
final census results.  This was questioned by the Western Cape Provincial Government, but without any 
avail because the official figures were not changed.  See Van Zyl Occasional Paper No 3 (Nov 
1997)12. 
51 National Treasury Budget Review 2001 147. 
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national government.52  Within all the provinces there are differences in socio-
economic conditions of the different communities. Even in the so-called rich 
provinces pockets of poverty exist.  Provincial policies and the setting of provincial 
spending priorities are therefore just as important as the setting of national standards 
and can have redistributive effects within individual provinces.   
 
The FFC proposed, in 2000, a change in the formula for the horizontal division of 
revenue from a formula based on the economic and demographic profiles of the 
provinces to a costed norms based formula.53 According to the FFC the costed norms 
approach to the formula is a way of calculating the financial resources necessary for 
the provision of basic social service levels taking into account norms and standards 
determined nationally.54  In other words, there must first be an estimate of the costs 
for the provision of a basket of basic services (education, welfare and health) that 
must be provided by the provinces at least at a minimum level. These minimum 
norms and standards are nationally determined.  Horizontal division of revenue should 
thus be done on the basis of costed norms.  The purpose of this approach, according to 
the FFC, is to ensure that each province has sufficient funds to provide all their 
inhabitants with constitutionally mandated basic social services at a nationally 
determined standard.55  
 
This approach did not find support with the National Treasury nor with the Budget 
Council due to the lack of sufficient data necessary to cost the norms and standards 
and the lack of clear norms and standards in certain areas.56  The FFC itself 
acknowledged that this was a shortcoming in its model, but still recommended it with 
a view to ensure a more objective approach to the calculation of the formula. An 
                                                 
52 National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2003 14; National Treasury Intergovernmental 
Fiscal Review 2000 A.2 
53 FFC Recommendations 2001 – 2004 MTEF Cycle (May 2000) 7 – 11. 
54 FFC Recommendations 2001 – 2004 7. 
55 FFC Recommendations 2001 – 2004 7. 
56 National Treasury Budget Review 2001 233. 
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additional criticism by the National Treasury was that such a “bottom up” approach 
would neglect the role of political judgement required in setting budget priorities.57   
 
In later proposals the FFC has again recommended the costed norms approach, albeit 
in a somewhat refined form.  It, for example, suggested that the education element 
must be based on the cost per learner of providing basic education to four target 
groups, namely those above or below the poverty line in rural and urban schools 
respectively.58  These recommendations were made in the absence of sufficient 
reliable data and were also not quantified.  It is thus difficult to evaluate what the 
direct effect of this costed norms approach would be on the actual financial 
equalisation process.   The National Treasury has responded in Budget Review 2002 
that a “formula-based approach” for the division of revenue as suggested by the FFC 
is impracticable for various reasons, for example the lack of concise definitions of 
constitutionally mandated basic services, the absence of objectively determined norms 
and standards for basic services and the unavailability of data necessary to implement 
such an approach.59  The National Treasury is, however, in favour of a regular review 
of the current formula and has commented in the Budget Review 2003 that it will 
undertake a comprehensive and fundamental review of the equitable share formula 
and all other allocations to provinces and local government.  This it will do in 
cooperation with the FFC.60  The review was still in progress when the 2004 division 
of revenue was done and will only be completed in time for the 2005 budget.61 
 
The attempts of the FFC to find an alternative or improved formula for the equitable 
division of revenue, suggest that there should be more emphasis on objective elements 
in the financial equalisation process and a lesser role for political decision-making by 
the National Treasury.  This obviously does not find favour by the National Treasury, 
which dominates financial intergovernmental relations in South Africa.62  The 
                                                 
57 National Treasury Budget Review 2001 235 
58 FFC Submission – Division of Revenue 2002 – 2003 (June 2001) 18. 
59 National Treasury Budget Review 2002 241. 
60 National Treasury Budget Review 2003 253. 
61 National Treasury Budget Review 2004 258. 
62 Murray & Simeon 2000 (15) SAPR/PL 498. 
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principles of co-operative government require co-operation between all the spheres of 
government and recognition of each sphere’s constitutional integrity.  Although 
nation-building dominated the formulation of the financial equalisation provisions in 
the Constitution and the ensuing legislation, it is perhaps time that in line with the 
FFC’s attempts to improve the financial equalisation process a more balanced 
approach should be developed where provinces should play a more significant role in 
the decision-making process. There should perhaps also be a greater emphasis on 
objective elements in the financial equalisation process.  In this regard the German 
experience provides valuable lessons for consideration. 
 
6 3 3 Additional allocations 
 
The third stage of the financial equalisation process in terms of section 214 (1) (c) of 
the Constitution, is the determination of additional allocations from the national 
government’s equitable share of nationally raised revenue to provinces and local 
government or municipalities where these allocations are reflected in the annual 
Division of Revenue Act.  These allocations are in addition to the equitable share 
allocations to provinces and local government and are in the form of conditional 
grants.  In 2003 the equitable share accounted for approximately 90 percent of 
transfers to provinces while the remaining 10 percent consisted of conditional 
grants.63  They are determined by the national government and are aimed at funding 
specific priority programmes.  This provides an important policy instrument for the 
national government, that can direct the spending of a grant by setting national 
standards and adding further conditions to it.  Through these conditional grants the 
national government can ensure that provinces deliver services within the concurrent 
functional areas at a stipulated national standard, failing which the national 
government can intervene in various ways, including the stopping of transfer of funds 
to the particular province.64  These grants are asymmetric in nature and address 
interjurisdictional spillovers, for example to provide targeted funding for research and 
                                                 
63 National Treasury Budget Review 2003 160.  
64 National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2000 58.  Intervention mechanisms, which are 
available as a last resort mechanism in case of a financial (or other) crisis, are provided in the 
Constitution in sections 100, 139 and 216. 
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training at the academic hospitals in Gauteng and Western Cape where most of South 
Africa’s medical students are trained. 
 
According to the National Treasury conditional grants have an important role to play 
in intergovernmental financial relations and are intended to: 
• Make provision for national priorities in provincial budgets; 
• Promote national norms and standards; 
• Provide funding to provinces that deliver specialised services and services 
which have a cross-border spillover effect; and 
• Support capacity building within provincial government.65 
 
Since the introduction of conditional grants in 1998 a range of grants with a variety of 
conditions attached have been provided to provinces and local government.  The 
following are examples of these grants: 
• Funding for the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme, where the 
provinces acted as agents for the municipalities in the development of 
infrastructure in local communities; 
• Funding for professional training and research in health to all provinces, but 
substantially higher allocations were made to the provinces with academic 
hospitals, such as Gauteng, Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal;  
• An HIV/AIDS Health Grant to all provinces to enable the health sector to 
“develop an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic”;66 and 
• Funding for special Presidential projects on urban renewal, where provinces 
would act as agents for the national government. 
 
Conditional grants are budgeted for in the budgets of the respective national 
departments, but spent by the provinces.  The national departments of Health, 
Housing and the National Treasury (provincial infrastructure grant) administer most 
of the additional grants to provinces.67  The National Treasury rationalised the diverse 
range of conditional grants in 2001 in order to enhance administrative efficiency and 
                                                 
65 National Treasury Budget Review 2001 149. 
66 Schedule 5 Division of Revenue Act, 7 of 2003. 
67 National Treasury Budget Review 2003 161 – 165. 
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accountability.68  In addition, the Minister of Finance introduced new policy priorities 
relating to the additional allocations; these include a focus on the child support grant, 
poverty alleviation programmes and infrastructure maintenance and development to 
stimulate investment and economic growth.69  The effect of the additional allocations 
to provinces and local government are indicated in Table 6 2 that sets out the division 
of revenue between the three spheres of government for the 2000/01, 2001/02, 
2002/03, 2003/04 and 2004/05 financial years.  The figures for the 2004/05 financial 
year are indicative figures and form part of the Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF). 
 
It is evident from Table 6 2 that conditional grants form a substantial part of the total 
allocation to local government, while in the case of provinces additional allocations, 
in the last stage of the financial equalisation process, form a relatively small part of 
their total allocation.  It is evident that during the period 2000 – 2005 it was planned 
that there should be a steady increase in the allocations to provincial and local 
governments to support improved service delivery. 
 
Table 6 2 Division of revenue between the spheres of government70 
            2000/01    2001/02             2002/03     2003/04     2004/05 
           Outcome      Outcome Revised Medium-term 
R million          estimates estimates 
National allocation          73 142       87 709     98 853       108 983     117 549 
Provincial allocation        108 904     121 099   136 919       158 995     175 468 
     Equitable share          98 398        107 460   123 457       142 386     155 313 
     Conditional grants           10 506          13 638     13 462         16 609       20 155 
Local government                   
Allocation                               5 576         6 516       8 801 12 001       13 249 
     Equitable share                  2 315         2 607       3 964           6 343         7 078 
     Conditional grants             3 261            3 909       4 837           5 658         6 171 
Allocated expenditure      187 621        215 324         244 573       279 979    306 266 
Percentage of shared total     100                100                100              100            100 
National share                     39,0%              40,7%           40,4%         38,9%        38,4% 
Provincial share                  58,0%              56,2%           56,0%         56,8%        57,3% 
Local government share       3,0%                3,0%             3,6%            4,3%          4,3% 
Note: The national government share excludes the additional allocations (conditional grants) made to 
provincial and local governments, since it is included at the appropriate sphere of government where it 
is spent. 
                                                 
68 National Treasury Budget Review 2001 149. 
69 National Treasury Budget Review 2001 240. 
70 National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2003 5. 
 
 205
 The provision of additional allocations to provinces, local government and 
municipalities has not been without problems.  Some of the conditional grants were 
poorly designed and contributed to a fragmentation of the budget process.  National 
Treasury has addressed this problem by rationalisation of the variety of grants to have 
a comprehensive set of dedicated conditional grants within various functional areas.71  
While provinces receive most of their funding by way of the equitable share and can  
set their own budget priorities, the conditional grants are sometimes used by national 
departments to direct spending in provinces and, in a way, override provincial 
governments’ discretion to determine their own priorities.72  Conditional grants can 
be beneficial to both the national government and the provincial and local 
governments by enhancing certain policy objectives while addressing the need for 
additional funding at the lower levels of governments.  
                                                
 
One of the biggest challenges that faces government in South Africa is the 
HIV/AIDS73 pandemic, that poses a growing threat to the economy while making 
high demands on national and provincial government budgets. 74   HIV/AIDS is a 
major health problem and requires specific funding for treatment facilities, medicine 
and counselling of patients throughout the country. Since most health services are 
delivered by provinces, the dedicated funding to combat HIV/AIDS must be included 
in the budgets of the provincial health departments.  The fight against HIV/AIDS is, 
however, not only a health issue as other functional areas such as education and 
welfare also play a significant role and must therefore also have appropriate budgets 
and action plans in place.  In view of the fact that provinces are responsible for the 
delivery of health, welfare and school education services to the public, it is clear that 
the fight against HIV/AIDS places a heavy additional burden on provincial budgets.  
The national government will obviously also have to budget for combating 
HIV/AIDS, but the primary delivery of services involved in fighting the pandemic 
 
71 National Treasury Budget Review 2004 263 – 268. 
72  Momoniat Fiscal decentralisation 11. 
73 This is the generally accepted term for the human immunodeficiency virus that lead to the acquired 
immune deficiency syndrome. 
74 Min of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) 
para 93; Van Wyk “The enforcement of the right of access to health care in the context of HIV/AIDS 
and its impact on the separation of powers” 2003 (66) THRHR 389 389. 
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rests with provinces.  National Treasury indicated in the Budget Review 2002 that 
there would be an increased allocation to provinces in the fields of education, health 
and welfare to complement the provincial own allocations in these areas to combat 
HIV/AIDS. 75   This was reflected in the Division of Revenue Act, 5 of 2002, as 
conditional grants dedicated to HIV/AIDS programmes in education, health and 
welfare. 76   In 2003 and 2004 there was again an increase in the specific grants to 
provinces for combating HIV/AIDS.   
 
It is clear that from a financial intergovernmental relations perspective the approach is 
that provinces should budget in a manner that would enable them to effectively 
address HIV/AIDS.  There should, for example, be priority programs in health, 
education and welfare dealing with HIV/AIDS and funded by the provinces from their 
equitable share allocation.  Dedicated funding in the form of conditional grants can 
also be provided to provinces as  additional allocations from the national government 
share of revenue.     
 
The example regarding HIV/AIDS illustrates the fact that conditional grants can be 
utilised effectively to make sure that national priorities get properly reflected in 
provincial budgets. 
 
6 4 A comparative analysis 
 
The purpose of this section is to compare key issues relating to financial equalisation 
in Germany and South Africa, with a view to learning from the German experience 
and to make recommendations for the improvement of the relatively new system in 
South Africa.  Amongst the various elements of the financial intergovernmental 
relations systems in both Germany and South Africa, one element is quite central, 
namely financial equalisation. This is because of its important socio-economic effects.  
In view of the important role it plays in both the German and the South African 
constitutional systems, a comparison of financial equalisation based on the following 
elements follows: 
                                                 
75 National Treasury Budget Review 2002 15, 141. 
76 Schedule 4 of Act 5 of 2002. 
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• Purpose of financial equalisation 
• Constitutional accommodation 
• Role of additional legislation 
• Results of financial equalisation 
 
6 4 1 Purpose of financial equalisation 
 
The foundation for financial equalisation (Finanzausgleich) in Germany is laid in 
Article 20 (1) of the Basic Law. This fundamental principle describes Germany as a 
federal state (Bundesstaatsprinzip).  The federal principle is recognised in the 
financial arrangements between the Bund and the Länder, and reflects the general 
acceptance of federalism in Germany.  The Basic Law states clearly in Article 106 
that the purpose of financial equalisation is to create a balance in the accommodation 
of the financial needs of the Bund and the Länder respectively and to ensure equal 
living conditions throughout the country.77  Horizontal financial equalisation has a 
further aim, namely to ensure a reasonable equalisation of the financial disparity of 
the Länder.   
 
The overall purpose of financial equalisation in Germany consists of two elements, 
namely a social and an economic element.  Socially it is aimed at the provision of 
equal living conditions throughout the country and economically the focus is on 
balancing the financial needs of the two levels of government. 
 
Constitutionally all provinces in South Africa have the same role to provide public 
services, but the disparity in financial capacity between the provinces means that they 
are not in the same position to fund all these public services.  There is a need for some 
form of financial equalisation.78  The fact that all major taxes are national taxes, while 
provinces have significant expenditure responsibilities without the accompanying own 
financial resources, is a further reason for financial equalisation. 
 
                                                 
77 See the discussion under 5 2. 
78 See the discussion under 6 2. 
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The constitutional provisions regarding financial equalisation are based on 
Constitutional Principle XXVI, that is part of the political compromise reached during 
the constitutional negotiations at Kempton Park.  The Constitutional Principles 
provided the basic framework for that new constitution but did not go into detail about 
issues such as specific constitutional aims.  This is perhaps why the purpose of 
financial equalisation is not stipulated as clearly in the South African Constitution as 
it is in the German Basic Law.  Nevertheless, the purpose of financial equalisation can 
be ascertained from two provisions, namely section 214 and section 227 of the 
Constitution.  There must be a vertical financial equalisation, in terms of section 214, 
to provide an equitable distribution of funds between the three spheres of government.  
The purpose of a horizontal financial equalisation is stated somewhat clearer in 
section 227, namely, to enable provinces and local government to provide basic 
services and to perform the functions they are responsible for.  It can be inferred from 
these provisions that the purpose of financial equalisation in South Africa also 
contains two elements, namely, a social and an economic element.  Economically, 
financial equalisation is aimed at providing a fair distribution of funds to all provinces 
and local government to fund the public services they are responsible for.  Socially, 
the purpose of financial equalisation is to provide equity, which relates to 
development, the alleviation of poverty and the improvement of the quality of life for 
the people of South Africa.79   
 
Although the crux of the purpose of financial equalisation in both countries is 
comparable, the constitutional provisions differ. In comparison with the German 
Basic Law, the South African Constitution lacks clarity on the specific purpose of 
financial equalisation and could benefit from the inclusion of a provision that links the 
founding principles to the purpose of financial equalisation. 
 
6 4 2  Constitutional accommodation 
 
The essential financial equalisation provisions in the case of Germany are contained 
in Article 106 and 107 of the Basic Law.80  The constitutional provisions are 
                                                 
79 FFC Framework Document for Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in South Africa (1995) iii. 
80 See the discussion under 5 3.  
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complemented by additional legislation, namely the Finanzausgleichgesetz.81  
Vertical financial equalisation is determined in Article 106 of the Basic Law, while 
Article 107 contains the basis for the horizontal financial equalisation. 
 
Article 106 (3) contains both a right to an equal proportion of funds for the Bund and 
the Länder and an obligation that their financial needs shall be coordinated in a 
balanced way.  The purpose of financial equalisation is also clearly stipulated in this 
section, namely to ensure equal living conditions in the whole country.  Article 107 of 
the Basic Law provides for the division of revenue amongst the Länder and stipulates 
further that this legal framework for the horizontal financial equalisation, must be 
completed by way of federal legislation that carries the consent of the Bundesrat, in 
other words, the Länder governments must agree to this legislation.  The aim of such 
legislation must be to ensure a reasonable equalisation of the financial disparity of the 
Länder. 
 
It is evident from the German situation that the provisions in the Basic Law are not 
only fundamental in providing the legal framework for financial equalisation, but that 
it also contains some of the detailed arrangements, the balance being provided by 
federal legislation and a political process of negotiations between the Bundesrat and 
the Federal Government.   
 
The constitutional accommodation of financial equalisation in the case of South 
Africa is provided by two sections in the Constitution, namely section 214 and section 
227.82  Section 214 contains the basic legal framework for financial equalisation 
while Section 227 clearly outlines a right for both provinces and local government to 
an equitable share of nationally raised revenue.  It also indicates the purpose of the 
equitable allocation to these two spheres of government, namely to provide basic 
services and fund the functions they are responsible for.  Unlike the German Basic 
Law the South African Constitution does not provide an equal right to funds for the 
national and provincial spheres of government.  Section 214 of the Constitution 
                                                                                                                                            
81 The current operative Act is the Finanzausgleichgesetz (FAG) of 23 June 1993, which has been 
replaced by the Maβstäbegesetz,2001, and the Finanzausgleichgesetz, 2001, from 1 January 2005. 
82  See discussion under 6 3. 
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merely determines that the division, that is both the vertical and the horizontal 
division, must be equitable, but not equal. 
 
The provisions regarding financial equalisation in the Constitution must be 
complemented by national legislation that must be supported by the National Council 
of Provinces.83  In practice this legislation consists of a “permanent” Act, namely the 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act, 97 of 1997, and an annual Act, namely the 
Division of Revenue Act.  There is also a political process, namely the discussions 
concerning the division of revenue that take place in the Budget Council and the 
extended Cabinet meeting. 
 
Conceptually a similar approach is thus followed in both Germany and South Africa, 
namely, to have a basic legal framework on financial equalisation exists in the 
constitution that also stipulates that there must be further national legislation to 
complete the legal arrangements.  There are, however, differences in the way the 
constitutional provisions are drafted.  In the case of Germany it is evident that the two 
spheres of government, namely the Bund and the Länder, have an equal claim to 
funds from current revenue.  This is not the case in South Africa, where the financial 
equalisation must be done equitably, but not equally amongst three spheres of 
government, namely national, provincial and local government.  The provisions in the 
Basic Law relating to financial equalisation are also more detailed than the 
comparable provisions in the South African Constitution.  
 
It is thus apparent from this comparison that the Länder in Germany are in a 
constitutionally stronger position vis-à-vis the Bund compared to the position of the 
South African provinces vis-à-vis the national government, since they have a 
guarantee of fifty percent of funds from current revenue while provinces have a right 
to an equitable division that must still be determined by national legislation following  
a political process.  This difference is not insignificant and it impacts clearly on the 
degree of financial autonomy of Länder and provinces.  Further the strong position of 
the Länder in the Bundesrat implies that legislation on financial equalisation cannot 
be adopted or implemented without their support.  The South African provinces are 
                                                 
83  Sec 76 (4) (b) of the Constitution. 
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not in such a strong position and do not have a legislative veto in the National Council 
of Provinces.84 If the political context was different and provinces competed with the 
national government because the political scene was not dominated by one party, the 
National Council of Provinces could play a more active role in financial equalisation 
legislation.  The South African system has only been tested in one political context 
dominated by the ANC.  One should bear in mind that the German system functions 
within a politically competitive environment which impacts differently on the 
functioning of the system and allows the Länder to promote their own interests 
regarding financial equalisation in the Bundesrat. 
 
6 4 3 Role of additional legislation 
 
In both Germany and South Africa additional legislation is required in terms of their 
constitutional provisions, but there are differences in scope and frequency of such 
legislation. 
 
Article 107 of the Basic Law determines that there must be federal legislation that 
requires the consent of the Bundesrat, that provides the details for the financial 
equalisation process complementary to Article 106 and 107 of the Basic Law.  The 
frequency of this legislation is not determined in the Basic Law.  The current law on 
financial equalisation was adopted by the German Parliament in 199385 and the 
applicable law prior to that dated from 1988.86  The Bundesverfassungsgericht 
ordered in its judgement on 11 November 1999 that the current Financial Equalisation 
Act, 1993, is unconstitutional, but that it can still apply until 1 January 2005 when 
new legislation in accordance with the Court’s judgement must be in place.87  Such 
new legislation, namely the Financial Equalisation Act, 2001, has already been 
adopted by the Federal Parliament on 23 June 2001.88  Although the Financial 
Equalisation Act (1993) has a longer-term purpose and effect, the actual calculation of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
84 See discussion under 6 2; Murray & Simeon “South Africa’s financial constitution” 491- 492. 
85 The Finanzausgleichgesetz (FAG) of 23 June 1993. 
86 The Finanzausgleichgesetz (FAG) of 28 January 1988. 
87 BVerfGE 110,158; Beierl Reforming Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Germany: The Bavarian 
Point of View (Sept. 2001) 8. 
88 Anon “Bundesregierung und Länder einigen sich auf Länderfinanzausgleich und Solidarpakt II” 
www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Themen_A-Z/Aufbau-Ost-,6771/Laenderfinanzausgleich-und-
Sol.htm 
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the equalisation contributions is done annually in terms of the Act.89  The additional 
legislation therefore fulfils an important role to complement and to give effect to the 
constitutional provisions relating to financial equalisation. 
 
In South Africa the further legislation required in terms of section 214 of the 
Constitution consists of two Acts of Parliament. The Constitution does not stipulate 
whether there must be one or more Acts.  They are the Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Relations Act, 97 of 1997, which provides for the structures and procedures 
applicable in intergovernmental fiscal relations, and an annual Act, namely the 
Division of Revenue Act.  Both these Acts require the consent of the National Council 
of Provinces.90  The calculation of the horizontal financial allocation amounts to the 
nine provinces is done according to a formula adopted by the Budget Council and 
confirmed by the extended Cabinet meeting. This calculation is based on 
recommendations by the Financial and Fiscal Commission.91  The actual amounts 
allocated to the three spheres of government and to the provinces are listed in the 
annual Division of Revenue Act. 
 
In comparison, it is clear that the German Financial Equalisation Act (1993) is much 
more detailed, and much more complex, than the annual Division of Revenue Act in 
South Africa.  In both cases there is an annual determination of the financial 
equalisation or allocation amounts, but the formulas and processes differ.  The 
formula for the horizontal financial equalisation is spelt out in the Financial 
Equalisation Act, 1993, the formula for the horizontal allocation of revenue in the 
case of South Africa, is not contained in the legislation.  The complexity of the 
German legislation complicates the functioning of the financial equalisation system 
and often causes problems, for example, the questions raised due to changes in the 
financial capacity ranking of the Länder due to the horizontal equalisation 
contributions.92 
 
                                                 
89 See discussion under 5 3 2. 
90 Sec 76 (4) of the Constitution. 
91 See discussion under 6 3 2. 
92 See discussion under 5 4 2. 
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The respective roles of the Bundesrat and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) 
differ.  Although both these legislative chambers must give their consent to the 
respective financial legislation, the Bundesrat, after the involvement of a mediation 
committee, has effectively a veto on such legislation.93  Decisions by the NCOP, after 
the involvement of a mediation committee, can be overturned by a decision of two 
thirds of the members of the National Assembly.94  The Bundesrat is therefore in a 
much stronger position regarding the passing of the required financial legislation than 
the NCOP, and consequently the Länder find themselves in a stronger position vis-à-
vis the Bund compared to the situation of the provinces vis-à-vis the national 
government in South Africa. 
 
6 4 4 Results of financial equalisation 
 
The results of financial equalisation can be considered from different perspectives.  In 
this analysis both the constitutional and the socio-economic perspectives will be 
considered.  A constitutional evaluation of the results of financial equalisation may 
sound formal and legalistic compared to an evaluation from a socio-economic 
perspective that looks at the results on the ground.  These two perspectives are, 
however, interrelated and an evaluation of the results of financial equalisation in a 
constitutional state should take account of both perspectives. 
 
In Germany financial equalisation should constitutionally achieve two results, namely 
ensuring equal living conditions in the whole country and a reasonable equalisation of 
the financial disparity of the Länder.  From a socio-economic perspective it is the first 
of these two results that must be achieved.  The second result is mainly a mechanical 
exercise through which financial parity must be achieved, but it causes a lot of debate 
regarding the meaning of “reasonable equalisation”.  This is evidenced by the last 
major court case on financial equalisation before the Bundesverfassungsgericht in 
1999.95   
 
                                                 
93 Art 77 of the Basic Law. 
94  Sec 76 (1) of the Constitution; see discussion under 6 2. 
95  BVergGE 101, 158 
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Another constitutional result of financial equalisation is that it reduces the financial 
autonomy of the Länder, because of the duty of financially stronger Länder to assist 
financially weaker Länder.96  This duty flows from the federal state principle 
contained in Article 20 of the Basic Law and the notion of Bundestreue. This is an 
implied result due to the nature of financial equalisation in a decentralised system of 
government.  Häde argues that in applying the principle of Bundestreue there is not 
only a duty on the Bund to provide the Länder with sufficient financial means to fulfil 
their constitutional obligations, but also a duty on the financially strong Länder to 
support, within limits, the financially weak Länder.97   
 
Whether the financial equalisation process in any given financial year achieves the 
constitutional and socio-economic aim of ensuring equal living conditions, is difficult 
to measure as the concept of equal living conditions will change over time.  This aim 
was more difficult to achieve in 1990 after the unification of Germany due to the huge 
differences in financial capacity between the old and the new Länder and the 
differences in their living conditions.98  Although the situation in the new Länder has 
improved dramatically over the last decade, these Länder are still the major 
beneficiaries of the horizontal financial equalisation process.   In general the 
economic conditions in the new Länder are still not on par with the rest of Germany 
and this requires continued special attention from the Bund.  The implementation of 
the financial equalisation process for all the Länder from 1 January 1995, could not 
bring the socio-economic development of the new Länder to the same level  of the old 
Länder.  Against this background the Federal Government and the Ministers-
President of the 16 Länder agreed on 23 June 2001 to a revised financial equalisation 
process and a new solidarity agreement (Solidarpakt II) between the old and new 
Länder.  This was aimed at the economic and social development of the new 
Länder.99 This financial assistance and economic development “package” contains 
                                                 
96 Art 106 (3) and 107 of the Basic Law; BVerfGE 1, 117 131. 
97 Häde Finanzausgleich (1996) 257; Mackenstein From Cohesion Policy to Financial Equalisation? 
(1997) 88; Kämmerer “Maβstäbe für den Bundesfinanzausgleich? – Dramaturgie einer verhinderten 
Reform” 2003 JuS Heft 3 214. 
98 See discussion under 5 4. Renzsch “Neuregelung der Bund/Länder-Finanzbeziehungen: Volle 
Einbeziehung der neuen Länder ab 1995” Gegenwartskunde 1/1994 75; Peffekoven “Finanzausgleich 
in vereinten Deutschland” Wirtschaftsdienst 1990/VII 346 347. 
99 Anon “Bundesregierung und Länder einigen sich auf Länderfinanzausgleich und Solidarpakt II” 
www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Themen_A-Z/Aufbau-Ost-,6771/Laenderfinanzausgleich-und-
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two key components, namely direct financial assistance through the financial 
equalisation process and payments from the German Unity Fund, and secondly 
economic development measures to create more jobs and promote more investment in 
the new Länder.100 In evaluating the results of financial equalisation in Germany, the 
total package of financial and economic measures, aimed at the socio-economic 
development of the new Länder, will have to be taken into account.  Mackenstein 
stated that financial equalisation in Germany provides a nominal balancing of the per 
capita revenues of the Länder, but that it does not address the underlying structural 
differences that causes differences in the income positions of Länder.101 
 
In South Africa financial equalisation must also achieve two results, namely an 
equitable division of revenue among the three spheres of government and the 
allocation of appropriate funding to provinces and local government to provide basic 
services and to fulfil their other constitutional obligations that will enhance the quality 
of life of their inhabitants.  The first result is essentially to achieve parity in the 
capacity or ability of provinces to provide public services to their inhabitants.  From a 
socio-economic perspective it is the second of these two results that is of critical 
importance.  Provinces and local government are the spheres of government where 
most of the service delivery takes place and they thus require sufficient funding to 
fulfil their constitutional mandates and to make a difference in the socio-economic 
conditions of the community.  In the Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2001 the 
National Treasury confirmed the important service delivery role of provinces and 
local government and concluded that although great progress has been made, the 
financial intergovernmental system is still evolving and will continue to make an 
impact on sustainable delivery of services to all South Africans.102  National Treasury 
confirmed the common aim of all spheres of government to improve the quality of life 
of all citizens in the Budget Review 2003.103 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Sol.htm ; Bundesministerium der Finanzen “Der neue bundesstaatlichen Finanzausgleich ab 2005” 
Monatsbericht 02.2002 (25/02/2002) 99. 
100 Anon “Kabinett verabschiedet den Jahresbericht 2002 zum Stand der Deutschen Einheit” 
www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Themen_A-Z (4/09/2002) 1. 
101 Mackenstein From Cohesion Policy to Financial Equalisation? 107. 
102 National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2001 11. 
103 National Treasury Budget Review 2003 241. 
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Most provinces struggled during the first few years after 1994 to implement the new 
financial intergovernmental system, but as administrative capacity improved, new 
financial management legislation was implemented and budgeting is now done on the 
basis of a medium term expenditure framework. Provinces are also playing a more 
significant role in implementing this system now.  According to the 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2001 provinces “are consolidating social services 
delivery, increasing capital expenditure, and enhancing the quality of spending.”104  
Although these positive developments are noted, it is evident that there are capacity 
related problems in many provinces and municipalities.  An important prerequisite for 
the financial intergovernmental relations system to function properly, is that the 
various constituent units should be effectively functioning governments.  If there is a 
skills or capacity deficit and a particular government cannot fulfil its functions, it will 
negatively impact on the whole financial intergovernmental relations system.  This 
situation requires new and creative ways to rectify the problem in order to ensure the 
effective implementation of the system and compliance with the Constitution. 
 
The South African Constitution requires an “equitable division of revenue” among the 
provinces compared to the German Basic Law that requires a reasonable equalisation 
of the financial disparity of the Länder.  Although the wording of the respective 
constitutional provisions differ, it seems from the analysis in this and the previous 
chapter that similar socio-economic results must be achieved, namely an improvement 
of the living conditions of the people in the whole country.105 
 
Whether financial equalisation in South Africa in any particular year has achieved the 
constitutionally required result, namely an equitable division of revenue among the 
national, provincial and local spheres of government, is not merely a mathematical 
calculation.  It is a complex issue that includes a whole range of factors that have both 
a constitutional character, since they are listed in section 214 of the Constitution, and 
a political character, since the Minister of Finance has a significant influence on the 
actual division of revenue.  This matter has not been argued before the courts and it is 
debatable whether the Constitutional Court would interfere with a decision by 
                                                 
104 National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2001 25. 
105 National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2001 25. 
 
 217
Parliament to pass the annual Division of Revenue Bill in view of the policy choices 
inherent in what is essentially a political decision.  It is, however, clear that one would 
be able to judge whether the Division of Revenue Bill adheres to the provisions of the 
Constitution and therefore if it has achieved the constitutional result envisaged.  In 
other words, the Constitutional Court can decide on the formal aspects of the division 
of revenue as stipulated in the Constitution, but would be hesitant to interfere with the 
substantial aspects of the division of revenue that relate to policy choices. The 
Constitutional Court has indicated that in appropriate circumstances it would use its 
wide powers to make orders that would affect policy as well as legislation.106 
 
Another constitutional result of financial equalisation in South Africa is that it impacts 
negatively on the relative financial autonomy of provinces.  The Budget Review 2002 
confirms the weak position of provinces in the financial equalisation process by 
stating clearly that the division of revenue is determined by an extended Cabinet 
meeting that includes the nine Premiers.107  Although the degree of financial 
autonomy of the South African provinces and the German Länder differs, in both 
cases their financial autonomy is diminished due to the nature of financial 
equalisation. 
 
6 5 Conclusion 
 
Financial equalisation is an essential element, and perhaps the most significant 
element, of the financial intergovernmental relations system in South Africa.  The 
framework or basic provisions governing financial equalisation is found in the 
Constitution and is amplified by further legislation.   
 
The formulation of the constitutional provisions on financial intergovernmental 
relations was, according to the FFC, primarily guided by two considerations, namely 
fiscal autonomy and nation building.108  The end result is a careful balancing act 
between these two concepts, but with a strong emphasis on nation building in view of 
historic and current financial imbalances.   The inclusion of specific financial 
                                                 
106 Min of Health v TAC (No 2) para 113. 
107 National Treasury Budget Review 2002 154. 
108 FFC Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 5, 7. 
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equalisation provisions in the Constitution confirms the importance of equity and 
equality considerations underlying the concept of nation building, and is aimed at 
socio-economic development that must improve the quality of life for all citizens of 
South Africa. 
 
It is evident from the above analysis of financial equalisation in South Africa that the 
national government plays the leading role, while provinces have limited 
constitutional scope to exercise influence in the financial equalisation process.  This is 
inter alia evidenced by the fact that the legislative and executive authority over the 
main tax sources in the country vests in the national government.  The chances for 
new provincial taxes also appear to be limited, in particular after the passing of the 
Provincial Tax Regulation Process Act, 2001. Constitutionally provinces and local 
government are guaranteed a right to an equitable share of the pool of nationally 
raised revenue, but they are still dependant on the national legislation required in 
terms of section 214 of the Constitution that stipulates the actual division of revenue. 
 
In comparing financial equalisation in Germany and South Africa, it is evident that in 
both countries the constitutional accommodation of financial equalisation follows a 
similar model, namely the inclusion of the basic provisions in the constitution 
together with the stipulation that it must be augmented by further national legislation.  
There are, however, significant differences.  The fundamental principles underlying 
financial equalisation are explicitly stipulated in the German Basic Law and clearly 
linked to the provisions for financial equalisation, while this is not the case in the 
South African Constitution.  The purpose of financial equalisation is not so clearly 
stipulated in the South African Constitution.  The comparison further indicates that 
the German Länder are in a constitutionally stronger position than the provinces in 
South Africa when the allocation of funds and their role in the financial equalisation 
process is looked at.  The financial autonomy of both the Länder and the provinces is 
diminished by financial equalisation.  
 
Although financial equalisation is a comprehensive process that inter alia includes 
some formula for the actual division of revenue, it appears from the above comparison 
that the financial equalisation legislation in South Africa is simpler to understand and 
implement than the German legislation.  This does not detract from the fact that 
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complex formulae are often necessary to underpin the actual financial equalisation in 
order to give effect to all the constitutional and practical considerations.  A further 
important difference is the fact that the South African legislation allows for a bigger 
political role in the actual financial equalisation process when compared to the 
German financial legislation, that is more mechanistic in nature. 
 
The results of financial equalisation can be considered both from a formal 
constitutional perspective and from a socio-economic perspective.  While the 
financial equalisation legislation has been contested a few times before the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, it is yet to be seen if and when the comparable South 
African legislation, namely the Division of Revenue Act, will be considered by the 
Constitutional Court.  The socio-economic results are very much the focus in both 
Germany and South Africa, but it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure it against 
the particular constitutional requirements.  What is, however, clear is that the 
respective constitutional aims of ensuring equal living conditions in the case of 
Germany and the allocation of an equitable division of revenue in South Africa, are 
not once off events, but are aims that follow a continuum.  Although the socio-
economic aim of financial equalisation is not clearly defined in the South African 
Constitution, it appears from important documentation, such as the annual 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Review, that the aim is comparable to that of Germany, 
namely the improvement of the quality of life for all the people in the country.    
 
Important lessons to be learnt from the German experience are the following: 
1.  A complex law on financial equalisation with elaborate mathematical 
exercises is not necessary to give effect to the relevant constitutional 
requirements, and a simple clear law such as the annual Division of Revenue 
Act is preferable; 
2. It is important to have objective criteria or factors in a formula for the 
horizontal financial equalisation in order to limit the possibility of arbitrary 
decisions on the division of revenue; 
3. The Länder have a significant influence on legislation regarding financial 
equalisation through their participation in the Bundesrat. Such a strong voice 
for provinces in South Africa is lacking and could enhance accountability at 
provincial government level; 
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4. More responsible and accountable provincial government can also be 
promoted by creating more own sources of revenue for provinces.  This is not 
a simple matter and requires proper consideration of the different needs of the 
various provinces, some with very low tax capacity, and the needs of the 
national government, for example, ensuring macro-economic stability and a 
coherent tax system for raising sufficient funding for financial equalisation 
purposes.  In accordance with economic theory and based on the work done by 
the FFC, it is argued that it is possible to deal with this issue in a balanced way 
in order to accommodate the conflicting needs of provinces and the national 
government;109 
5. The clear purpose of financial equalisation in Germany as contained in Article 
106 (3) of the Basic Law, namely to “ensure equal living conditions in the 
federal territory”, guides the whole financial equalisation process and has 
constitutional status. This implies that all financial equalisation legislation 
must be measured against this objective and stay beyond party politics. It is 
also clearly linked to the fundamental principles contained in Article 20 of the 
Basic Law.   Although section 227 (1) of the Constitution gives some 
direction, an overarching aim in the form of a clear statement in the 
Constitution, which could be linked to the founding provisions in section 1, is 
lacking in South Africa and should be considered.   
 
109 FFC Recommendations 2001 – 2004 MTEF Cycle (May 2000) 93.  See discussion of economic 
theory relating to revenue allocation under 3 3. 
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Chapter 7 Justiciability of financial constitutional arrangements 
 
7 1 Introduction 
 
Judicial review, the doctrine of separation of powers and the principle of supremacy 
of the constitution are cornerstones of the constitutional systems in Germany and in 
South Africa. 1   This study would be incomplete if it only dealt with the roles of the 
                                                 
1 The modern doctrine of separation of powers or trias politica is mainly based on the work of 
Montesquieu, L’Esprit des Lois, in the 18th century and is widely recognised in various democratic 
states, although it is only in the USA where an absolute separation of powers is recognised and strictly 
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legislature and the executive and excluded the judiciary, that has an important role to 
play in interpreting the applicable legislation and upholding the Constitution.  The 
contribution of the judiciary, in particular the constitutional courts, vis-à-vis the other 
branches of government in dealing with the theme of this dissertation, warrants 
special attention. This chapter focuses on the justiciability of the financial 
constitutional arrangements and the role of the respective constitutional courts in this 
respect. 
 
What is the basic approach of the South African Constitutional Court with respect to 
its judicial review function and what can be expected of it when it has to adjudicate 
disputes involving financial constitutional arrangements?   
 
The legitimacy of judicial review and the need to reconcile it with democratic 
accountability pose familiar problems that have to be recognized within the context of 
the present study.  The majoritarian principle might be in conflict with that expression 
of checks and balances that we find embedded in the notion of judicial review. 
However, the real problem is probably not the existence of this tension or an inherent 
conflict; but, as Cappelletti has argued, how to reconcile the conflicting principles as 
much as possible.2 
 
 At several occasions the Constitutional Court favoured a “conservative” approach 
with respect to its power of judicial review.  Although the certification of the 
Constitution was a rather unique exercise, the Court expressed itself in favour of a 
basic conservative philosophy when it stated: 
 
“But this Court has no power, no mandate and no right to express any view on 
the political choices made by the CA in drafting the NT, save to the extent that 
such choices may be relevant either to compliance or non-compliance with the 
CP’s.”3 
                                                                                                                                            
adhered to.  In many other jurisdictions the doctrine is applied in an amended form, e.g. where 
members of the executive are appointed from the ranks of the legislature, as is the case in South Africa 
and Germany.  See Currie & De Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Vol I 
Constitutional Law (2001) 91; Van der Vyver “The separation of powers” 1993 (8) SAPR/PL 177 178. 
2 Cappelletti The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (1989) xiii. 
3 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the RSA, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), 1996 (10) BCLR 
1253 (CC) (First certification case) para 27. 
 223
 Here the Court referred to the unique function of certifying the new Constitution; a 
function performed against the background of the fact that the Constitution entered 
into force without any plebiscite or popular acceptance process.  To be “conservative” 
under such conditions is to do the obvious. 
 
In the context of the Bill of Rights a conservative approach was confirmed again in a 
number of instances. In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister 
of Home Affairs the Court stated with reference to the principle of separation of 
powers: 
 
“In essence, however, it involves restraint by the courts in not trespassing onto 
that part of the legislative field which has been reserved by the Constitution, 
for good reason, to the legislature.”4 
 
In S v Makwanyane the Court emphasized another aspect regarding the interpretation 
of the Constitution, in particular the Bill of Rights, when it stated that constitutional 
interpretation should be done in a purposive and generous way that “gives expression 
to the underlying values of the Constitution.5  Malherbe argues that this approach 
does not only apply in Bill of Rights cases, but also in disputes regarding the 
autonomy of provinces.6 This view may be problematical because it purports to 
elevate the institutional arrangements regarding the relationship between the   
provinces and the national government to the level of basic constitutional values.  
That is problematical for several reasons.  Article 1 of the Constitution does not 
support such a view and the historical roots of the provinces are simply too recent. 
 
The overall impression is that the Court will follow a conservative approach in cases 
concerning intergovernmental disputes.  This is an area where the need for transition 
and transformation is very evident and the underpinning “value” may indeed be one 
that recognises the need for poverty relief and equalisation. 
                                                 
4 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 66; Ferreira v Levin NO 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC), 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) para 
183; Currie & De Waal Constitutional and Administrative Law 116. 
5 1995 (SA) 391 (CC) para 9; Currie & De Waal Constitutional and Administrative Law 335 – 338.  
6 Malherbe “ The role of the Constitutional Court in the development of provincial autonomy” 2001 
(16) SAPR/PL 255 263. 
 224
  The Court must interpret and give meaning to the Constitution and in doing so could 
find itself in a position where it has to adjudicate matters that include both questions 
of law and rather clear policy choices of the other branches of government.  This 
could easily happen in disputes regarding financial constitutional issues.  There have 
been very few constitutional disputes about the vertical division of powers, or the 
“federal” issue, and questions about the equitable division of revenue have not yet 
come before the Constitutional Court.  Nevertheless, it would seem that the Court 
would follow a minimalist approach in these matters and deal with disputes regarding 
financial constitutional issues very cautiously.  Jurisprudence on these issues would 
enrich the knowledge and understanding of the provisions of the Constitution and 
would have given a clearer indication on the question regarding the philosophy of the 
Court.   
 
In the German constitutional system, the doctrine of the separation of powers is 
entrenched in the Basic Law, that clearly provides for the separation of the executive, 
legislative and judicial powers.7 Although the doctrine is not as strictly applied, as in 
the case of the United States of America, there is a rather clear distinction between the 
functions of the three branches of government.  The Bundesverfassungsgericht has 
stated that the Basic Law does not provide for an absolute separation of powers, but 
for checks and balances between the three branches of government.8  There is also a 
second form of separation of powers or of hierarchy, namely between the federal level 
of government and the Länder.9  
 
In the case of South Africa the doctrine of separation of powers, although not 
explicitly referred to, is given effect to in the Constitution.10  Already during the 
constitutional negotiation process at Kempton Park one of the Constitutional 
                                                 
7 Art 20 (2) and (3), 79 (3) of the Basic Law.  See Venter Constitutional Comparison – Japan, 
Germany, Canada and South Africa as Constitutional States (2000) 216; Sachs Grundgesetz 
Kommentar (1996) 636; Benda Der soziale Rechtsstaat in Benda et al (eds) Handbuch des 
Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1983) 492. 
8 BVerfGE 7, 188; Venter Constitutional Comparison 216. 
9 See discussion in Ch 2; Herzog The Separation and Concentration of Power in the Basic Law in 
Kirchhof & Kommers (eds) Germany and its Basic Law (1993) 391 393. 
10 Devenish “The doctrine of separation of powers with special reference to events in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe” 2003 (66) THRHR 84 96; Currie & De Waal Constitutional and Administrative Law 96; 
Erasmus & De Waal “Die finale Grondwet: Legitimiteit en ontstaan” 1997 (1) Stell LR 31 34. 
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Principles agreed to, required that this doctrine should be adhered to in the new 
constitution: The Constitutional Court certified that the new constitutional text indeed 
complies with this requirement.11  The basic separation of powers between the three 
branches of government is provided for in sections 43 (legislative authority), 85 and 
125 (executive authority) and 165 (judicial authority).  Furthermore, the Constitution 
is characterised by a vertical division of powers between the national, provincial and 
local spheres of government.12   In Executive Council of the Western Cape 
Legislature v President of the Republic of South Africa, in confirming the application 
of the doctrine of separation of powers in South Africa, Chaskalson P stated that a 
strict separation between the legislature and the executive is not required in 
Commonwealth countries, but that the independence of the judiciary is indeed a high 
riority.13  
                                                
p
 
The Basic Law, which includes in Article 20 the concept of a Rechtsstaat, is the 
supreme law of Germany and all other law is subject to it.14  Also, in the case of 
South Africa the Constitution is supreme, it binds all branches of government and all 
other law or conduct inconsistent with it, is invalid.15 It thus forms the basis of the 
legal order in the country.  It is evident that the overarching principle of constitutional 
supremacy is fundamental to the constitutional orders in Germany and in South 
Africa, and that it is interwoven with the doctrine of separation of powers.  Starck 
states in this respect that the concept of constitutional supremacy “stands in a 
 
11 CP VI: “There shall be a separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and judiciary 
with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.”  See In 
Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC); 1996 
10 BCLR 1253 paras 112 – 113. 
12 Sec 40 (1) of the Constitution.  See discussion under 2 2 and 4 2 2. 
13 Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature v President of the Republic of South Africa 1995 
4 SA 877 (CC) paras 55- 60.  See also Currie & De Waal Constitutional and Administrative Law 92; 
Rautenbach & Malherbe Constitutional Law 3rd ed (1999) 86 – 92; South African Association of 
Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 1 SA 883 (CC); 2001 1 BCLR 77 (CC) paras 22 - 24; National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC) para 66; De 
Lange v Smuts NO 1998 3 SA 785 (CC) paras 44, 60, 61. 
14 Art 20 (3) and 28 (1) of the Basic Law.  See discussion under 2 2; Venter Constitutional Comparison 
66; Currie The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1994) 18; Von Münch Staatsrecht 
Band I (1993) 133; Klein The Concept of the Basic Law in Starck (ed) Main Principles of the German 
Basic Law (1983) 23. 
15 Sec 1 (c) and 2 of the Constitution; Stern “Global constitutional movements and new constitutions” 
2002 (17) SAPR/PL 154 157; Currie & De Waal Constitutional and Administrative Law 74; Malherbe 
“The role of the Constitutional Court in the development of provincial autonomy” 2001 (16) SA PR/PL 
255 257; Rautenbach & Malherbe Constitutional Law 24 – 25; De Lille v Speaker of the National 
Assembly 1998 3 SA 430 (C) paras 22 – 25, 30; Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature v 
President of the Republic of South Africa paras 61 - 62. 
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symbiotic relationship to the separation of powers, since it is in itself an indispensable 
pre-condition for the supremacy of the constitution.”16  Although all three branches of 
government must function within the parameters of the Constitution and respect the 
Constitution as the supreme law, an independent judiciary is essential for the effective 
rotection of constitutional supremacy.17    
cifically mandate the constitutional courts to be the 
uardians of the constitution.  
                                                
p
 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht in Germany and the South African equivalent, the 
Constitutional Court, were established as the highest courts in each country with the 
primary function to protect the constitution.18  In both cases, these ‘supreme’ courts 
are very powerful constitutional institutions that must protect the rule of law and the 
constitutions in their respective countries.19  The status of both these courts as 
constitutional institutions of the highest order and not merely ordinary courts of 
justice, is emphasised by the fact that the Basic Law and the Constitution respectively 
provide their powers and spe
g
 
This thesis does not only consider the constitutional framework for the distribution of 
financial resources and obligations, but due to the nature of the subject also addresses 
related issues, such as the economic and financial considerations in the design of 
decentralised systems of government and some of the policy considerations that play a 
role in government decisions regarding the distribution of funds.  Constitutional and 
other legal provisions regarding financial intergovernmental relations, must by 
implication, be justiciable in view of the supremacy of the Constitution.  However, the 
application of these provisions often involves policy issues.  This raises the question 
of the extent of constitutional review of executive decisions and of legislation 
 
16 Constitutional Interpretation in Starck (ed) Studies in German Constitutionalism (1995) 47 52; see 
also Rautenbach & Malherbe Constitutional Law 11. 
17 Ackerman J in De Lange v Smuts NO 1998 3 SA 785 (CC) para 47.  See also Anon “Mbeki: Judges 
are independent” The Natal Witness 13 August 2003 www.witness.co.za/content/2003_07/16821.htm. 
18 Art 20, 92 and 93 of the Basic Law; Sec 1, 165, 166 and 167 (3) of the Constitution (the 
Constitutional Court was already created by the 1993-Constitution); Currie & De Waal Constitutional 
and Administrative Law 21.  In Germany there are also five other federal courts in specific fields of 
law, namely the Federal Court of Justice, Federal Administrative Court, Federal Labour Court, Federal 
Fiscal Court and the Federal Social Court (Art 95 of the Basic Law). 
19 Erasmus & De Waal 1997 (1) Stell LR 43; Claassen “The functioning and structure of the 
constitutional court” 1994 (57) THRHR 412 413; Simon Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Benda et al 
Handbuch des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland  (1983) 1253 1268. 
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especially as it relates to questions of financial constitutional law.  What is the scope 
of the jurisdiction of the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Constitutional Court 
respectively in this regard?  This question will be discussed below by reviewing a 
umber of key judgments of the two courts. 
 2 Functions of the constitutional courts in Germany and South Africa 
  In 
ated to rule on: 
n rights;21 
 for example legislation on 
a Land Government or one third of the members of the 
Bundestag.24 
                                                                                                                                           
n
 
7
 
The Basic Law in Articles 92 and 93 clearly determine the role and status of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht as one of Germany’s supreme constitutional institutions, 
namely that it is responsible for adjudicating disputes regarding the interpretation and 
application of the Basic Law, in other words, upholding the Basic Law (giving effect 
to the principle of constitutional supremacy) and protecting the Rechtsstaat.20
fulfilling this role the Bundesverfassungsgericht is inter alia mand
 disputes about the infringement of basic huma
 disputes between the Bund and the Länder;22 
 constitutionality of federal or Land legislation
financial equalisation (‘concrete’ review);23 and 
 abstract judicial review of legislation at the request of the Federal 
Government, 
 
One of the most significant changes to the constitutional order in South Africa in 1994 
was the creation of the Constitutional Court.  It was established by section 98 of the 
 
 
20 Art 13 of the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz) of 12 
March 1951; Holle Das Verfassungsgericht der Republik Südafrika (1997) 63; Anon Law on the 
Federal Constitutional Court in Documents on Democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany (1994) 
3; Doehring The function of the German Constitutional Court in its capacity as the principal guardian 
of the Constitution, of the Rule of Law and of Democracy in Anon The example of Federalism in the 
Federal Republic of Germany (1994) 174 178.  
21 Art 93 (1) 4a of the Basic Law; Art 13 (1) of the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court; Schlüter 
“The German constitutional court” 1998 (2) TSAR 284 285; Simon Verfassungsgerichsbarkeit 1264. 
22 Art 93 (1) 3, 4 of the Basic Law; Art 13 of the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court; Schlüter  
1998 (2) TSAR  287; Simon Verfassungsgerichsbarkeit 1263. 
23 Art 100 (1) of the Basic Law; Art 13 (11) of the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court; Schlüter 
1998 (2) TSAR  289; Simon Verfassungsgerichsbarkeit 1265. 
24 Art 93 (1) 2 of the Basic Law; Art 13 (6) of the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court; Schlüter 
1998 (2) TSAR  288; Simon Verfassungsgerichsbarkeit 1265. 
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1993-Constitution and denoted as the highest court in South Africa on all matters 
relating to the interpretation, protection and enforcement of the Constitution.  It could, 
however decide only constitutional matters.  This was confirmed by section 167 of the 
Constitution.25  The primary role of the Constitutional Court, that is the highest court 
in all constitutional matters, is to uphold the principle of supremacy of the 
Constitution and to protect the Rechtsstaat.  The Constitutional Court confirmed this 
principle in the following words: 
then all 
organs of state are enjoined to honour and enforce that supremacy.”26 
urt may only decide constitutional matters and has exclusive 
e of 
tions regarding the constitutionality of any provincial or parliamentary 
tional 
islature;29   
 the constitutionality of amendments to the Constitution;30  
 
“First the Constitution is elevated to supremacy over all law, and 
 
Similar to the position under the German Basic Law the functions of the 
Constitutional Court are enumerated in the South African Constitution.  The 
Constitutional Co
jurisdiction over: 
 disputes between organs of state in the national or provincial spher
government concerning their constitutional status, powers or functions;27 
 applica
Bill;28 
 applications regarding the constitutionality of any provincial or national Act, 
if such an application is brought by one third of the members of the Na
Assembly or by one fifth of the members of a provincial leg
                                                 
25 While the basic functions of the Constitutional Court are stipulated in sec 167 (3), (4) and (5) of the 
Constitution, the Constitutional Court Complementary Act, 13 of 1995, regulates matters incidental to 
e Western Cape Legislature v President of the 
7 (CC) para 62. 
of the South African Constitutional Court” 1997 (114) SALJ 134 145; Claassen 1994 
 Sec 167 (4) (d) of the Constitution. 
the functioning of the Constitutional Court.  
26 Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SALR 850 (CC) para 128.  See also Currie & De Waal Constitutional 
and Administrative Law 74; Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council 
1998 2 SA 374 (CC) para 56; Executive Council of th
Republic of South Africa 1995 4 SA 87
27 Sec 167 (4) (a) of the Constitution. 
28 Sec 167 (4) (b) of the Constitution. 
29 Sec 167 (4) (c) of the Constitution; Malherbe & Brand South Africa – Sub-national Constitutional 
Law in Alen et al (eds) International Encyclopaedia of Laws: Sub-national Constitutional Law  (2001) 
71; Venter Constitutional Comparison 101; Rautenbach & Malherbe Constitutional Law 256; Sarkin 
“The political role 
THRHR (57) 419. 
30
 
 
 
 229
 questions about the non-fulfilment of a constitutional obligation by 
Parliament or the President; 31 and 
 the certification of a provincial constitution.32  
 
In disputes concerning the constitutional validity of legislation or the constitutionality 
of the conduct of the President, the Constitutional Court has concurrent jurisdiction 
with the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal but must make the final 
order.33   
 
In view of its particular scope of responsibilities, the Constitutional Court has indeed 
a significant potential to influence the future constitutional development of South 
Africa, and has since its inception in 1994 made an important contribution in 
interpreting, protecting and enforcing the Constitution as the supreme law of South 
Africa.34   
 
A critical question in this chapter is; What is the scope of jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court and of the Bundesverfassungsgericht  in financial constitutional 
matters?  In other words, what is the relationship between these courts and the 
legislative and executive arms of government in financial constitutional matters?  It is 
evident from the provisions in the Basic Law and the Constitution respectively, that 
both the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Constitutional Court have the power to 
review the constitutionality of legislation.  This includes concrete review, in other 
words, where the disputed legal rule is applied and is part of the subject matter before 
court, and abstract review, where the court has to review the constitutionality of a law 
without it being applied in an actual case.35 
                                                                                                                                            
 
31 Sec 167 (4) (e) of the Constitution. 
32 Sec 167 (4) (f) of the Constitution; In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Western Cape, 1997 
1997 9 BCLR 1167 (CC), 1997 4 SA 795 (CC); In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Province 
of KwaZulu-Natal, 1996 1996 11 BCLR 1419 (CC), 1996 4 SA 1098 (CC). 
33 Sec 167 (5) of the Constitution; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex parte 
President of the RSA 2000 2 SA 674 paras 54 – 56; Currie & De Waal Constitutional and 
Administrative Law 280. 
34 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA case para 55; Watts Is the New Constitution 
Federal or Unitary? in De Villiers Birth of a Constitution (1994) 75 85. 
35 Rautenbach & Malherbe Constitutional Law 256. 
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The issue of constitutional review has its origins in American law and was first raised 
in the judgment of Chief Justice Marshall of the Supreme Court in Marbury v 
Madison in 1803, where the Court confirmed the supremacy of the Constitution and 
the role of the Supreme Court as guardian of the Constitution.  Although the 
Constitution of the USA does not specifically state that the Supreme Court has a 
judicial review power, the Chief Justice found that judicial review is inherent in the 
functions of the judiciary to interpret the law.36 The judicial review exercised by the 
Supreme Court is however limited to cases where the question about constitutionality 
of a law, or executive acts of the state, is incidental to a concrete dispute before the 
court.  Contrary to the position in Germany and South Africa, abstract review is not 
llowed in American law.37 
a clear 
emarcation of functions between the constitutional court and the legislature. 
 
                                              
a
 
The notion of judicial review is not uncontroversial and is criticised as being anti-
democratic and anti-majoritarian in view of the fact that judges are not elected and 
often appointed for life, while the legislators are democratically elected for a pre-
determined period and represent the majority of the population. Furthermore, the 
court has the power to declare laws adopted by the elected legislature 
unconstitutional.38  This debate is essentially a question concerning the legitimacy of 
the jurisdiction of the court to review decisions of the legislature.  While it is evident 
that judicial review will have a limiting effect on the freedom of the legislative branch 
of government to legislate, it is also clear that within a constitutional state, the 
constitution is supreme and it places limitations on the jurisdiction of the legislature.  
Judicial review by a constitutional court is thus essential to protect the supremacy of 
the constitution.39  In a constitutional state, there must therefore be 
d
   
36 Art III of the Constitution of the United States of America (17 September 1787) determines that the 
judicial power of the USA shall vest in one supreme court, as highest court in the country, and other 
inferior courts established by the Congress.  Stern  2002 (17) SAPR/PL 261; Venter Constitutional 
Comparison 80. 
37 Simon Verfassungsgerichsbarkeit 1259. 
38 Venter Constitutional Comparison 81. 
39 Starck Constitutional Interpretation 52. 
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In Germany, the Bundesverfassungsgericht must exercise its power of judicial review 
in such a way that it does not enter the field of political activities; that is the duty of 
the executive and legislature.  The Bundesverfassungsgericht has been criticised in the 
past for “stretching” its judicial review power to have a quasi-legislative or political 
character.40  Despite such criticism, there is general respect for the very important role 
that the Bundesverfassungsgericht plays as guardian of the Basic Law.  The Court has 
imposed on itself the principle of judicial self-restraint. This means that the Court will 
refrain from making policy choices or interfering in the area of politics.41   
 
Under the Basic Law, the Federal Parliament is free to legislate and determine its 
priorities, as long as there is no constitutional limitation that inhibits the scope of its 
legislative jurisdiction.  Likewise, the Federal Government enjoys freedom of 
decision-making and determining policy priorities in governing the country.  
Although the Bundesverfassungsgericht has the power of judicial review, it does not 
have the power to determine if the Federal Parliament or the Federal Government has 
made a good or a bad decision.42  Policy choices and determination of government 
priorities are the domain of the executive and legislative branches of government and 
not that of the judiciary.  In the execution of judicial review the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht can give clear direction to the legislature and the executive 
if a law does not comply with the provisions of the Basic Law, and in doing so, the 
Court contributes to the further development of the law in Germany.43  
 
The judicial authority and independence of the courts in South Africa are explicitly 
provided for in section 165 of the Constitution.44  The scope of jurisdiction of the 
                                                 
40 Kommers The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 2nd ed (1997) 56. 
41 BVerfGE 36, 1 14; Venter Constitutional Comparison 94; Schlüter 1998 (2) TSAR 285; Starck 
Constitutional Interpretation 54; Simon Verfassungsgerichsbarkeit 1279. 
42 Simon Verfassungsgerichsbarkeit 1280; BVerfGE 4, 157 168. 
43 BVerfGE 56, 54; BVerfGE 34, 269; Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence 125. 
44 Sec 165: 
   “ (1) The judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts. 
    (2) The courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must   
apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice. 
    (3) No person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the courts. 
    (4) Organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect the courts to 
ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts. 
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Constitutional Court in South Africa vis-à-vis the executive and the legislature is aptly 
described in the following two cases, namely, S v Makwanyane,45 a case involving the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights and in which the death penalty was found to be 
unconstitutional, and Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature v President 
of the Republic of South Africa,46 a dispute between two levels of government 
concerning the constitutionality of national legislation.  In S v Makwanyane the Court 
explained the new constitutional order that is based on the principle of constitutional 
supremacy and said that judicial review of all legislation and the adjudication of 
disputes regarding human rights are placed in the hands of the courts. This is an 
important part of the new constitutional order.47 
  
In the Western Cape-case the Constitutional Court was even more explicit and stated 
that it will not interfere in the realm of the executive or the legislative branch of 
government, but that it had a clear mandate to interpret the Constitution and to uphold 
the principle of constitutional supremacy.48  The Court described its role as follows: 
 
“Our duty is to declare legislative and executive action which is inconsistent 
with the Constitution to be invalid, and then to deal with the consequences of 
the invalidity in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.”49 
 
These judgments provided a solid foundation for the application of judicial review by 
the Constitutional Court in South Africa and, together with the clear authorization in 
the Constitution, effectively dealt with any anti-majoritarian arguments that might be 
raised.  The undisputed position of the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the 
Constitutional Court as courts entrusted with the responsibility of guardians of the 
Basic Law and the Constitution respectively, lays the foundation for their authority to 
                                                                                                                                            
    (5) An order or decision issued by a court binds all persons to whom and organs of state to which it 
applies.” 
45 1995 3 SA 391 (CC). 
46 1995 4 SA 877 (CC). 
47 Makwanyane-case para 88; Currie & De Waal Constitutional and Administrative Law 65; Venter 
Constitutional Comparison 83. 
48 Western Cape-case paras 99 and 100; Venter Constitutional Comparison 84. 
49 Western Cape-case para 100.  See also President of the RSA v United Democratic Movement 2003 1 
SA 472 (CC) para 31.  
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decide matters pertaining to the division of functions between the spheres of 
government and financial intergovernmental relations.   
 
In matters such as the division of functions or allocation of financial resources to the 
various spheres of government, disputes are partly of a constitutional-legal nature and 
partly of a discretionary political nature and obvious policy implications are involved. 
However, this dividing line is not always clear.  It is the task of the constitutional 
courts to provide guidance to the other organs of state for the interpretation and 
application of the Basic Law and the Constitution respectively.  In doing so, they must 
always be conscious of their role as judges in the constitutional scheme of things and 
of the separation of powers, that allows for checks and balances among the three 
branches of government.50   
 
7 3 The contribution of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Germany 
 
In fulfilling its role as guardian of the Basic Law and upholding the principle of 
constitutional supremacy, the Bundesverfassungsgericht is responsible for judicial 
review of legislation and other official acts by the other organs of state and for 
adjudicating disputes between organs of state.51  Always conscious of the separation 
of powers and the interplay between the three branches of government, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht plays a key role in giving effect to and interpreting the 
Basic Law.  This includes the adjudication of constitutional disputes in the area of 
financial intergovernmental relations. 
 
In interpreting the Basic Law the Bundesverfassungsgericht would apply the ordinary 
or conventional canons of interpretation, for example giving effect to the ordinary 
meaning of words and understanding the linguistic usage of terminology.52  Although 
this is the general approach, it should be noted that different considerations should be 
taken into account in disputes about human rights compared to disputes concerning 
the structural principles of the constitution and matters of organisation, procedures 
                                                 
50 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence 164. 
51 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence 37 ; Art 13 of the Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz (Law on 
the Federal Constitutional Court (1951); Venter Constitutional Comparison 91 
52 Starck Constitutional Interpretation 54. 
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and competences. Interpretation of fundamental rights includes a clear value 
orientation that lacks in disputes of an organisational or intergovernmental nature.  In 
human rights cases the central issue is giving effect to an individual’s fundamental 
right vis-à-vis the state.  The scope of protection of fundamental rights is not without 
boundaries and can be limited.  The principle of proportionality would guide the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht in considering if the limitation of a fundamental right is 
constitutionally justifiable.53  In the Basic Law, the structural principles are 
interlinked and cannot be interpreted in isolation.  This is evident from the wording of 
Article 20 (1), that states that Germany is a “democratic and social federal state”, and 
in Article 28 (1), where reference is made to “the principles of the republican, 
democratic and social state.”54  In interpreting the individual structural principles, the 
basic rule is that the courts must consider the expression of the structural principles 
within the constitutional provisions on organisation, procedures and division of 
competences.55  This means that a court would not interpret the principle of a federal 
state in isolation, but would look at other provisions in the Basic Law where this 
principle is expressed, for example Article 84 (implementation of federal legislation 
by the Länder).  Bayer states in this respect that Bundestreue is a general legal 
principle which gives expression to the federal state principle and which direct 
intergovernmental relations in practice.56  
 
The creation of the Bundesverfassungsgericht as a federal constitutional organ 
followed on various discussions during the constitutional negotiations prior to the 
adoption of the Basic Law in 1949.  Its role and wide jurisdiction to adjudicate all 
constitutional disputes, including the review of legislation, were the result of many 
discussions and negotiations between delegates in the Parliamentary Council in Bonn 
in 1948.  For five decades the Bundesverfassungsgericht played its part alongside the 
other federal organs, such as the Federal Government and the Federal Parliament, to 
shape the constitutional landscape in Germany.  Between 1952 and 2002, there were a 
                                                 
53 Starck Constitutional Interpretation 61. 
54 See discussion under 2 1 2; Venter Constitutional Comparison 93. 
55 Starck Constitutional Interpretation 65. 
56 Bayer Die Bundestreue (1961) 126. 
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few milestone decisions by the Bundesverfassungsgericht that guided the 
development of financial intergovernmental relations in Germany.   
 
An important aspect of the contribution of the Bundesverfassungsgericht is the 
development of the concept of Bundestreue, also within the context of financial 
intergovernmental relations.  Bundestreue, that is an expression of the federal state 
principle, is fundamental to the relationship between the Bund and the Länder.57 The 
Basic Law does, however, not mention the obligation to respect federal loyalty or 
Bundestreue. Historically the concept of Bundestreue not only explained the 
relationship between the Bund and the Länder, but it was regarded as a functional 
principle that gave clear expression to the federal character of the state.58  In some of 
the earlier disputes of an intergovernmental nature before the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht the Court had to reflect on the nature of the relationship 
between the Bund and the Länder and give meaning to the federal state principle.  
This led the Court to expressly recognise the concept of Bundestreue in applying the 
federal state principle and to state clearly that both levels of government have a duty 
to act in a “federal friendly” manner.59  Today Bundestreue is commonly accepted as 
a general legal norm that directs the relations between the Bund and the Länder as 
well as the relations among the Länder.  The Bundesverfassungsgericht has applied 
the concept of Bundestreue in later disputes between the two levels of government. 
Some of these disputes will be discussed below.  
 
The basic framework for the division of functions (Articles 70 – 75) and the 
distribution of financial resources to the Bund and the Länder (Articles 104a – 107) 
are provided in the Basic Law and the financial provisions are supplemented by 
further federal legislation. The result has been the development in Germany of a 
rather well-developed branch of constitutional law consisting of constitutional 
provisions, legislation and constitutional case law.  It is in particular the financial 
provisions that caused disputes amongst the Länder and between the Länder and the 
Bund that were brought before the Bundesverfassungsgericht for decision.  Some of 
these key decisions are reviewed in this section.  
                                                 
57 Bayer Die Bundestreue 83 – 87.  See discussion of Bundestreue under 1 1 4 and 1 2. 
58 Bayer Die Bundestreue 32. 
59 BVerfGE 1, 117; Bayer Die Bundestreue 83, 87. 
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7 3 1  Financial equalisation case I (BVerfGE 1, 117 – 20/02/1952) 
 
The first dispute regarding financial equalisation was brought before the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht only a few years after the new Basic Law was implemented 
(1949) and the financial intergovernmental relations system was still in its infancy.  
This took place against the backdrop of a country that had just started massive 
rebuilding and development in an attempt to deal with the devastating effects of 
World War II.  The shadows of the War and the occupation of Germany were also 
influential during this dispute before the Court.  In fact, the influence of the Western 
Occupation Forces on the rebuilding of Germany and on the shaping of the financial 
intergovernmental relations was evident. 
 
Two of the Länder, namely Württemberg-Baden (as it was then known) and 
Hamburg, initiated this case by questioning the constitutionality of the financial 
equalisation legislation (Finanzausgleichgesetz) of 1950.  The application was 
opposed by the federal government, the Bundestag (Lower House of the German 
Parliament) and the Governments of the Länder Bavaria, Rheinland-Pfalz and 
Schleswig-Holstein.  The Court had to decide the following fundamental questions: 
 
i. Is the financial equalisation system, including the 
Finanzausgleichgesetz, compatible with the federal principle and the 
federal structure of Germany?; 
ii. How must the income of the whole state be divided between the Bund  
and the Länder (vertical financial equalisation)?; 
iii. How can the differences in financial capacity and obligations among 
the various Länder be equalised (horizontal financial equalisation)? 
and 
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iv. Does the Finanzausgleichgesetz of 1950 comply with Article 106 (4) 
of the Basic Law?60 
 
In deciding these questions, the Court referred to the historical developments 
preceding the adoption of the Basic Law, particularly Article 106.  The question 
regarding the division of finances, including the issue of financial equalisation, had 
been the subject of discussion by the Western Occupation Forces and later also by the 
Parliamentary Council (Parlamentarische Rat).  The Protocol of the Finance 
Committee and the Main Committee of the Parliamentary Council, that contained 
proposals for a new constitution, included the following decisions of 10 February 
1949 concerning the future financial intergovernmental relations of Germany: 
 
i. The division of federal taxes between the Bund and the Länder must be 
done in accordance with the allocation of obligations to the two levels 
of government and in such a way that the Länder receive a statutory 
right to the allocation of specific federal taxes, or to a share of specific 
federal taxes. 
ii. Further detail of financial equalisation must be arranged by way of a 
financial equalisation law, that must take into account a fair and 
suitable equalisation of obligations.61 
 
The Western Occupation Forces and the military governors had some reservations 
regarding the decisions of the Parliamentary Council and were particularly concerned 
that too much power over the division of public finances would be left in the hands of 
the Bund.  After discussing their concerns, they came to an agreement with the 
Parliamentary Council on 25 April 1949, that led to the wording of Article 106 (4) of 
the Basic Law.  While the basic point of departure as contained in the above decisions 
of the Parliamentary Council, was generally accepted, it was decided that provision 
                                                 
60 Art 106 (4): “The respective shares of the Federation and the Länder in turnover tax revenue shall be 
reapportioned whenever the ration of revenue to expenditure differs substantially as between the 
Federation and the Länder.  Where federal legislation imposes additional expenditure on or withdraws 
revenue from the Länder the additional burden may be compensated by federal grants pursuant to a 
federal law requiring the consent of the Bundesrat provided that the burden is limited to a short period.  
The law shall lay down the principles for computing such grants and distributing them among the 
Länder.” 
61 BVerfGE 1,117 para 26 –36. 
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must be made in the Basic Law for allowances or grants to be paid by the Bund to the 
Länder and to facilitate a process of financial equalisation that would provide some 
guarantees to the financially weak Länder.62   
 
It was further decided that a federal law that required the consent of the Bundesrat 
and resulted from delegations from all the Länder, may allocate part of the revenue 
from income and corporate tax (federal taxes) to pay allowances to Länder to fund 
their constitutionally allocated functions or obligations, in other words, provision was 
made for the statutory accommodation of financial equalisation.  This crucial 
agreement laid the foundation for the further development of the financial 
equalisation system, including the principle that the Bund and the Länder have an 
equal right to the income derived from income and corporate tax in order to fund their 
respective obligations.63 
 
Although Germany was in ruins at the end of World War II, the economic needs and 
the ability to recover differed from one area to another.  The Bund and the Länder 
carried the burden of payment of war debts.  The idea of some form of horizontal 
financial equalisation, to assist the financially weak Länder, was realised for the first 
time in 1949 when a law on the settlement of war debts in the Combined Economic 
Area was implemented.64  This law required the financially stronger Länder within 
the Combined Economic Area, to make monthly contributions from the revenue of 
consumer tax that accrued to the Länder to the Administration of the Combined 
Economic Area.65  These funds were to be used to make monthly payments to the 
financially weaker Länder, to assist them with the payment of their war debts.  A 
further law on the settlement of war debts included the Länder in the French occupied 
zone, where payments were made to the Bund who was responsible for making 
                                                 
62 BVerfGE 1, 117 para 41 – 42.  
63 Klein Bund und Länder nach der Finanzverfassung des Grundgesetzes in Benda Handbuch des 
Verfassungsrechts 863 884; Von Münch Grundgesetzkommentar (1983) 801. 
64 The Gesetz des Wirtschatfsrats zur vorläufigen Regelung der Kriegsfolgelasten im Rechnungsjahr 
1949 of 6 August 1949; BVerfGE 1,117 para 8. 
65 The Combined Economic Area consisted of the areas within the British and American zones and 
included the Länder Hessen, Württemberg-Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, 
Lower Saxony and North Rhine Westphalia; Laufer & Münch Das föderative System der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1997) 62. 
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monthly payments to the financially weaker Länder.66  These laws preceded the 
Finanzausgleichgesetz (financial equalisation law) of 1950, that was based on the 
provisions of Article 106 (4) of the Basic Law.67   
 
In this case before the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Land Württemberg-Baden 
argued that Article 106 (4) of the Basic Law created the possibility for federal 
legislation to allow a general financial equalisation amongst the Länder and not 
merely to provide for the payment of federal grants to individual Länder.  Such a 
situation, it was argued, is against the federal principle contained in Article 20 of the 
Basic Law and undermined the financial autonomy of the Länder.  The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht confirmed that Bundestreue must be given effect to and 
that there is a duty on the Bund and the Länder to respect the overall financial 
situation of both levels of government.68  The Bundesverfassungsgericht decided that 
the federal principle contained in Article 20, and guaranteed in Article 79, of the 
Basic Law does not only imply rights, but also implies duties, one of which is that the 
financially stronger Länder should, within specific limits, provide assistance to 
financially weaker Länder.69  This inevitably causes a limitation on the financial 
autonomy of the Länder. To compensate partially for this loss of autonomy, Article 
109 of the Basic Law determines inter alia that the Federation and the Länder shall be 
autonomous and mutually independent in their budget management.  The Court 
concluded that the framework for financial equalisation contained in the Basic Law is 
compatible with the federal principle.  The Court further indicated that this principle 
would be offended if the financial equalisation legislation provides for financial 
equalisation in such a way that the financial capacity of the contributing Länder is 
substantially weakened or if it could lead to an absolute equalisation or financial 
levelling (Nivellierung) of the Länder:70  This important decision by the Court guided 
the further development of financial equalisation in Germany and the later judgments 
given by the Court.   
                                                 
66 The Bundesgesetz zur Regelung von Kriegsfolgelasten im 2. Rechnungshalbjahr 1949 of 21 March 
1950. 
67 The Bundesgesetz über den Finanzausgleich unter den Ländern im Rechnungsjahr 1950 of 16 March 
1951 (FAG).  
68 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence 72. 
69 BVerfGE 1, 117 para 44. 
70 BVerfGE 1, 117 para 45; Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence 91; Häde Finanzausgleich (1996) 
217 – 218. 
 
 240
 According to the Bundesverfassungsgericht the Finanzausgleichgesetz of 1950 
provided for a financial equalisation mechanism that consists of a series of 
calculations.  The financial capacity of each Land is determined by taking into 
account the total tax income of that Land, including its municipalities, available to 
fund the obligations it has but excluding those obligations that have national 
importance.  This amount is known as the financial capacity of a Land.  The average 
financial capacity of all the Länder divided by the total population results in a figure 
known as the equalisation measure (Ausgleichsmeßzahl).  The Court further stated 
that the financial capacity measure (Finanzkraftmeßzahl), that is the financial capacity 
divided by the population of that Land, must be compared with the equalisation 
measure.  The differences between these two figures should be equalised within 
specified limits.  The contributing Länder are those Länder whose financial capacity 
measure is higher than their equalisation measure, while the receiving Länder are 
those Länder whose financial capacity measure is lower than their equalisation 
measure.  The Court concluded that the Finanzausgleichgesetz of 1950 did not lead to 
an absolute equalisation of the Länder and that it was therefore not unconstitutional, 
but that it in fact complied with the provisions of Article 106 (4) of the Basic Law. 
 
7 3 2 Financial equalisation case II (BVerfGE 72, 330 – 24/06/1986) 
 
A period of more than thirty years elapsed before the Bundesverfassungsgericht heard 
the next dispute regarding financial equalisation.  During this period, major reform of 
the financial intergovernmental relations had taken place and in 1969 the essence of 
this was the constitutional accommodation of cooperative federalism.71 In Financial 
equalisation case II six Länder, namely Baden-Württemberg, Bremen, Hamburg, 
Hessen, North Rhine-Westphalia and Saarland, disputed the constitutionality of 
certain provisions of the Finanzausgleichgesetz (Financial Equalisation Act) of 
196972 and the Zerlegungsgesetz (Division of Taxes Act).73  The crux of this matter 
was the question concerning how the provisions of Article 107 (1) the division of 
                                                 
71 See discussion under 5 2. 
72 Gesetz über den Finanzausgleich zwischen Bund und Ländern of 28/08/1969, BGBl I, 1432. 
73 Gesetzes über die Steuerberechtigung und die Zerlegung bei der Einkommensteuer und 
Körperschaftsteuer of 25/02/1971, BGBl I, 145. 
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revenue from wage tax and (2) horizontal financial equalisation of the Basic Law 
were interpreted and applied in these pieces of legislation.74 
                                                
 
The first part of Article 107 (1) determines that revenue from Land tax and the Länder 
share of revenue from income and corporation tax, must be divided according to the 
place of collection of that revenue (Prinzip der örtlichen Aufkommen).75  Federal 
legislation must specify the breakdown of local revenue from wage and corporation 
taxes and the way it must be allocated.  The Zerlegungsgesetz was a federal law that 
gave effect to this stipulation in Article 107 (1) of the Basic Law and it inter alia 
provided that revenue from wage tax must be allocated according to the place of 
residence of the taxpayer (Wohnsitzprinzip).76  
 
The city-states of Bremen and Hamburg, that have a large number of commuters that 
work in those Länder but live in some of the neighbouring Länder, argued that they 
loose a substantial amount of revenue because the wage tax is collected at the place of 
residence of the taxpayer.  They further argued that their expenditure responsibilities 
include amongst other things the provision of roads and schools for all their 
inhabitants and for the commuter workers and that they should thus be able to retain 
the tax income generated from these commuters.  The Court regarded Article 107 (1) 
of the Basic Law as part of the framework of the financial constitution, and accepted 
 
74 Art 107 (1): “Revenue from Land tax and the Land share of revenue from income and corporation 
tax shall accrue to the Länder to the extent that the taxes are collected by the revenue authorities in 
their respective territories (local revenue).  Federal legislation requiring the consent of the Bundesrat 
shall specify the breakdown of local revenue from corporation and wage tax as well as the method and 
extent of its allocation.  Such legislation may also provide for the breakdown and allocation of local 
revenue from other taxes.  The Land share of revenue from turnover tax shall accrue to the Länder on a 
per capita basis; federal legislation requiring the consent of the Bundesrat may provide for 
supplemental shares not exceeding one quarter of a Land share to be granted to Länder whose per 
capita revenue from Land taxes and from income and corporation tax is below the average of all the 
Länder combined. 
    (2) Such legislation shall ensure a reasonable equalization of the financial disparity of the Länder, 
due account being taken of the financial capacity and requirements of the municipalities (associations 
of municipalities).  The legislation shall specify the conditions governing the claims of Länder entitled 
to equalization payments and the liabilities of Länder required to make such payments, as well as the 
criteria for determining the amounts.  It may also provide for federal grants to be made to financially 
weak Länder in order to complement the coverage of their general financial requirements 
(complemental grants).” 
75 Land taxes are all the taxes of which the revenue shall accrue to the Länder, e.g. inheritance tax and 
motor vehicle tax; Art 106 (2) of the Basic Law. 
76 Wieland “Die verfassungsrechtliche Rahmenordnung des Finanzausgleichs” 1988 (8) Jura 410 412; 
Muβgnug “Der horizontale Finanzausgleich auf dem Prüfstand des Bundesverfassungsgerichts” 1986 
(11) JuS 872 873; Klein Bund und Länder nach der Finanzverfassung 886. 
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that it gave the legislator some latitude in shaping the legislation that would give 
effect to the provisions of this section.77  It did not, as Bremen and Hamburg argued, 
require the federal law to stipulate that the revenue from wage tax must be allocated 
to the place where it is generated.  Article 5(1) of the Zerlegungsgesetz, that provided 
that the revenue from wage tax must be allocated to the Länder according to the place 
of residence, was therefore held to be in accordance with the provisions of Article 107 
(1) of the Basic Law.78   
 
The other important part of this decision related to the interpretation of Article 107 (2) 
of the Basic Law, in particular the first part that envisages a reasonable financial 
equalisation of the Länder.  In terms of the financial reform of 1969, there is a duty on 
the federal legislature to ensure “a reasonable equalisation” of the financial capacity 
of the Länder.  The financial equalisation process consists of three basic steps, 
namely: 
(i) vertical financial equalisation aimed at providing sufficient financial resources 
to the Bund and the Länder; 
(ii) horizontal financial equalisation between the Länder;  and 
(iii) additional grants transferred by the Bund to individual financially weak 
Länder to supplement their specific financial needs.79 
 
Article 107 (2) is the basis for the last two steps in the financial equalisation process.  
In its consideration of the horizontal financial equalisation process the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht analysed the scope of the term “financial capacity” in the 
context of Article 107 (2).  The Court stated that “financial capacity” is a 
comprehensive term that includes not only the tax capacity of a Land but also includes 
all other revenue that accrues to a Land.80   
 
The division of financial resources between the Bund and the Länder is the most 
visible expression of the constitutional relationship between the various components 
                                                 
77 Wieland 1988 (8) Jura 8 415. 
78 BVerfGE 72,330 333; Wieland 1988 (8) Jura 8 415; Muβgnug 1986 (11) Jus 874. 
79 See discussion under 5 4; Muβgnug 1986 (11) JuS  872 - 873. 
80 Häde Finanzausgleich 231; Wieland 1988 (8) Jura 416. 
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of the federal state.  The fundamental principle that must be applied here is the federal 
principle contained in Article 20 of the Basic Law.  The Court confirmed that in 
applying it to the first sentence of Article 107 (2) implies that there is a duty on the 
financially stronger Länder to support the financially weaker Länder in such a way 
that it does not lead to an absolute equalisation (Nivellierung) of their financial 
positions.  Those Länder that are overall in a financially weaker position must thus be 
supported by the financially stronger Länder.81  The poor financial position of a Land 
cannot only be attributed to an insufficient own tax base.  It is the overall financial 
position inclusive of all revenue of a Land that must be assessed to determine whether 
a Land qualifies to receive support. In this horizontal financial equalisation process, 
the special needs of individual Länder should not be taken into consideration.  This 
would, however, be relevant and taken into account at the end of the financial 
equalisation process when the Bund considers additional allocations from its revenue 
to individual Länder.  Additional allocations in terms of Article 107 (3) are aimed at 
financing those special needs that could not be considered during the horizontal 
financial equalisation process where the focus is on the general financial capacity of 
the Länder.82   
 
The federal legislature must therefore ensure that the financial equalisation legislation 
is in accordance with Article 107 as interpreted by the Court.  The 
Finanzausgleichgesetz of 1969 did not comply with Article 107 (2) since it provided 
for the special treatment of two Länder, namely Hamburg and Bremen, in that it 
guaranteed them a minimum financial status and was therefore ruled to be 
unconstitutional. Article 107 (2) requires a reasonable financial equalisation of all the 
Länder.83  The Court instructed the Federal Parliament to correct the law and set a 
time limit of two years for them to do so.  Within the framework of the Basic Law, 
more specifically Article 107, the Federal Parliament has the freedom to legislate, as 
recognised by the Court.84 
 
                                                 
81 Wieland 1988 (8) Jura 416. 
82 Wieland 1988 (8) Jura 417; Muβgnug 1986 (11) JuS 877. 
83 BVerfGE 72, 330 333; Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence 91;Wieland 1988 (8) Jura 418; 
Muβgnug 1986 (11) JuS  878. 
84 BVerf GE 72, 330 333; Wieland 1988 (8) Jura 418. 
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The judgment in this case is not only relevant for the detailed development and 
implementation of the financial equalisation system, but is also of particular 
significance for the development of the relations between the Bund and the Länder.  
The importance of the federal principle and the duty on the Bund to treat the Länder 
on an equal basis in the financial equalisation process were confirmed by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht.85  Von Münch stated that financial equalisation is an 
expression of federal solidarity, a statement that highlights the essence of this 
judgment.86  The notion of cooperative federalism received clear support and 
direction from the Court.  The Länder in particular have a duty to support each other, 
and likewise the Bund has a duty to support the financially weaker Länder.  This 
judgment emphasizes that the successful functioning of the financial equalisation 
system is dependant on the application of the federal principle.  Wieland, in his 
discussion of this judgment, argued that the federal state could only function 
optimally if all its constituent parts, namely the Bund and the Länder, are financially 
enabled to perform their respective constitutional obligations.87  This is a reasonable 
inference from the Court’s decision.  It is further evident from this judgment that 
Article 107 of the Basic Law is one of the cornerstones of the financial constitution 
and as such, an important element of the overall constitutional arrangements in 
ermany.   
 3 3  Financial equalisation case III (BVerfGE 86, 148 – 27/05/1992) 
financial aid of DM 115 billion over five years, were put in place to assist these new 
                                                
G
 
7
 
Financial equalisation case III, a judgment by the Second Senate of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht on 27 May 1992, was the first judgment regarding financial 
equalisation after the reunification of Germany in 1990.  It should be noted that the 
application of the financial equalisation provisions in the Länder of Brandenburg, 
Mecklenburg-Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia and Berlin was 
suspended until 31 December 1994 and in terms of the Einigungsvertrag (Unification 
Treaty) special arrangements, such as the German Unity Fund that provided for 
 
85 BVerfGE 72, 330 331; Wieland 1988 (8) Jura 415. 
86 Von Münch GG Komm 842.  
87 Wieland 1988 (8) Jura 418. 
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Länder financially during this transitional period.88 This case was argued and decided 
on the legislation as it was prior to unification. 
 
In the previous case regarding financial legislation, namely Financial equalisation 
case II in 1986, the Bundesverfassungsgericht held certain provisions of the 
Finanzausgleichgesetz of 1969 to be unconstitutional.  The Federal Parliament  
enacted an amended Finanzausgleichgesetz in 1987, which kept the basic structure of 
the financial equalisation system unchanged but accommodated the directions of the 
Court to bring the law in line with the provisions of Article 107 of the Basic Law.89  
In 1992 four Länder, namely Bremen, Hamburg, Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein, 
made an application to the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Financial Equalisation Case 
III) in which they questioned the constitutionality of various provisions of the 
applicable financial equalisation legislation.  The two main issues under consideration 
in this case were the scope of the horizontal financial equalisation in terms of Article 
107 (2) of the Basic Law and the question of additional financial allocations to 
financially weaker Länder.  In addressing these issues, the Court analysed the fairly 
complex nature of the actual horizontal financial equalisation process. An overview of 
the most important aspects of this is provided below.  
 
The Court confirmed that the purpose of the division of financial resources is to place 
the Bund and the Länder in positions that allow them to fulfil their constitutionally 
allocated functions or obligations.  The financial equalisation process supports this 
aim and includes all the Länder in accordance with the federal principle.90 
 
The obligation in Article 107 (2) to ensure a reasonable equalisation of the financial 
disparity of the Länder, with due consideration of the financial capacity and needs of 
the municipalities, was confirmed by the Court.91  In giving content to this obligation, 
the Finanzausgleichgesetz (FAG) of 1987 provided the detail for a comprehensive 
                                                 
88 BVerfGE 86, 148 160; Article 7 of the Gesetz zu dem Vertrag vom 18. Mai 1990 über einer 
Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik vom 25. Juni 1990, (Gesetz zum Staatsvertrag) BGBl 1990 II 518.  
See discussion under 5 4. 
89 Achtes Gesetz zur Änderung des Finanzausgleichgesetz of 18/12/1987, BGBl I 2764. 
90 BVerfGE 86, 148 213.  
91 BVerfGE 86, 148 152; Häde “Solidarität im Bundesstaat” DÖV 46 (1993) 461 462. 
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horizontal financial equalisation process, the outline of which is as follows.  Article 6 
FAG determined the two yardsticks for the calculation of the equalisation payments, 
namely, the financial capacity measure (Finanzkraftmeβzahl) and the equalisation 
measure (Ausgleichsmeβzahl).  While the financial capacity measure of a Land 
consists in general of its revenue and the revenue of its municipalities, Article 7 and 8 
FAG determined the specific taxes and scope of their inclusion in this calculation.   
The equalisation measure of a Land is derived at by multiplying the number of 
inhabitants of that Land with the average Länder revenue per inhabitant.  In terms of 
Article 9 FAG, the population of the city-states Bremen and Hamburg is revalued at 
135% of their actual number and the population of municipalities of more than 5000 
inhabitants is revalued according to a sliding scale based on the density of the 
population.  Article 10 FAG determined the scope of equalisation, in other words, to 
what extent contributing Länder must make financial equalisation contributions and to 
what extent receiving Länder would qualify for receiving equalisation contributions. 
The last section of significance for this case is Article 11a FAG that dealt with the 
question of additional federal allocations (Bundesergänzungszuweisungen) to 
financially weaker Länder. 
 
The Court in this case confirmed that the concept of financial capacity must be 
interpreted comprehensively and that it cannot only include the tax capacity of a 
Land.92  Article 7 and 8 FAG stipulated a list of Land and municipal revenue sources 
that must be included in determining the financial capacity of a Land.  The Court 
analysed these provisions thoroughly while considering the individual elements 
determining the financial capacity of a Land and came to the conclusion that the way 
in which the specified municipal revenue items had been included complied with the 
requirements of Article 107 (2) of the Basic Law.93  In the division of expenditure 
responsibilities between the Bund and the Länder in Article 104a of the Basic Law, 
the municipalities are incorporated as part of the Länder.  The inclusion of part of the 
revenue of the municipalities in determining the financial capacity of a Land thus 
corresponds with the allocation of expenditure responsibilities to the Länder.  The 
Court stated that the horizontal financial equalisation of the Länder in terms of Article 
                                                 
92 BVerfGE 86, 148 216; Häde DÖV 46 (1993) 462 – 464; BVerfGE 72, 330. 
93 BVergGE 86, 148 225 – 233; Häde DÖV 46 (1993) 463. 
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107 (2) is part of a multiphased system of division of revenue in the whole country, 
that has as its aim the financial enablement of the Bund and the Länder, including the 
municipalities, to fulfil their respective constitutionally allocated obligations.  This 
will then support the respective autonomies of the Bund and the Länder in terms of 
the Basic Law.94   
 
Although the special needs of individual Länder may not be considered in 
determining the financial capacity of a Land, an exception is allowed for the special 
needs of the three Länder with seaports, namely Bremen, Hamburg and Lower 
Saxony. This is due to the fact that they are responsible for the maintenance and 
development of those ports while other Länder also use it.  Article 7 (3) FAG made 
specific provision for the deduction of substantial amounts from the revenue of these 
Länder when determining their financial capacity. This could enable them to qualify 
for financial equalisation payments.  The Bundesverfassungsgericht considered these 
provisions and concluded that they are constitutional as they are regarded as 
“traditionally part of the financial equalisation arrangements between the Länder in 
German financial constitutional law”.95  
 
In determining the equalisation measure as part of the horizontal financial 
equalisation process, the city-states of Bremen and Hamburg receive special attention 
by the stipulation of a population valuation of 135%.  These two Länder argued that 
this population valuation in Article 9 (2) FAG is too low and that their special 
circumstances as city-states have not been properly accommodated.  This is one 
element of the determination of the equalisation measure that is of particular 
importance to these Länder in view of their status as city-states.  The Court rejected 
their argument and ruled that the provision is constitutional since the Federal 
Parliament acted within its constitutional mandate and it does not have to give reasons 
for its determination of a specific population valuation.96  The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht confirmed its previous judgment (BVerfGE 72, 330 
401,415) that it was allowed to take the structural peculiarities of these two city-states 
into account by way of a population valuation.  It was the duty of the legislator to 
                                                 
94 BVerfGE 86, 148 213 – 214. 
95 BVerfGE 86, 148 236 – 238; Häde DÖV 46 (1993) 465; BVerfGE 72, 330 331, 413. 
96 BVerfGE 86, 148 238; Häde DÖV 46 (1993) 466. 
 248
determine the scope of the particular measures that should be based on objectively 
determined factors.  Federal Parliament has done this and based its decision to 
determine the population valuation for Bremen and Hamburg on 135% on criteria 
indicated in an expert report of an economical research institute (Ifo-Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung) produced on request of the Federal Government.   
 
The question of additional federal grants (Bundesergänzungszuweisungen) to Saarland 
and Bremen, that both experienced serious financial crises, was the second main issue 
under consideration by the Bundesverfassungsgericht in this case.  Saarland, a 
geographically small Land, found itself in a financial crisis due to its history.  This 
area changed “ownership” between France and Germany a few times since 1919 and 
only became a Land in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1957.97  Its economy was 
essentially developed around coal and steel and therefore during the 1930’s, the arms 
industry was very important.   The economy of Saarland suffered under increasing 
unemployment and led many people to leave to look for jobs in other parts of 
Germany.  These historical factors compounded to cause the financial crisis 
experienced by Saarland prior to their application before the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht in Financial Equalisation Case III.  The position of 
Bremen was somewhat different, although it was also in a serious financial crisis.  
Bremen, a city-state, experienced below average growth in own revenue for a number 
of years, while it had to cope with an increase in expenditure needs caused by the 
migration of workers from the surrounding Länder.  This caused a rise in debt and 
budget deficits and led to the extreme financial situation that Bremen found itself in 
prior to this case.98 
 
The duty to assist each other, a duty that flows from the federal principle, was 
reconfirmed by the Court, that stated that in case of an extreme financial crisis 
experienced by a Land, it is the duty of the other members of the federal state to 
support that Land in order to stabilise its financial position.99  Additional federal 
grants in terms of Article 107 (2) are aimed at providing special assistance to 
                                                                                                                                            
 
97 BVerfGE 86, 148 186.  
98 BVerfGE 86, 148 199 – 201. 
99 BVerfGE 86, 148 263 – 270; Häde Finanzausgleich 248; Häde DÖV 46 (1993) 467. 
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financially weaker Länder and cannot replace the transfer payments made in terms of 
the horizontal financial equalisation process.  They should thus always be less than 
the horizontal equalisation payments.  The Bundesverfassungsgericht stated that this 
assistance from the Bund should only be given if there is a corresponding duty on the 
recipient to contribute to the “rescue operation”.100  Special grants may for example, 
be allocated by the Bund to a Land on condition that the specific Land develops and 
implements a financial rehabilitation program.101 
 
The last part of Article 107 (2) of the Basic Law makes it possible for the Bund to pay  
additional federal grants to financially weaker Länder.  Based on this provision, 
Article 11a FAG provided for additional federal grants to be paid to a few Länder, 
including Saarland and Bremen.  The Court reiterated that the additional federal 
grants are complementary payments.  It ruled that Article 11a FAG was constitutional, 
but that the additional federal allocations to Bremen should be increased to the same 
amount as that for Saarland.102  Bremen, a small Land similar to Saarland, was 
awarded less than Saarland and for 1987 and 1988 it did not get any additional grant.  
This was ruled to be unconstitutional as Länder must be treated even-handedly.103 
 
This aspect of the judgment is of particular importance for the new Länder that were 
incorporated into the financial equalisation system from 1 January 1995.  The 
financial situation of these Länder was even more serious than that of Bremen and 
Saarland at the time of this judgment and this implied an increased demand on the 
financial aid from the Bund and from the financially stronger Länder. 
 
7 3 4 Financial equalisation case IV (BVerfGE 101, 158 – 11/11/1999) 
 
In the latest case on financial equalisation the three southern Länder, Baden-
Württemberg, Bavaria and Hessen, lodged an application to the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht declaring certain provisions of the Finanzausgleichgesetz 
                                                 
100 BVerfGE 86 148, 268; Häde DÖV 46 (1993) 468. 
101 Häde DÖV 46 (1993) 468. 
102 BVerfGE 86, 148 271 – 276; Häde DÖV 46 (1993) 468. 
103 BVerfGE 86, 148 270 - 271. 
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of 23 June 1993 unconstitutional.104  This application was opposed by Bremen, Lower 
Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein.  The three applicants were financially stronger 
Länder and contributors in the horizontal financial equalisation process.  One of their 
main complaints was that the financial equalisation system creates negative incentives 
and that it results in the unfair treatment of the contributing Länder.  The applicants 
argued that the Finanzausgleichgesetz of 1993 is unconstitutional on a number of 
grounds including the following: 
 The population valuation for the city-states is unconstitutional because it 
does not fit within the constitutional notion of financial capacity of a Land 
and with the inclusion of Berlin, a city-state, it should have been reviewed;105 
 The provisions in the Finanzausgleichgesetz that describe the calculation of 
the actual equalisation payments (Article 10 (2) and (4)) are unconstitutional 
since they contradict the constitutional requirement of a “reasonable 
equalisation”;106  
 The additional federal grants in terms of Article 11 (2) of the 
Finanzausgleichgesetz are unconstitutional since it is in contrast with the 
prohibition against absolute equalisation;107 and 
 That the whole financial equalisation process resulted in an absolute 
equalisation of the financial capacity of the Länder, which is 
unconstitutional, and causes the average financial capacity of the contributing 
Länder to be lower than the average of the receiving Länder.108  
 
The crucial question before the Court was: does the financial equalisation legislation 
comply with the requirements in Articles 106 and 107 of the Basic Law to strengthen 
the constitutional framework for the division of revenue?  In answering this question, 
the Court reviewed the whole financial equalisation system and ruled that the 
Finanzausgleichgesetz is unconstitutional, but that it should be seen as a transitionary 
measure until 1 January 2005.109   
                                                 
104 BVerfGE 101, 158, a judgment of the Second Senate of 11 November 1999. 
105 BVerfGE 101, 158 A III.3. 
106 BVerfGE 101, 158 para A III.4. 
107 BVerfGE 101, 158 para A III.5. 
108 BVerfGE 101, 158 para A III.9 
109 BVerfGE 101, 158; Spahn “The German Constitutional Court takes on the principle of ‘solidarity’” 
2001 (Vol 1 nr 1) Federations 1. 
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 The Court stated that the constitutional framework for the division of revenue 
between the Bund and the Länder is provided in Articles 106 and 107 of the Basic 
Law, and that this framework required that federal legislation must strengthen and 
supplement the constitutional measures.  After analysing the whole financial 
equalisation system and the shortcomings in the Finanzausgleichgesetz of 1993, the 
Court ruled that the Federal Parliament must in particular provide for standards for the 
division of turnover tax between the Bund and the Länder (Article 106 (3)), the 
criteria for the allocation of supplemental shares of the turnover tax to financially 
weaker Länder (Article 107 (1)), standards for the equalisation payments and receipts 
including the maximum thereof (Article 107 (2)) and standards for the identification 
and justification of additional federal grants in terms of Article 107 (2) of the Basic 
Law.110  
 
The financial constitution requires in Article 106 (3) and (4) and in Article 107 (2) of 
the Basic Law a set of standards laid down in legislation. In other words, standards 
must be determined for the division of revenue or financial equalisation before the 
practical implementation thereof is effected.  The Court ruled that there must be a 
standards Act that will lay down the mechanisms and standards, followed by a 
financial equalisation Act, which will provide for the actual division of revenue.111  
While the standards Act should be seen as a more permanent law, the financial 
equalisation Act must be enacted annually.   
 
The financial constitution binds the standards Act and the financial equalisation Act to 
the four steps in the financial equalisation process in the following way as expressed 
by the Court: 
 
(i) The first step is the division of revenue from turnover tax between the 
Bund and the Länder in terms of Article 106 (3) of the Basic Law (vertical 
financial equalisation).  Both levels of government have an equal claim to 
cover their “necessary expenditures” and the assessment of their needs 
                                                 
110 BVerfGE 101, 158 para C I.1. 
111 BVerfGE 101, 158 para C I.1 (c).  The standards Act had to be implemented from 1 January 2003 
and the new financial equalisation Act at the latest from 1 January 2005. 
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must result in a fair balance, the prevention of excessive burdens to the 
taxpayer and ensuring equal living conditions throughout the country.  
The Court stated that this ideal could be achieved through co-ordinated 
medium-term financial planning based on objective statistical data.112  
Spahn criticized this view and suggested that it is not possible to compare 
the necessity of expenditures at the federal level with that at the Länder 
level.  It is however possible to make such a comparison, based on 
objective norms, between the Länder, where they have comparable 
constitutional obligations, for example the provision of education.113 
(ii) In the next step, namely the horizontal financial equalisation amongst the 
Länder, the standard is the principle of place of origin of the tax revenue.  
Constitutionally the measure for the division of revenue from turnover tax 
is the number of inhabitants, that gives a clear expression of the principle 
of origin of such revenue, and at least 75% of the Länder share of the 
turnover tax is distributed according to this.  A maximum of 25% of the 
Länder share of the turnover tax revenue may be allocated to those 
financially weaker Länder whose financial position is below the Länder 
average.  This step concludes the primary allocation of finances to the 
individual Länder.114   
(iii) The following step in the horizontal financial equalisation process is the 
comparison of the financial capacity of individual Länder and the 
reasonable equalisation of the disparities.  The Court referred with 
approval to its previous decisions in this respect and stated clearly that the 
horizontal financial equalisation should narrow the gap, but should not 
lead to an absolute equalisation of the financial capacity of the Länder.115  
The Court’s dilemma here was the balancing of two fundamental 
principles, namely that of federal solidarity amongst the Länder and the 
                                                 
112 BVerfGE 101, 158 para C I.1 (c). 
113 Spahn 2001 (1) Federations 2. 
114 BVerfGE 101, 158 para C I.2 (b); BVerfGE 72, 330 384. 
115 BVerfGE 101, 158 para C I.2 (c) and the Court’s reference to BVerfGE 1, 117 132; 72, 330 386; 86, 
148 215. 
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autonomy of the Länder.  The duty to ensure a reasonable equalisation of 
the financial capacity of the Länder, that is an expression of federal 
solidarity amongst the Länder, may not lead to an absolute equalisation 
and prohibits a reversal of the financial capacity ranking of the Länder.  It 
is in particular this issue that was of great concern to the applicants when 
they argued that the notion of a reasonable equalisation is applied in an 
incorrect and unconstitutional way in the Finanzausgleichgesetz, since it 
leads to negative incentives and an absolute equalisation of the financial 
capacity of the Länder.116  The Court concluded that federal solidarity has 
limits and can reduce differences, but may not lead to a levelling of 
differences.117 
(iv) The last step in the financial equalisation process is the possibility of 
additional federal grants to financially weaker Länder in terms of Article 
107 (2) of the Basic Law.  It is not a mere extension of the horizontal 
financial equalisation but should rather be seen as a federal financial 
intervention that accommodates special needs of individual Länder and 
that can only be for a limited amount and as a transitionary measure.118  It 
may not be used to assist financially weaker Länder to such an extent that 
it changes the financial capacity ranking of the Länder, since that would 
contradict the prohibition against an absolute equalisation. 
 
The Court ruled that the then existing legislation, namely the Finanzausgleichgesetz 
of 1993, did not comply with the provisions of Articles 106 and 107 since: 
 it was not based on multi-year financial planning,  
 it did not provide objective standards or criteria for the actual financial 
equalisation, and 
  it led to an absolute equalisation of the financial capacity of the 
Länder.119   
 
                                                 
116 BVerfGE 101, 158 para A III.4 (a).  Negative incentives in this context mean that, due to the 
particular financial equalisation measures, there is no motivation for the financially weak Länder to 
improve their economic situation and their financial capacity since there is always the possibility of 
financial assistance in some form or another as part of the financial equalisation system. 
117 BVerfGE 101, 158 para C I.2 (c). 
118 BVerfGE 101, 158 para C I.2 (d), C II.3 (a); Spahn 2001 (1) Federations 2. 
119 BVerfGE 101, 158 para C II.1 - 4.   
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What was envisaged is an overall review of the financial equalisation legislation by 
the Federal Parliament that will include the adoption of a standards Act as well as an 
annual financial equalisation Act.120    
 
One of the applicants in this case, Bavaria, argued repeatedly for a revision of the 
financial equalisation system, mainly in view of the increasing lack of incentives to 
promote better performance.121  The implementation of the Finanzausgleichgesetz of 
1993 had the effect that the contributing Länder had to make such high contributions 
that their financial capacity rankings fell below the average of all the Länder. This 
implied that there was no incentive to perform well.  This situation led the Court to 
scrutinise the  financial equalisation system, including the elements that contributed to 
the distorted position where the financially stronger Länder eventually found 
themselves below the average financial capacity due to all the contributions they 
made to the financially weaker Länder.  It is evident from the Court’s judgment that 
in addition to the somewhat mechanical approach to remedy the situation, namely, to 
introduce a standards Act followed by an annual financial equalisation Act, that 
certain fundamental principles are crucial for the financial relations between the Bund 
and the Länder and amongst the Länder. These need to be adhered to.  These 
principles are the federal principle or solidarity among the Länder (assistance for 
those in need), the recognition of the financial autonomy of the Länder and the 
prohibition against an absolute equalisation of the financial capacity of the Länder.  
This case can be seen as a milestone in the development of the legislative 
arrangements regarding the division of funds, or more specifically, the financial 
equalisation, in Germany. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
120 The Federal Parliament adopted the two laws required by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, viz the 
Maßstäbegesetz on 9 Sept 2001 and the Finanzausgleichgesetz on 20 Dec 2001.  See discussion under 
5 6; Kämmerer “Maßstäbe für den Bundesfinanzausgleich? – Dramaturgie einer verhinderten Reform” 
JuS 2003, Heft 3 214 215; Kämmerer Föderalismus als Solidarprinzip in Vitzthum & Winkelman (eds) 
Bosnien-Herzegovina im Horizont Europas – Demokratische und föderale Elemente der Staatswerdung 
in Südosteuropa (2003) 195 212 et seq. 
121 Beierl Reforming Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Germany: The Bavarian Point of View 
(2001) 7. 
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 7 3 5 Comments 
 
Already in the first dispute regarding the division of revenue before the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, namely, the Financial Equalisation Case I, the Court was 
quite aware of the separation of powers and its role vis-à-vis that of the legislature, 
when it stated that a decision about the intensity of the actual horizontal financial 
equalisation within specific limits is a financial political matter and not a 
constitutional matter.  Therefore, horizontal financial equalisation falls outside the 
jurisdiction of the Bundesverfassungsgericht.122 It was evident in this case, that the 
Court has an important role to consider the constitutionality of the financial legislation 
itself and the constitutionality of the effect of financial equalisation.  It appears that 
the relationship between the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Federal Parliament is a 
complex or somewhat sensitive one, at least as far as the financial constitution is 
concerned.  Federal Parliament must provide the financial equalisation mechanisms 
and procedures by way of federal law in order to comply with the requirements of the 
Basic Law. The Bundesverfassungsgericht must interpret such legislation and ensure 
its compliance with the Basic Law, but it cannot adjudicate financial political 
questions.    
 
The judgment in Financial Equalisation Case II gave more content to the financial 
constitution of Germany and confirmed the structural framework within which there 
is scope for political decision-making where the Court would not interfere.  The 
legislature must function within the set limits of this constitutional framework and the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht may test the legislation, for example, financial equalisation 
legislation, produced by the Federal Parliament.123  Häde stated in this respect that 
although financial constitutional arrangements make use of undefined legal terms that 
create scope for decision-making and evaluation, the legal arrangements thus made by 
the Federal Parliament are subject to judicial scrutiny in order to adjudicate their 
compliance with the financial constitutional framework.124  The relevance of the 
                                                 
122 BVerfGE 1, 117 para 50. 
123 Häde Finanzausgleich 223. 
124 Häde Finanzausgleich 233. 
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doctrine of separation of powers and the interaction between the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Federal Parliament was reiterated by this judgment.   
 
In its discussion of the working of the financial equalisation system, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht in Financial Equalisation Case III said that horizontal 
financial equalisation is a separate phase and should receive separate attention when 
analysing the system.  Horizontal financial equalisation is aimed at a reasonable 
equalisation of the disparity in the financial capacity of the Länder that does not 
imply an absolute financial equalisation, but rather a reasonable closing of the gap of 
the financial capacity, of the different Länder.125  The duty to make equalisation 
payments may not lead to a change in the ranking of the Länder based on their 
financial capacity since this will be exceeding the constitutional boundaries of 
reasonable financial equalisation.126  This statement by the Court is of great value for 
the future development of financial equalisation in Germany, since it gives a clear 
indication that there are limits to horizontal financial equalisation that are of particular 
relevance to the inclusion of the new Länder in the financial equalisation system.  The 
basic point of departure of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, is that the financial 
equalisation process must put the Bund and the individual Länder in financial 
positions where they can perform their constitutionally allocated obligations or 
functions.  In doing so, the relative financial autonomy of both the Bund and the 
Länder is recognised.127 
 
The milestone judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Financial Equalisation 
Case IV is not only important because of its thorough discussion of the various 
elements of the financial equalisation process, but also because of the clear 
consideration of the applicable fundamental principles underlying the relations 
between the Bund and the Länder that have a direct impact on the financial 
equalisation process, for example the federal principle contained in Article 20 of the 
Basic Law.  The Bundesverfassungsgericht in its analysis of the practical functioning 
of the financial equalisation system stated clearly that there must be a balance 
                                                 
125 BVerfGE 86, 148 214 – 215. 
126 BVerfGE 72, 330 418; BVerfGE 86, 148 250. 
127 Bayerische Staatsministerium der Finanzen Die Reform des Finanzausgleichs – föderale, 
ökonomische und verfassungsrecthliche Aspekte (1998) 23. 
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between the solidarity duty of the Länder and the Bund, and the recognition of the 
financial autonomy of the Länder.128  The Bundesverfassungsgericht is  aware of the 
principle of the separation of powers and made it clear in this case that it does not 
have the final say about financial equalisation and that the Federal Parliament has an 
important legislative role to play in providing the rules for financial equalisation that 
must be in accordance with the constitutional framework.129 The Court, however, 
perhaps went too far in prescribing to the Federal Parliament what the new legislation 
should include.  In reviewing the financial equalisation legislation the Court found 
that the Act was unconstitutional, but it went further to prescribe to the Federal 
Parliament what the new legislation should include.130  This created an opportunity 
for some critics to say that the Court did more than merely reviewing an Act, and that 
it in fact acted as legislator. 
 
7 4 The contribution by the South African Constitutional Court 
 
South Africa’s new democracy is still young and the Constitutional Court was only 
established in 1994.  There is a significant difference in the volume of jurisprudence 
produced by this Court, in a decade, when compared to that produced by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht in half a century.  There are very few Constitutional Court 
judgments relating to the central issue of this dissertation, namely the constitutional 
accommodation of the division of functions and the allocation of financial resources.  
A number of factors have contributed to this situation, for example, the relatively 
young age of the Constitutional Court, the fact that the Constitution requires that 
organs of state involved in intergovernmental disputes should first attempt to resolve 
such disputes by non-judicial means before approaching a court of law, the political 
context and the dominant position of the ruling party, as well as the fact that the 
system of financial equalisation is still relatively new.131  The absence of a history and 
tradition of federalism is of particular importance.  In South Africa factors such as the 
long tradition of unitary government before and the conditions caused by apartheid 
                                                 
128 BVerfGE 101, 158 para A III.4. 
129 BVerfGE 101, 158 para D. 
130 See discussion under 7 3 4. 
131 Sec 41 (3) of the Constitution. 
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(which now have to be remedied)  have steered sensitivities and effort in a different 
direction.  
 
The judgments of the Constitutional Court can be divided into two broad categories, 
namely, human rights judgments and judgments relating to constitutional 
organisational matters that include for, example, intergovernmental disputes over the 
allocation of functions and the division of finances.  Although judgments in the first 
category primarily concern the relationship between the state and an individual, some 
of these judgments are relevant for the developing system of financial 
intergovernmental relations, as will be discussed below.  In this analysis of important 
South African judgments relating to the constitutional accommodation of the division 
of functions and the allocation of financial resources generally, the selection of cases 
includes judgments primarily concerned with human rights questions but that have an 
impact on financial intergovernmental matters.   
 
The fact that the Constitution is the supreme law in South Africa since 1994 has a 
significant effect on the interpretation of laws.  In all the judgments discussed here, 
the principal of constitutional supremacy was upheld.  The literalist approach to 
interpretation prior to 1994 has made way for a normative approach where effect is 
given to the values and norms of the Constitution.132  When interpreting a law a court 
has to ask ‘What does the Constitution say?’ or “How is effect given to the promotion 
of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights?’133    
 
The selection of cases below consists of an important judgment regarding the 
allocation of functions in the Constitution, three judgments that focus on socio-
economic issues, that have an impact on financial intergovernmental matters and the 
only judgment so far that concerns the question regarding the equitable division of 
revenue raised nationally.  It should be noted that the three cases on socio-economic 
issues were not instituted by provinces.  They were brought by individuals. 
 
                                                 
132 Malherbe & Brand South Africa: Sub-national Constitutional Law in Alen et al (eds) Sub-national 
Constitutional Law (2001) 42; S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) para 9; Carmichele v Minister 
of Safety and Security and Another 2001 10 BCLR 995 (CC) para 54.  
133 Art 39 (2) of the Constitution. 
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 7 4 1 Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In Re Constitutionality 
of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 732 (CC) 
 
In the first case where the presidential referral procedure was used, the President of 
the Republic of South Africa referred the Liquor Bill [Bill131B-98] to the 
Constitutional Court for a decision on its constitutionality.134  This case followed the 
end of a protracted dispute between the Western Cape Provincial Government and the 
national Minister of Trade and Industry concerning the regulation of the liquor 
industry and the interpretation of the Constitution in this respect.  The Minister of 
Trade and Industry introduced the Liquor Bill, that was new national legislation 
relating to the liquor industry, in the National Assembly and after passing through all 
the legislative stages, it was adopted by Parliament.  The President had reservations 
regarding the constitutionality of the Bill, namely, that the provisions relating to the 
registration for the manufacture, distribution and retail sale of liquor might be in 
conflict with the strict requirements of a national law in terms of section 44 (2) of the 
Constitution,135 and he first referred it back to the National Assembly for 
reconsideration.136  No amendments were added to the Bill and the President then 
referred the Bill to the Constitutional Court for a decision on its constitutionality.    
The Western Cape Provincial Government contested the constitutionality of the Bill 
primarily on the ground that it infringed on the exclusive legislative powers of 
provinces with respect to liquor licenses.137  The fundamental underlying 
constitutional questions in this case relate to the division of legislative functions 
                                                 
134 In terms of sec 79 (1) the President must refer a Bill back to the National Assembly if he has 
reservations about the constitutionality of the Bill, and in terms of sec 79 (4), after the reconsideration 
of the Bill, the President must either assent to and sign the Bill, or if he still has reservations, must refer 
a Bill to the Constitutional Court for a decision on its constitutionality.  See also sec 84 (2) (c) of the 
Constitution. 
135 Sec 44 (2): “ Parliament may intervene, by passing legislation in accordance with sec 76 (1), with 
regard to a matter falling within a functional area listed in Schedule 5, when it is necessary – 
(a) to maintain national security; 
(b) to maintain economic unity; 
(c) to maintain essential national standards; 
(d) to establish minimum standards required for the rendering of services; or 
to prevent unreasonable action taken by a province which is prejudicial to the interests of another 
province or to the country as a whole.” 
136 Ex Parte President of the RSA: In Re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 732 (CC) 738 
para 21. 
137 Liquor Bill-case para 36 – 37. 
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between the national and provincial spheres of government and the issue of national 
legislative intervention in the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of provinces.   
 
According to the Constitutional Court, the organisational framework of the 
Constitution appears to be designed from a functional perspective based on what is 
appropriate to each sphere of government, hence the division of concurrent and 
exclusive ‘functional areas’ of legislative competence.138 The functional areas central 
to the matter before the Court are “trade”, “industrial promotion” (concurrent 
legislative functional areas) and “liquor licenses” (an exclusive provincial legislative 
functional area). The Court acknowledged the fact that in some cases there can be an 
overlap between Schedule 4 and 5 functional areas.  The Court went further to state 
that, irrespective of a potential overlap with concurrent functions in this case, a 
distinct meaning must be given to the exclusive functional area of ‘liquor licenses’.139  
The Court concluded that “liquor licenses”, that are clearly in the realm of an 
exclusive provincial function, must be interpreted restrictively since it covers a 
narrower field than the liquor trade, that includes issues such as the manufacture and 
distribution of liquor.140   According to the Court, the provincial exclusive 
competence of “liquor licenses” refers to the licensing of the retail sale of liquor 
within a province, while the regulation of the liquor trade, that falls within the 
concurrent field, suggests a national law due to the nature of the issues the law has to 
deal with, for example, the determination of national economic policies and the 
promotion of inter-provincial trade.   
 
Even if one could argue that the scope of “liquor licenses” could be extended to 
include the manufacture and distribution of liquor, there would be sufficient 
justification for a national law in terms of section 44 (2) of the Constitution.  The 
Court said that the ‘economic unity’ requirement in section 44 (2) (b) had been 
satisfied since there was a clear need for the maintenance of economic unity in the  
country as far as it relates to the manufacture and distribution of liquor.141 The reason 
being that the liquor industry has national implications that require the setting of 
                                                 
 
138 Liquor Bill-case para 51. 
139 Liquor Bill-case para 51. 
140 Liquor Bill-case para 53 – 58; Malherbe 2000 (63) THRHR 331. 
141 Liquor Bill-case para 75 – 78; Malherbe 2000 (63) THRHR 332. 
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national common standards for traders and national regulation of the industry so that 
liquor enterprises can operate countrywide under one license.   The Court concluded 
that a national law regulating the liquor industry, but excluding the issue of liquor 
licenses for the retail sale of liquor, is constitutionally permitted.142 
 
Malherbe, in his discussion of this judgment by the Constitutional Court, criticized the 
Court for not using the guidelines for testing national intervention in terms of section 
44 (2) of the Constitution, which the Court itself laid down in the First Certification 
Case.143  These guidelines refer to the principles of cooperative government, in 
particular those listed in section 41 (1) (e), (f) and (g), and the fact that the 
intervention power is limited and should be used sparingly.144  Although the criticism 
might be justified, it is doubtful whether the Court would have reached another 
decision in the light of the various considerations indicated above that are in favour of 
a national law. 
  
The allocation of powers and functions to the three spheres of government provides a 
framework for government that must be explored and enhanced through legislative 
and executive means, for example, various national and provincial policies, 
programmes and laws.  In doing so, Parliament and the provincial legislatures must 
adhere to the principle of constitutional supremacy and the principles of cooperative 
government.  The Constitutional Court in this case provided more insight into the 
constitutional division of powers between the national and provincial spheres of 
government by giving content to the exclusive provincial legislative matters and the 
national intervention powers in terms of section 44 (2).145   
 
This judgment showed how complex and difficult it often is to define the parameters 
of national and provincial competences, in particular in relation to concurrent 
                                                 
142 Liquor Bill-case para 87. 
143 Malherbe 2000 (63) THRHR 328 – 329. 
144 Sec 41 (1): “All spheres of government …must – 
(e) respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of government in other 
spheres; 
(f) not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of the Constitution; 
and 
(g) exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the 
geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another sphere”. 
145 Malherbe 2000 (63) THRHR 333 – 334. 
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functional areas.  One may be critical regarding the way the Court defined “liquor 
licenses” and “trade”, but the fact remains that the Constitution does not define the 
functional areas listed in Schedules 4 and 5 and when legislation gives content to the 
functional areas, constitutional supremacy determines that it must be measured 
against the Constitution. 
 
Although this case did not involve financial intergovernmental issues, it is evident 
that new legislation in a concurrent functional area could have an impact on the actual 
division of revenue.  This would in particular be the case if such legislation created 
obligations for provinces.  A national Act in a concurrent field, for example, “trade”, 
that provides for partial or full administration thereof at provincial level implies that 
provinces must budget for it.  The ordinary approach is that funds should follow 
functions.  Provinces could validly argue that this Act creates new obligations for 
which funding should be allocated by way of an increased equitable share to 
provinces, or additional allocations to provinces.  Giving content to concurrent 
functional areas could therefore impact on financial intergovernmental relations. 
 
7 4 2 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1997 12 BCLR 1696 
(CC) 
 
This is an important constitutional case since it was one of the first judgments of the 
Constitutional Court that involved the application of a socio-economic right.  
Although this study does not focus on human rights issues, this case has relevancy for 
the dissertation since it relates to the relationship between the judiciary and the 
legislature and the question concerning judicial review of policy issues, such as how 
budget allocations are made.  The development and adoption of a provincial (or 
national) budget includes a legal mandate element and policy considerations.  The 
question that must be asked is; How far does the courts’ jurisdiction go regarding 
financial policy issues?  
 
The primary issue in this case is the application of the right of access to health care 
services, in particular the right not to be refused emergency medical treatment, as 
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stipulated in section 27 (3) of the Constitution.146  The Department of Health in 
KwaZulu-Natal is responsible for the provision of health care in its provincial 
hospitals and the appellant in this case requested specialised dialysis treatment for 
chronic renal failure, that was threatening his life.  The hospital refused his 
application due to a shortage of financial resources and the fact that it had a set policy 
for the use of dialysis resources.  In terms of this a patient only qualified for treatment 
if he or she is free of significant vascular or cardiac disease.  The applicant did not 
meet this requirement since he had a heart disease.147  When his application was 
refused by the particular provincial hospital, the appellant lodged a claim in the High 
Court, and upon dismissal of such claim, he then approached the Constitutional Court. 
 
The equitable share formula, in terms of which each province’s allocation of the 
provincial share is to be determined, includes a health component.148  The allocation 
of funds to different portfolios within a province is done in accordance to the 
provincial priorities, taking into account conditional grants and the compliance with 
nationally determined norms and standards.  In practical terms, it would mean that it 
is within the mandate of a provincial government to determine what funding should 
go to what hospital and for what service within its province.149 The determination of 
the specific budget allocations within a province is thus an executive decision that 
aims to address the needs of that province within its available financial resources. The 
KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Government in this case had to decide on its overall budget 
priorities and the funding allocation within the health budget. The Constitutional 
Court stated in this respect that: 
 
“The provincial administration which is responsible for health services in 
KwaZulu-Natal has to make decisions about the funding that should be made 
available for health care and how such funds should be spent.  These choices 
involve difficult decisions to be taken at the political level in fixing the health 
budget, and at the functional level in deciding upon the priorities to be met.  A 
court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by 
                                                 
146  Sec 27 (3) of the Constitution: “No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.” 
147 Soobramoney paras 1 – 5. 
148 See discussion under 6 3 2. 
149 This is in addition to special grants provided for example to the academic hospitals in Gauteng, Free 
State, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. 
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the political organs and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to deal 
with such matters.”150 
 
The Court concluded that the state’s failure to provide the requested medical 
treatment to all persons suffering from chronic renal failure did not result in a breach 
of the obligations in section 27 of the Constitution, because the appellant did not meet 
all the requirements for patients to receive the particular medical treatment. It was 
also not proven that the required treatment was “emergency medical treatment” in 
terms of section 27 (3).151 
 
It is evident from this judgment that the allocation of funds to the various budget 
votes within a provincial (or national) budget is essentially a policy decision that a 
court would be reluctant to interfere with.  The main question in this judgment, 
however, was the determination of a claim based on section 27 (3) of the Constitution, 
namely the right not to be refused emergency medical treatment, a question that 
eventually also related to the allocation of funds.  The state, in this case the KwaZulu-
Natal Provincial Government, has a constitutional duty to comply with the obligations 
stated in section 27 of the Constitution152while at the same time being responsible for 
providing funding through its budget for all its executive functions.  Du Plessis 
referred to the dilemma the Constitutional Court faced in this case, namely, to 
adjudicate the application of a socio-economic right that had budgetary implications, 
in a situation where a government must make difficult policy decisions regarding the 
funding of its executive functions.153  He argued that the Constitutional Court would 
refrain from “over-constitutionalising issues” and, on the basis of subsidiarity, would 
not interfere with decisions taken by another organ of state.  This, he argued, explains 
why the Court did not want to interfere with a policy decision by the KwaZulu-Natal 
Provincial Government.  This is a novel way of applying the principle of subsidiarity 
and is open to criticism.  The Court’s reasoning can and should rather be explained by 
                                                                                                                                            
150Soobramoney para 29.  See also Du Plessis v De Klerk para 180. 
151 Soobramoney para 36; Currie & De Waal Constitutional and Administrative Law 400. 
152 There is also a general duty on the state, including all spheres of government, in terms of sec 7 (2) 
of the Constitution to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.  
153 Du Plessis “The South African Constitution as Memory and Promise” 2000 (3) Stell LR 385 391.  
See also Blackbeard “Renal failure – right to haemodialysis denied” 1999 (62) THRHR 304 309; 
Devenish  2003 (66) THRHR  97. 
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applying the separation of powers doctrine.  It is not the Court’s duty to make such 
clear policy choices.  That falls within the scope of jurisdiction of the executive.  
However, as the German cases demonstrate, matters relating to financial 
intergovernmental issues are often more nuanced and the legal and policy 
considerations are more difficult to separate. 
 
This judgment underlines the complexities involved in determining budget priorities.  
Provinces cannot only focus on their own policy objectives, but have to take into 
account nationally determined norms, for example the teacher-learner ratio used to 
determine funding for schools, and  the constitutional requirement to progressively 
realise socio-economic rights.   
 
7 4 3  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 
1169 (CC) 
 
In this case a group of squatters initially lodged an application in the Cape High Court 
seeking an order directing the Oostenberg Municipality to provide basic housing or 
shelter to them and their children, a claim based on section 26 (1)154 (the right to have  
access to adequate housing) and 28 (1) (c)155 (the right of children to basic nutrition, 
shelter, basic health care services and social services) of the Constitution.156  
Although this judgment is primarily concerned with a request to provide access to 
adequate housing or shelter, an important underlying issue is the question of state 
funding or the financing of basic services. 
 
The Cape High Court confirmed that the right to have access to adequate housing is a 
socio-economic right that cannot be effected immediately and which is qualified by 
the requirement that the state must take reasonable measures within its available 
resources to achieve the progressive realization of this right.157  The Court followed 
                                                 
154 Sec 26: 
“(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to 
achieve a progressive realisation of this right.” 
155 Sec 28 (1) (c): “(1) Every child has the right - … 
 (c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services.” 
156 Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality and Others 2000 3 BCLR 277 (C).  The Western Cape 
Provincial Government and the National Government were also respondents in this case. 
157 Grootboom v Oostenberg 283. 
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the approach of the Constitutional Court in Soobramoney, namely that the fulfilment 
of the constitutional obligations relating to socio-economic rights depends on the 
resources available to the state.158  This qualification does not mean that the state, be 
it a national government department, provincial government or municipality, can 
neglect its constitutional obligations regarding the realization of socio-economic 
rights because of limited financial resources.  The State must make effective use of its 
available resources and it has to show what steps it took to fulfill its obligations.159  
Furthermore, the conduct of the state must be reasonable.  The Cape High Court 
denied the application based on the right to have access to adequate housing and 
decided that the respondents complied with the requirements of section 26 (2) of the 
Constitution since it had a rational housing programme in place to address the 
pressing need for the provision of basic housing for the poor within the context of 
scarce financial resources.160   
 
The Court then distinguished the applicants’ right to have access to adequate housing 
from the right of children to shelter, that is guaranteed in section 28 (1) (c) of the 
Constitution.  It stated that shelter is a form of temporary lodging and concluded that 
the state must provide shelter to the children and because the family must be 
maintained as a unit, the provision of shelter would include the parents of the 
children.161  This decision meant that the state had to employ some of its financial 
resources to provide shelter, albeit temporary form of accommodation, to poor 
families. 
 
The Constitutional Court reconsidered the matter and reversed the Cape High Court’s 
decision.  After a thorough analysis of the socio-economic rights in sections 26 and 28 
of the Constitution, the Court concluded that neither of these sections entitles a person 
to claim shelter or housing immediately on demand.  It stated that children’s right to 
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159 Grootboom v Oostenberg 286. 
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shelter does not create an obligation on the state where the children are in the care of 
their parents or families.162  There is however, a duty on government to develop and 
implement a coordinated programme aimed at meeting its obligations in terms of 
section 26.  This means that the state must take positive action to develop, fund and 
implement a programme to provide relief to the extremely poor and homeless people.  
This duty is qualified by the requirement that the measures must be reasonable, it 
must be aimed at the progressive realization of the right and must be done within the 
available resources of the state.163  In this case, the Cape Metropolitan Council (under 
which the Oostenberg Municipality resorted) failed to make adequate provision to 
achieve the progressive realization of the right of access to housing, since it did not 
provide for temporary shelter for homeless people.164   
 
Any programme established to provide housing or temporary shelter obviously 
requires funding.  Giving effect to the right to have access to adequate housing in 
section 26 (1) of the Constitution thus has a direct impact on the budgets of the 
responsible government entities.  Already in Soobramoney, the Court emphasized the 
fact that financial resources are scarce and that governments face difficult choices 
when determining budget priorities with limited available finances.165  The 
qualification “within its available resources” in section 26 (2) means that the 
obligation does not require the state to do more than what its available resources 
would allow.166  The availability of resources determines the way in which effect is 
given to the progressive realization of a socio-economic right.  Local government and 
each province must utilize its respective equitable shares of the revenue raised 
                                                                                                                                            
162 Government of the RSA v Grootboom  2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) para 77; Sloth-Nielsen “The 
child’s right to social services, the right to social security, and primary prevention of child abuse: some 
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163Government of the RSA v Grootboom para 38 – 46. 
164 Government of the RSA v Grootboom para 44, 93 – 99; Currie & De Waal Constitutional and 
Administrative Law 398 – 399. 
165 Soobramoney para 11. 
166 Government of the RSA v Grootboom para 46.  See Streak & Kgamphe “Government’s recent 
performance in budgeting for the child’s right to social assistance in South Africa” in Budget Brief nr 
107 (June 2002) for a discussion on budgeting for social assistance to children based on the 
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nationally to inter alia provide basic services.167  Provision of basic housing to the 
poor or unemployed is an example of basic services that provinces and municipalities 
are responsible for.   
 
This judgment of the Constitutional Court has an important implication for 
government, namely that when designing the budget, the setting of priorities must 
take into account the requirements of the provisions on socio-economic rights in the 
Constitution.  This implies that government departments and municipalities 
responsible for the provision of basic services, such as housing, water and health care, 
should include in their strategic plans and budgets comprehensive programmes within 
their available resources aimed at progressively realizing the socio-economic rights 
laid down in the Constitution.   
 
Sloth-Nielsen said that this was an important judgment that made a positive 
contribution to the fulfilment of socio-economic rights.168  Another commentator, 
Bilchitz, criticized the Constitutional Court’s judgment because it failed to interpret 
the right of access to adequate housing as including a minimum core content.169 The 
Constitutional Court did not follow the minimum core approach, but in stead 
considered the reasonableness of the state’s programmes.  The Court’s approach is 
supported by authors such as Currie & De Waal, who stated that the requirement of 
reasonableness includes the opportunity for the Court to get a progress report from the 
executive on the measures it has designed, funded and implemented in an effort to 
achieve the progressive realization of the right.170  The achievement of this right 
cannot be seen as a once off event, but requires appropriate measures and funding on 
an ongoing basis.171   
 
This judgment reiterates the difficulty that governments face when they have to set 
budget priorities with limited funding available.  It also gives some guidance 
                                                 
167 Sec 227 (1) of the Constitution. 
168 Sloth-Nielsen 2001 (17) SAJHR 224. 
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regarding measuring “the progressive realization” of a socio-economic right, an issue 
that has a direct impact on the equitable division of revenue since it places a duty on 
government to budget for it. 
 
7 4 4 Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others 
(No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) 
 
The latest case before the Constitutional Court that concerned the right of access to 
public health care services in terms of section 27 (1) and a child’s right to basic health 
care services in terms of section 28 (1) (c) of the Constitution is the case of the 
Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) 2002 
5 SA 721 (CC).  The case started in the Pretoria High Court as an application by the 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and a number of civil society associations to 
order the government (the national Minister of Health and all the provincial 
governments except the Western Cape) to make an antiretroviral drug called 
Nevirapin available in the public health sector for the treatment of HIV-positive 
mothers and pregnant women in order to reduce the risk of transmission of the disease 
to their babies.  The Western Cape Provincial Government was the only government 
in South Africa that, before the start of this case, had a treatment programme in place 
for pregnant women, mothers and their babies to combat mother-to-child transmission 
of HIV.  The government (national Minister of Health and eight provinces) appealed 
to the Constitutional Court against the orders made in the High Court that directed 
them to provide the specific treatment requested by the applicants and to provide an 
effective comprehensive national programme to prevent or reduce the mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV.  The policy of the national Minister of Health at the time was to 
allow the provision of Nevirapin only at certain test sites at various locations in South 
Africa.172  An important constitutional issue before the Constitutional Court was the 
potential impact that the enforcement of a socio-economic right might have on the 
principle of separation of powers. 
 
The scope of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in South Africa and the need for substantive 
measures to combat the spread of the disease is central to this case.  That all spheres 
                                                 
172 Min of Health v TAC(No 2) paras 10 – 15. 
 270
of government have a role to play in addressing this issue is not questioned.  
However, the scope of responsibility of government in this respect, with particular 
reference to the constitutional obligations in sections 27 and 28 of the Constitution, 
was the focus of this case before the Constitutional Court.  The main issue was 
whether government is constitutionally obliged to adopt and implement a 
comprehensive and progressive programme for the prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV throughout the country.173   
 
The Court was again faced with the question of the enforcement of a socio-economic 
right and the financial implications thereof.  It upheld its previous decisions in 
Soobramoney and Grootboom and confirmed that the state has an obligation to give 
effect to socio-economic rights.  The question was whether the government adopted 
reasonable measures to give effect to the right of access to health care services, with 
particular reference to HIV-positive mothers and their newborn babies.  It was not the 
Court’s role to determine the spending priorities of governments when addressing 
various socio-economic needs, but the Court did have an important role to play in 
evaluating the reasonableness of the measures, or programmes, adopted by the state to 
fulfil its constitutional obligations.174  Van Wyk commented that the separation of 
powers is given effect to, when a court has to assess the reasonableness of the 
government’s policy and programmes to give effect to the right of access to health 
care services.175  The court does not assume the role of the executive, but has to 
measure the policy and programmes of government against the constitutional 
requirements.  If it is not reasonable and does therefore not comply with the 
provisions in section 27 of the Constitution, the court can make an order that would 
ensure effective relief for the applicants, even if it affects government policy or 
legislation.176  The Court referred to its decision in Grootboom and stated that in order 
to be reasonable, a programme for the realization of socio-economic rights must be 
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impact on the separation of powers” 2003 (66) THRHR 389 400. 
176 Min of Health v TAC (No 2) para 106; Van Wyk 2003 (66) THRHR 400. 
 
 
 
 271
balanced, flexible, give attention to short, medium and long term needs and may not 
exclude any significant part of the community.177   
 
The Constitutional Court found that the cost of providing Nevirapin to mother and 
child where counselling and testing facilities exist, was within the financial means of 
the state and could thus be provided.178  It was further held that sections 27 (1) and (2) 
of the Constitution warrant a comprehensive and co-ordinated programme by 
government to realise progressively the rights of pregnant women, HIV-positive 
mothers and their babies to have access to health care services to combat mother-to-
child transmission of HIV.  The government policy of a limited treatment programme 
at test sites discriminated against patients, who were not close to the test sites, and 
was not reasonable and therefore did not meet the constitutional standard.179  The 
Court followed the approach in Soobramoney and Grootboom to assess the 
reasonableness of the government policy in giving effect to the right of access to 
health care services, and in doing so contributed to a better understanding of the scope 
of the courts’ jurisdiction vis-à-vis the constitutionality of policies by the executive. 
 
The Constitutional Court ordered the government to remove the restrictions on the 
provision of Nevirapin at public hospitals and clinics and to develop and implement a 
comprehensive treatment program at public hospitals and clinics throughout the 
country.  This must be done progressively and within the available resources, that is, 
in accordance with reasonable measures and with the shortest possible delay.180   
 
An important result of this judgment is that the progressive realisation of socio-
economic rights within the available financial resources of government implies that 
government must provide a reasonable policy and programme to give effect to socio-
economic rights, and that the courts can assess the reasonableness of the measures 
designed and adopted by government.  Although such a review by the courts can have 
an impact on a government’s budget, Van Wyk states correctly that a court’s role is 
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not to reprioritise budget allocations.181  The Constitutional Court was quite clear in 
this respect, when it confirmed that a court is not equipped to decide on the most 
effective allocation of public revenue in a government’s budget.182  That is the task of 
the executive, in particular the Minister of Finance and his nine provincial 
counterparts.   
 
As far as government funding for the fight against HIV/AIDS is concerned, it should 
be noted that as part of a long term strategy, special attention is given to the 
prevention and combating of HIV/AIDS in the Division of Revenue Act 5 of 2002 
and in 2003 and 2004 through the allocation of additional conditional grants to 
provinces.183   
 
7 4 5 Uthukela District Municipality and Others v The President of the RSA and 
Others 2002 11 BCLR 1220 (CC) 
 
The only case so far before the Constitutional Court concerning a dispute between 
organs of state about the division of revenue in terms of section 214 of the 
Constitution, is the case of Uthukela District Municipality and Others v The President 
of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2002 11 BCLR 1220 (CC).  The three 
applicants are Category C municipalities (district municipalities) in KwaZulu-Natal 
and amongst the respondents are the Minister of Finance (second respondent) and the 
Minister of Provincial and Local Government (third respondent).184   
 
The Division of Revenue Act 1 of 2001 (“the 2001 Act”) provides inter alia in section 
3 (1) for the division of revenue raised nationally among the national, provincial and 
local spheres of government.  In section 5 (1) provision is made for the allocation of 
the local government equitable share to individual Category A and B municipalities, 
but no allocation is made to Category C municipalities.185  Uthukela District 
                                                 
181 Van Wyk 2003 (66) THRHR 405. 
182 Min of Health v TAC (No 2) para 37. 
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185 Sec 5 (1) of the 2001 Act provides as follows: 
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Municipality and the other two applicants did not receive an allocation in terms of the 
2001 Act and therefore lodged an application to the Natal High Court, that gave an 
order declaring section 5 (1) of the 2001 Act unconstitutional.  The Constitutional 
Court has to confirm any High Court order of unconstitutionality of an Act of 
Parliament;186 hence this application, that focuses on the entitlement of Category C 
municipalities to part of the equitable share of revenue raised nationally.   
 
The question before the Court was whether category C (district) municipalities are 
entitled to an equitable share of revenue raised nationally.  In a settlement agreement 
that was concluded during the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, it was 
agreed that the first three respondents would pay to each of the three applicants a 
specified amount and that the application for payment of the applicants’ 2001 
equitable share be withdrawn.187  In view of this settlement, which satisfied the 
applicants’ immediate financial needs, the Constitutional Court did not fully address 
the important constitutional questions underlying the applicants’ request, namely the 
issue of the constitutionality of the 2001 Act and the question of whether Category C 
municipalities had a right to an equitable share of revenue raised nationally.  It should  
be noted that at the time of hearing this application in the Constitutional Court, the 
2001 Act had been repealed by the Division of Revenue Act 5 of 2002 (“the 2002 
Act”). This made the question regarding the confirmation of the High Court order 
academic.  The Constitutional Court then decided that in the absence of full argument 
on the constitutional issues concerned and in view of the settlement reached and 
because of the repeal of the 2001 Act, that it should not entertain the question 
concerning confirmation of the High Court order.188 
 
There was a further issue raised by the Constitutional Court, namely that the 
municipalities concerned and the Minister of Finance and other interested parties, 
should first have attempted to resolve this intergovernmental dispute before bringing 
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it to Court.189  The Constitution is quite clear that all organs of state in an 
intergovernmental dispute must make a reasonable effort to resolve such dispute by 
means other than litigation and must exhaust all other remedies before approaching a 
court.190   The Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act 97 of 1997 provides for two 
intergovernmental bodies, namely the Budget Council and the Budget Forum (where 
local government is also represented), where discussions on fiscal, budgetary and 
financial matters take place.  Provision is further made that organs of state should 
make every effort, including using intergovernmental bodies such as the Budget 
Forum, to settle any disputes regarding allocations provided for in that Act, before 
going to court.191  In accordance with the Constitutional Court’s view, the applicants 
should have attempted, in the interest of cooperative government, to resolve this 
dispute within the Budget Forum. 
 
It was to the benefit of the applicants to reach the settlement they reached, because 
they received financial much needed allocations from the national government in 
terms of the settlement. These allocations were needed to fulfil their functions as 
district municipalities.  From a constitutional law perspective it is, however, a pity 
that full argument was not heard on the constitutional questions and that the Court did 
not make a ruling on the question of the right of district municipalities to an equitable 
share of revenue raised nationally.  It would have been the first judgment that 
considered the scope of section 214 and section 227 of the Constitution together with 
the provisions of the relevant Division of Revenue Act and would have contributed to 
a better understanding of the constitutional arrangements pertaining to financial 
intergovernmental relations.192 It is apparent from the judgment that an aggrieved 
party, such as the Uthukela District Municipality, should utilise intergovernmental 
mechanisms, like the Budget Forum, to try and resolve its dispute. 
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7 4 6 Comments 
 
There are a number of reasons why the Constitutional Court has so far not given any 
judgments regarding the substance of the equitable division of revenue.  The fact that 
there is a constitutional imperative that all other remedies should be utilised before 
intergovernmental disputes are brought before a court certainly has a suppressing 
effect on potential Constitutional Court judgments in this field, but the most important 
reason is perhaps that the political stage of South Africa is dominated by a single 
ruling party.  This limits the possibility of legal disputes regarding the division of 
revenue and of the Constitutional Court having to rule on such matters.  
 
The value of the decision of the Constitutional Court in the Liquor Bill-case lies 
primarily in the fact that the Court made a thorough analysis of the constitutional 
demarcation of the legislative functions between the national and provincial spheres 
of government.  This was a particularly difficult matter because of the fact that the 
Bill contained provisions that fell within both the concurrent and exclusive provincial 
legislative areas.  The division of functions was one of the most contentious and 
difficult matters during the constitutional negotiations and during the certification 
process before the Constitutional Court.  This judgment is therefore important for the 
further development of the South African constitutional system and for a better 
understanding of the Constitution, since it provides meaning to the exclusive 
provincial legislative powers and it gives some guidance regarding the understanding 
of national intervention powers in terms of section 44 (2) of the Constitution. 
 
The fact that the Constitutional Court confirmed that ‘liquor licenses’ is an exclusive 
provincial legislative competence is also significant for the subject of this dissertation, 
since it establishes a potential source of provincial own revenue, something provinces 
are in need of. 
 
Although it was a case about socio-economic rights, one of the underlying issues in 
Soobramoney was the question regarding the scope of the Constitutional Court’s 
review power over policy decisions by the executive.  Both the High Court and the 
Constitutional Court held in this case that the decision by the KwaZulu-Natal Health 
Department to refuse Soobramoney’s claim for dialysis treatment was essentially a 
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political one and that they would not interfere with that decision.  Van Wyk 
commented that the Court’s review of the decision by the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial 
Government was correctly done since it weighed and balanced the financial 
constraints of the Provincial Government, the rights of other patients and 
Soobramoney’s right to health care before finding that the decision by the Provincial 
Government was under the particular circumstances a reasonable decision.193  The 
Constitutional Court did not analyse the different policy options or the way funds 
were allocated, as they would have been interfering in the policy decisions that the 
executive make and would therefore have been unconstitutional.194  In this manner the 
principal of separation of powers was adhered to. 
 
The Constitutional Court in Grootboom gave a clear indication of how effect should 
be given to the constitutional requirements regarding the progressive realisation of 
socio-economic rights, but at the same time acknowledged that they are very difficult 
to enforce and that one will have to assess it on a case by case basis.195  Again, as in 
Soobramoney, the Court based its decision on the test of the reasonableness of the 
measures taken by government to give effect to the applicable constitutional 
requirements.  The relevance of these judgments, as well as the Constitutional Court’s 
judgment in Minister of Health v TAC (No 2), for this study, lies in the fact that 
governments in all three spheres must, amongst other policy considerations, take into 
account the requirements relating to the fulfilment of socio-economic rights when 
determining their budget priorities.  They in fact have a specific duty to progressively 
give effect to the socio-economic rights contained in the Constitution.196 
 
In the only case so far that concerns the division of revenue in terms of section 214 of 
the Constitution, namely Uthukela District Municipality v President of the RSA, the 
Constitutional Court did not discuss the scope of section 214 and section 227 of the 
Constitution and the consequential legislation, namely the Division of Revenue Act, 
as a settlement between the parties was reached prior to full argument and because of 
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 277
the fact that the 2001 Act, that was in question, had been repealed.197 No real insight 
was thus gained regarding the scope of these constitutional provisions governing the 
financial intergovernmental relations. 
 
In the recent cases of Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others 
and Mahlaule and Another v Minister of Social Development and Others 2004 6 
BCLR 569 (CC), the Constitutional Court gave further direction to the state’s 
responsibility to progressively give effect to socio-economic rights.  In these cases the 
right of access to social security in terms of section 27 (1) (c) of the Constitution was 
highlighted.198 Mokgoro J, in a majority judgment, stated that when assessing the 
reasonableness of legislative or other measures taken by the state, the desirability of 
the specific measures or the prioritisation of expenditure obligations would not be 
questioned by a court.199  In assessing the reasonableness of the legislation, the Court 
must inter alia consider the purpose of the social security provisions and the impact it 
has on other intersecting rights.  The Constitutional Court concluded that the specific 
legislative provisions governing the payment of social security grants were not 
reasonable since they excluded permanent residents from the application of the law 
and this affected their dignity and equality.200  The right to have access to social 
security is awarded to everyone and not only to citizens.   
 
This judgment demonstrates an important feature of the South African cases, namely 
how obligations with respect to socio-economic rights impact on financial 
intergovernmental relations, in particular the vertical division of revenue.  It places an 
additional financial obligation, the size of which is unclear, on government to make 
sufficient financial provision for the payment of social security grants to permanent 
residents.   
 
This judgment contributed to a better understanding of the implications of 
implementing socio-economic rights.  In particular, it gave further guidance to 
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government regarding the way in which the “progressive realisation” of such rights 
should be addressed in practice. 
 
7 5 Conclusion 
 
The judgments discussed in this chapter underline the important role of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Constitutional Court in upholding the principle of 
constitutional supremacy and confirms the principle of separation of powers and the 
necessary interplay between these two fundamental constitutional principles.201  In a 
recent judgment, the Constitutional Court very aptly described this position as 
follows: 
 
“The Constitution requires the courts to ensure that all branches of 
government act within the law.  The three branches of government are indeed 
partners in upholding the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of 
law.”202  
 
In both Germany and South Africa, the respective constitutional provisions relating to 
the allocation of functions and the division of finances, provide a framework that must 
be complemented by additional legislation.  Any such legislation must obviously 
comply with the relevant constitutional provisions and in this respect it is the role of 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Constitutional Court respectively, to test the 
legislation against the constitutional provisions and, in doing so, give effect to the 
principle of supremacy of the constitution.  The Bundesverfassungsgericht was, since 
its inception in 1951, instrumental at crucial times in Germany’s constitutional history 
and has given guidance to the further development of the constitutional system, in 
particular as far as it relates to the allocation of functions and the financial 
constitution.  This court continues to play this role, as is evident in the latest case on 
financial equalisation, namely, Financial equalisation case IV.203 The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht gave clear direction to the Federal Parliament in this case 
about the legislation to be developed in terms of section 106 and 107 of the Basic 
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Law, while at the same time recognising the scope of the legislature’s function to give 
content to these constitutional provisions.  This confirms the principle of separation of 
powers and the important place of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in the system of 
checks and balances. 
 
The Constitutional Court, which was established in 1994, has also left its mark on the 
shaping of South Africa’s new constitutional order.  It has, however, played a limited 
role in the area of jurisprudence relating to the constitutional accommodation of the 
division of functions and the allocation of financial resources to the various spheres of 
government.  This could be ascribed to a combination of the following factors: 
 
1. The dominating role that human rights jurisprudence has occupied since 1994; 
2. A growing human rights culture in South Africa; 
3. The fact that an important part of the South African constitutional philosophy, 
as described in Chapter 3 of the Constitution, is that intergovernmental 
disputes should first be resolved by means other than litigation and that the 
Constitutional Court should only be the final arbiter.  South Africa has its own 
political agenda and priorities.  The  need to address the legacy of apartheid 
and to relieve poverty will not only determine spending priorities, it will also 
influence decisions on constitutional litigation;  
4. The particular South African political context which is characterised by the 
dominance of the ruling party and the absence of political contest  between 
provinces inter se and between provinces and the national government;  
5. The fact that the new South African constitutional order has been in place for 
only one decade and the time it has taken the new institutions to be properly 
established and new legislation and intergovernmental relations, mechanisms 
and structures to be developed;   
6. The absence of a history of federalism.  The provinces are not rooted in a long 
history of constitutional and political legitimacy and popular sentiment.  They 
are part of a recent political settlement and a compromise formula, not the 
source of major contestation; and  
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7.  Since the adoption of the South African Constitution the “federal” issue has 
declined in importance and there are new concerns about effective governance 
and fiscal and financial discipline.   
 
 It is evident from all the German judgments discussed in this Chapter that there is an 
important difference in the constitutional philosophy in Germany compared to that in 
South Africa, namely, that contrary to the South African situation, there is no explicit 
provision in the Basic Law that requires organs of state to first try and resolve their 
disputes out of court before they approach the Bundesverfassungsgericht. There are 
thus, at least as far as the Basic Law is concerned, no obstacles in the way of any 
organ of state to take an intergovernmental dispute to the Bundesverfassungsgericht.   
 
An important difference in the approach of the two constitutional courts is the role of 
Bundestreue.  The Bundesverfassungsgericht has been quite active over the years in 
developing specific obligations of the Bund and the Länder respectively based on the 
principle of Bundestreue, that in turn relates to the federal state principle contained in 
the Basic Law.204 The Constitutional Court, on the other hand, has so far not been that 
creative, for the reasons indicated above.  In the absence of a Constitutional Court 
judgment about the equitable division of revenue between the spheres of government, 
one can only speculate about how far the Constitutional Court would act  to give more 
content to the financial equalisation provisions.  It is likely that the Constitutional 
Court will follow its basic philosophical view and take a conservative approach to 
questions relating to the division of functions and questions regarding financial 
equalisation.  If there were competition between the provinces and the national 
government, it is likely that the Court would have had to adjudicate more disputes 
about the division of revenue. In these cases constitutional concepts such as “co-
operative government” and “equitable division of revenue” would perhaps be further 
developed. 
 
It is further evident that the fundamental constitutional principles of a federal, 
democratic and social state are overarching constitutional principles that guide the 
interpretation of intergovernmental and structural issues and human rights issues.  
                                                 
204 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence 72 – 75. 
 281
Starck commented in this respect that in interpreting these structural principles of the 
Basic Law, one must have regard for the expression of these principles in the 
constitutional norms of organisation, competence and procedure.205  When, for 
example, the division of legislative functions or the allocation of funds in terms of 
financial equalisation legislation is the subject matter of a dispute before the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, the fundamental principles of a democratic and social 
federal state would be interpreted as they find expression in the relevant provisions on 
organisation, competence and procedure.  In all four of the judgments discussed here 
the Court followed this approach and tested the applicable financial legislation and 
Articles 106 and 107 of the Basic Law against the fundamental principles contained in 
other parts of the Basic Law, for example, the federal principle in Article 20.  It is 
therefore clear that the fundamental principles in the Basic Law indeed play a key role 
in understanding and giving effect to the constitutional provisions relating to the 
allocation of functions and division of revenue to the Bund and the Länder 
respectively.   
 
The application of the federal principle, that describes the nature of the constitutional 
system in the financial equalisation process was confirmed in all four of the 
judgments of the Bundesverfassungsgericht discussed here.  The Court stated, in 
Financial Equalisation Case I and confirmed in subsequent judgments, that the 
financially stronger Länder have a duty to support the financially weaker Länder in 
such a way that it does not lead to a total equalisation of their financial positions.206 
Von Münch commented that financial equalisation is an expression of federal 
solidarity.207  This is not only important for the functioning of the financial 
equalisation system in Germany, but is also of value to the financial equalisation 
system in South Africa.  ‘Federal solidarity’ implies that the various governments 
should assist one another, and in particular in cases of financial need that the richer 
governments (Bund and Länder) should support the financially weaker Länder. 
   
                                                                                                                                            
205 Starck Constitutional Interpretation 65. 
206 BVerfGE 1, 117 para 44. 
207 Von Münch GG Komm 842. 
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In South Africa with its huge economic disparities between the different provinces, 
the application of this notion would mean that provinces must be able to support each 
other financially. This implies that provinces should have more own sources of 
revenue that would enable them to fulfil this supportive role to assist one another.  
Currently it is only the national government that assists provinces in financial need 
and there is no question of solidarity.  If cooperative government is further developed, 
especially on a horizontal level in South Africa, the notion of ‘federal solidarity’ 
would be an element to be considered. 
 
Another important aspect of the German judgments discussed above, is the statement 
that the financial equalisation system is a multiphased system of division of revenue 
throughout the country that aims to enable the Bund and the Länder to fund their 
respective constitutional obligations.208  In other words, the financial resources must 
be allocated in such a way that the respective governments can each play a 
constructive role in fulfilling their respective constitutional mandates.  The South 
African Constitution echoes this view by the inclusion of a provision relating to the 
funding for provincial and local governments, namely section 227 (1) that refers to the 
entitlement of local government and each province “to an equitable share of revenue 
raised nationally to enable it to provide basic services and perform the functions 
allocated to it”.  This matter was referred to in Uthukela District Municipality, but in 
view of the out of court settlement reached there was, unfortunately not analysed.209   
 
The recent reconsideration of the functioning of the financial equalisation system in 
Germany, after the judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Financial 
Equalisation Case IV, is not only a significant milestone, but also perhaps a turning 
point in the development of the German financial equalisation system.  In this respect 
it should firstly be noted that particular provisions enshrined in the Basic Law play a 
key role and must be adhered to, namely, the federal principle or solidarity amongst 
the Länder (Article 20), the recognition of the financial autonomy of the Länder 
(Article 104a and 109) and the prohibition against an absolute equalisation of the 
financial capacity of the Länder (Article 107 (2)).  In providing the constitutionally 
                                                 
208 BVerfGE 86, 148 213. 
209 Uthukela District Municipality para 2 – 3. 
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required legislation for financial equalisation, the Federal Parliament must give effect 
to these principles in a balanced way.  If too much emphasis is placed on either 
solidarity amongst the Länder or the recognition of their financial autonomy, it will 
have negative effects on the financial equalisation system and will then not be in 
compliance with the Basic Law.  It is thus important in a decentralised system of 
government to have clear principles contained in the constitution guiding the 
development of legislation for financial equalisation, and that the notions of financial 
autonomy and solidarity or cohesion amongst the provinces should be accommodated 
in a balanced way.  Such clear principles are lacking in the case of South Africa, and 
could have been useful in the further development of financial intergovernmental 
relations if they were included in the Constitution. 
 
It is evident from all the judgments of the Constitutional Court discussed here, that it 
either expressly or by implication confirmed the principle of constitutional supremacy 
when it tested both executive decisions and legislation against the provisions of the 
Constitution.  The Liquor Bill-case perhaps provided the clearest reference to this 
when the Court described the division of functions in the new constitutional order.210  
The three judgments on socio-economic rights highlighted the dire socio-economic 
needs of a large section of society in South Africa as well as the difficulties facing 
government in addressing these needs.  The Constitutional Court further made it clear 
in these three judgments that the national government, each province and the 
municipalities (where applicable) should accept their financial responsibility to 
address the socio-economic rights but it was acknowledged that these rights cannot be 
immediately fulfilled.     
 
The sometimes complex nature of the relationship between the judiciary, in particular 
the Constitutional Court and Bundesverfassungsgericht respectively, and the 
executive and legislative arms of government was highlighted in quite a number of 
the judgments discussed here.  It was the symbiotic relationship between the principle 
                                                 
210 Liquor Bill-case 755.  
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of constitutional supremacy and the separation of powers, as Starck described it that 
was demonstrated in these judgments.211   
 
From this analysis concerning some of the key judgments in both Germany and South 
Africa regarding the constitutional accommodation of the allocation of functions and 
division of financial resources, it is evident that constitutional provisions should be 
sufficiently clear and should include specific fundamental principles to guide the 
further development of applicable legislation, including legislation on financial 
equalisation. The Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Constitutional Court are key 
institutions in this respect, although they are not the developers of policy or 
legislation. 
 
 
211 Starck Constitutional Interpretation 52; UDM v President of the RSA (No 2) para 115. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
 
8 1  Constitutional accommodation of financial intergovernmental relations 
 
8 1 1 Impact of economic, political and other considerations 
 
The main question posed in this dissertation is: how does the constitutional arrangement 
regarding the distribution of financial resources and constitutional obligations to the 
various spheres of government in Germany compare with that in South Africa?  In other 
words, what are the particular constitutional arrangements governing financial 
intergovernmental relations in these two decentralized or multi-level systems of 
government, and how do they function?  A mere theoretical comparison of the relevant 
constitutional arrangements in both countries would have only provided a limited view of 
the situation. The socio-economic and political considerations that impacted on the 
design of the particular constitutional arrangements and the practical effect of these 
arrangements was thus also included in this study.   
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Although the basic fiscal and economic model for government designed by Musgrave 
was developed for a unitary system of government, the principles developed by him can 
also be applied to a multi-level system of government.1  In fact, economists, for example, 
Oates and King have built on this basic model for their research on public finance in 
multi-level or federal systems of government.2  It is evident from the discussions in 
Chapter 3 that there is no economic blueprint for the design of financial 
intergovernmental relations in such systems of government.  However, the economic 
guidelines or principles developed over time by economists such as Oates and Musgrave 
provide useful and important guidance in this respect.3  Their basic theoretical model is 
used as a point of departure for both developed and developing countries.  The basic 
economic theory applied to decentralized systems of government suggests that 
expenditure responsibilities regarding the provision of public services can best be 
provided for at a regional or local level and should be decentralized, while macro-
economic stabilization, redistribution of income and the provision of those public goods 
that affect the welfare of all citizens, for example, defence, should be centralized.   
 
It is important to note that in terms of the financial and economic considerations 
discussed above, resource allocation to the various levels of government must be 
equitable and aimed at reducing disparities while economic theory requires that the most 
efficient resource allocation should be obtained.  When there are disparities between 
levels of government or between sub-national units, some form of financial equalisation 
is required to reduce these.  Equity and efficiency considerations are as important in 
designing the financial equalisation mechanisms in decentralized systems of government 
as they are in the basic allocation of expenditure responsibilities and revenue resources to 
the various levels of government.   
 
                                                 
1 Musgrave The Theory of Public Finance (1959) 3; See discussion under 3 1. 
2 Oates Federalism and Government Finance in Quigley & Smolensky (eds) Modern Public Finance 
(1994) 129; Oates Fiscal Federalism (1993) 14 – 17; King Fiscal Tiers: The Economics of Multi-Level 
Government (1984) 36. 
3 Musgrave Public Finance in a Democratic Society (Vol III) (2000) 333; Wehner “Fiscal Federalism in 
South Africa”, 2000 Publius: The Journal of Federalism 47 49; Oates Fiscal Federalism 37. 
 287
When one applies the economic theory as discussed above to Germany and South Africa, 
it is evident that it played a role, whether explicit or implicit, in the development of the 
actual constitutional arrangements regarding allocation of financial resources and 
constitutional obligations.4  In addition, the political considerations and the socio-
economic conditions prevalent at the time of drafting the two constitutions also played a 
part and it is therefore appropriate to consider the combined effect of all these factors.  
 
 The serious socio-economic needs of the people of Germany resulting from the 
devastation of World War II called for a major rebuilding of the country.  This process 
included economic reconstruction initiatives, assistance from the Allied Occupation 
Forces, the development of a new constitution and the election of new political leaders.  
In the process of negotiations and consultations that led to the design of the Basic Law, 
the Allied Occupation Forces played an important role. Political considerations, for 
example, the need to diffuse power to prevent the abuse of power and the prevailing 
socio-economic needs of the people influenced this process that finally resulted in the 
Basic Law.  A compromise reached in the Parliamentary Council on the constitutional 
arrangements regarding the division of obligations and allocation of financial resources 
was essential to this process and the final drafting of the Basic Law.5  Some of the 
important considerations that influenced the discussions in the Parliamentary Council 
were the need to develop a modern economy, the promotion of a welfare state in 
accordance with the principle of uniformity of living standards (Einheitlichkeit der 
Lebensverhältnisse), and the recognition of the financial autonomy of the Länder.6  The 
huge war debt and occupation costs became the responsibility of the Bund.7  While the 
socio-economic situation in the country dictated that most of the taxing powers should be 
allocated to the Bund in order to effectively deal with the economic rebuilding of the 
country, other considerations led to the decentralisation of powers and a particular 
                                                 
4 See discussion under 2 1 1, 4 2 1 and 4 2 2.  
5 Fischer-Menshausen Das Finanzwesen in Von Munch Grundgesetzkommentar Band 3 (1996) 876; Klein 
Bund und Länder nach der Finanzverfassung des Grundgesetzes in Benda Handbuch des 
Verfassungsrechts (1983) 863 865. 
6 Kilper & Lhotta Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1996) 97. 
7 Art 120 of the Basic Law; Fischer-Menshausen "Die Abgrenzung der Finanzverantwortung zwischen 
Bund und Ländern" in Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (November 1952) 673. 
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division of obligations between the Bund and the Länder.8  It can thus be concluded that 
a combination of political considerations, economic guidelines and socio-economic needs 
resulted in the specific constitutional arrangements contained in the Basic Law. 
 
In South Africa, during the early nineties when the new constitutional order had to be 
developed, there was likewise a combination of factors that impacted on the process.  
There was a common understanding amongst all political groups that South Africa 
required a new constitutional order that would lead to the creation of a democratic system 
of government.  There were, however, diverse views regarding the detail of such a new 
constitutional system.  From the start of the constitutional negotiations political 
considerations, such as the structural arrangements of government, intergovernmental 
relations and the content of a bill of rights, rather than economic considerations 
dominated the process.9 Socio-economic considerations such as the extreme poverty in 
some areas, the huge economic disparities between communities and the significant 
infrastructure needs concerning matters such as housing and schools  received political 
attention and thus featured prominently in the constitutional negotiations.  Guidelines in 
terms of economic theory did play a role, albeit not a very prominent one as politics 
seems to have dominated.  The final result was a political compromise between the main 
political forces in the country that emphasized unity while providing for a decentralised 
form of government.10  
 
Expectations of the South African public and the international community were high and 
there was a great deal of pressure on the negotiating parties to reach a compromise.  
Although part of the political compromise, the decentralization of expenditure 
                                                 
8 Fischer-Menshausen "Die Abgrenzung der Finanzverantwortung” 673. 
9 See discussion under 2 2 1 and 4 2 2. 
10 Preamble, sec 1and 40 of the Constitution; Wehner “Fiscal federalism in SA” 47; Haysom Federal 
Features of the Final Constitution in Andrews & Ellmann The Post-Apartheid Constitutions (2001) 504 
507; Van Wyk “’n Paar opmerkings en vrae oor die nuwe Grondwet”, 1997 (60) THRHR 377 391. See 
discussion under 4 2 2.  
 
 
 
 289
responsibilities in the 1996-Constitution is in line with economic theory.11  The allocation 
of revenue sources remains highly centralized resulting in a vertical fiscal gap between 
the national and provincial spheres of government that requires some form of financial 
equalisation.  The particular revenue sharing model included in the 1996-Constitution 
was part of the political compromise reached in the constitutional negotiations.  It is thus 
concluded that, although there was a combination of factors that impacted on the design 
of the new constitutional order in South Africa, political considerations had the biggest 
influence on the final product, the 1996-Constitution. 
 
The differences in constitutional philosophy prevalent when Germany and South Africa 
were drafting their constitutions also influenced the drafting of their own specific 
constitutions and this in turn influenced the functioning of the two systems.  In Germany 
the “bottom up” approach in the creation of the new German state is reflected in the 
constitutional division of powers between the Bund and the Länder .  In the allocation of 
constitutional obligations to the two levels of government there is inter alia a list of 
exclusive functions allocated to the Bund and the residual legislative powers vest in the 
Länder.  In contrast, South Africa’s constitution making followed a “top down” approach. 
Nine provinces were created in 1993 as products of the Constitution and the allocation of 
constitutional obligations to the three levels (after 1996 called spheres) of government 
followed the devolution of power route.  In South Africa’s case the national government 
is vested with residual legislative authority while provincial and local governments have 
legislative authority over specified functional areas.  There was not much of a federal 
culture in South Africa while Germany had a long history of federalism.  The political 
debates at the time of drafting the Basic Law and the South African Constitution were 
quite different and took place in different eras of the twentieth century.  After the War 
there was a real concern that the new German state should not allow too much power at 
the federal level.  There was strong support, from the Allied Forces and the existing 
Länder, for a decentralized or federal system of government where the Länder would 
play a key role.  In the case of South Africa a dominating concern in the constitutional 
                                                 
11  Wehner “Fiscal federalism in SA” 70 – 71. 
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negotiations was to avoid the fragmentation of the past and to build a new united 
democratic South Africa with a decentralized system of government, but one where the 
balance of power would rest with the national government.  This historic difference 
explains the different approaches in the drafting of the respective constitutions and is 
crucial to a better understanding of the functioning of the financial intergovernmental 
relations systems in Germany and South Africa. 
 
A significant characteristic of the German constitutional system is Bundestreue that 
regulates the relationship between the Bund and the Länder and between the Länder 
themselves.  It is specifically in the field of financial intergovernmental relations that 
Bundestreue plays an important role.  It is concluded that Bundestreue that is closely 
linked to the federal state principle, guides the Bund and the Länder in their interaction 
with one another and determines their rights and obligations.  The principle of 
Bundestreue influenced the adoption of the principles of cooperative government and 
intergovernmental relations in Chapter 3 of the South African Constitution that describes 
the relationship between the three spheres of government in South Africa.12  Both South 
Africa and Germany can be described as systems of cooperative federalism or, in terms of 
Simeon’s classification, integrated or shared models in the wide spectrum of federal 
systems of government.13  The parallel between the German and the South African 
constitutional systems is not only important for a better understanding of the general 
functioning of both systems, but is of particular significance when looking at the 
functioning of the financial intergovernmental relations within each country. 
 
The subject matter of this study does not only require that one considers the economic 
and political considerations at the time of drafting the respective constitutions, but it also 
dictates that one considers the way in which they operate today under the prevailing 
socio-economic conditions in Germany and South Africa. This is in order to provide a 
                                                 
12 De Villiers Bundestreue: The Soul of an Intergovernmental Partnership in Occasional Papers March 
1995 6; Bayer Die Bundestreue (1961) 126; see the discussion under 2 3. 
13 Simeon “Considerations in the design of federations: the South African constitution in comparative 
context” 1998 (13) SAPR/PL 42 59. 
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more comprehensive assessment of the two financial intergovernmental relations 
systems.  It is evident that the functioning of the two constitutional systems takes place 
within a particular political and socio-economic context.  Germany has a highly 
developed modern economy and is an economic engine of Europe, however, the 
reunification of Germany placed extra demands on the available financial resources in the 
country and today, after more than a decade of a united Germany, the new Länder still 
have not reached the same economic strength as most of the old Länder.  Financial 
equalisation, as determined in the Basic Law, thus continues to play an important role in 
providing much needed support to the new Länder.  South Africa has enjoyed moderate 
but steady economic growth since 1994, but is still a developing country with huge socio-
economic disparities.  Poverty in large parts of the country creates a high demand for 
basic services that must be delivered by provinces and municipalities. This requires that 
financial equalisation mechanisms continue to play an important role.   
 
This study indicates that the constitutional accommodation of financial intergovernmental 
relations is not merely about structural or organizational issues that are part of 
“traditional” constitutional law.  In view of the importance of economic theory, socio-
economic realities and policy issues relating to financial intergovernmental relations, it is 
concluded that this study falls within a distinct and multi-facetted part of constitutional 
law, that could be described as financial constitutional law.  The following elements are 
included in financial constitutional law in decentralised systems of government: 
♦ Financial and economic considerations in the design and implementation of 
financial intergovernmental relations; 
♦ Policy considerations in the design and implementation of financial 
intergovernmental relations; in other words, the relationship between 
constitutional law and the relevant political and socio-economic context; 
♦ The constitutional allocation of financial resources and expenditure functions to 
the various levels of government; 
♦ Constitutional and other legal provisions relating to revenue sharing or financial 
equalisation mechanisms; and 
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♦ Justiciability of the legal provisions dealing with financial intergovernmental 
relations. 
 
8 1 2 Functioning of system  
 
The analysis of the particular parts of the constitutional systems in Germany and South 
Africa have provided valuable insight into the practical functioning of financial 
intergovernmental relations, in particular of the financial equalisation processes in each 
system.  It is evident from the analysis that in both cases the respective constitutional 
arrangements provide the basis for the financial intergovernmental relations between the 
various spheres of government.  This constitutional basis consists of two elements, 
namely, the allocation of expenditure functions and financial resources to the various 
spheres of government and the framework for financial equalisation mechanisms.  In both 
cases the constitutional framework is augmented by further legislation that provides the 
detail financial equalisation arrangements.  Although this rough outline is similar in both 
systems, there are differences in the detail of the respective legal provisions and in the 
functioning of the two systems.   
 
It is, however, not only legislation that directs the functioning of the two systems, but as 
discussed in Chapter 7, the courts, in particular the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the 
South African Constitutional Court, also play an important role in interpreting the 
constitutional and other legislative arrangements and in giving guidance to the executive 
and legislative arms of government.  The active role that the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
played over the years, in particular in the four judgments on financial equalisation, 
contributed to a better understanding of how the constitutional provisions should be 
interpreted and given effect to.14  It is evident from these judgments that the fundamental 
principles of the German constitutional system, in particular the federal state principle 
and Bundestreue, play a key role in the functioning of the financial intergovernmental 
relations between the Bund and the Länder and between the Länder.  The Court has 
                                                 
14 BVerfGE 1, 117; BVerfGE 72, 330; BVerfGE 86, 148; BVerfGE 101, 158; see discussion under 7 3. 
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reiterated in Financial Equalisation Case IV that it is envisaged by the Basic Law that 
there should always be a careful balance between the solidarity duty of the Länder and 
the Bund and the recognition of the financial autonomy of the Länder.15  This applies 
specifically to the financial equalisation process.  This search for a balance will continue 
to be a focus point at regular discussions and debates concerning financial equalisation in 
Germany. 
 
Judicial review in cases about financial constitutional issues is not always easy to analyse 
since the subject matter includes legal and policy issues that are often intertwined.  It is 
the role of the courts to adjudicate such matters and to measure them against the Basic 
Law or the South African Constitution respectively.   
 
There is a close link or a symbiotic relationship, as Starck points out, between the 
principles of separation of powers and supremacy of the constitution. The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht as guarantor of the Basic Law plays an important role in 
giving effect to these principles.16   This is particularly evident in the judgments of the 
Court on financial intergovernmental relations.  In cases relating to financial equalisation 
there is often a fine line between a constitutional issue, to be decided by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, and a political issue, to be dealt with by the Federal 
Government or the Federal Parliament.  The Bundesverfassungsgericht was criticized by 
some authors for crossing the line in Financial Equalisation Case IV and for actually 
acting as a legislator.17 This perception of the Court as “legislator” was strengthened 
when the Federal Parliament used the exact words from the Court’s judgment in the 
drafting of the Maβstäbegesetz, 2001.  One could criticize the Federal Parliament for a 
lack of innovation in drafting the new Maβstäbegesetz, but as legislator they did follow 
                                                 
15 BVerfGE 101, 158 para A III.4. 
16 Starck Constitutional Interpretation in Starck (ed) Studies in German Constitutionalism (1995) 47 52; 
Herzog The Separation and Concentration of Power in the Basic Law in Kirchhof & Kommers (eds) 
Germany and its Basic Law (1993) 391 395. 
17 Kämmerer Föderalismus als Solidarprinzip in Vitzthum & Winkelman (eds) Bosnien-Herzegovina im 
Horizont Europas – Demokratische und föderale Elemente der Staatswerdung in Südosteuropa (2003) 195 
206. 
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the easy route and used the wording of the judgment to ensure that the law will be 
acceptable to the Bundesverfassungsgericht.   
 
It can be concluded that there is an important interaction between the Federal 
Government, Federal Parliament and the Bundesverfassungsgericht in matters pertaining 
to the relations between the Bund and the Länder, and specifically in relation to financial 
equalisation issues that lie at the heart of the Bund-Länder relations. 
 
Also in the case of South Africa the supremacy of the Constitution and the principle of 
separation of powers are seen as two closely linked cornerstones of the South African 
constitutional order.  The Constitutional Court stated in this respect that the three 
branches of government must cooperate to uphold the supremacy of the Constitution.18 
As far as the functioning of the financial intergovernmental relations in South Africa is 
concerned, the Constitutional Court has not yet had much opportunity to give further 
content to the meaning of the relevant constitutional provisions.  In the absence of a 
judgment on an intergovernmental dispute regarding the equitable division of revenue, it 
is difficult to say whether the Constitutional Court would play the same active role as the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht in the development of financial constitutional law.  The 
Constitutional Court’s basic conservative philosophy will most likely guide its approach 
in cases concerned with financial constitutional issues.  It is evident from the human 
rights cases discussed in Chapter 7 that the Court is quite aware of the interaction 
between the principle of separation of powers and the supremacy of the Constitution.  In 
upholding the Constitution, the Court made it clear in Minister of Health and Others v 
Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) that it has the authority to decide on the 
constitutionality of policy issues, even if they have financial implications, but that it 
cannot decide on the most effective way a government should determine its budget.19 
Although the human rights cases were not concerned with the functioning of the financial 
                                                 
18 President of the RSA v United Democratic Movement 2003 1 SA 472 (CC) para 25. 
19 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 37; Van Wyk “The enforcement of the right of access to health care in the 
context of HIV/AIDS and its impact on the separation of powers” 2003 (66) THRHR 389 405; see 
discussion under 7 4 4. 
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intergovernmental relations system, it is evident that the implementation of socio-
economic rights can have a direct financial implication for government since it has to 
make provision in its budget to give effect to such rights. This could in turn influence the 
financial equalisation process if, for example, additional allocations are made to 
provinces to provide specific treatment for HIV/AIDS patients, thus giving effect to the 
right of access to health care services.20   
 
As far as the functioning of the financial intergovernmental relations system in both 
countries is concerned, it is evident that different approaches to the design and 
functioning of financial equalisation have led to different results.  In the case of Germany 
the basic constitutional framework is clear and does not appear to be problematic.  The 
same can, however, not be said of the financial equalisation process and the applicable 
legislation. The complex nature of the legal provisions governing financial equalisation in 
Germany seems to add to the problems regarding the functioning of the financial 
equalisation system. It can, however, be argued that the very detailed and mechanistic 
formulation of the German Financial Equalisation Act (1993) limits the scope for 
arbitrary decisions that could be to the detriment of the Länder.   
 
In the case of South Africa there is less detail in both the Constitution and in the financial 
equalisation legislation. This creates a reasonably clear legal framework but leaves ample 
room for political decisions pertaining to the division of revenue.  The one model is not 
necessarily better than the other.  It can, however, be concluded that in developing the 
appropriate model for a financial equalisation legal framework at least the following 
issues should be considered, namely: 
♦ there should be scope for an objective formula that should be the basis of the 
financial equalisation process, while some flexibility that is important for 
government as it allows for policy choices and weighing up of expenditure 
priorities is also important; 
♦ there should be a balance between detailed provisions and simple language; and 
                                                 
20 Sec 27 (1) (a) of the Constitution. 
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♦ there should be a clear constitutional objective concerning financial equalisation. 
 
Co-operative government in South Africa and Bundestreue in Germany determine the 
interaction between the various constituent governments.21 This is nowhere more visible 
than in the area of financial intergovernmental relations.  The Budget Council in South 
Africa and its German equivalent, the Finanzministerkonferenz (Finance Ministers’ 
meeting) are crucial to the successful functioning of these relations in both countries.  It 
is in these meetings that many discussions regarding financial equalisation take place, 
guided by the principles of co-operative government and Bundestreue respectively.  It 
should, however, be noted that the political contexts in the two countries differ in many 
ways and this factor impacts on the functioning of the financial intergovernmental 
relations systems.  
 
There is a further angle to the role of Bundestreue and the principles of co-operative 
government respectively in the functioning of the two financial intergovernmental 
relations systems.  Bundestreue, based on the Bundesstaatprinzip (federal state principle) 
in Article 20 of the Basic Law, requires that the Bund and the Länder have a duty to assist 
each other and, at the horizontal level, that the financially stronger Länder have a duty to 
assist the financially weaker Länder.22  This is also referred to as the solidarity duty.  
Financial equalisation in Germany is thus in essence a practical application of 
Bundestreue.  This was particularly evident in the period after unification when the 
rebuilding of the new Länder and their eventual inclusion in the financial equalisation 
system called for extraordinary high financial contributions by the Bund and the 
financially stronger old Länder that all made sacrifices to assist the financially weaker 
Länder.23 
   
                                                 
21 See discussion under 2 3 and 4 4; Von Münch Staatsrecht Band I  (1993) 237, 240. 
22 See discussion under 5 3; Häde Finanzausgleich (1996) 257; BVerfGE 1, 117 131; Wieland “Die 
verfassungsrechtliche Rahmenordnung des Finanzausgleichs”, 1988 (8) Jura  410 419. 
23 See discussion under 5 5. 
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The duty to assist is not without limits. This was clearly pointed out by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht in the latest case on financial equalisation, when it stated that 
reasonable financial equalisation does not mean an absolute equalisation of the financial 
disparity of the Länder.24  Placing limits on the reasonable financial equalisation means 
that there should be a balance between solidarity and the financial autonomy of the 
Länder.  It is therefore concluded that the federal state principle and Bundestreue are 
fundamental to the successful functioning of the constitutional system in Germany and in 
particular for the financial intergovernmental relations between the Bund and the Länder 
and between the individual Länder. 
 
The principles of co-operative government in the case of South Africa are, at least in 
principle, equally important in the functioning of South Africa’s financial 
intergovernmental relations.  This has however only been tested in one political context 
dominated by one party and it remains to be seen how effective it would be in a political 
setting similar to that of Germany where there is a more even division of power.  It is 
argued that these principles would be of even greater importance in a context where there 
is competition between provinces and central government and between the various 
political parties in the provinces.   
 
In terms of section 41 (1) (h) of the Constitution all spheres of government and organs of 
state must support and assist one another, in other words, there is a “solidarity duty”.  The 
fact that the South African provinces have less financial autonomy than the German 
Länder does not detract from the fact that they and the national and local governments 
must adhere to these principles. Lacking in the case of South Africa is a clear 
constitutional aim that is directly linked to financial equalisation or division of revenue, 
for example, to ensure the equality of living conditions throughout the country.  The 
importance of co-operation between all constituent governments in South Africa to give 
effect to the constitutional requirements regarding financial equalisation should not be 
                                                 
24 BVerfGE 101, 158 par A III. 4 (c), C I.2 (c). 
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underestimated and this was in fact mentioned in the Budget Review 2003.25 South Africa 
still has serious socio-economic needs regarding issues such as housing, water, medical 
services and schools and to effectively address these needs, a high degree of cooperation 
between all spheres of government is required.  In addition, many municipalities and 
some provinces still lack sufficient administrative capacity to fulfil their constitutional 
obligations effectively.  Financial equalisation that is aimed both at the equitable 
distribution of funds to all three spheres of government and at improving the quality of 
life of everybody in the country, requires a co-operative approach to realize these aims.26  
It is therefore concluded that the principles of co-operative government are fundamental 
to the practical functioning of financial intergovernmental relations in South Africa. 
 
8 2  Current challenges 
 
An important question relating to the subject of the dissertation is: What important 
current challenges impact on the functioning of the constitutional systems, and 
particularly on the financial aspects of the constitutional systems in Germany and South 
Africa?  It would appear that some of the challenges are of a legal nature while others are 
of a socio-economic nature, but due to the nature of the subject and the fact that legal and 
socio-economic issues are sometimes interrelated, they are treated simultaneously in this 
discussion.  Although there could be a variety of challenges facing government, the focus 
in this discussion is on two serious challenges within each country. 
 
8 2 1 New improved financial legislation in Germany 
 
In Germany the Bundesverfassungsgericht in the latest case regarding financial 
equalisation, decided that the system is not functioning as determined by the Basic Law 
and must therefore be amended to bring it in line with constitutional provisions.27  
                                                 
25 National Treasury Budget Review 2003 239. 
26 See discussion under 6 5 1; FFC Framework Document for Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in South 
Africa (1995) iii. 
27 Financial equalisation case IV BVerfGE 101, 158.  See discussion under 7 2 4. 
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Federal Parliament was instructed to follow a different approach to financial equalisation  
to simplify the legislation.  The problem the Court faced was partially a historical issue, 
namely, it was centered around the question of what “a reasonable equalisation of 
financial disparity of the Länder” means.  The problem was exacerbated by the 
unification of Germany and the huge financial and economic needs that had to be 
addressed.28  Today, more than ten years after unification and even after billions of 
Deutsch Mark and euro have been pumped into the new Länder through the German 
Unity Fund and as a result of financial equalisation, serious socio-economic needs in 
parts of Germany still exist.  The fact that financial disparities between the Länder 
existed historically and continue to exist, implies that there must be some form of 
financial equalisation in order to give effect to the constitutional aim of ensuring equal 
living conditions throughout the country.  This is not questioned.  It is the implementation 
of this that has caused the problems that were addressed by the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
in 1999.29 
 
In its analysis of the functioning of the financial equalisation system vis-à-vis the 
constitutional framework, the Court in Financial equalisation case IV recognized the 
financial autonomy of the Länder on the one hand and the constitutional obligation to 
assist one another (solidarity duty) on the other hand.30  In doing so the Court underlined 
the inherent tension in the Basic Law that forms an essential part of the federal 
constitutional order that was created in 1949.  It is evident from the Court’s judgment that 
a balanced approach is required to give effect to these and other constitutional 
requirements in Article 106 and 107 of the Basic Law.  The problem is to find the right 
balance. Addressing the needs of financially weaker Länder through financial 
equalisation, without causing a disincentive for Länder to perform well, is quite a 
                                                 
28 Already in the first case on financial equalisation (BVerfGE 1, 117 para 45) this question was discussed 
by the Court.  See discussion under 5 5 and 7 3. 
29 BVerfGE 101, 158. 
30 BVerfGE 101, 158 par C II.2 (c).  See Beierl Reforming Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Germany: 
The Bavarian Point of View (2001) 8; Bayerische Staatsministerium der Finanzen et al Die Reform  des 
Finanzausgleichs – Föderale, ökonomische und verfassungsrechtliche Aspekte (1998) 1. 
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challenge.  The Court has directed the Federal Parliament to follow a balanced approach 
in creating new legislation to give effect to the constitutional framework. 
 
The very complicated financial equalisation mechanisms contained in the Financial 
Equalisation Act (1993), in particular with regard to horizontal financial equalisation, 
were difficult to understand and implement and caused concern among some of the 
Länder.31 This problem was raised by various parties before the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht in Financial equalisation case IV where the financial 
equalisation system was referred to by some Länder as incomprehensible and opaque.32    
Prior to this milestone case Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg advocated a reform of the 
financial equalisation system at various opportunities and even published a reform 
proposal for a simplified and more transparent system.33 The simplification of the legal 
provisions governing the financial equalisation system remains a challenge, not only to 
make it more comprehensible but also to create a legal framework for the division of 
financial resources that is transparent and that promotes accountability.  The Court gave a 
direct instruction to the Federal Parliament to draft a standards law that contains objective 
criteria for the actual division of finances and which creates a transparent system of 
financial equalisation.34  
 
The adoption of the Maβstäbegesetz and the Finanzausgleichgesetz followed a 
compromise reached between the Bund and the Länder regarding the “best” way to give 
effect to the decision of the Court. This however did not turn out to be the best result 
Germany needed.  The development of a standards Act raises the question what the status 
of this Act is.  The Finanzausgleichgesetz must still be measured against the Basic Law, 
and now must also be measured against the Maβstäbegesetz that clearly cannot have the 
same or higher status than the Basic Law.  The contents of the Finanzausgleichgesetz, 
2001 is not really simpler, and not that different either, when compared to the previous 
                                                 
31 See discussion under 5 4. 
32 BVerfGE 101, 158 par A III.9. 
33 Bayerische Staatsministerium der Finanzen et al Der neue Finanzausgleich – einfach federal gerecht 
(1998). 
34 BVerfGE 101, 158 par C I. 1 (e). 
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financial equalisation legislation.  It is debatable whether the Maβstäbegesetz, 2001, and 
the Finanzausgleichgesetz, 2001, meet the constitutional requirements and if it really is 
an improvement on the current legislative arrangements contained in the 
Finanzausgleichgesetz, 1993.   
 
8 2 2 Socio-economic needs of the new Länder  
 
The relatively weaker economic situation in the new Länder continues to pose a 
challenge to the Bund and the financially stronger old Länder.  An indication of the 
economic woes of the eastern Länder is their relatively high unemployment compared to 
that of most of the other Länder.  According to recent statistics the average 
unemployment rate in the eastern Länder is 18,2%, while the average rate in the western 
Länder is 8,3%.35  A further example of the weaker financial position of some of the 
eastern Länder is the situation of Berlin, the capital city and one of the sixteen Länder.  
Berlin finds itself in a severe budgetary crisis and made an application to the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht to question the constitutionality of the Finanzausgleichgesetz, 
1993.  This application was based on the solidarity duty of the Bund and the other Länder 
to assist a Land that is in a severe financial crisis.36  
 
In giving effect to the constitutional demand of ensuring equal living conditions in the 
federal territory the Bund, with the assistance of the Länder, have to secure financial 
support for and the economic development of the new Länder.  While the current 
solidarity agreement is nearing the end of its lifespan in 2004, a second solidarity 
agreement (Solidarpakt II) was agreed to by the Federal Government and the Ministers-
President of the 16 Länder on 23 June 2001.37  This solidarity agreement, with a total 
expenditure of euro 306 billion, will be implemented from 1 January 2005 for the 
                                                 
35 Schmitt “Mühsame Suche nach den Jobs” Süddeutsche Zeitung (9. Oktober 2003) 22. 
36 Nölte “Ein ‘Notland’ hofft auf Solidarpflicht” Neues Deutschland (6. September 2003) 1.  At the time of 
writing this dissertation the matter has not yet been heard by the Court. 
37 Bundesregierung Jahresbericht der Bundesregierung zum Stand der Deutschen Einheit 2003 (September 
2003) 20; Bundesregierung “Bundesregierung und Länder einigen sich auf Länderfinanzausgleich und  
Solidarpakt II” www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Themen_A-Z/Aufbau-Ost-
,6771/Laenderfinanzausgleich-und-Sol.htm 
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following fifteen years.  The Solidarpakt II provides the legal and financial foundation 
for the aid programs for the new Länder, often referred to as the Aufbau Ost (rebuilding 
of the east), and includes investment aid, incentives and direct financial contributions as 
part of the financial equalisation process.  The focus areas within the Aufbau Ost are 
investment promotion, innovation and research, infrastructure development and job 
creation.38  The Federal Government’s aim for the Aufbau Ost is to create more jobs and 
training opportunities that would contribute to sustainable economic growth in a modern 
economy that is directly linked to the constitutional aim of ensuring an equalisation of 
living standards between the east and the west in Germany.  This is a huge endeavour to 
rebuild the economy and the social fibre of the new Länder in the east and will continue 
to be a major challenge for both the Bund and the financially stronger Länder in the west 
for the next couple of years. 
 
8 2 3 Good governance in South Africa 
 
Provinces and municipalities have not yet developed their full potential as 
constitutionally distinctive governments, and often still lack sufficient administrative 
capacity and adequate financial resources to fulfil their constitutional obligations. The 
Butterworth intervention at local government level and the poor record of some provinces 
and many municipalities in the delivery of services are examples of current problems in 
the implementation of the constitutional system. This indicates that the initial 
constitutional dream has not yet been realized.39 This situation fuels the case of some 
critics who want to abolish provinces.  These problems do however not suggest that the 
constitutional system per se is flawed, but rather that there are implementation issues that 
should be addressed.  Good governance, including sound financial management and 
accountability, is not negotiable and is mandated by the Constitution and should be 
applied to all three spheres of government.   
 
                                                 
38 Bundesregierung Jahresbericht 2003 16. 
39 Murray & Simeon “South Africa’s financial constitution: towards better delivery?” 2000 (15) SAPR/PL 
477 503. 
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Sound public financial management and effective administration are the basis for good 
governance. In addition, an effective financial intergovernmental relations system would 
support good governance and improve service delivery.40  In the case of South Africa 
transparency and accountability are clear objectives for budgetary processes and financial 
management stipulated in the Constitution. Effect is given to this requirement inter alia 
by way of the adoption and implementation of the Public Finance Management Act, 1 of 
1999, the national and provincial treasury regulations that followed, medium term 
financial planning, the improvement of the quality of publications relating to budgets, the 
division of finances and financial management.41 The Public Finance Management Act 
has contributed significantly to better and more regular reporting, improved financial 
management and more detailed and informative reports on the spending of public funds 
within the national and provincial spheres of government.  This Act is performance and 
output oriented and in terms of the Act accounting officers are required to submit 
measurable objectives for each main division within a vote. They must also give account 
of all votes in an annual report.42  The National Treasury indicated in the 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2003 that, although there has been a remarkable 
improvement in public financial management, there remains a challenge to bring all 
government departments and provinces to the same standard of budgeting, financial 
management and reporting.  There is therefore a need to improve the quality of budgeting 
and financial management.43  
 
A major challenge is currently to introduce sound financial management practices to local 
government in South Africa. These should be similar to those that apply to the national 
and provincial governments in terms of the Public Finance Management Act.  During the 
second half of 2003 a comprehensive Act, the Municipal Finance Management Act, 56 of 
                                                 
40 Murray 2000 (15) SAPR/PL 503. 
41 Sec 215 and 216 (1) of the Constitution; National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2003 (2003) 
7.  
42 Sec 27 (4) and 40 (3) (a) of Act 1 of 1999; Visser & Erasmus The Management of Public Finance (2002) 
256. 
43 National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2003 7. 
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2003, was adopted by Parliament.44  This Act introduced key financial reforms for local 
government.  The object of the Act is “to secure sound and sustainable management of 
the financial affairs of municipalities and municipal entities by establishing norms and 
standards and other requirements” for a range of financial issues, such as budgeting, 
financial planning, borrowing, reporting and handling of financial problems in 
municipalities.45  The 284 municipalities in South Africa face many challenges ranging 
from developing required skills to developing appropriate administrative capacities 
required to provide basic services to the poorest of communities.  It is essential that all 
the municipalities be well managed according to sound financial management practices.  
The implementation of the Municipal Finance Management Act will add a further 
challenge to municipalities, but it is essential that they obtain the necessary expertise as 
quickly as possible and follow the proposed financial management prescripts in order to 
promote good governance and enhance service delivery.46  Capacity problems and 
insufficient payment for municipal services continue to hamper the effective functioning 
of municipalities in South Africa.  It remains a challenge to all spheres of government to 
ensure that administrative and financial management skills are developed to build 
sufficient capacity at municipal level as this will ensure good governance.  National and 
provincial governments have a constitutional obligation to assist municipalities in this 
respect.  This is an area where much more can be done by assisting weaker municipalities 
to strengthen the capacity of local government to deliver.  
 
Although the transparency and accountability requirements pose a continuous challenge 
to all spheres of government in South Africa, it is being attended to in a constructive and 
evolutionary manner.   
 
 
 
                                                 
44 The Act was assented to by the President on 9 February 2004 and published in Government Gazette No. 
26019 of 13 February 2004. 
45 Sec 2 of the Municipal Finance Management Act. 
46 Anon “No quick fix” Business Day (Monday, 15 September 2003) 6. 
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8 2 3 Addressing HIV/AIDS in South Africa  
 
It is a well-known fact that Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest infection rate of HIV in 
the world.  South Africa, being one of the countries, where the spread of HIV/AIDS is 
quite high, faces serious social and economic problems.47  The scope of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic in South Africa, in particular in a province such as KwaZulu-Natal, places high 
demands on the budgets of provinces as provinces are responsible for health care 
services, where most of the spending on HIV/AIDS takes place. Some demands are also 
made on education, where awareness and life skills programs are implemented in schools 
to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS.  As AIDS patients become unable to work and the 
number of AIDS orphans increases, there is also a higher demand for social service 
support, which means further pressure on the budgets of provinces and this will then 
influence the equitable division of revenue. 
 
Although provinces must budget for specific treatment or awareness programs as part of 
their normal budgets, it is not nearly enough to deal with the high cost of treatment for 
HIV/AIDS patients.  Additional allocations from the national government’s share of 
revenue dedicated to treatment programs (health), awareness campaigns (education) and 
increased social grants (welfare services) have to be made annually to assist provinces.48 
At an international level the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculoses and Malaria was 
set up in 2001 by Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations. This is an 
international effort to assist countries to address these serious diseases on an appropriate 
scale.  Applications for funding can be made via a country co-coordinating mechanism, 
for example, the South African National Aids Council, to the Global Fund that invites 
applications every six to twelve months.49  Two provinces in South Africa have so far 
been successful in making applications for funding, namely KwaZulu-Natal and recently 
                                                 
47 National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2000 14. 
48 National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2001 B20; Schedule 4 Division of Revenue Act, 5 of 
2002; Schedule 5 Division of Revenue Act, 7 of 2003. 
49 The Global Fund is managed by an Executive Director and supervised by a Board that is representative 
of governments, the private sector, non-governmental organizations and people living with AIDS, and the 
South African Minister of Health also serves on this Board. 
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the Western Cape. In the case of KwaZulu-Natal the national Minister of Health tried to 
intervene to have the funds that were allocated to KwaZulu-Natal included in the 
allocation to the national government as the province did not make its application via the 
South African National Aids Council.50  The funding provided by the Global Aids Fund 
runs into millions of dollars and makes a substantial contribution to assist the provinces 
in providing appropriate treatment for HIV/AIDS patients, in particular for the prevention 
of mother to child transmission.  There is no constitutional impediment to provinces for 
sourcing foreign development aid and this can complement provincial budgets for the 
delivery of services.  Foreign development aid or donations are extra-budgetary and thus 
fall outside the process for the equitable division of revenue, but proper financial 
administration and reporting is still required.  The combat of HIV/AIDS will be one of 
the biggest socio-economic challenges facing provinces for the next couple of years.   
 
The series of court cases that the Treatment Action Campaign has had against the 
national Minister of Health and against some of the provinces to get government funding 
for the treatment of HIV/AIDS patients highlighted the importance of appropriate 
provision in the respective budgets of the national and provincial health departments for 
health care services in order to give effect to the specific human rights concerning health 
matters and to effectively address the HIV/AIDS pandemic.51 This implies that there is 
proper recognition of this need in the financial equalisation process. 
 
8 3 Reform initiatives in Germany 
 
The first major reform of financial legislation in Germany since 1969 was agreed to in 
2001 when the Bund and the Länder agreed to a new solidarity agreement (Solidarpakt 
II) and two new pieces of legislation governing financial equalisation, namely a 
Standards Act (Maβstäbegesetz, 2001) and a new Financial Equalisation Act 
(Finanzausgleichgesetz, 2001).  The Federal Parliament, acting on a decision of the 
                                                 
50 Kahn “Fight over AIDS fund do SA more harm” Business Day (23 July 2002) 3. 
51 See discussion under 7 4 4. 
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Bundesverfassungsgericht on 11 November 199952 regarding the constitutionality of the 
Finanzausgleichgesetz, 1993, attempted to give effect to the directions of the Court by 
passing these two laws.53  The Court required the Federal Parliament to establish 
objective standards or measures in terms of which the actual financial equalisation must 
be done and to develop a new Financial Equalisation Act that would enforce these 
standards.   
 
Although there is a prima facie new approach to financial equalisation flowing from the 
Court’s decision, the Federal Parliament did not provide the objective standards required 
by the Court and missed an opportunity to provide the real substantial legislative reform 
that is perhaps needed in Germany.   The Maβstäbegesetz, 2001, is to a large extent a 
repetition of the directions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht and did not live up to the 
expectations of providing a set of clear criteria and objective standards for financial 
equalisation.  It did however state that the population valuation is to be used as the 
criteria for determining the financial capacity of the Länder.54  This Maβstäbegesetz did 
therefore not provide the envisaged legal framework for the new Finanzausgleichgesetz 
to be developed.  The new Finanzausgleichgesetz, 2001, was instead a product of 
political negotiations between the Bund and the Länder and led to the new solidarity 
agreement to enhance social and economic development in the new Länder, namely, 
Solidarpakt II.55 
 
Some reform measures were, nonetheless, included in the new Finanzausgleichgesetz, 
2001.  These include: 
 Incentives for Länder to increase their own revenue, by excluding part of their tax 
revenue from the financial equalisation process; and 
                                                 
52 BVerfGE 101, 158; see discussion under 7 3 4. 
53 See discussion on legislative reform under 5 6. 
54 Kämmerer “Maβstäbe für den Bundesfinanzausgleich? – Dramaturgie einer verhinderten Reform” JuS 
(2003) Heft 3 214 216; Kämmerer Föderalismus als Solidarprinzip 212. 
55 Kämmerer Föderalismus als Solidarprinzip 217. 
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 Strengthening the solidarity duty of the Länder by special provisions for financial 
assistance to the poorer Länder, including Berlin.56 
 
It seems that the Federal Parliament attempted to maintain a balance between financial 
autonomy and solidarity in the new Finanzausgleichgesetz, 2001, following the approach 
in the Basic Law.  Whether the above reform measures were enough to properly attend to 
the demands for reform of the financial equalisation system is not clear, and whether the 
two new laws will stand the test of time is debatable as they are already criticized for not 
complying with the requirements of the Court and the Maβstäbegesetz for being 
constitutionally questionable.57 
 
Schultze, in a recent article on the challenges to German federalism, suggested that 
substantial reform of the German constitutional system, and not only the financial 
equalisation system, is urgently needed.58  He argued that the new European environment 
and the growing pressures from within the German constitutional system required a total 
modernization of the system by creating a multi-level system of government that would 
allow more autonomy, subsidiarity and competition and more taxing powers for the 
Länder.  This reform should attempt to find a balance between cooperation and 
competition amongst the various constituent units.  Whether the first reform steps 
undertaken by the Federal Government in terms of the financial legislative reform, are 
part of a bigger constitutional reform process remains to be seen. 
 
There is growing pressure on the Federal Government to undertake major reforms of the 
social welfare system in order to address the problems of high unemployment, 
diminishing funds for the payment of old age pensions and the growing cost of the state 
health care system.59  Various initiatives to tackle unemployment are being considered, 
                                                 
56 Bundesministerium der Finanzen “Der neue bundesstaatliche Finanzausgleich ab 2005” Monatsbericht 
02.2002 100; Kämmerer Föderalismus als Solidarprinzip 220; see discussion under 5 6. 
57 Kämmerer 2003 JuS Heft 3 215; Kämmerer Föderalismus als Solidarprinzip 199 – 201. 
58 Schultze “German federalism at the crossroads” 2003 (Vol 3 no 3) Federations 13 15. 
59 Mahler et al  “Reform-Haus Deutschland” Der Spiegel Nr 42 (13. Oktober 2003) 30 – 46; 
Bundesregierung “Health reform” http://eng.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Artikel (21 May 2003) 1. 
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for example, shortening the period for which one can claim unemployment and creating 
more jobs.  Less unemployment will have a positive effect on the state pensions and 
health care systems.  The state pension system is under pressure since people tend to now 
live longer and therefore depend on pension for a longer period, while at the same time 
there are fewer young people that contribute to the pension scheme due to a declining 
birth rate in Germany.60  There is thus a need for reform of the pension system that will 
enable the Federal Government to continue caring for its senior citizens during their 
retirement on a basis that will take the current situation into account.  The rising cost of 
maintaining the statutory health insurance system has forced the Federal Government to 
consider a number of measures that will contribute to a more affordable health system, 
while maintaining or even increasing the high level of quality medical treatment provided 
in Germany. 
  
8 4 Prospects and proposals for reform in South Africa 
 
The South African Constitution provides a framework for government in the three 
spheres to function, but it requires complementary legislation, for example in the field of 
financial intergovernmental relations, to strengthen the way government is functioning 
and to give effect to the Constitution.  Much progress has been made since 1997 
regarding the development of the new constitutional system through the implementation 
of the various pieces of financial legislation, for example, the Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Relations Act, 97 of 1997, and the Public Finance Management Act, 1 of 1999.61   
 
There was never any doubt that the cost of implementing the new constitutional system in 
South Africa would be high.  This is even more evident today after the first ten years of 
democracy.  The particular structure of government, namely, three spheres of government 
with provinces and municipalities being the main service delivery institutions, has an 
influence on the actual delivery of services.  Poverty is still a huge problem in South 
                                                 
60 Mahler et al  “Reform-Haus Deutschland” Der Spiegel 40; Bundesregierung “Pensions” 
http://eng.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Artikel (1 August 2003) 1. 
61 National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2003 7. 
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Africa and places high demands on the delivery of basic services such as housing, water 
and electricity.  Some of the poorest areas in South Africa are in provinces and 
municipalities that struggled for years with insufficient administrative capacity required 
for good governance and effective delivery of basic services.  This situation creates a 
bottleneck in the effective implementation of the constitutional system in South Africa.  , 
Lack of administrative capacity is not inherent in municipal or provincial government, 
but because these spheres of government are at the coalface of service delivery, any 
problem relating to effective governance quickly attracts the public’s attention.  
 
The existence of problems relating to a lack of capacity and skills in provinces and 
municipalities and that hamper the effective functioning of the constitutional system, 
does not necessarily require a reconsideration of the specific distribution of financial 
resources and constitutional obligations.  The problems regarding the functioning of the 
constitutional system should first be addressed before consideration is given to 
constitutional changes that would change the constitutional balance and weaken the 
position of provinces and municipalities in the constitutional order.  The debate should 
not in the first place be about taking away some of the functions of provinces and 
municipalities in order to address their failures.  There should rather be a debate about the 
means of assistance that can be given to struggling provinces and municipalities to 
contribute to an optimalisation of their respective constitutional roles as important service 
delivery institutions.  This constitutional obligation of both the national and the provincial 
governments has not been fully utilized.62 Much more can be done to train staff and to 
ensure that the correct skills, including managerial skills, are developed and utilized in 
the provinces and municipalities.  It is perhaps too early in the life of the new 
constitutional system to talk about major constitutional or legislative reforms as some 
aspects of the system have not yet been fully explored or developed.   
 
Innovative thinking is required to ensure that the budgets of provinces and municipalities 
are properly spent to enhance good governance.  Regular reporting and monitoring 
                                                 
62 Sec 125 (3) and 154 (1) of the Constitution. 
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mechanisms as required by the Public Finance Management Act and other legislation or 
national policies need to address the problem at hand, but are presently ex post facto 
mechanisms only.  Conditional grants with specific project and reporting requirements 
also address part of the problem, but conditional grants form only a small part of 
provincial and local government budgets.  Provision is made in the Constitution for the 
exercise of functions on an agency basis.63 A practical example of the application of this 
provision could be that a provincial executive could agree with a municipality that it 
would act as an agent and manage a housing plan for that municipality for a specified 
period of time in order to solve the problem of a lack of delivery in that particular 
municipality.   Such an agency agreement must respect the principles of co-operative 
government.   
 
In order to address the concerns of the National Treasury that some provinces and 
municipalities do not perform and do not spend their budgets, it may be useful to explore 
some form of performance contract, similar to those which individual managers within 
the public service have.  Performance agreements would allow for more regular 
interaction between the national and provincial government departments within a line 
function area or, more specifically, for the implementation of a specific law.  This would 
require that all parties to such a performance agreement must make a specified 
contribution, for example, the national department will have to provide assistance to the 
province to ensure that the agreed targets are met.  On what basis should performance 
agreements be initiated?  They can only be developed within the framework of co-
operative government and all performance agreements must acknowledge the 
constitutional status and integrity of government and the organs of state.  Although this 
may be a novel idea for the further development of the constitutional system in South 
Africa, the notions of equity and accountability as reflected in the Constitution provides a 
basis for the development of such performance agreements.  Section 215 (1) of the 
Constitution requires that  
                                                 
63 Sec 238 of the Constitution. 
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“National, provincial and municipal budgets and budgetary processes must 
promote transparency, accountability and the effective financial management of 
the economy, debt and the public sector.” 
 
This leads one to the question of asymmetry because the suggested performance 
management approach is focused on individual specific arrangements and cannot 
meaningfully be achieved in a collective way.  Asymmetry is already provided for in the 
Constitution.  Section 125 (3) recognizes that provinces can develop at a different tempo.  
Some might be able to take on more responsibility than others.  If, for example, Gauteng 
has the administrative capacity to develop and maintain a modern road infrastructure 
network, they should be allowed to continue developing it and not be hampered because 
of failures in other provinces.  Greater recognition of asymmetry could allow for more 
flexibility in the delivery of services and in the further development of financial 
intergovernmental relations.  This could create new opportunities for partnerships 
between provinces or even between provincial departments and others where there is a 
need for support and strengthening of capacity. 
 
It is concluded that there is a need for refining the South African constitutional system, in 
particular as far as it relates to financial constitutional issues.  There should be a 
continuous weighing up of issues to find the right balance between fiscal autonomy and 
solidarity and between centralization and decentralization of the constitutional system 
that functions within a specific socio-economic context.64  Such an exercise would assist 
in improving the functioning of the constitutional system by making the necessary 
adjustments or fine-tuning it from time to time.   
 
Furthermore, the progressive realization of socio-economic rights does not warrant 
legislative reform, but requires that government take proper account of the requirements 
of the Bill of Rights and pronouncements by the Constitutional Court in this respect.  
This implies that provision should be made in the respective budgets of the national, 
                                                 
64 Murray 2000 (15) SAPR/PL 500. 
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provincial and local governments, and also in the financial equalisation process to make 
financial provision, within available resources, for giving effect to socio-economic rights.  
This must be done within the context of large-scale poverty and high levels of 
unemployment throughout South Africa that place additional demands on the available 
financial resources in the country.  Attention should be turned to the effective 
implementation of the Constitution instead of to the call for making major constitutional 
amendments that would change the existing constitutional model. 
 
The National Treasury is currently working on some reforms that are aimed at enhancing 
the quality of budgeting and financial management in all three spheres of government.  
These reforms include the development and publishing of service delivery measures to 
complement financial information as published in budgets and reports, and the 
introduction of financial management rules and practices for local government. These 
will be similar to that applicable to the national and provincial governments, and will be 
done through the Municipal Finance Management Act.65 
 
It is envisaged that as far as financial equalisation is concerned there will be some reform 
in the near future. These reforms will reflect the new census data and secondly, may 
include an amendment to the financial equalisation formula.  The National Treasury, in 
reaction to the reform proposals made by the Financial and Fiscal Commission in the 
Financial and Fiscal Commission Submission: Division of Revenue 2003 – 2004, 
indicated that “a comprehensive and fundamental review of the equitable share formula” 
will be undertaken during 2003 with the aim of introducing some reforms during 2004.66 
This review will include consideration of the impact of new census data on the current 
division of revenue and the impact of possible provincial and local government taxes and 
will actively involve the FFC.  In the 2004 Budget Review the National Treasury 
indicated that the review process has started, but that it will only be completed in time for 
                                                 
65 National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2003 7. 
66 National Treasury Budget Review 2003 253. 
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the 2005 budget.67  As a result, the formula for the provincial equitable share was kept in 
tact for 2004 but was updated with new data. 
 
In Chapter 6 the results of the comparison between the financial equalisation systems in 
Germany and South Africa indicate that there are a few lessons to be learnt from the 
German financial intergovernmental relations system, some of these are to be avoided 
and some others to be considered.68  Against this background the following specific 
recommendations for reform of the South African financial intergovernmental relations 
system are made: 
 
(i) Provinces should have a stronger say in the decision-making process in the 
National Council of Provinces, in particular as far as it relates to the passing of 
legislation regarding the raising of taxes and regarding financial equalisation 
or division of revenue, in order to limit the imbalance between decision-
making about financial resources and the expenditure obligations of provinces 
and to enhance accountability at provincial government level.  This would 
require a constitutional amendment regarding the voting procedure in the 
NCOP.  In view of the current political situation where the ANC has an 
overwhelming majority in the National Assembly and in the nine provinces, 
such an amendment would however have little effect. 
(ii) Provincial accountability could be further strengthened by the development of 
own sources of tax revenue.  Such a development would be in line with 
accepted economic theory on fiscal federalism.69  This could be done through 
ordinary legislation and does not require any constitutional amendment.  This 
is a complex issue that warrants a balanced approach that recognizes the 
legitimate need for more own sources of revenue for provinces and the need 
for sufficient funds required for financial equalisation.   
                                                 
67 National Treasury Budget Review 2004 258. 
68 See discussion under 6 6. 
69 See discussion under 3 1. 
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(iii) The constitutional provisions on the division of revenue in the South African 
Constitution should be amended to include a simple but clear objective, such 
as “the improvement of the quality of life of all citizens”, or “promoting 
equality in living conditions throughout the country”.  This would enhance the 
quality of the provisions on the division of revenue by giving it a more 
substantive purpose than just stating that there must be an equitable division 
of revenue with a view to provide sufficient funding for the provision of basic 
services.  Such an objective should be the fundamental principle of the 
financial constitution.  The fact that the Constitution is the supreme law in the 
country implies that the inclusion of such an objective in the Constitution 
would give it extremely high status, and legislation on the division of revenue 
can then be measured against it.  This would assist the courts in adjudicating 
cases relating to financial constitutional issues.  This recommendation implies 
a constitutional amendment. 
(iv) A special management unit, consisting of a small team of experts in public 
administration, financial management and constitutional law, should be 
established to act as a rapid response team that must address crises in 
provinces and municipalities.  National Treasury should provide the funding 
for the establishment and functioning of this unit.  Skills development and 
capacity building in all spheres of government are long term investments and 
should receive continuous attention in order to strengthen good governance.  
The special management unit is a short term intervention mechanism that 
should be utilized in those areas where there are serious problems, and it 
should be done for a short period of time only. 
(v) An asymmetric approach to the further development of provinces should be 
followed in order to allow for flexibility in the delivery of services in different 
parts of the country and to create the opportunity for some form of 
performance agreement between national and provincial governments and 
between provinces and municipalities in specific fields. 
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In conclusion, this study has shown that the distribution of financial resources and 
constitutional obligations in decentralized systems such as that of Germany and South 
Africa is done by way of a basic constitutional framework that is augmented by further 
detailed legislation, in particular regarding financial equalisation.  It is also concluded 
that the legal framework cannot be considered in isolation since it functions within a 
specific political and socio-economic context that impacts on the way financial 
intergovernmental relations are conducted.  Lastly, it is concluded that clear objectives 
for financial equalisation, preferably contained in the constitution, are essential and that a 
direct link between the fundamental principles of the constitution and the actual division 
of financial resources and obligations can add value to a better understanding of the 
functioning of the constitutional system.   
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